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Abstract
among the so-called “anti-psychiatrists” of the 1960s and ‘70s, it was Félix 
Guattari who first identified that psychiatry had undergone a “molecular 
revolution.” It was in fact in a book titled Molecular Revolutions, published 
in 1984, that Guattari proposed that psychotherapy had become, in the de-
cades following the Second World War, far less personal and increasingly 
alienating. The newly “molecular” practices of psychiatry, Guattari mourned, 
had served only to fundamentally distance both patients and practitioners 
from their own minds; they had largely restricted our access, he suggested, 
to human subjectivity and consciousness. 
This thesis resumes Guattari’s work on the “molecular” model of the 
subject. Extending on Guattari’s various “schizoanalytic metamodels” of hu-
man consciousness and ontology, it rigorously meditates on a simple ques-
tion: Should we now accept the likely finding that there is no neat, singular, 
reductive, utilitarian, or unifying “model” for thinking about the human 
subject, and more specifically the human “author”?  
Part 1 of this thesis carefully examines a range of psychoanalytic, psychi-
atric, philosophical, and biomedical models of the human. It studies and re-
formulates each of them in turn and, all the while, returns to a fundamental 
position: that no single model, nor combination of them, will suffice. What 
part 1 seeks to demonstrate, then, is that envisioning these models as differ-
ent attempts to “know” the human is fruitless—a futile game. Instead, these 
models should be understood in much the same way as literary critics treat 
literary commonplaces or topoi; they are akin, I argue, to what Deleuze and 
Guattari called “images of thought.” In my terminology, they are “psycho-
tropes”: images with their own particular symbolic and mythical functions.
Having thus developed a range of theoretical footholds in part 1, part 2 
of the thesis—beginning in chapter 4—will put into practice the work of this 
first part. It will do so by examining various representations of authorship 
by two authors in particular: Aldous Huxley and Philip K. Dick. This part will 
thus demonstrate how these author figures function as “psychoactive scriv-
eners”: they are fictionalising philosophers who both produce and quarrel 
with an array of paradigmatic psychotropes, disputing those of others and 
inventing their own to substitute for them. 
iv
More than this, however, the second part offers a range of detailed and 
original readings of these authors’s psychobiographies; it argues that even 
individual authors such as Huxley and Dick can be seen as “psychotropic.” It 
offers, that is, a series of broad-ranging and speculative explanations for the 
ideas and themes that appear in their works—explanations rooted in the 
theoretical work of the first part. 
Finally, this thesis concludes by reaffirming the importance of these 
authors’s narcoliteratures—both for present-day and future literary studies, 
and beyond. For while Huxley and Dick allow us to countenance afresh the 
range of failures in the history and philosophy of science, they also prom-
ise to instruct us—and instruct science—about the ways in which we might 
move beyond our received mimetic models of the human.
Psychotropes
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Introduction
To Gaze Upon the Sun 
Le soleil ni la mort ne se peuvent regarder en face. 
(Neither the sun nor death can by looked at steadily.)
— François de La Rochefoucauld 1
on the morning of the day of his death, Aldous Huxley, weak and passive on 
a creaky hospital bed, scrawled a barely legible note on a small square sheet 
of paper. This was Huxley’s last-ditch effort, perhaps, to relieve his pain. As 
Huxley’s bony hand passed the note to his wife, Laura, the words “Try LSD 
100 mm intramuscular” must have caused her some concern; Huxley longed, 
it seemed, for one final experience of that “moksha-medicine in which he 
believed”: LSD (or d-lysergic acid diethylamide). 2 Laura granted Huxley’s 
request and, at around lunchtime, several hours after she had injected the 
first 100 micrograms (µg), she injected her husband with “another shot” of 
roughly the same quantity. Some three or four hours after that, a peaceful 
Huxley would pass away; he would fade into his death, as Laura observed, 
“like a piece of music,” concluding his life “so gently in sempre più piano, 
dolcemente.” 3 
If this dialogical and chemical exchange between Huxley and his wife 
constitutes more than simply a private act of tender love and care, it also, as 
Laura herself puts it, strikes us as a “last gesture of continuing importance.” 
While it “might,” Laura continues, “be ignorantly misinterpreted” by some, 
Huxley’s dying ode to LSD seems to demand our attention—not least be-
cause of the respectable and even grandiose familial and historical tradition 
after which it arises: the “history,” as Laura remarks, in which “Huxleys stop 
ignorance before ignorance stops Huxleys.” 4
1 François De La Rochefoucauld, Moral Reflections, Sentences and Maxims (New York: 
William Gowans, 1851), 12 (Maxim 27). Also see Peter Sloterdijk, Neither Sun Nor Death, 
tr. Steve Corcoran (New York: Semiotext(e), 2011), passim.
2 Laura Archer Huxley, This Timeless Moment: A Personal View of Aldous Huxley (London: 
Chatto & Windus, 1969), 303-8.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 308.
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Yet, no matter how profoundly the gesture struck those who knew Hux-
ley, it would not be very long after the man’s death that history and ignorance 
seemed to escape the control and influence of such staunchly scientific fam-
ilies as his. And, in a way, Huxley’s death marks a break from the period in 
which the “family name,” as such, would mean anything at all. That is, after 
Huxley’s death, history seems to take a sharp turn towards something alto-
gether less peaceful and benevolent than this Huxley death scene. It would 
enter into a time in which the constancy, uprightness, and objectivity that 
had been signalled by his family name, ever since his grandfather’s monu-
mentalisation in the early decades of twentieth century, would all but disap-
pear. By 1968, for instance—by which time Philip K. Dick had already been 
practising his daily regimen of ingesting 45mg of methamphetamine for 
some 36 months—a score of news reports, all of them vicious counterpoint 
to Huxley’s “gesture of continuing importance,” had appeared in the United 
States press about drugs and the human mind. 
One report, published in the San Francisco Chronicle in 1967, just four 
years following Huxley’s death, describes how a group of four male users of 
LSD had each, as a consequence of using the drug, suffered a severe eye in-
jury that would later be named “solar retinopathy.” 5 But the report was also 
concerned with how the drug could cause other injuries: LSD could bring 
on deep spiritual delusion, it observed, and, among other things, it offered 
details of how one man among the four had felt he had been “holding a 
religious conversation with the sun.” 6 The article made the damage of such 
rituals abundantly clear: “What this has left the students with,” it posited, “is 
not total blindness but a blind spot in the center of their vision.” 
Rich in metaphorical potential (not to mention its ironic reverberation 
of the story in which Huxley came to bear his own “blind spot”—a story this 
thesis will tell), the report’s literary and even Ovidian mythological allu-
sions appear only slightly less remarkable than the dismaying accident it 
describes. But the report was also suspect: those who were interviewed for 
the report appeared to know very little about the incident. One represen-
5 On Philip K. Dick’s methamphetamine use, see chapter 7 of this thesis. Also see Phil-
ip K. Dick to Terry and Carol Carr, October, 1964, quoted in Lawrence Sutin, Divine 
Invasions (Carrol & Graf Publishers, 1989), 119; “A Blinding LSD Vision,” San Francisco 
Chronicle, May 18, 1967, 3. On cases of solar retinopathy, see H. Schatz and F. Mendel-
blatt, “Solar Retinopathy from Sun-gazing Under the Influence of LSD,” British Journal 
of Ophthalmology 57 (1973): 270-3.
6 “Four LSD Users Suffer Serious Eye Damage,” Los Angeles Times, May 19, 1967, 1-2. The 
story was also reported elsewhere: see “Four Students Under LSD Hurt Eye by Sun-Gaz-
ing,” New York Times, May 19, 1967.
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tative of the Santa Barbara Opthalmological Society could convey only his 
“impression” that “each of the sun-staring incidents occurred separately.” 
Unsure of the details, however, he could name neither a specific student 
nor doctor who had been involved. 7 Nonetheless, since the story came at a 
time when a number of other reports had warned of LSD’s dangers, the facts 
of the story were accepted uncritically, easily digested by a public already 
worried about the idea of a countercultural revolution. Such events as these, 
scant in detail though they were, served merely to confirm the pestilence and 
danger of those novel substances that the wider population had already been 
persuaded to condemn—substances such as LSD.
Yet when a similar news story emerged some eight months later in Janu-
ary 1968, it did seem to be even more serious than the others. While it gener-
ated some hysteria, it also attracted the suspicion and attention of a range of 
commentators well placed to invigilate its credibility. These were the doctors 
who, calling on their experience, began to question whether what had been 
reported about LSD represented a likely or possible physiognomic response 
to the intrusion of UV rays into the eye. For it was this group of tutored read-
ers who possessed, it seemed, the higher wisdom of what Huxley had called 
the “psycho-physical instrument” (EOA, 12). They had wisdom enough, at 
least, to see these reports for what they were: fraudulent fabrications. On 
this occasion, Newsweek, among other sources, reported that no less than 
six student LSD users had been rendered permanently blind by engaging in a 
round of LSD-induced sungazing. 8 (Some commentators have since suggest-
ed that this story represents no more than a concocted mutation of the first 
report, a psychopolitical elaboration driven by an anti-LSD agenda.) But what 
7 My analysis of these news reports profits greatly from the research of Jan Harold Brun-
vand and his colleagues at snopes.com. See “Blinded By The Light,” at http://www.
snopes.com/horrors/drugs/lsdsun.asp, accessed July 14, December 2014. Also see 
Mark Kurlansky, 1968: The Year That Rocked the World (London: Random House, 2004), 
188; Joel Fort, The Pleasure Seekers: The Drug Crisis, Youth, and Society (New York: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969), 139-140.
8 “Darkness at Noon,” Newsweek, 22 January 1968. It is notable that this article’s title 
makes reference to Arthur Koestler’s novel of the same name. In 1967, Koestler had 
written an article for the Sunday Telegraph (London) titled “A Return Trip to Nirvana” 
(it is also sometimes recorded as having been published in 12 March, 1961). Address-
ing the value of hallucinogens, the article formulated a response to Huxley’s Doors of 
Perception. On Huxley and Koestler, also see James Sexton, ed. “Introduction to the 
Toronto Luncheon Colloquy 1961,” Aldous Huxley Annual 10/11 (2010-11): 153-221, esp. 
189; cf. Jeff Aronson, “The Magic Phrase,” British Medical Journal 320, no. 7226 (2000): 
50. Other sources of the story include the following: “6 College men Take LSD, Blind-
ed by Sun,” Los Angeles Times, January 13, 1968, 1; and “Medicine: More Bad Trips on 
LSD,” Time, May 26, 1967, 64.
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was distinctive about this second story was that, this time, a source for the 
information had been named. 9
This source was Dr. Norman Yoder, a man who had been rendered blind 
by an injury at an early age, and who had become the commissioner of the 
office of the Blind in the Pennsylvania State Welfare Department. Yoder, it 
was revealed, had filed an “informal report” to Washington, and had given 
a press conference in which he presented this story “as established fact.” 10 
But many ophthalmologists who heard the story were doubtful; as one Time 
reporter remarked, having heard some of the skeptical responses, it was un-
likely that “even LSD could wipe out the eye-closing reflexes so completely.” 11 
Before long, Yoder’s story was revealed to have been completely fabricated—
the result of his personal wish to “drive home the dangers of LSD.” 12 Having 
falsified the records of six college students, “all of whom had been blinded 
for reasons completely unrelated to LSD,” Yoder was suspended from his 
post and, now “distraught and sick,” immediately “had himself admitted to 
the Philadelphia Psychiatric Center.” 13 
A reader’s letter to Newsweek scolded the magazine for printing what 
had been not just a false story, but a disturbing illustration of a “grotesque 
situation”—one that expressed the fabricator’s “wrong-minded fear of the 
unknown.” 14 However, within weeks of this story, the US Federal Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) persuaded its Commissioner, Dr. James Goddard, to en-
dorse “the Johnson LSD bill,” persuading him against his own instincts, and 
thus making possession of the drug a “federal offense for the first time.” 15
These “staring at the sun” narratives are not simply disturbing and ex-
emplary proofs of the processes of psychopolitical fabrication; they are also 
fascinating works of fiction. This is because they convey much more than 
simply their authors’s desire to convey the “dangers of LSD.” When we read 
9 See, for instance, “Blinded By The Light.”
10 Fort, The Pleasure Seekers, 139.
11 “Another LSD Hallucination,” Time, Friday, January 26, 1968, 1.
12 Richard Neville, Play Power (London: Paladin, 1970), 118. Yoder’s hoax was reported, 
albeit, as Neville asserts, not very widely. See “LSD Sun-Blinding Revealed as Hoax,” 
Oakland Tribune, January 18, 1968, 3; “Another LSD Hallucination”; “Official Will Be 
Removed for LSD Blindness Hoax,” The New York Times, 19 February 1968. 
13 Fort, The Pleasure Seekers, 139; “Another LSD Hallucination.”
14 “Hoaxes Ex Cathedra,” Letter from Christopher Barr to the Editor, Newsweek, 5 Febru-
ary, 1968.
15 “Penalties for LSD,” Time Magazine, Friday 8 March, 1968; Stephen Siff, “Glossy Vi-
sions: Coverage of LSD in Popular Magazines, 1954-1968,” PhD diss., University of 
Ohio, 2008, ProQuest: AAT 3338743, 188; Stephen Siff, “Henry Luce’s Strange Trip: 
Coverage of LSD in Time and Life, 1954-68,” Journalism History 34, no. 3 (2008): 126-34.
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that the students “didn’t realize they were staring at the sun until they came 
out of the trance,” for instance, we are warned not only of the dangers of 
drugs or suns—we are also directed to ignore what the writer more surrep-
titiously conveys: their knowledge of the power of trances. Thus, even while 
we are directed to disregard it, what remains visible here is a psychotrope: a 
tropism that represents a certain thought-image of the mind—and in this 
case a particularly dismaying image, one in which the mind, having reached 
the potential to overpower the body, renders its owner sightless and helpless. 
The story, as one Time reporter suggests, was “Another LSD Hallucina-
tion”; but this story’s egregiousness followed from the fact that it trafficked 
in one untruthful distortion (that of the overwhelming trance) precisely 
to erase or obscure the possibility of another (that of the self-experiment, 
emblematised by Huxley’s “last gesture”). 16 The moment recalled the one 
in which the Egyptian king Thamus, as Plato suggests in his Phaedrus, had 
rejected the truthfulness of letters and writing; to deploy an object or a tech-
nic (tekhne) without knowledge of its power, Thamus suggested, would mean 
becoming subject to it, succumbing to its poisonous, hypnotic, delirious, or 
toxic potential while “know[ing] nothing.” 17 
Despite what Thamus expressed about language, the danger of subject-
ing oneself to such a poison is a notion that this thesis will court—embrac-
ing a risk, to be sure. But this thesis will also carefully examine the range of 
precarities entailed by these procedures: by the ingestion of new technics 
and by staring at such suns. By offering a detailed elaboration on the freight-
ed conjugation of writing and drugs, this thesis attempts to demonstrate the 
importance of this long-vexed conjugation for literary history, and particu-
larly for literary practices of the twentieth century. That drugs compel the 
creation of texts in many ways, for instance, should already be evident—it 
will be clear, at least, to anyone who tracks the emergence of the sungazing 
news reports. For it is in these reports that we see how fear, ignorance, and 
political pressure can conspire to concoct a new fiction—even if to dismiss 
fantasies of another kind. But what is less clear about these news reports—
and about the texts this thesis will examine—is how every detail of these 
stories also constitutes a biopolitical or psychopolitical enunciation. That is, 
how every of Yoder’s utterances, for instance, also develops a progressively 
16 “6 College men Take LSD, Blinded by Sun,” 1.
17 See Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, tr. Benjamin Jowett, 5 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1892), 1: 487. Cf. Plato, Phaedrus, tr. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003); and Jacques Derrida, “Pharmakon,” in Dissemination, tr. Barbara John-
son (New York: Continuum, 1981 [1972]), 95-116.
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striated and intractable narcoliterature, borne of some deeper dictation as 
to what must not be encountered at the level of cognition. That these deep 
dictations exist, that they are discoverable in the works of Huxley and Dick, 
and that their residues may be traced in all works of writing: this is what this 
thesis proposes; and these are its founding claims.
It is important to underscore that in part 1 of this thesis, the works of 
Dick and Huxley—and the authors themselves—will appear only as spectral 
figurations. They are not in this part the objects of the theory; rather, my 
brief allusions to their works and biographies will serve only to foreshadow 
their more illuminated appearance in part 2. As with Yoder’s fiction, Part 1 
may be understood to fabricate its own report on the dangers (and wonders) 
of authorship in the twentieth century, naming such an engagement with 
reading literature “psychobiographic” (by means of “psychobiographia”). 
This term names my method of engagement with writing: one that takes 
texts to be, and reads texts as, the inscribed effects of mental procedures; it 
is a combination of psychoanalytic, psychological, or psychiatric, biological, 
and biographical inquiry.
However, part 1 is also admittedly a theoretical experiment, a kind of 
unworking (désoeuvrement) whose intent is to develop a set of principles 
or axioms that reverse engineer the very possibility of authorship, and to 
discover the strange set of preconditions that give rise to authorship’s pro-
cesses. In a vigorous effort to announce the principles by which we might 
encounter all writing as an effect of the body and brain, this part of the larg-
er psychographic project begins with what are those putatively “observable” 
parts of our world. Taking up a range of scholarship on the human body, 
chapter 1 proposes the radical alterity of our “human microbiomes,” pop-
ulated as they are by greater numbers of microbiotic (or nonhuman) genes 
than human ones. Theorising about the importance of this discovery for the 
nature of subjectivity, authorship, and identity, the chapter then turns to the 
brain, first offering an analysis of this organ’s mytholigisation, and then ar-
ticulating a series of speculations about the impact of a range of myths—or 
“mythemes”—on the speaking subject.
In chapter 2, the figure of the author is more carefully scrutinised. Ac-
cepting Roland Barthes’s elegiac commiseration of the author’s death in his 
1968 essay “The Death of the Author,” this chapter fabricates a model for 
that same author’s resurrection: if they may be reconstituted, I argue, it is 
as a molecular entity, one that I name the “psychoactive scrivener.” Thus 
intent to recuperate the author as a form of consciousness that interacts 
functionally with its environment, this chapter transcodes Michel Foucault’s 
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analysis of the “author function” in an original model of the author; it does 
so in a manner akin to Félix Guattari’s “modelisation” of the human in his 
schizoanalytic “metamodelisations.” 18 In other words, this chapter seeks to 
represent this theory of writing or “scrivening” in diagrammatic form; in so 
doing, this diagrammatic model names four “operants” that are constitutive 
of the author, thus providing an original taxonomy (see chapter 2, figure 2.1). 
The chapter will then return to the brain, both as a means of interrogat-
ing materialist formulations of consciousness, and of apprehending what 
Deleuze and Guattari called the “brain subject.” Finally, to interrogate some 
of the concepts that have already been proposed, the chapter offers a short 
summary of “scrivening”: the production of writing under the instruction of 
an external agent.
Extending on the final sections of chapter 2, chapter 3 will focus more 
closely on the history of the scrivener, offering a “short scribal history.” Here 
I return to the scrivener’s literary-theoretical adumbration in modern his-
tory, paying particular attention to the technical processes of authorship 
and what Bernard Stiegler calls “technicization”—both of which serve as 
important psychotropes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This is a 
time when technologies including drugs have begun to reshape the extent to 
which the authorial subject is now automatised or, as I propose (conceiving 
of prior modes as “automatic”) “deautomatised.” What is equally as import-
ant as the history of authorshop in this chapter is the historical develop-
ment of psychiatry, which—as it ever more precisely defines certain kinds 
of madness—allows for the production of a range of new “psychotropes.” 
That is, as psychiatry develops, so arise various kinds of madness—but not 
simply as discrete phenomena in the world, but figures for literary authors 
to reproduce, experiment with, and re-express in their works. Madness thus 
connotes, for Derrida (after Kierkegaard), as fundamental an experience as 
certain moments of judgment: as he suggests, one is as good as mad in the 
very “instant of decision.” 19 
Tracing psychiatry’s history, chapter 3 will also propose a range of ways 
in which literature and madness start to become close allies, coiling one with 
18 See, for instance, Félix Guattari, Schizoanalytic Cartographies, tr. Andrew Goffey (New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2013); Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis, tr. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis 
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995). Both originally published in French as 
Cartographies Schizoanalytiques (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1989), and Chaosmose (Paris: 
Éditions Galilée, 1992).
19 Jacques Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” in Writing and Difference, tr. 
Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 2002 [1978]), 36.
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the other until they are separated only by what James Joyce calls a “transpar-
ent sheet.” 20 It is this imbrication that will prompt both of them to undergo 
a process of redefinition—one that I argue renders each category gradually 
more interchangeable with the other. 21 The chapter will then consider the 
role of drugs in this transition, suggesting that, when one reflects on the 
changes of the twentieth century, drugs and other related kinds of adjuncts 
may be seen to increasingly begin to substitute for what had previously taken 
the form of the injunction to write, articulated by a sovereign to a scrivener. 
Observing the ways in which writing or scrivening has always elicited acedia 
and melancholy, the chapter concludes by proposing that drugs should be 
understood not as products of the advent of the chemical sciences, but rath-
er as simply another means of overcoming what the Greeks had previously 
described as the “noncaring state.”
Comprising three chapters, part 2 constitutes what I call a series of “Psy-
chobiographic Speculations.” Here, much of what part 1 has already articu-
lated in a theoretical manner is interwoven with the close study of specific 
texts and events in literary history, so that the conceptual apparatus of part 
1 is now applied to specific literary works and ideas. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 
undertake to examine a range of Huxley’s fiction and essays in what are this 
thesis’s most detailed and extensive textual interlocutions. Proposing that 
the geometrical and ontological figure of the “chiasmus” serves to model, 
explicate, and reflect Huxley’s thought, chapter 4 examines Huxley’s strained 
relationship with a range of emergent ideas in the physical, mathematical, 
and mental sciences. In many cases, I propose, Huxley problematises and 
rebuts the emergent ideas in science by privileging metaphysical experience; 
this mode, which recalls Bergson’s resistance to Einsteinian theoretical 
physics, remains as persuasive today as ever, for reasons I will elucidate. The 
chapter will then examine the historical evidence of Huxley’s polyamory to 
analyse the impact of Huxley’s apparently open marriage on his ideas about 
women, Victorianism, and gender and sexual politics. 
Of course, to engage with the question of Huxley’s sexuality is to return 
to one of Freud’s wider concerns: that of fatherhood or paternity. It is to 
meditate on the way in which fathers condition the adolescences of their 
sons and daughters. Developing an analysis of Huxley through his father and 
grandfather, chapter 5 thus focuses on the “filial” or “genealogical” origin of 
Huxley’s masculinity and sexual identity. The chapter will consider various 
20 Quoted in Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” 36.
21 Ibid.
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of Huxley’s “expurgations” and “extrospections”; it conceives of these liter-
ary operations as symptoms or reflections of certain biophysical orientations 
and drives. Identifying various of Huxley’s biological and cynical modes of 
exteriorisation, chapter 5 will read these “psycho-physical” productions and 
projections as Huxley’s attempt to express both his epiphenomenalism as 
well as his cynical rejection of the world. A chiastic pairing of ideas, this 
ontological position, I argue, had been particularly shaped by the influence 
of Huxley’s grandfather, Thomas Henry Huxley. 
Turning then to Huxley’s writing on the human as an amphibian, chap-
ter 6 reads Huxley’s writings about the body’s operations as a mode of Swif-
tian misanthropy. Understood in this way, so many of Huxley’s novels are 
visible as instances of what Herbert Marcuse called the literature of “great 
refusal.” 22 In other words, this chapter will argue that Huxley’s amphibian 
writing—which apprehends the human as a poorly evolved animal—rep-
resents further evidence of this author’s tendency to purge, resist, and “sub-
limate” aspects of his own humanness. These writings also produce, I argue, 
a “Gestalt” description of all humans’s lived experience, constructing an 
existential psychotrope that shares much with, as Huxley himself notes, the 
understudied methods, and results, of the Gestalt psychologists (DOP, 47). 
In the final sections of chapter 6, I will seek to bring into view the phe-
nomenological effects of Huxley’s partial blindness; this is my attempt to 
adumbrate the striking affinities that Huxley’s eye condition—together with 
his relationship with his father, Leonard, and his deep affection for early-de-
ceased mother, Julia—seem to engender as between Huxley and the figure of 
Oedipus. But this familiarity or resemblance is more than simply a biograph-
ical coincidence. As I will claim, Huxley’s narratives also feature instances 
of Oedipal triangulation: configurations in which fathers and sons compete 
for the affection of the same woman, for instance. Combined with a range of 
allusions in Huxley’s letters to his father, I propose that these illustrations of 
masculine contestation serve as evidence of Huxley’s immense frustration 
and “lack of respect” for his father. 23
In this thesis’s final chapter, chapter 7, I shall consider science fiction 
author Philip K. Dick’s use of various drugs. This chapter represents my at-
tempt to circumvent or reshape the discourse in which Dick is dismissed as 
an “acid-crazed visionary” or “drug-addled nut.” Proposing that Dick’s some-
22 See Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (London: Routledge, and Kegan Paul, 
2007), 66.
23 See chapter 7; and Gervas Huxley, quoted in Sybille Bedford, Aldous Huxley: A Biogra-
phy, 2 vols. (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973), 1: 14. 
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times seemingly ignominious reputation has at least partially prevented any 
serious debate about the material effects of drugs on the author’s material 
writing practices, this chapter seeks both to recuperate Dick and to contrib-
ute more broadly to the discourse on drugs and literature—a field in which 
so many authors other than Dick have been dismissed on the ground of their 
drug use. 24 
Short-circuiting this “critical psychotrope,” this chapter will examine 
the developments in psychiatry and psychopharmacology from the 1960s 
and onward (that is, after Huxley’s death); it will consider, that is, not only 
Dick’s instrumentalisation of amphetamines, but also the way in which Dick’s 
novels, and specifically The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch (1965), serve 
to generate new and important postmodern “biopolitical psychotropes.” 
As this chapter will explain, these biopolitical conceptualisations of drugs 
form the very fabric of some of Dick’s most important narratives; these are 
those stories in which various figurations of alienation, subsistence, and 
deterritorialisation become all the more dismaying when they are soldered 
to one of Dick’s favourite thematics: the pestilence of drug dependency. 
Thus, if this thesis begins by envisioning the way in which the body and 
the brain can influence authorship, it ends by apprehending, with Dick, a 
biopolitical future in which we remain only barely in control of these very 
influences. When these powers are restrung in weird and novel ways, our 
psychophysical instruments seem, now more than ever, to fully govern the 
shape and substance of our minds. However, as this thesis will conclude, we 
may yet come to a realisation or metanoia that should detract neither from 
Huxley’s biological determinism nor from Dick’s paranoiac vision of a body 
“against itself.” Namely, we may come to understand that it is yet possible to 
reverse engineer the mind through our bodies; we may conceive of thought, 
that is, not only as the body’s language, but as the mind’s own body. 
In other words, we may understand the mind as a body that is consti-
tuted by psychotropes: these are the myriad imagistic models of the mind’s 
own practices, limits, dangers, and strengths—many examples of which I 
will describe throughout this thesis’s pages. To finally name and identify 
these psychotropes, however, will not be enough; in the spirit of Foucault’s 
archaeological endeavour, I will also attempt to disinter them, historicise 
their emergence, and understand how each of them remains animated and 
functional in society today. It is only in undertaking such a process, I pro-
pose, that we may finally be enabled to remodel the mind’s future.
24 See Sutin, Divine Invasions, 9.
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Principia Psychobiographia Literaria:
The Principles of Literary 
Psychobiography
2Chapter One
Molecular Correspondences:  
Writing With, On, and About Drugs
It is our belief that the issue of drugs can be understood only at 
the level where desire directly invests perception, and perception 
becomes molecular at the same time as the imperceptible is 
perceived. Drugs then appear the agents of this becoming.
—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 1
in our human world of letters, the question of what or who exactly may be 
said to write has long been a subject of scholarly speculation. 2 And while 
this work may have seemed often arbitrary, circular, and even unproductive, 
the fruit of the labour has been, and remains, for most literary scholars, as 
tantalising as it is essential. “Who writes?” is a question that is worth taking 
seriously too, since the prospect of discovering a vital new answer to the 
question—however moderate its improvement on previous explanations—
implies nothing less than a new literary and intellectual enlightenment.
If we can better discover precisely how and why it is that we humans 
produce such language as we do, then we shall perhaps have answered a 
number of other vital questions along the way, and have accumulated new 
knowledge in disciplines as diverse as biochemistry, theology, and politics. 
1 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
tr. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 282.
2 Among many others, the following studies of the last half-century take up this ques-
tion: Michel Foucault, “What Is An Author?” in Paul Rabinow, ed. The Foucault Reader 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 101-20; Roland Barthes, “The Death of The Author,” 
in Image – Music – Text, tr. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 142-8; Ju-
dith Butler, Giving An Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005); 
Jorge J.E. Gracia, Texts: Ontological Status, Identity, Author, Audience (New York: Uni-
versity of New York Press, 1996); Alexander Nehamas, “What An Author Is,” Journal of 
Philosophy 83 (1986): 685-91; and José Medina, Speaking From Elsewhere: A New Contex-
tualist Perspective on Meaning, Identity and Discursive Agency (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2006).
Molecular Correspondences 3
Routinely reposing and countenancing afresh this central question of 
the nature of authorship is also of vital importance for the continued life, 
relevance, and seasonal renewal of the humanities. It is necessary to con-
tinue in this work to express a belief less in “progress” than a faith in the 
“rightness” of that infinite chaos that is subjective experience. To continue 
this work is to acknowledge, in other words, that the status of subjectivity 
continues to change and transform—drastically, unabatedly, and intrinsi-
cally. For those who broad-mindedly look at literary history, it is not hard 
to see how, generation after generation, an ever enlarging surfeit of modern 
epistemological and disciplinary pulses leads, untiringly and confirmably, 
towards more particular answers to explain its secrets. We can now better 
express exactly what is reflected about us in the many human literatures that 
have appeared through time than we previously could do. Of course, much of 
this work now takes place under the august dominion of the biological and 
physical sciences—or at least by close reference to them. But there has been, 
and there remains, an abundance of philosophical and critical approaches 
to understanding literary authorship and the authorial subject outside of 
these domains. 
In almost all modern theorisations of the author, this writing figure is 
presupposed to enjoy an individual identity, which is to say a unified and 
subjective authority, one that is valorised or reified in such features as their 
name or body. These features seem to be upheld or endorsed by an author’s 
social context, which individualises and personalises them—often through 
epideixis: the language of praise and blame. And while this identity is prob-
lematised in various ways, its existence remains largely unquestioned—at 
least it remains demonstrable, we think, at the level of molecularity, psychi-
atry, biochemistry, or neurology. 
A chief dictum of history, then, has been this: “Individuals exist.” But 
why, then, is there such a paucity of scholarship devoted to the conjunction 
between, first, the metaphysics of authorship (that is, the philosophy of lit-
erary subjectivity, and the notion that authors are individuals) and second, 
the biochemical and physical science of individuality (that is, the work that 
discovers that human bodies and brains are genetically, biochemically, and 
neuropsychologically unique)? My contention is that, if so little work has 
been devoted to this conjunction, it is because the “results” of the literary 
experiments in biochemical alteration, by human authors, have been largely 
understudied. 
In any case, in almost all instances in which such work has been under-
taken, the text is read as if it were any other—as if the author’s biochemical 
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conditions, even if much is known about them, are by and large to be con-
sidered immaterial. But if it is true that “individuals exist,” can we not also 
accept that there may be certain parts of these individuals that are not, in 
fact, parts of them at all? 
Exploring a range of ideas that may be understood to reside at the limits 
of the scientific method, part 1 of this thesis seeks to develop a pathway 
along which an answer to this question of biological authorship might be 
faced. Proposing a fresh appraisal of this question through a “molecular” 
or biochemical optic, the chapter aims less to discover a panacea—a perma-
nent and singular answer—than to enhance the many prophesies and prior 
proposals about the epistemology of authorship. 3 
After all, it may already be apparent that the question I pose closely re-
sembles Roland Barthes’s 1967 invocation: “Who is speaking?” As such, this 
thesis embarks on a quest, or a “request,” to solve a problem that Barthes 
ultimately came to understand as insoluble; for him, the “very being of writ-
ing” militates against its explanation at the level of intention or individuali-
ty—its essence keeps it “from ever being answered.” 4 To encounter Barthes’s 
proposition at this basic level, however—and even to accept his conclusion 
that writing’s very “being” makes the question of the nature of authorship 
unanswerable—is to intuit the chimerical, defeatist, and fatalistic character 
of literary studies’s myriad encounters with authorship. 
When Jacques Derrida disavows the “violent hierarchy” of the Hegelian 
dialectic, for instance—the binary dualism that, were it not already apparent, 
he reveals to be detectable at every stage of philosophy’s history—Derrida 
also prevents us from speaking of a singular, static, and originary author. As 
with so many conceptions, the author cannot be understood as a homogenous 
agent; but neither are they to be seen as fixed, static sites of production, nor as 
series of orthodox processes that, when put in train, simply produce writing. 
An author fits none of these descriptions because, as Derrida suggests, 
each of them engenders a dichotomised asymmetry, and one that is essen-
tially too violent or blunt to be accepted—for each reinscribes the same, 
problematic distinction between the singular author and their others (the 
world). 5 And in any event, to imagine an author as such a unitary agent 
3 I will afford a range of examples attesting to the limits of science at a later stage of this 
chapter, including Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, and Alfred Whitehead’s 
theorisations on processuality.
4 I will address Barthes’s work in much great detail at the beginning of chapter 2. Ro-
land Barthes, S/Z: An Essay, tr. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), 140.
5 Jacques Derrida,”Interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta,” in Posi-
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would be to rehearse only another of those “Manichean oppositions” that 
Félix Guattari— in a similar, but different way to Derrida—renounces, taking 
particular exception to them when he identifies them in Freud’s “parents 
versus child” model of Oedipal triangulation. 6
The crucial point in all of this is that studies of authorship have largely 
conceived of the question of authorship in terms of a crude distinction 
between the author’s identity on the one hand, and the external world on 
the other. What makes the question of a comestible drug fascinating—and 
a productively disruptive heuristic in this desertified zone of indetermina-
cy—is the fact that drugs are capable of traversing the world at two levels: 
the external and internal. 
 In recalling Derrida’s suspicions about fictitious oppositions, however, 
we may be reminded to avoid speaking in such binary terms about drugs’s 
capacities. We should perhaps also seek not to dichomatise the subject by 
speaking of what is “internal” and “external” to them; nor still should we 
describe consciousness in this binary fashion—we should eschew, that is, 
the false dichotomy between “sobriety” and “intoxication.” 7 
It is better, perhaps, to conceive of the apparently singular “writer” as 
constituted by an assemblage of multiple proxies; they consist not of “ins” 
and “outs,” “ups” or “downs,” that is, but only of a striated diffusion of ac-
tors, “actants,” agents, and agencies. 8 
The history of philosophy and, to a lesser extent, that of literary theory 
and criticism, offers a great deal to these questions; and yet it is this same 
history that, writ large, expresses only uncertainty when it comes to a bio-
logical or psychobiological literary criticism. Yet, we should not lose hope. 
Given that there has been so vast a number of approaches to the general 
tions, tr. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 39-41, esp. 42. Also see 
Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing 
and Difference, tr. Alan Bass (New York: Routledge), 351-69. 
6 Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis, tr. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis (Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1995), 12. Originally published in French as Chaosmose (Paris: Édi-
tions Galilée, 1992).
7 An instructive work that problematises sobriety in a productive manner is David Len-
son’s On Drugs (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 3. Lenson’s discus-
sion of the oppositional dynamic between intoxication and sobriety is one of the most 
valuable of its kind in the critical literature of psychography.
8 Matthew Ratcliffe develops a comprehensive argument for rejecting the “binary oppo-
sition” that undergirds Thomas Szasz’s political theory of psychiatry, which draws an 
opposition between “mental” and “bodily” illness. See Ratcliffe, “Binary Opposition 
in Psychiatry: For or Against?,” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 17, no. 3 (2010): 
233-39, 234; cf. Pat Bracken and Phil Thomas, “From Szasz to Foucault: On the role of 
critical psychiatry,” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 17, no. 3 (2010): 219-28.
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question of authorial subjectivity—whether any are directly or indirectly 
concerned to provide an “answer”—it is appropriate to speculate that some 
“order of things” might be found amid this work. It behooves us, that is, to 
circumspectly assume that we are on the “right path.” 
When one considers the diversity of characters who have uttered the 
proverb “all roads lead to Rome,” the diversity may itself serve sufficiently to 
confirm the phrase’s validity. But this diversity also serves to illustrate the 
scope of this thesis’s scholarly reach, since, in an uncanny coincidence, we 
find that not only do each of this phrase’s utterers metonymise at least one 
of the methods deployed in this thesis, but that their collective utterance of 
this phrase also confirms one of the thesis’s central findings: namely, that 
the same language, tropes, or “psychotropes” can move between and among 
divergent authors as freely as they move between or among convergent ones.
Thus, when Gayatri Spivak, for one, employed this phrase in an intro-
duction to a public lecture in 2004, she also quoted what had first been en-
shrined by Le Fontaine in a fable, and what had, sometime between Spivak 
and Le Fontaine, been uttered by Julian Huxley—one of Aldous’s brothers— 
in a biological study on individuality. 9 So, just as this locution can be applied 
in different contexts, it also works to reinforce the view that any number of 
pathways might serve to convey us to our intellectual destiny, to our con-
clusions—or to what Isabelle Stengers, recalling Whitehead, calls our final 
“Foothold of the Mind.” 10 
But despite the plurality of approaches open to this work, this chapter, 
will be concerned with what are in essence material or physical objects— 
which is to say the various molecular entities, chemical compounds, and at-
omistic alkaloids, be they synthetic or otherwise, known as “drugs.” It shall 
begin, then, by adopting a physicalist vernacular: that is, by examining in 
physical terms the relation of our bodies and brains to the question of autho-
rial subjectivity.
9 See Gayatri Spivak, “The Trajectory of the Subaltern in My Work” (lecture, University of 
California ,“Voices” series, September, 2004), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ZH-
H4ALRFHw/, accessed 27 April 2014; Jean de La Fontaine, “The Arbiter, The Almoner, 
and The Hermit,” in The Fables of La Fontaine, tr. Robert Thompson (London: J.C. Nim-
mo and Bain, 1884), Book XII, Fable xxvii; Julian Huxley in fact deploys this idiom in 
the closing paragraph of his book on human individuality in the context of evolution-
ary theory: The Individual in the Animal Kingdom (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1912), 154.
10 See Isabelle Stengers, Thinking With Whitehead: A Free and Wild Creation of Concepts, tr. 
Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), chapter 3, 58-73.
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Our Bodies Are Not Our Own:  
Reformulating Bodily Constructivism
What, know ye not that your body is the Temple of the holy Ghost 
which is in you, which yee haue of God, and ye are not your owne?
—1 Corinthians 11
The body, however, is only a peculiarly intimate bit of 
the world. Just as Descartes said, “this body is mine”; so 
he should have said, “this actual world is mine.”
—Alfred North Whitehead 12
recent claims in microbiological science affirm that our bodies are constituted 
by no less than “90 percent bacteria.” 13 While we may imagine that our “hu-
man microbiomes” are our own possessions, scientists increasingly under-
stand our bodies as the shared province of so many other, nonhuman forms of 
life. Predominantly, in fact, our bodies are the property of nonhuman organ-
isms—many of which have gone long unacknowledged, previously not known, 
and have certainly never been understood to form part of the human being.
And, perhaps needless to say, such microorganisms—at least in studies 
of the body and its relation to authorial subjectivity—have been almost in-
variably ignored in literary scholarship, or else only very seldom recognised 
to be living properties that may constitute, in any material way, our human-
ness. Occupied by a “virtual zoo” of “non-human genes that are represented 
by human microbiota,” the human body is home to huge numbers of nonhu-
man genes, numbered at “about 1,000,000, as compared to the 25,000-30,000 
genes in [the] human genome.” 14
Much more than simply the symbolic sites of competition and parasit-
ism, though, our human bodies have each been “colonized by a vast number 
11 The Holy Bible, Conteyning the Old Testament, and the New (The King James Bible) 
(London: Robert Baker, 1611), 1 Corinthians, chapter 6, verse 19, see http://www.king-
jamesbibleonline.org/. 
12 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology [Corrected edi-
tion] (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 81.
13 On the claims, see “‘We are 90% bacteria’ says researcher for Hospital Microbiome 
Project,” Chicago Tribune, 2 January, 2013, accessed 22 April 2014, available at http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-01-02/news/ct-met-microbiome-20130102_1_hu-
man-microbiome-bacteria-human-life/. On microorganisms, bioscience, and literary 
culture, see Craig A. Gordon, Literary Modernism, Bioscience, and Community in Early 
20th Century Britain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 66-75.
14 Rup Lal, “Human Body: A Virtual Zoo of Bacteria,” Indian Journal of Microbiology 51, 
no. 1 (2011): 1.
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of microbes.” 15 This produces a ratio in which, for every single human gene 
that has been sequenced in the human genome, thirty-three nonhuman 
genes exist. 16 Recent metagenomic research attests to the same discovery: 
“Within the body of a healthy adult, microbial cells are estimated to out-
number human cells ten to one.” 17 In this very material and mathematical 
sense, humans are constituted less by any one received notion of our hu-
manness—and less by any traditional understanding of the human as im-
bued with an agent or a spirit—than defined by this material occupation: 
this progressively more elaborated and elucidated reality of the vast physical 
otherness that lies within us.
Of course, this is not exactly what had been meant by “the Other” when, 
to name only two proponents of the notion, Jacques Lacan and Emmanuel 
Lévinas employed variations of the term. Yet Lacan and Lévinas both gen-
erally mark a site of presence that is radically different to and from a sin-
gular self, one that we cannot say ever absolutely excludes such an idea as 
this: that the “other” might be a range of microbial agents. 18 Having had the 
opportunity to witness these developments in microbiological science, how-
ever, more recent philosophers, such as Dorian Sagan, have emphasised the 
changing definition of the human. Sagan notes that we are now “more than 
human”—and that our knowledges of such embodied “interspecies commu-
nities” represents nothing less than a development of “the New Facts of Life.” 
And likewise, Stefan Helmreich notes that we are so “threaded through” 
with so many kinds of “microscopic companion species and stranger 
15 See the opening bylines of Nature’s Human Microbiota Special (14 June 2012): www.
nature.com/nature/focus/humanmicrobiota/index.html, accessed 12 June 2013, em-
phasis mine.
16 For an excellent summary of the modern history and current state of genomic and 
metagenomic analysis, see Pieter De Maayer, et al., “The Current State of Metagenom-
ic Analysis,” in Maria S. Poptsova, ed. Genome Analysis: Current Procedures and Appli-
cations (Norfolk: Caister Academic Press, 2014), 183-220.
17 “The Human Microbiome Project, Overview”: http://commonfund.nih.gov/hmp/over-
view.aspx, quoted in Stefan Helmreich, “Homo Microbis: The Human Microbiome, 
Figural, Literal, Political,” in Thresholds 42 (2014): 52.
18 In 1955, during his annual seminars, Lacan draws a distinction between the “little 
other” and the “big Other.” Following this, Lacan refers to the little other as a, for 
the French autre, and the big Other as A, for Autre. See Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of 
Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses, 1955-1956, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, tr. Russell 
Grigg (London: Routledge, 1993), 41-2. Also see Emmanuel Lévinas’s conception of the 
other as a besieging “neighbour” in Dieu, le mort et le temps (Paris: Editions Grasset & 
Fasquelle, 1993), published in English as God, Death, and Time, tr. Bettina Bergo (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 138-39. Lévinas also contemplates the other as 
a “face” that “resists possession” in Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, tr. 
Alphonso Lingis (London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 50-1, 194, 197, 297.
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strains” of bacteria, that it is now more difficult than ever to comprehend 
the number of “others” that may exist in our bodies—let alone to estimate 
their influence. 19 But if these complex, even incomprehensible realities are 
the “New Facts of Life,” then what does this mean for the human author and 
their body? How might we develop an equivalent epistemology in literary 
and authorship studies: the “New Facts of Authorship”? 
In the 1970s, Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous, and Monique 
Wittig, among others, described “l’ecriture feminine”: the inscription of the 
female body on and through a text. This “women’s writing,” they argued, less 
exudes from the body as its product than “writes the body” itself, a kind of 
master signification process that constituting the body’s desires, sexuality, 
power, among so many other features. 20 Expanding on this work in the fol-
lowing decades, Judith Butler, Judith Halberstam, and many others, empha-
sised the corporealised experience of writing. And if these latter writers did 
not proceed along a divergent trajectory, than they perhaps wrote toward a 
different end. Less entangled with psychoanalysis, and less focused on the 
body’s libidinal economy, Butler’s scholarship, for one, aims not to discover 
the “common truth” in the body, but to reveal “a domain of unthinkable, 
abject, [and] unlivable bodies.” 21 That such bodies have hitherto remained 
hidden in historical studies, she writes, has been facilitated, among other 
things, by so many ludic language games. 
Determined, or even overdetermined, by a series of discursive and lin-
guistic formations, these unspeakable bodies—for instance, intersex bod-
ies—have abided in silence, notwithstanding the triumphant discoveries in 
the sciences that such bodies really do live, and really do speak. Feminist 
writing, of course, seeks to bridge the gap, becoming a de facto commu-
nicator for science, an interpreter of its implications. But it is not enough, 
argues Butler, for feminist theory to argue that there is “no prediscursive 
sex,” as though simply to bear witness to language’s myriad determinations 
would suffice to undo its reification and constitution of the body as a social 
19 See Dorion Sagan, Cosmic Apprentice: Dispatches from the Edges of Science (Minneap-
olis, MN: University of Minneapolis Press, 2013), chapter 1 (passim); and Helmreich, 
“Homo Microbis,” 52.
20 For a succinct contemporaneous summary of the work of each of these scholars’s 
studies, see Ann Rosalind Jones, “Writing The Body: Toward an Understanding of 
L’Ecriture Feminine,” Feminist Studies 7, no. 2 (1981): 247-63. I will deal with Irigaray’s 
description of the chiasmus in chapter 4.
21 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On The Discursive Limits of Sex (New York: Routledge, 
1993), xi. 
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object. 22 Rather, developing a legitimate “cultural intelligibility,” Butler ar-
gues, requires more than even linguistic or semantic analysis, more than 
language performances—and even more than performativity, one of Butler’s 
primary interpretative axiomatics. 23 Exhibiting a deconstructionist inheri-
tance from Derrida, and evincing an archaeological tendency from Foucault, 
Butler encounters the problematic in “which bodies come to matter—and 
why,” addressing the question by interrogating how what has been previously 
unthinkable represents a “violent circumscription” at the levels both of lan-
guage and ideology. 24 While language determines much of what constitutes 
thought, there are, for Butler as for Freud, phenomena “beneath” thought. 
Along this same vector—and concurrently, in the 1990s—Donna Haraway 
and N. Katherine Hayles embrace another kind of “unthinkable body”: that 
of the posthuman cyborg. 25 But if the cyborg ostensibly does away with the 
distinction between male and female, its language also retains the residue 
of “phallogocentrism”—for all writing, as Derrida proposes, is a history of 
male writing. This is an emanation not just from the male body but from the 
diacritical phallus, which “eludes any dialectical sublimation (Aushebung).” 26
In this milieu, procedures such as calculation, as Hayles writes in a more 
recent study, offer themselves up to the figure of the woman. For it is she who, 
as Hayles claims (quoting Jenifer Wicke), operates not at the “switch point” of 
desire, as men have done, but as this switchpoint: as truly a machinic “com-
puter.” 27 Now the woman’s body is a proxy for a language and consciousness 
so much more “grounded,” and yet also more circumscribed, than its male 
equivalents. And of course, as “switch points,” crucial junctures that form a 
“link between an unknowable alien and a male protagonist,” women’s bod-
ies and their “automata” are now also commoditised: objects to be circulated 
and transited, repurposed by “powerful men... as tools against other men.” 28
22 Ibid. Also see Judith [Jack] Halberstam and Ira Livingstone, eds. Posthuman Bodies 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). 
23 Butler, Bodies That Matter, vi.
24 Ibid., xii, 23.
25 See Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology and Socialist-femi-
nism in the Late Twentieth Century,” in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinven-
tion of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991), chapter 8; originally published in Socialist 
Review 15, no. 2 (1985): 65-107.
26 See Derrida, Dissemination, tr. Barbara Johnson (London: Continuum, 2008), 39n39; 
98-118, 100-1; originally published in Paris in 1972 by Éditions du Seuil. Also see my 
discussion of phallogocentrism and Huxley in chapter 4.
27 N. Katherine Hayles, My Mother Was A Computer: Digital Subject and Literary Texts (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 79.
28 Ibid., 183. 
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By and large indifferent to gender difference or sexual identity, “Plato’s 
Pharmacy”—which is to cite Derrida’s essay of that title, but to allude to the 
history of Western medicine—attends less to the body’s gametes than to 
the circumvolution of objects within the body. But both Derrida’s essay and 
Western medicine also attentively apprehend the corporealised history of 
authorship, and the longstanding imbrication of the physical with the enun-
ciative. 29 Much of Derrida’s work has allowed us to name, define, unveil, and 
even “deconstruct” the body, however much deconstruction remains unreal-
ised—or unrealisable—as a “method.” 
What deconstruction does, though, is help us comprehend afresh the 
body’s intelligible relations with writing; it facilitates a kind of persistent 
thought on this relation that is yet not perseverant in any psychopathological 
sense. And yet there remains the possibility that the body is all too abstruse—
too radically different to the subject—to ever really comprehend. And it is 
equally possible that the body may not, as Butler suggests, be defined alone, 
or even at all, by its materiality. It may rather turn out that only a spectral and 
“productive effect” of the body arises as a result of that power with which it 
is invested by language. 30 But, even then, if the body is simply a productive 
effect of power, who, from within such a body, speaks in its name?
While late twentieth-century feminism’s work on the body illumines a 
spate of crucial points about the author’s status—including, as Elizabeth 
Grosz’s Volatile Bodies (1994) testifies, the body’s eruptive, violent, and va-
porous potential—doubt persists about, or rather appears as, the aporia of 
the body’s externality: What exactly constitutes this interstice, this lacuna, 
this dehiscence, between body and consciousness? 31 Detailed, meditative, 
and retreading the terrain trod by Descartes in his Meditations, Butler’s 1997 
essay “How Can I Deny These Hands and This Body Are Mine?” interrogates 
this “fabulous trajectory of doubt.” But just as Descartes “calls the body into 
question” only to discover that it is the very “condition of his own writing,” 
Butler will apprehend the body’s “phenomenality” in and as an inscription—
in that physical, material writing that functions to represent it: “there can be 
no reference to materiality except via materiality,” she concludes. 32
To carefully and attentively notate the body’s impulses—its every pulse 
and movement—seems an absurdly ambitious philosophical goal. Nonethe-
29 See Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” in Dissemination, 98-118, esp. 100-1.
30 Butler, Bodies That Matter, 3.
31 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward A Corporeal Feminism (Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1994).
32 Butler, Bodies That Matter, 68.
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less, it is the goal to which Descartes’s Meditations—more than any other 
philosophical self-experiment—seems poised to pursue. If Descartes’s aim 
is unique, however, it is because the project will precipitate a “break,” its 
results, as Butler observes, generating nothing less than the complete “up-
heaval of all of [Descartes’s] former opinions.” 33 
And if Descartes’s work is precise, then Butler’s is doubly so, for Butler 
carefully identifies the interstices that appear fugitively within the Des-
cartes’s attempt at a totalising theorisation of the body. Butler’s essay focuses 
on the way in which, that is—however much Descartes seeks to short-circuit 
language—his words engender every single one of his observations ab initio. 
But Butler also rejects that language only ever fabricates the body, because 
where it produces thought it also erases it—and where it might seem to do 
both, it does neither of these things completely:
Although one might accept the proposition that the body is only knowable 
through language, that the body is given throughout language, it is never ful-
ly given, when it is given, in parts—it is, as it were, given and withheld at the 
same time, and language might be said to perform both of these operations. 34
If language seeks to “deny its own implication in the body” and, in the 
process, begins to refute the body’s material constitution, remnants of the 
corpus, we find, still begin to reappear “in spectral and partial form within 
the very language that seeks to perform their denial.” 35 Ghostly emergences, 
emanating from the body itself in a multimodal production, engender a car-
nival spectacle of which language forms but one working part.
When one reads Aldous Huxley’s early writing, one encounters multiple 
occasions on which to examine precisely such a spectral projection—and 
often, it is humorous. Huxley’s fiction and essays routinely figure the body as 
an unstable site of emergence; the body can, for instance, articulate itself—
can speak even when its owners are unaware of its presence. The body can 
also become a locus of chaos and disorder—a crucible that resists foreclosure 
even when it is ignored by its “owner,” or positively disavowed in words. 36 
In Philip K. Dick’s fiction, as I argue in chapter 7, embodied experience 
summons different kinds of corporeal and linguistic effects. With the aid of 
33 René Descartes, Meditations, quoted in Judith Butler, “How Can I Deny That These 
Hands and This Body Are Mine?” Qui Parle 11, no. 1 (1997): 1-20.
34 Butler, “How Can I Deny,” 4.
35 Ibid., 5.
36 See my detailed discussion of Huxley’s deployment of body humour and “semantic 
gravitation” in chapters 4, 5, and 6.
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drugs, characters often encounter a disorienting ontology that less resembles 
the parodic bathos of some inevitable, automatic biological process than mim-
ics the anxious, remediating complexity of an out-of-body experience (OBE). 37 
Having been diverted around an elocutionary cul-de-sac, the body re-
turns in Dick’s fiction in a different way; and if it remains farcical, it is as a 
farce in a different idiom to Huxley’s. The body, for Dick, is not an “event” or 
“eventality”—such as in Huxley’s vomiting (chapter 6)—but takes the form of 
many nonhuman chimera: a cartoonish animal, a play doll (Perky Pat), and a 
machine (Palmer Eldritch). 38 If in all these cases the “figural persistence” of 
the body seems to continue, however, it is because, as Butler argues, in each 
of these figurations lingers the body’s fundamental ontological problematic:
as we begin that description of what is outside language, the chiasm reap-
pears: we have already contaminated, though not contained, the very body 
we seek to establish in its ontological purity. The body escapes its linguistic 
grasp, but so too does it escape the subsequent effort to determine ontologi-
cally that very escape. 39
Butler deploys the figure of the “chiasm” throughout her essay to configure 
the relation of the self and the body; and such a figure, notably, will also 
become an important heuristic for Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Luce Irigaray 
in their philosophies of perception and embodiment. 
Taking up this figure as one of the most crucially determinative “psy-
chotropes” for Aldous Huxley’s thought, my analysis of Huxley in chapters 
4, 5 and 6 attends to the “chiastic” relations of Huxley’s linguistic and on-
tological worlds. These are the relations that I argue are modulated, first of 
all, by a range of biographical traumas—including the deaths of his broth-
37 For a thoroughgoing examination of OBEs and their precipitation, both by the exoge-
nous administration of the psychedelic N, N-Dimethltriptamine (DMT), or the endog-
enous stimulation of the pineal gland (a speculation similar to the one once posited 
by Descartes himself), see Rick Straussman, DMT: The Spirit Molecule (Vermont: Park 
Street Press, 2001), 31, 43, 222. Cf. René Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geome-
try, and Meteorology, tr. Paul J. Olscamp (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1965), 100.
38 While this thesis shall not directly address the appearance of these “cartoonish ani-
mals” in Dick’s fiction, they appear in a variety of his novels, such as in A Scanner Dark-
ly, where Charles Freck will compare his friend Barris, a methamphetamine user, to 
Donald Duck, cautioning him not to “do too much” methamphetamine (ASD, 129), in 
Dick’s recurrent depiction of rats and “glucks” in The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch 
(TSPE, 96), or even in his continued references to his cat “Pinky,” which Dick compares 
to “Tony The Tiger” (and then to his friend “Tony Boucher”) in his Exegesis (Ex, 127). 
Notably, John Ashbery, another postmodern, calls on similar images in his 1975 poem 
“Daffy Duck in Hollywood,” in Houseboat Days (New York: Penguin, 1977).
39 Butler, “How Can I Deny,” 4-5.
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er and mother—and later become contoured (perhaps even more impact-
fully) by Huxley’s excitement about the potential he sees in mind-changing 
drugs: a potential for them to reconfigure, and to extend, the interiorised 
and exteriorised limits of the human species. 
Only a few short years before America would see a rapid, unprecedented 
growth in its pharmacological industry, Huxley would proselytise the use 
of psychoactive drugs, anticipating biomedicine’s similarly enthusiastic 
embrace of psychoactive substances in the ensuing decades. Giving rise 
to a proliferation of amphetamine-based medicines—including novel pre-
scriptions for depression and mood disorders—the mid-twentieth century 
brought about a period of rapid pharmacological change: most importantly, 
it allowed for near-universal access, throughout the United States, to a spate 
of newly enhanced or reconfigured ontological and affective states. 40
In 1963, the year of Huxley’s death, a vertiginous and reckless Dick would 
be spiraling into a field of psychosis whose dimensions reflected an acute 
dopaminergic infusion—an excess that was likely, but not certainly, the 
result of methamphetamine toxicity. 41 Dick’s experience, as with so many 
other amphetamine abusers in 1960s America, provides a counterpoint to 
the theory of psychotomimesis—or, to be more specific, the “serotonin hy-
pothesis” of psychosis that had been developed in the early 1950s, and which 
had gained some currency at the beginning of that decade. 42 
This was a theory to which Huxley had himself subscribed, at least no-
tionally, throughout the final decade of his life. According to its proponents, 
a model psychosis—which is not much distinct from the pathological form—
could be predictably occasioned by the ingestion of LSD (or, as it was com-
monly called at the time, d-lysergic acid diethylamide, or “LSD-25”). 43 Now, 
it is far more commonly proposed that the stimulation or “agonisation” of 
dopamine—not serotonin—will more dependably generate a paranoid-type 
“model” psychosis. LSD does not affect dopamine as its primary effects, but 
40 On this history see Richard DeGrandpre, The Cult of Pharmacology: How America Be-
came The World’s Most Trouble Drug Culture (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 
146-8. 
41 See my discussion of Dick’s methamphetamine use in chapter 7.
42 See, for instance, Humphry Osmond, “A Review of the Clinical Effects of Psychotomi-
metic Agents,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 66 (1957): 418-34; David Nich-
ols, “Potential Psychotomimetics: Bromomethoxyamphetamines and Structural Con-
geners of Lysergic Acid,” PhD diss., University of Iowa, 1973, ProQuest: AAT 7330961, 
esp. 6-8.
43 On the history of the serotonin hypothesis, see Erika Dyck, Psychedelic Psychiatry: LSD 
From Clinic to Campus (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 32-51. 
Also see my chapters 2 and 4.
Molecular Correspondences 15
rather acts on a small group of serotonin (5-HT) sub-receptor sites known 
as 5-HT2 and 5-HT2a. 44 As David Nichols notes, when these sub-receptors 
are antagonised by LSD and other hallucinogens, the body generates visual 
distortions and other kinds of modified perceptions—and it is this that psy-
chiatrists of the ‘50s described as the drug’s characteristic hallucinations. 45 
That Dick’s own apparently psychotic visions—and particularly those of 
1963, one of his most disorienting years—occurred while he was ingesting 
large amounts amphetamine and methamphetamine, allows us to see Dick as 
a kind of synecdoche for the progression of psychopharmacological research 
of this time. As I have emphasised, in this period, the aetiology of psychosis 
moved from serotonin-based speculations, such as the adrenochrome hypoth-
esis, to dopamine-based speculations. 46 This is a shift that also emblematises 
the arrival of Dick’s psychosis and the departure or “come down” of Huxley’s 
intoxicated years—an intoxication that, via intramusuclar injection of LSD on 
his deathbed, quite literally faded away with and as Huxley’s life. 47 
In 1966, three years after Huxley’s death, US politicians enacted laws that 
prohibited the study of hallucinogens on humans; and, squarely in the mid-
dle of Dick’s most tumultuous period, the interest in drugs that Huxley had 
himself arguably fostered, began itself to wane—just as the prescription of 
amphetamines had in fact reached its nadir. 48
While in many ways Huxley and Dick make complicated and unlikely 
interlocutors, they are at least sutured by an interweaving of time. While 
Huxley dies what seems only moments before the countercultural revolution 
44 On the effect of hallucinogens on these receptor subtypes, see David Nichols’s detailed 
overview of the pharmacokinetics and psychopharmacology of these compounds in 
his “Hallucinogens,” Pharmacology and Therapeutics 101 (204): 131-81, esp. 139-48. On 
“stimulant psychosis,” see Catherine Curran, et al., “Stimulant Psychosis: Systematic 
Review,” The British Journal of Psychiatry 185 (2004): 196-204. 
45 I discuss Dick’s drugs use in detail in chapter 7. Also see Nichols, “Hallucinogens,” 
Pharmacology and Therapeutics 101 (204): 138-9.
46 On the disavowal by biochemists and others in psychiatric medicine of the opinion 
that hallucinogens can produce a model psychosis, see Alessandra Paparelli, et al., 
“Drug Induced Psychosis: How To Avoid Star Gazing in Schizophrenia Researches 
by Looking at More Obvious Sources of Light,” Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 5 
(2011): 1-9.
47 See Laura Archer Huxley, This Timeless Moment: A Personal View of Aldous Huxley (Lon-
don: Chatto & Windus, 1969), 302-7.
48 For a recent summary of the psychotherapeutic and other studies of LSD in history 
before this prohibition in the US, and afterward in other countries, see Peter Gas-
ser, et al., “Safety and Efficacy of Lysergic Acid Diethylamide-Assisted Psychotherapy 
for Anxiety Associated With Life-Threatening Diseases,” The Journal of Nervous and 
Mental Disease (3 March 2014, ePub ahead of print at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmed/24594678/): 1-8. 
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will begin, Dick’s fame and writing career will be established around this 
very same moment. By contrast, Butler’s relationship with Descartes is char-
acterised by no such temporal overlap; and yet their interaction, it might also 
be said, forms a far more intricate and intimate dialogue.
Butler’s response to Cartesianism entails far more than merely her elab-
oration on those originary arguments about the body’s linguistic construc-
tion that she had previously advanced in Bodies That Matter. Too often veiled 
by reductive descriptions that focus on dualism and extrication, Descartes’s 
work expresses an unusual and at times mystical theory of the mind-body 
relation that, as Butler seems to apprehend, is founded on a far more con-
tentious strain of materialism. As Karen Jacobs notes, Descartes’s work is 
nothing if not resistant to a resolution; it generates, she says, a “bedrock 
ambiguity” at the level of this most fundamental of relationships. 49 
An instructive example of Descartes’s vision of the body, however, is ex-
pressed in his La Dioptrique (1637); here he proposes that all those things 
that are seen by the human subject, the entirety of those “products of the 
eye,” may also be transubstantiated—are ingested somehow—into the hu-
man body itself. Sometimes, when they are seen, these envisionings begin 
to grow or emerge within the corpus itself, reappearing as lesions. Here they 
are “made flesh” biologically—that is, by the operation of the pineal gland. 50 
Descartes explains the process in this way:
I could go even still further, to show how sometimes the picture can pass from 
there through the arteries of a pregnant woman, right to some specific mem-
ber of the infant which she carries in her womb, and there forms these birth-
marks which cause learned men to marvel so. 51 
For Descartes, what has been seen may also be embodied; vision is incorporat-
ed or introjected materially—and not only into consciousness, but into biology. 
Thus, the visions of a mother may pass through her eye and body to the 
child, who, presumably, may be only a foetus. Then these visions are, like 
tumours, reinscribed on the child’s skin. The skin is thus less a reflection 
of the child’s experience than a reverberation of these “progenic” visions. 
And for Descartes, this is a proof of the process in which mimesis becomes 
49 Karen Jacobs, The Eye’s Mind: Literary Modernism and Visual Culture (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press), 10-11.
50 Descartes, Discourse on Method, 100. Also see Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigra-
tion of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993), 76.
51 Ibid. Also see Jay, Downcast Eyes, 77n178.
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incorporation. But this is only one among the myriad ways in which Des-
cartes suggests the body is at least partly nonhuman. In general, his incor-
porational model makes the body a res extensa: it is a living trace of so many 
perceived exteriorities, now mutated into organs. Of course, Descartes’s view 
is not as formal as those propositions advanced by the evolutionary theorists 
that succeeded him—by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck or Charles Darwin—and nor 
are they as detailed. 
Rather, such studies of Descartes’s, including his Meditations, are specu-
lative observations about the unpredictable emergence of the human body; 
and, at the time, they designed a new, profound intersection in which the 
material and metaphysical can be conjoined. The profundity of these studies 
follows from the privilege they accord to what Butler describes as our “mad” 
visions:
Descartes not only reports that others perform... hallucinations, the report 
[also] constitutes the textualization of the hallucination: his writing perform 
them for us, through an alienation of perspective that is and is not exclu-
sively his own. Thus, he conjures such possibilities precisely at the moment 
in which he also renounces such possibilities as mad, raising the question 
whether there is a difference between the kind of conjuring that is a constitu-
tive part of the meditative method and those hallucinations that the method 
is supposed to refute. 52
As Butler suggests, Descartes’s renunciation of experience may apprehend 
the possibility of that experience at the same time as it also declares that 
experience nugatory or alien. And what is tellingly typical of the processual 
manner in which these “chiasmic” 53 operations occur, Butler claims, is the 
“strange grammar” of Descartes’s rhetorical question itself—the question 
in which he asks “How could I deny that these hands and this body here be-
long to me?” Enabling the philosopher both to express his inability to deny 
such a proposition, and to ponder the ways in which this inability might 
be overcome (“how could I... ?”), the question begs not only an answer to a 
hypothesis, but poses a question to an answer already presupposed. 54 
However, since this question is not a legitimate information-seeking 
utterance, but rather an example of a “redundant interrogative” 55 deployed 
52 Butler, “How Can I Deny,” 11.
53 While I generally favour “chiasmic,” I will occasionally also use the term “chiasmatic”; 
these terms are taken to be interchangeable.
54 Ibid., 8; Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, tr. Elizabeth Haldan and G. R. 
T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 126. 
55 See Hannah Rhode, “Rhetorical Questions as Redundant Interrogatives,” San Diego 
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merely for effect, the rhetorical question—at least as that form may be said 
to appear in Descartes’s meditative vernacular—operates or “textualises” 
itself in way that more freely invites paradoxical interpretations. In fact, this 
utterance insists on its own paradoxicality. The result is that, as Butler ar-
gues, Descartes’s question “hallucinates” its own answers, generating a kind 
of “mad” presentiment or presentimentation that may never be known other 
than as what it is: an idiopathic Cartesian hallucinosis. 56
But if little can be known of Descartes’s affective composition, recent work 
on rhetorical questions at least confirms Butler’s description of the effect she 
describes. Apprehending Descartes’s crucial question, it becomes possible to 
assert, for instance, that—while one study seems to call this kind of question 
a “new type of rhetorical question”—it is also arguably not of a new type at 
all. To be sure, it could be one of these “wrong-opinion questions,” as one 
study claims, which have arisen only recently. These involve the speaker’s 
expression of an “obviously wrong” opinion only for the purpose of demon-
strating that same opinion’s absurdity. 57 Indeed, as with the “wrong-opinion 
question,” Descartes’s question may be seen to say something about the body 
that is “obviously wrong,” and it may be understood, equally, to advance such 
a notion precisely to refute it—and in an economic utterance withal. 
And yet, as Butler suggests, Descartes also presupposes the enunciation 
of a voice that imagines this wrong opinion’s actual possibility. 58 Taking this 
voice seriously, Descartes’s question accords to the wrong opinion the possi-
bility of its own autonomous invention. As Descartes writes,
I would invent, in effect, when I am imagining something, since imagining is 
nothing other than contemplating the figure or image of a corporeal thing. 59
Thus, to write meditatively—and to employ a method of “doubt”—becomes 
for Descartes nothing any more complex than the reanimation of an object 
that, if it should appear in one’s mind, can only ever bespeak an originary 
and corporeal presence—one that, until then, had eluded thought. 60
Linguistics Papers 2 (2006): 134-68, cf. Todd Oakley, “Afterword: From Cognitive Gram-
mar to Systems Rhetoric,” in Cognitive Grammar in Literature, eds. Chloe Harrison, et 
al. (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co.), 234-5.
56 Butler, “How Can I Deny,” 11-12.
57 See Russell Lee-Goldman, “Rhetorical Questions and Scales: Just what do you think 
constructions are for?” Presentation at the International Conference on Construction 
Grammar, University of Tokyo, Japan, 2006, see www1.icsi.berkely.edu/~rleegolfd/
ling/iccg4-presentation.pdf, slides 17-36.
58 Butler, “How Can I Deny,” 12.
59 This translation is Butler’s: see Butler, “How Can I Deny,” 12 and 12n6.
60 These ideas are, of course, elaborated in Descartes’s Meditations and elsewhere: see 
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In his 1956 seminar on The Psychoses, Lacan problematised what might 
be seen as the corporalealised anthropogenesis of writing. When he defined 
“the Other” as that which “must first of all be considered a locus, [and] the 
locus in which speech is constituted,” 61 Lacan suggested the alterity of the 
self, since the self, which will soon speak, is “the Other.” For him, the I that 
speaks or writes “is never there where it appears in the form of a particular 
signifier,” but is rather at once beneath the representational field, and within 
it—at least for the prolocutor in the enunciatory act: “Underneath everything 
that is said, there is an I who pronounces it. It’s in this enunciation that 
the you appears.” 62 In the same lecture, Lacan asks an important question, 
similar in effect to Descartes’s enquiry: 
What happens when the signifier in question, the organizing center, the point 
of significant convergence that it constitutes, is evoked but fails to appear 
[ fair default]? 63 
Resonant not only with Descartes’s meditation, but also with the question 
that opens this chapter, Lacan’s enquiry apprehends the subject as the 
centre of a discursive system that, in its obfuscation within that system, 
is made occult and equivocal, failing to appear, and failing to be seen, as a 
“final” object in itself. 
In his lecture’s concluding paragraphs, Lacan offers an oblique answer 
to the enquiry by returning to the figure of the symbolic father (the “Law 
of symbolization”) that his seminar had earlier introduced. 64 In his final 
remarks, Lacan identifies this other who speaks as in fact no more than a 
symbolic father. But in this case, the specific other appears to Daniel Paul 
Schreber, the German judge who was Freud’s famous analysand, 65 And the 
The Philosophy of Descartes, vols. 1, 2 and 3, tr. John Cottingham, et al. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985, 1984, and 1991). However, whether Descartes was 
“interactionist” (as was Aldous Huxley) who believed that the body and mind interact-
ed so that the mental events have physical effects, or an “ocassionalist” who believed 
that physical and mental events occurred “as one,” and under the will of God, is un-
clear. On this, see Cecilia Wee and Michael Pelczar, “Descartes’s Dualism and Con-
temporary Dualism,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 46, no. 1 (2008): 145-60, esp. 
156. On Huxley’s interactionism, see Aldous Huxley, “A Psycho-physical Education,” 
in Wilfred Barlow, ed. More Talk of Alexander (London: Gollancz, 1978), 65-8; also see 
Huxley’s essay in the same volume titled “End-Gaining and Means-Whereby,” 149-53, 
and my chapters 4-6.
61 Lacan, The Seminar, Book III, 274.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 283.
64 Ibid., 83.
65 See Sigmund Freud, “Psychoanalytic Comments on an Autobiographical Account of a 
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“other” is therefore, in Lacan’s reading, Schreber’s symbolic father. 66 Where 
Descartes had accepted that a child’s birthmark may be evidence of some 
matrilineal or parental incorporation or presence, now Lacan identifies just 
such a presence in the voice of the father. 
In part 2 of this thesis, I will return to this question of patrilineal inheri-
tance as I examine Aldous Huxley’s biography (in chapters 5 and 6). Notably, 
many of the anecdotes Huxley’s biographers supply form exemplary narra-
tives of paternal incorporation. What is of greater concern in this part 1, 
however, is whether the body’s nonhuman genes—which I have already de-
scribed—and then whether drugs, as analogues for these nonhuman genes, 
can be said to write with, through, or for the author, in much the same way as 
psychoanalysis or philosophy often takes the parents (or father) to be capa-
ble of such intermediating operations. My claim is that if certain traumatic 
memories, or certain kinds of mother or father figures, or other filial agents, 
serve to constitute the coordinates of the neuroses and psychoses, then the 
initial institution or establishment of these figurations as other things, in a 
biological sense—or in other biosynthetic figurations, such as drugs—must 
be equally as crucial and determinative. 
Accordingly, when Lévinas describes the other as specifically not a father 
figure, he lays emphasis on the figuration’s independent, non-paternal fea-
tures. Paternity is less a discrete being than a “face,” he argues; it is less a 
particular agent than a general status or gestalt:
Paternity is not a causality, but the establishment of a unicity with which the 
unicity of the father does and does not coincide. The non-coincidence con-
sists, concretely, in my position as brother; it implies other unicities at my 
side. Thus my unicity qua I contains both self-sufficiency of being and my par-
tialness, my position before the other as a face. 67 
But if the other is no more than a “face,” its influence can be witnessed only 
in moments of “epiphany,” where this face becomes perceptible as a nonhu-
man entity—one that is separate and distinct “from that which characterizes 
sensible experience.” 68 Lévinas’s understanding of the other as materially vi-
sual—and more specifically as facial—serves not only to dovetail Descartes’s 
Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides),” in James Strachey, ed., The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1959 [1911]), 
12: 9-82. 
66 Lacan, The Seminar, Book III, 284.
67 Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, tr. Alphonso Lingis 
(London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 214.
68 Ibid., 187.
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visual epistemology with the patricentric formulations of psychoanalysis; it 
also bears heavily on Dick’s vision of his father’s face in the sky, which I will 
address in chapter 7. 
For the time being, it is enough to note that this condensation of the 
father and some Lévinasian facial otherness may be regarded not simply as 
some desultory species of psychotic hallucination, but as an essential indi-
cation or index of some order in that “idiopathic Cartesian hallucinosis,” 
to which I referred previously. But if Dick’s visions also reflect simply his 
madness and drug use, then his attentively written descriptions of these 
phenomena become only so much more interesting—for they now, with Des-
cartes’s meditations, offer another instance, if not a new mode, of such a 
productive “psychography” as this thesis analyses. 69
Encountering Molecular Psychobiography
my task in this first chapter is to examine the question of authorial subjectiv-
ity—not simply in psychoanalytic terms, though, but in terms of the philos-
ophy, biopolitics, and psychopolitics of human interiority. 70 This enterprise 
demands that these areas be addressed within certain axioms. I call my 
method “psychobiographic,” for it concerns the “psycho,” “bio,” and “graph-
ic” models of the human; it has regard to the disciplines in which knowledge 
of the body and brain is developed, and makes reference to the historical 
emergence of those new drugs, both licit and illicit, that appeared in the 
twentieth century. 
Much of the scholarship on the subject of drugs arises out of what is a 
catalytic political firmament. Forged from a crucible of social and academic 
criticism that had arisen in response to an increasingly psychiatrised West, 
drugs begin to connote madness and mental illness—and perhaps little 
else. The method by which drugs come into contact with the mad and the 
ill, however, will in this context soon come to be regarded, at least by some, 
less as a legitimate treatment method or medical process than just as anoth-
er historical transmogrification of the old Foucauldian power struggle—a 
situation in which a powerful sovereign dispenses their particular mode of 
discipline and punishment to certain element within its population. 
69 See chapter 7.
70 In adopting this term I paraphrase, or reappropriate, the words of Peter Sedgwick; 
Sedwick used this term as the title for his book Psycho Politics (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1982).
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In the 1960s, just such a view was championed by those who identified 
with the so-called anti-psychiatry movement; this was a loose coterie ex-
emplarily represented by, for instance, Italy’s great social reformer, Franco 
Basgalia, and the United Kingdom’s most “intellectualistic” psychiatrist duo, 
David Cooper and R. D. Laing. 71 It is also from out of this political context that 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
(1972)—and the work that followed it, A Thousand Plateaus (1980)—would ap-
pear in the following two decades 72 
Adroitly observing this history in a succinct literary-cultural study of psy-
chiatry, Angela Woods underscores the extent to which Deleuze and Guat-
tari, in their critique of psychoanalysis, are indebted to other such critiques 
of psychology of the time, including “Michel Foucault’s Madness and Civiliza-
tion” (as it was so published in 1965). 73 But Deleuze and Guattari’s adoption 
of the diagnostic term “schizophrenia”—a term distinguished from Freud’s 
psychoanalytic categories, which are emblematised by his descriptions of 
psychosis and neurosis—indicates the authors’s wish to “speak back” to the 
institutionalised taxonomisation of mental phenomena as it has thus far, 
largely with Freud, proceeded. 
Their aim, in other words, is to become vociferous interlocutors in the 
progressively more bureaucratised science of mental health—an area in-
creasingly buffeted by a scientific regime that is itself sustained by exclu-
sionary methodologies unlikely to be understood by those who are made 
the subjects of its practices. In rejecting Freudian psychopathology, Deleuze 
and Guattari also deprivilege Freud’s authority within the regime of twen-
tieth-century psychopolitics; in this they at least tacitly agree with Sylvére 
Lotringer’s claim that Freudianism survives in America not as a truthful 
method, but merely as a transmogrification of “communications theory.” 74
For Deleuze and Guattari, the persistence of Freudianism is not simply 
dependent on late capitalism, though, but radically transcoded by it. Psy-
chopathology metastasises in the middle decades of the twentieth century; 
from here it departs from the private couches and notebooks characteris-
71 I examine R.D. Laing’s philosophy of psychiatry in more detail in chapter 4.
72 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, tr. Robert Hurley, 
Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983). 
Originally published as L’anti-Œdipe (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972).
73 See Angela Woods, The Sublime Object of Psychiatry: Schizophrenia in Clinical and Cul-
tural Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). I will take up Foucault’s History of 
Madness and examine it in some detail in chapters 2 and 3. 
74 See Sylvére Lotringer, “Libido Unbound,” The Politics of ‘Schizophrenia,’” in Semiotex-
te 2, “Anti-Oedipus: From Psychoanalysis to Schizopolitics,” no. 3 (1977): 5-6.
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tic of so many psychoanalysts’s consultation rooms and, with medicine’s 
authorisation, enters the state’s officiating volumes, which is to say the 
medical, and even legislative books of the state’s legal-medical sector—its 
public health organisations. But, concerned less with usurping medicine’s 
authority than with stimulating and extracting value from the state’s la-
bour and economic machines, Freudianism would enter a period in which, 
by May 1968, it had only itself to diagnose as ill—and with no less than 
such a disease as “economic neurosis.” 75 Guattari would comment on this 
situation in the first issue of the Revue de psychothérapie institutionelle—a 
review that anticipates and, for Julian Bourg, would become the “urtext” 76 
of Anti-Oedipus:
Institutional therapeutics is a delicate infant. Its development needs close 
watching, and it tends to keep very bad company. In fact, the threat to its life 
comes not from any congenital debility, but from the factions of all kinds that 
are lying in wait to rob it of its specific object. Psychologists, psychosociolo-
gists, even psychoanalysts, are ready to take over bits of it that they claim to 
be their province, while voracious governments look for their chance to “in-
corporate” it in their official texts. 77 
If Guattari’s remarks openly express his scorn both for “voracious govern-
ments” and self-interested social psychologists, Deleuze and Guattari’s cri-
tique of psychoanalysis in Capitalism and Schizophrenia will even more dis-
dainfully repudiate psychopathology’s formalisms, which are now practiced 
in its invariably coercive and deceptive “institutional therapaeutics.” 
In Woods’s words, the authors convey a general “irreverence towards the 
psychiatric establishment” 78—and this indicates their contempt for those 
“factions” that threaten to “rob” something both from psychiatry’s legitimate 
practitioners and its involuntary patients. To be specific, psychiatry takes 
from practitioners a range of intellectual and professional freedoms, and 
from patients the fundamental belief and realisation that some heterogeneity 
in human mental life is to be expected and appreciated. The aim of “capitalist 
75 Ibid.
76 Julian Bourg, From Revolution to Ethics: May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 139-40.
77 Guattari, “Transversality,” in Molecular Revolutions: Psychiatry and Politics (New York: 
Puffin, 1984), 11-23. Originally published in 1964 in the Revue de Psychothérapie Insti-
tutionelle, no. 1. On the shortlived history of this review, and the society that produced 
it—the Société de psychothérapie institutionelle (SPI)—see Bourg, Revolution to Ethics, 
137-43.
78 Woods, The Sublime Object of Psychiatry, 148.
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colonialism,” Guattari would later say, had been no less than to enforce and 
facilitate a homogenisation of mental experience, achieved slowly but surely, 
and by so many “conservative reterritorialisations of subjectivity.” 79 
Authoring a complex microanalysis of capitalism’s procedures, Deleuze 
and Guattari’s lifework remediates and transcodes those ossified assemblag-
es of the socius that also function as its systemic constituents, chief among 
them psychoanalysis and institutionalised psychiatry. This they do not only 
to fortify a new epistemological resistance, but to nurture and recuperate 
the political desires of others. The regulation and availability of drugs, for 
instance—controlled by governmental agencies as much as by psychiatric 
organisations—will become an increasingly important subject for the au-
thors in A Thousand Plateaus. 
Here, for instance, Carlos Castaneda’s escape from “semiosis” and his 
concomitant entry into a “visual and sonorous microperception,” will lead 
him into what the authors describe as a “becomings-molecular.” This is a body 
transformation that is distinguishable from those others that, in the preced-
ing passages of the book, the authors have described in different terms. Before 
now, the authors have conceived of the body’s morphologisation in terms of its 
animality; when they have previously described changes in the body or mind, 
the authors have, as if to accord with some “law of the jungle,” understood them 
as instances of a “becomings-animal.” 80 This “becomings-molecular” registers 
a new re-encoding of the subject—one that has everything to do with the mo-
lecular revolution, which, beginning in the 1950s, stretches into the present.
My claim is that much of Deleuze and Guattari’s work expresses an effec-
tive concern to see the liberalisation of drugs (and primarily illicit drugs)—
even if the authors have intended to express no such concern. Just this con-
cern, for instance, is reflected in their recurrent valorisation of their tropaic 
Body Without Organs (the “BwO”), which—traceable to other alternative or 
anormative bodies, such as, for one, the “drugged body” of Antonin Artaud—
gives itself over to the intoxication of desire almost as readily as Artaud him-
self actually gave his body over to the intoxication of mescaline. The authors 
commend Artaud, and similarly laud Henri Michaux, whose ability to discon-
nect hallucinatory experience from “the question of causality with respect to 
drugs,” allows Deleuze and Guattari to fabricate a philosophy of wild creation, 
apprehending the world less as structural system than mutating specter. 81 
79 Guattari, Chaosmosis, 3.
80 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 227, 248.
81 Ibid. On the “drugged body” see 165; on Michaux and Artaud, see 283-5.
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To perform on Dick and Huxley the same kind of analysis would be to 
attend to the way in which these authors similarly reconstitute their bod-
ies as sites of disorder, and engage in such a “becomings-molecular.” But as 
with Deleuze and Guattari, both Dick and Huxley often devalue biochemical 
causation at they same time as they privilege the imaginative experiences 
that drugs induce; all four writers, different though they are, would seem 
to agree on the notion that, while particular compounds or narratives can 
elicit these exceptional affects, these affects’s phenomenology is no more 
important than their historical aetiology—than the systems, that is, that 
have served to produce and elicit them.
In certain passages of A Thousand Plateaus the authors condemn “drugs” 
for being “too unwieldy.” Far from enabling us to overcome our “inability 
to grasp the imperceptible and the becoming-imperceptible,” drugs do no 
more than reproduce the question for which they were presumed the an-
swer: “drug users believed that drugs would grant them the plane [of consis-
tency but] the plane must distill its own drugs, remaining master of speeds 
and proximities.” 82 But the origin of Deleuze and Guattari’s pessimism about 
drugs’s revelatory potential remains less clear than this line would suggest; 
and their observation is here expressed in the past tense as if, with the pass-
ing of the 1980s, so vanished the faithfulness they impute to drug users. 
In other words, it remains arguable that Deleuze and Guattari’s pes-
simistic imputations demonstrate their acknowledgment of a notion that 
was already apparent in the inaugural years of late capitalism, only one year 
after Lyotard’s “Report On Knowledge,” The Postmodern Condition: that all 
drugs could be recognised only as simulations of subjective processeses and 
self-therapising medicaments. 83 And since drugs are now seen as chimerical 
agents rather than as legitimate biochemical therapies, it is also possible to 
imagine that Deleuze and Guattari, should they have ever reflected on such 
figures as Huxley and Dick, would have done so only to promptly disendorse 
their literatures, along with these writers’s faith in the potential, good or bad, 
of drugs. 
While Deleuze in particular expresses some caution about championing 
the use of drugs, his trepidation on the drug question seems, as Dave Boo-
throyd notes, to constitute an uncharacteristic resilement from an otherwise 
unblemished history of truth-seeking: 
82 Ibid., 286.
83 See Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report On Knowledge (Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
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It is hard to imagine that... Deleuze might be genuinely concerned with what 
people think of them [he and Foucault], in the sense of incurring bourgeois 
disapproval, for being illicit drugs into a discussion of the philosophical pur-
suit of truth and for considering the philosophical significance of the effects 
and experience of such drugs.
Yet, that Deleuze is open to theorising about drugs remains an arguable 
proposition—even if we acknowledge that he at one time feels compelled to 
respond unfavourably (or quizzically) to Foucault’s scholarship on LSD and 
opium. 84 Read in its totality, there can be little doubt that the Deleuze and 
Guattari’s co-written volumes ultimately work to advocate for the kinds of 
disruptions in the “play of Reason” that drugs, for one, elicit—even if they 
baulk at the kinds of biochemical powers that these drugs might also at the 
same time exert. 
Indirect evidence of Deleuze’s ultimate veneration of the chaos initiated 
by drugs, for instance, appears in various of his ratiocinations in The Logic of 
Sense. Boothroyd tracks Deleuze’s valorisation of theatrical performance in 
this book, and writes of it as a “mimetic” and “perverse” experiment—and 
an endorsement of drugs equally as important as Foucault’s more explicit 
description of acid’s effects. 85 The same is true of much of Guattari’s writing, 
including that in his Molecular Revolutions, where Guattari suggests that psy-
choanalysis—with all its most valuable techniques—threatens to do more 
harm, and to exert more damage, than any psychoactive substance could 
ever do. But this, as Guattari writes, is not even an accident, for the
psychoanalyst, too, tries to make his technique gentler [than biochemical 
drugs]—and ultimately more insidious. He de-guts and neutralizes every-
thing his patients tell him, thus administering a kind of subjectivity drug. 86 
Further still, Deleuze and Guattari’s repeated remarks in A Thousand Pla-
teaus concerning the potential of drugs to invest perception with desire—to 
84 Michel Foucault, “Theatricum Philosophicum” in Language, Counter-memory, Prac-
tice, tr. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1977), 165-96, esp. 191. Also see Eleanor Kaufmann, “Madness and Repetition: The 
Absence of Work in Deleuze, Foucault and Jacques Martin” in Deleuze and Guattari: 
New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture, Kaufman and Kevin Jon Heller, eds. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 243.
85 Dave Boothroyd, “Foucault and Deleuze on Acid,” in Boothroyd, ed., Culture on Drugs: 
Narco-cultural Studies of High Modernity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2006), 158-62. I will address Deleuze’s trepidation in respect of Foucault’s description 
of LSD’s effects in chapter 3. Also see Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, ed. Constantin V. 
Boundas, tr. Mark Lester (London: Athlone Press, 1990 [1969]), 202-7.
86 Guattari, Molecular Revolutions, 69.
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molecularise it and to enable a new kind of “becoming” (such as in those 
lines I have quoted as an epigraph at the beginning of this chapter)—consti-
tute these authors’s clear endorsement of drugs’s productive potential. 
It is an endorsement made all the more resounding when one reads the 
pair to suggest not only that drugs may be utilised or instrumentalised as 
adjuncts to therapy, but deployed as spurs to the same “rhizomic” or “abores-
cent” trajectories—to the same lines of flight—that the authors have already 
so readily compelled their readers to adopt, or at least to imagine adopting, 
as one legitimate pathway that has been taken by others before them. 87
In other words, drugs can serve a purpose largely consistent with the 
aims of Deleuze and Guattari’s work, which itself serves as a kind of meta-
morphosed expression of what are at least partly Huxley’s and Dick’s goals 
too. For, as Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly emphasise, “schizoanalysis”—
which the authors introduce in Anti-Oedipus—is an analytic that seeks to 
disalign the coordinates within which almost all the perceptions of the sub-
ject have conventionally proceeded. Now encountered both from within and 
without, the subject will be interrogated from all angles, and in the context 
of all histories. 88 Guattari will elaborate on the schizoanalyst’s particular 
procedure in Chaosmosis, where he notes that “rather than moving in the 
direction of reductionist modelisations, which simplify the complex,” schi-
zoanalysis privileges “complexification”—so, if its “works” at all, it does so 
ever “towards its [own] ontological heterogeneity.” 89 
In Anti-Oedipus, the task of reaching or observing a “plane of consisten-
cy”—a point of complexity that is equally an experience of ontological for-
titude as an expression of chaotic mentation—is allegorised as a process of 
path selection. One must choose, they write, from among a “row of doors,” 
and locate in one an entry point that “provides a means of eliminating 
the empty and cancerous bodies that rival the body without organs.” An-
ticipating the very “door” (or “doors”) of perception through which Huxley 
would himself enter in his own aborescent mescaline intoxication, the pair’s 
analogy also proposes that, so as to find one’s bearings within this plane of 
consistency, one must choose not an existing drug, but “distill” one’s own 
87 See Isabelle Stengers, “Gilles Deleuze’s Last Message,” accessed 10 May 2014, http://
www.recalcitrance.com/deleuzelast.htm/.
88  Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 273-382.
89 Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis, tr. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis (Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1995). Originally published in French as Chaosmose (Paris: Éditions 
Galilée, 1992), 61.
Molecular Correspondences 28
concoction. One must remain “a master of [one’s own] speeds,” that is. 90 
Schizoanalysis, in short, “rejects any idea of [a] pretraced destiny”; it creates 
its own doors, and its own drugs, only in order to itself then become such a 
drug. To put it more clearly, schizoanalysis is a discursive potion—an anti-
dote both to the body’s and the subject’s apparently inexorable “reterritori-
alisation” by desire. 91 
In Chaosmosis, Guattari diagrammatises his model of schizoanaly-
sis; but this model must be a metamodel, he says, if it is to incorporate 
into its own system those antecedents from which it draws—those in the 
“history of ontological formations.” To be more precise, the model must 
overcome the aporia, Guattari suggests, that is common to all those an-
tecedents, which is to say the problem of self-reference in language. Of 
course, the term “model”—and even the idea of a model—“harbors neg-
ative undertones” for Guattari, for it suggests, as Janel Watson argues, 
“the schematic reductionism which for Guattari characterizes both struc-
turalism and the capitalist axiomatic.” But metamodeling constitutes some-
thing different: a “discipline of reading other systems of modeling, not as a 
general model, but as an instrument for deciphering modeling systems in 
various domains.” Intent less on producing of a model for everything than 
a unique and particular model for each thing it encounters, “schizoanalytic 
metamodelisation,” much like schizoanalysis, creates a new “door” for each 
“row”—a new heuristic for each and every application. 92
In this way, Guattari’s models offer entry points to the impassive and, as 
he calls them, “diverse existing systems (religious, metaphysical, scientific, 
psychoanalytic, animistic, neurotic... )” of human fabrication, all of which 
“nearly always skirt around the problem of self-referential enunciation.” 93 
These systems, Guattari argues, tend to reterritorialise the subject sooner 
than they develop or crystallise in themselves. The result obtains not only in 
these systems’s inertia—nor in their theoretical redundancy—but appears 
as the egregious misapplication of these models. 
One of Guattari’s metamodels, the “assemblage of the four ontological 
functions” (see figure 1.1, below), distinguishes between discursive “Expres-
90 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 508.
91 Ibid., 13.
92 Janel Watson, Guattari’s Diagrammatic Thought: Writing Between Lacan and Deleuze 
(London: Continuum, 2009), 8-9; Gary Genosko (ed.) The Guattari Reader (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1996), 133; Jean Oury, Félix Guattari, and François Tosquelles, Pratique de 
l’institutionnel et politique, ed. Jacques Pain (interviewer) (Vigneux, France: Matrice, 
1985), 72; Guattari, Cartographies Schizoanalytiques (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1989), 27.
93 Guattari, Chaosmosis, 60-1.
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sion” and subjective (non-discursive) “Content.” In this way it offers what is 
in effect a distinction between the following bodies and languages: 
 • first, the embodied or machinic subject and its language, where that “ac-
tual (discursive)” expression in language is machinic and ordained only by 
physical conditions such as energy, space, and time; and
 • “secondly, the virtual enunciative nuclei (non-discursive)” content, where 
this non-discursive activity or “content”—or what might be understood 
simply as “thought” (be it conscious or unconscious 94)—is determined be 
what can only be presumed to be physical conditions. The conditions are 
active both inside and outside the body, endogenous and exogenous, and 
are named “incorporeal complexity” (exogenous) and “chaosmic incarna-
tion” (endogenous). 
While the above description reduces the four-part chiasmus to a dialectic, 
making the four a two, it does so to bring into sharper relief the distinction 
between the known physical conditions of the machine and the unknown 
conditions of the “choasmic incarnation.” The latter, when it produces its 
non-discursive content, generates a dialect I have simply called, for want of 
clarity, “thought.” But Guattari elsewhere calls it a “virtual autopoesis.” And 
yet, this is a language whose lexicon is unknowable because both it and its 
speaker are presubjective—which is to say they are subjectively and histor-
94 Guattari rejects the Freudian distinction altogether: 
A long time ago I renounced the Conscious-Unconscious dualism of the Freudian 
topoi and all the Manichean oppositions correlative to Oedipal triangulation and to 
the castration complex. I opted for an Unconscious superposing multiple strata of 
subjectivation, heterogeneous strata of variable extension and consistency.
 Guattari, Chaosmosis, 12.
Figure 1.1 “The Assemblage of the Four Ontological Functions,” a  
diagram from Guattari’s Schizonalytic Metamodelisation. See  
Guattari, Chaosmosis, 60.
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ically prior to their own constitutions as human objects, and prior even to 
their constitution even as “prehumans.”
While perhaps no scholar or philosopher has so rigorously attempted to 
diagrammatise consciousness as Guattari, his models do not arise ex nihilo. 
As Simon O’Sullivan asserts, this Guattarian schema 
owes much to [Louis] Hjemslev, from whom the expression content frame-
work is taken (and which is Guattari’s response to the Saussurean signifier/
signified framework in Lacanian modelisations). 95
In fact, all Guattari’s schizonalytic models represent the philosopher’s at-
tempt to proliferate, recombine, and reconstitute existing and future mod-
els of the subject; and they gesture toward a limitlessness—one that occurs 
both in time and space, and which signals or maps the infinite potentiality 
of the human. 
In their apprehension of a metaphysical formula—and when read as 
attempts to detect presentiment—Guattari’s metamodels recall Pierre Teil-
hard de Chardin’s and Julian Huxley’s post-World War II conceptualisations 
of the “transhuman.” 96 But while transhumanism appears merely as what 
Guattari calls—employing a term with a Huxleyan genealogy—an “epiphe-
nomenon,” it is also the product of certain mythological narratives. 97 Even 
in its descriptions avant le lettre by Nietzsche in The Anti-Christ, where Ni-
etzsche introduces the figure of the superman as the “hyperborean,” this 
human represents not a phenomenon in itself, but rather only an expression 
of some other desire. 98 
By and through myths, Guattari posits, the “existential function accedes 
to discourse.” It defines the “stake of ethico-political strategies of avoidance 
of enunciation,” and thus remains one of those social forces not captured, not 
metabolised, by the empirical sciences or even by the sciences of language. 99 
These mythological forces include, Guattari notes, the trinitary Christian 
doctrine, among many other broad historical doxa. And it is these doctrines 
95 Simon O’Sullivan, “Guattari’s Aesthetic Paradigm: From the Folding of the Finite/In-
finite Relation to Schizoanalytic Metamodalisation,” Deleuze Studies 4, no. 2 (2010): 
269.
96 On transhumanism, see Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man (London: Im-
age Books, 204), 239; Julian Huxley, New Bottles For New Wine (London: Chatto & Win-
dus, 1957), 13-17.
97 I deal with the emergence of the doctrine of epiphenomenology, often erroneously 
attributed to Aldous Huxley’s grandfather, Thomas Henry (“TH”), in chapter 6.
98 See Nietzsche, “The Anti-Christ: A Curse on Christianity,” 3-4. 
99 Guattari, Chaosmosis, 64-5.
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such as these that conspire against the subject, existentially deterritorialis-
ing them. Notwithstanding their crucial harmfulness, the power these doc-
trines have to deterritorialise or “stratify” the subject, which arises by means 
of their production of engrossing mythological doxa, is never really complete 
or absolute. For even a “monad’s knowledge of being-in-the-world, of a sphere 
of for-itself,” Guattari avers, “implies a pathic apprehension which escapes” 
conciousness—which is outside of the “energetico-spatio-temporal coordi-
nates” of human mentation—and so must also elude deterritorialisation. 
That is, at the point of sensing an ability to “pathically apprehend” the 
world, even the monad perceives something of its true self—its “existential 
transference [and] non-discursive transitivism.” Thus, they are enabled to 
apprehend that mise en abyme in which that subject apprehends itself, that 
recursive feeling that arises as he or she looks into its own chaotic and ex-
tra-linguistic ego. And yet, it is also the “enunciation of this transference”—
that is, the turning-into-a-language of this experience—that prevents the sub-
ject, in and by this real-world action, from ever finally knowing itself. This 
impasse arises “through the diversion of a narration whose primary function 
is not to engender a rational explanation but to promote complex refrains.” 
In an “extraordinary attack of subjective subjection,” then, presub-
jective narration is detoured through the complex refrains and codes of 
stratified determinations, much like Melville’s Bartleby, who continually 
repeats his refrain (“I would prefer not to”), and thus at once expresses 
a desire not to be lingual and disavows his own dependence on that de-
sire. 100 By “making visible the stakes of these strategies,” and by pinpoint-
ing where the “avoidance of enunciation” occurs, Guattari’s schema of 
the four ontological functions displaces, as he writes, the “logic of sets” 
that we see in both Freudian and Christian modelisations of the human. 
In substituting these models, Guattari’s schema presents an “onto-logic” 
that—like a quantum engineering manual—details “a machinics of ex-
istence whose object is not circumscribed within fixed, extrinsic coordi-
nates.” It is, Guattari suggests, a contingent and volatile deduction that 
may enlarge, reproduce, or self-destruct at any time, for it is conditioned 
by and reacts in parralel to the chimerical and insensible force that it 
represents: “the Universe of alterity with which it is compossible.” 101 
100 Ibid., 61-2; Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 336.
101 Guattari, Chaosmosis, 64-5. Guattari borrows this formulation of “compossibility” 
from Leibniz: see Die Philophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed. Carl I. 
Gerhardt, 7 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann 1875-90; repr. Hidlesheim: Georg Olms, 1965), 3: 
573; Catherine Wilson, “Plenitude and Compossibility in Leibniz,” The Leibniz Review 
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It must be acknowledged that Guattari’s critique of territorialisation in 
Chaosmosis is an analysis of those impingements on subjective liberty that it 
detects, largely, in Freudianism. Yet it is by turns staunchly oppositional to 
and reverential of Freud, an insightful critique of Freudianism’s “modelisa-
tion” of the subject that leads us right to the Viennese doctor’s own limit con-
cept and his psychoanalytic horizon: “the psychotic.” True to form, Guattari’s 
work then redeems or resuscitates this figure, exculpating and excusing them 
from the condemnatory system that has also, in part, engendered them. 102
Of course, Guattari accepts that Freud “brought about a clear enrich-
ment in [the subject’s] production,” for he offered “an enlargement of its ref-
erential constellations,” and thus produced a more complex vision of human 
social and psychosexual development—even if that development now reads 
as a crudely reductive model of their ontology. But, if we accept that the same 
“referential constellations” in Freud are also at least partly at play within 
Guattari’s signification of “the schizo,” then we are led to recall the dilemma 
of language apprehended in Plato’s Phaedrus.
The Phaedrus, which is so punctiliously reinterpreted by Derrida, re-
minds us that language is a pharmakon: to be sure, the crucial question is 
whether it is, at any one time, a toxic drug or beneficent potion. But it is also 
worth emphasising that, if it is a pharmakon, it is in any case and at all times 
also something “psychoactive.” Of course, in Derrida’s interpretation, the 
pharmakon is almost always a poison rather than a cure; and so it is in Plato’s 
text. Writing, we read in Plato, is always seemingly more toxic than amelio-
rative, for writing threatens—much as, for Guattari, psychiatry threatens to 
rob pratcitioners and patients of freedom—to “rot the minds of men,” and to 
rob them of their wits. 103 
Is it possible to think of Guattari’s analysis as a reenactment of the Plato-
nian myth of Theuth? Is Guattari’s project little more, in other words, than a 
rearticulation of the myth in which, at least on Derrida’s reading, the Egyp-
tian king rejects the word itself, seeing in it all the deleterious malevolence 
of a psychotomimetic drug? Does Guattari not now characterise writing (at 
least in the form it took under Freud’s control), no less than psychiatry, in 
10 (2000): 1-20.
102 I will return to the figure of the psychotic—and to the diagnostic description of psy-
chosis—many times throughout this thesis. I simply wish to note here Guattari’s com-
pelling emphasis on writing and narrative in the context of his discussion of schizo-
phrenia. For him, the “schizo reduction” is a language cast in “asignifying refrains 
which give back to the narrative, which [is] recast in artifice, existential narrativity and 
alterity, albeit delirious ones” (Chaosmosis, 64). 
103 See Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 98-118, esp. 100-101. 
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the same way in which it had long before been characterised by Plato: as a 
delirium-inducing poison? Writing, after all, is the very same instrumental 
power that Freud will, in an almost virtualised “infliction by inflection,” use 
to rot the minds of those men who, having returned from the First World 
War, will be so shocked and distressed that they are diagnosed as war neu-
rotics—and later, as Freud interviews them and “writes them up”—be there-
by transformed into psychotics. 104 
This transformation involved a process that, as Laurence Rickels 
notes, Freud had fabricated out of his own apparently ahistorical “myth-
ico-conceptual narrative”—a doxa borne out of the far from ahistorical 
instantiation of the Great War. After 1918, Freud will chart a trajectory in 
which what he originally named the “peace-ego” and “war ego” will, less 
than a year later, be renamed the “ego” and the “superego”—those con-
cepts so well known to modern scholars of psychoanalysis. And it is at this 
juncture too that Freud’s period-specific theorisation at the “borderline 
zone between neurosis and psychosis”—a formulation engendered by the 
profound trauma and mourning of total war—will become a normative 
schema—one under whose aegis so much more than a “war diagnosis” 
can and will henceforward be conferred. 
Of course, if “psychosis” is a “limit concept,” it is only one among a series 
of Freudian structures that resided at the pre-World-War-I limit of Freud’s 
psychoanalytic system. But all of these had been brought into focus, legiti-
mised and utilisable, by the end of Great War. Diseases, now, are less physical 
than “evental.” That is, war neurosis, or “war disease” (as it was commonly 
described), becomes exactly that: a disease occasioned by an event. As Rick-
els explains, the Great War precipitated these diseases’s “takeover” of pre-
vious models of schizophrenia. It was in the wake of this event, that is, that 
the interest and investment in the diversified structures of psychosis, group 
psychology, and perversion took over even in psychoanalysis, where, pre-
World War I, they had been left out as limit concepts. 105
While it is only in the wake of war neurosis, then, that Freud can apprehend 
the excess that constitutes the symptomatology of each and every psychopa-
104 See Freud, “Introduction,” in Sándor Ferenczi, Karl Abraham, Ernst Simmel and 
Ernest Jones, Psycho-analysis and The War Neurosis (London: The International Psy-
cho-analytic Press, 1921), 1-4. 
105 Laurence Rickels, “Giving Up The Ghost of a Fetish: Between the Couples Theory of 
Marxo-Freudianism and Nazi Psychoanalysis,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 97, no. 2 
(1998): 297-325.
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thology, once these have arisen, they can not be dismissed: in other words, 
that which has been already seen cannot now for Freud be unseen. For long 
after the war, and generations after it in fact, psychologists everywhere acted 
as if they had been compelled by some implicit Freudian dictate: that the 
show of war disease, at least as “psychosis,” must go on. Hence the lesson 
in the subtitle of Rickels’s first volume of his Nazi Psychoanalysis three-part 
series—“Only Psychoanalysis Won the War.” 106 For if among the many trag-
edies engendered by the Great War there remained any clear victor, it was 
psychoanalysis—and, more to the point, psychosis.
If Freud’s impact on twentieth-century thought is amplified by the Great 
War, then, it is an amplification that Huxley laments in his 1925 essay “Our 
Contemporary Hocus-Pocus.” 107 Decades later, Dick will similarly take up in 
various of his novels, such as in his 1959 Time Out of Joint, the aftermath of 
the war and its implications for biopolitical control. 108 But in both writers’s 
bodies of work, we discover that the effect of the twentieth-century’s World 
Wars on psychological knowledge has been so effectively compossible with 
the development of western thought that, even as knowledge of these wars 
is everywhere refracted in their books, it also remains disguised, its sheer 
scale too great to ever be totally visible. After these wars, so ingrained have 
become the doxa of psychoanalysis in the population’s epistemological con-
stitution, that Freudianism begins to constitute what Foucault calls, in The 
Order of Things, an “épistémè.” 109 
A serviceable analogy with which to further illuminate this point about 
the development of Freudian psychoanalysis may be discovered in the post-
World War II impact of other discoveries, such as those in biochemical engi-
neeering. In the 1980s, for instance, the discovery or invention of polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) enabled forensic science and cloning to become a reality. 
106 For a comprehensive historical analysis of psychoanalysis’s post-war growth, see Rick-
els, Nazi Psychoanalysis: Only Psychoanalysis Won the War, vol. 1 (Minneapolis: Univer-
sity of Minneapolis Press, 2002). For a more sympathetic account of psychoanalysis’s 
contribution to the neuroscience of subjectivity, see François Sauvagnat, et al., “A His-
torical Perspective on the Collaboration Between Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience,” 
Journal of Physiology – Paris 104, no. 6 (2010): 288-95.
107 Aldous Huxley, “Our Contemporary Hocus-Pocus,” Forum 73 (1925): 313-20; and repr. 
in Adelphi, 2 (1925): 966-74.
108 On the “inordinate number of explicit references” to Freud’s work in this 1959 nov-
el, see David Gill, “Delusions of Grandeur: Paranoia in the Life and Work of Philip 
K. Dick,” master’s thesis, San Francisco State University, 2006, chapter 1 (pages not 
enumerated), https://www.academia.edu/1759119/Delusions_of_Grandeur_Paranoia_
in_the_Life_and_Work_of_Philip_K_Dick.
109 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (London: Routledge, 2005 [1966]), xxiii, 33-4.
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PCR, as a new method, allowed scientists to amplify no more than a single 
strand (or copy) of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in an amplification process 
that then permitted the DNA sample to be, in effect, greatly magnified in a 
chemical chain reaction, one that allowed scientists to then undertake func-
tional and phylogenetic analyses of not just the sample, but the enlarged 
DNA sequence. This was a larger, some might say “semi-synthetic” sequence 
that had hitherto remained invisible, and certainly had never before been 
comprehensible as such. Moreover, PCR would also enable the entire DNA 
sequence to be reproduced, allowing for replication of the DNA to occur, and 
giving rise to what we now know as “gene cloning.” 
My point is this: Just as the amplification of DNA in the 1980s permitted 
humans to investigate and manipulate this material sequence at levels hith-
erto inconceivable, so had trauma during the Great War been amplified and 
magnified to a degree previously unimaginable. The Great War thus allowed 
Freud to see—in a new and enhanced visualisation process—as well as to 
manipulate, those formerly under-determined psychical coordinates and 
symptoms that, as he would soon discover, undergirded or constituted the 
“neurotic” and “psychotic.” 
Like manevolent scientific procedures, replete with loss, the World Wars 
permitted Freud and his colleagues to detect and psychoanalyse their sub-
jects through a new, and apparently less restricted prism. Of course, there 
can be no doubt that just as PCR is invaluable today, so psychoanalysis had 
been valuable and necessary in the 1920s. As Rickels’s historicisation of psy-
choanalysis attests, the abiding attitude was one of a collectively acknowl-
edged compulsion to—and even a public mandate for—such a therapeutics. 
At this time, those who presided over psychoanalysis’s coming into the 
mainstream—where it went ahead in such forms as “Practical Psychother-
apy”—would soon also be those who announced that every physician “must 
practice psychotherapy, whether he wants to or not.” 110
Converting Freud’s work on “war shock” into generalisable diagnostic 
protocols, mainstream psychoanalysis soon ossified into a set of axioms 
under whose “depth-psychological interpretations” always lay the limit con-
cepts of war psychosis. The array of symptoms that appeared in patients were 
now to be understood less as idiopathic or sui generis behaviours than as 
reverberations of this underlying ur-category, which could appear at any mo-
ment: as war psychosis “without the war.” When mainstream psychoanalysts 
110 Werner Kunkel, Conquer Yourself: The Way to Self Confidence (New York: Ives Wasjburn, 
1936), cited and quoted in Rickels, “DSM3rd Reich,” in Nazi Psychoanalysis, 1: 125.
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discovered that the “related symptom pictures once associated with ‘classic 
hysteria’ have all but disappeared,” practitioners would not conclude that 
hysteria itself had disappeared, however. They would deduce only this: that 
the patients’s methods of expressing the same disorder had changed—and 
that it had simply morphologised, no doubt, into more complex new disor-
ders. Where once “sensational blindness, muteness and other paralysis” had 
been commonplace, for instance, in hysterics, now “complicated intrigues, 
insidious physical ailments, hatred, scorn and sullenness” characterised the 
group of symptoms to be henceforth identified in the diagnostic interview 
with these patients—and much the same was true for the diagnosis of neu-
rotics and psychotics. 111
As I will argue in chapters 4, 5, and 6, Huxley had himself responded to 
the shock of war; he had suffered a kind of post-war trauma in the context 
of a range of great personal losses. Having already mourned the death of his 
mother in 1908 and the loss of his eyesight in 1911, the death of Huxley’s 
brother, Trevanen, in 1914, was an especially difficult tragedy for this young 
man to bear. A mentor for Huxley at Oxford, Trevanen had committed sui-
cide following what he interpreted as his unsatisfactory results in his Civil 
Service examinations—and after having ended two “complicated” relation-
ships with different women. 112 In such novels as Antic Hay (1925), Huxley pa-
rodically depicts the disillusionment felt by many after the Great War, toying 
with a theme that, two years later, he would more explicitly take up in his 
venomous dismissal of Freudianism as “hocus pocus.” 113
As with Guattari’s critique of Christian Trinitarian symbolism in Chaos-
mosis, Huxley perceives Freudianism as just another form of encoding the 
subject through a “diversion of narration.” For Huxley, the idea that 
anything so fantastic as this theory of interpretation by symbols (which are 
made to mean anything whatever according to the taste of the analyst) should 
ever have been regarded as possessing the slightest scientific value, is really 
quite unbelievable (OCHP, 317). 
When, some decades later, Huxley in his Doors of Perception (1954) will bring 
his sceptical, even-minded rationalism to bear on the question of drugs, he 
will yet again encounter the question of the scientific value of “symbolisa-
tion.” But Huxley’s own “becomings-molecular” now only confirms his belief 
111 Kunkel, Conquer Yourself, 107, cited and quoted in Rickels, Nazi Psychoanalysis, 1: 126.
112 See Ronald W. Clark, The Huxleys (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 163-4.
113 Huxley, “Our Contemporary Hocus Pocus.” 
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in the delimitations of seeing through the sedimented and “endlessly elab-
orate... symbol systems and implicit philosophies which we call languages.” 
And here he concludes that the place “which, in the language of religion, is 
called ‘this world’ is the universe of reduced awareness, expressed and, as it 
were, petrified by language” (DOP, 11). 
As I will argue in more detail in the following chapter 2, Huxley builds on 
Bergson’s “filtration” theory of the brain when he suggests that language “pet-
rifies” perception. Seeing the brain as “an instrument of analysis in regard to 
the movement received, and an instrument of selection in regard to the move-
ment executed,” 114 Bergson pays great attention in his Creative Evolution (1922) 
to the brain’s processes of selectivity. 115 Similarly, Huxley often considers the 
“Temporary by-passes” that circumvent this organ’s “reducing valve.” These 
by-passes produce, he argues, a state in which a subject is less hamstrung by 
the brain’s endogenous sensations than protected from them (DOP, 11-12). But, 
if one should seek to experience all of the mind’s sensations at once, one may 
experience a newly liberated ontology; but this may come only “as the result,” 
Huxley argues, “of the natural spiritual exercises, through hypnosis or by means 
of drugs” (DOP, 11). Nonetheless, at the end of The Doors of Perception, psychot-
omimesis, at least for Huxley, remains the descriptor best suited to the use of 
LSD, for the “schizophrenic is like a man permanently under the influence of 
mescaline” (DOP, 45). 
While Huxley offers no explicit solution to the problem of self-reference 
that I have addressed in this chapter so far—that is, to the difficulty that a 
subject encounters in their attempt to understand themselves in a new way, 
one that is placed outside their own prejudices, biases, and habits of mind—
Huxley urges that we should still accept that this is an impossibility: this “in-
tolerable selfhood,” he writes, must remain an unfathomable “Mystery.” 116
Through the first three decades of the twentieth century, the aporia of 
self-reference will be a problem faced again and again in an array of academ-
ic disciplines by scores of distinct thinkers—and not only by philosophers 
of psychologists. When the problem is taken up by mathematician Kurt 
114 See Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, tr. Nancy Paul, et al. (London: MacMillan, 
1929 [1911]), 20; also see Creative Evolution, tr. Arthur Mitchell (London: MacMillan 
and Co., 1922), where Bergson describes the brain as a “switchboard” (266). Also see 
Paul Marshall, Mystical Encounters with the Natural World: Experiences and Explana-
tions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), ch. 8, “Mind Beyond the Brain: Reducing 
Valves and Metaphysics,” esp. 237-9. 
115 See Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, tr. Arthur Mitchell (London: MacMillan and 
Co., 1922); Huxley, DOP, 11.
116 Ibid., 34, 50.
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Gödel, and then turned into a numeric equation, for example, Gödel will 
discover it to have been, at least mathematically, insurmountable or insol-
uble all along. But, inspired by the philosophy of mathematics as much as 
its procedures of strict calculus, Gödel will attempt to calculate the problem 
philosophically and theoretically, building on Alfred North Whitehead and 
Bertrand Russell’s attempt at the “axiomatization of mathematics” in their 
Principia Mathematica. It is there, in this latter work, that the authors had 
produced “valuable results in [various] regions, such as infinite number” 
theory, among other subjects that had been “formerly regarded inaccessible 
to human knowledge.” 117
By 1931, Gödel’s two formal mathematical theorems—known as the “in-
completeness theorems”—demonstrated the validity of the proposition that 
no system is internally consistent—at least, it could not be seen to be such 
without having first committed some grave epistemological or empirical 
error. Even mathematical systems, Gödel showed, could not overcome the 
aporia of self-reference without defying itself or its own rules. 118 Whitehead 
had reached much the same conclusion at much the same time; he had ar-
gued, however, that for an organism to attain legitimate self-awareness was 
a fanciful notion—something empirically unimaginable, and akin to an “ar-
gument from ignorance.” 
Whitehead would first express this view in his lectures on process and 
philosophy at Edinburgh in 1927 and 1928, but would later revise the lec-
tures for publication for his Process and Reality of 1929. Unlike Descartes, 
however, Whitehead proposes not that the body belongs to an individual, 
but to the “entire world,” which is to say to nature more generally. However, 
the “process of ‘being myself,’” Whitehead argues, “is my origination from 
my possession of the world.” 119 And so, while the claim that “the body is a 
‘possession of the world’” is a weaker one than the claim that “the individual 
possesses (as in ‘apprehends’) the world,” neither of these statements is com-
pletely false, since in both cases, we seem always to accept the claim that an 
individual possesses their body. 
117 Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica , 3 vols. (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910), 1: v. Also see notably Isabelle Stengers’s 
Thinking With Whitehead, 3, and ch. 18, “Feeling One’s World,” which deals with a 
range of Whitehead’s dicta from Process and Reality concerning the “doctrine of [the 
human] organism” as it is interposed with subjectivity or the “finality of the individu-
al.” (296). Also see Whitehead, Process and Reality, 60.
118 Kurt Gödel, “Über Formal Unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und Ver-
wandter Systeme” in Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik 38 (1938): 173-98.
119 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 81.
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In view of this situation, what is the “process” by which we are led to 
conclude that we “possess” our bodies in such a way? For Guattari, it is the 
dream of schizoanalysis that will work towards the “complexification” of 
this question, perhaps offering an answer. For Whitehead, quite similarly, 
it is through the “processual enrichment” of each individual’s possession of 
the world that we will more clearly elucidate the origins of these seemingly 
contradictory propositions. 
But what if, despite the richness and complexity of these various models 
of the mind and body, from Descartes to Guattari, this aporia that appears 
invariably unconquerable is nothing less than precisely the condition of our 
microbial subjectivity? If the genomicists are right, that is, to postulate that 
humans are constituted not predominantly by human genes, but by nonhu-
man ones, then is it also not possible that we should experience our microbial 
embodiments exactly as this inability to detect or sense parts of them? For 
should we not simply expect to be incapable of sensing what will turn out to 
be insensible? Is this not, in other words, precisely the predictable situation 
in which we experience an impotency to feel what is not biologically feelable? 
To elaborate in this way on the apparent genomic constitution of our 
bodies is to acknowledge the crucial determination of subjectivity by mo-
lecular compounds, including but not limited to drugs. It is also to char-
acterise writing—even as we do so in writing—as an agon with an interior-
ity that, more than we had previously thought, resists its own recitation. 
As with all accounts of the material or phenomenological aspects of the 
word—the semantic, phonemic, syntagmatic, or linguistic—it is prudent to 
avoid totalising claims. 
No matter, though, since what is likely to be true for the body, is not simply 
as likely to be true for all its organs: each is different, and the brain more 
different to any other of them. So while it may become increasingly apparent 
that our bodies are not fully our own, this should not imply the notion that we 
materially do not “own” or “possess” our brains. And yet, while the brain ap-
parently remains free from microbes—an organ sealed by a hermetic barrier 
of blood—it too has a history of encumbrance, albeit largely mythical or ideo-
logical. 120 And it is to that history that this final section of chapter 1 now turns.
120 On the drug-user-subject’s sensory experience of “the world of the non-human,” see 
chapter 6, “The World of the Non-Human” in Robert Masters and Jean Houston, The 
Varieties of Psychedelic Experience: The Classic Guide to the Effects of LSD on the Human 
Psyche (Vermont: Park Street Press, 2000), 151-83.
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A Grey Matter: The Brain’s 
“Latent Human Potentialities”
predating our recent empirical knowledge that the body is constituted by dis-
crete forms of life that are nonhuman, a similar notion—or what I shall call 
a “mythos”—persists in relation to the human brain. Understood as a partial 
or inchoate object, as an organ never fully utilised by its “owners,” the brain 
is considered a latent entity; and one in need, that is, of development and ex-
pansion. This mythos is often described as the “ten percent of brain myth”: 
a widely perpetuated and erroneous statistical claim that, as the locution 
suggests, humans only use approximately ten percent of their brains. 121
Often misattributed to Einstein—despite there being no record of his 
having said anything like this—the notion is also a principle that we discover 
adopted approvingly and energetically by Huxley in the last years of his life. 
So enamoured of the notion is Huxley, in fact, that it forms the foundation of 
a panegyrical lecture on “human potentialities”—one of the last talks that 
he would deliver. 122 Given before an eager audience in 1959 at the University 
of California, this lecture concerns what had become an important theme in 
Huxley’s thought—and even a “psychotrope”—during the last two decades 
of his life: that the human had not reached, and may not ever reach, its po-
tential. 123 
121 On the myth generally see Barry Beyerstein’s chapter, titled “Whence Cometh the 
Myth that We Only Use 10% of our Brains?” in Mind Myths: Exploring Popular Assump-
tions About the Brain and Mind, ed. Sergio Della Sala (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 
1999), 3-24. Beyerstein traces the history of this expression or mythos, including its 
misattribution to Einstein. He then comprehensively rejects the myth on a number 
of grounds, including on the philosophical-fallacious ground that it is an “argument 
from ignorance.” He then also points to the serious doubts raised about this idea in 
the scientific studies of brain damage, evolution, and imaging, many of which involve 
microstructural analyses of the organ. Also see Rachel Vreeman and Aaron Caroll, 
“Medical Myths,” British Medical Journal 335, no. 7633 (2007): 1288-9.
122 Beyerstein, “Whence Cometh the Myth,” 13-4.
123 Huxley focused on the illustration that we only use 10% of our brains in his 1959 
lecture at the University of California at Santa Barbara. An edited version of this lec-
ture was transcribed by Piero Ferrucci, and published under the title “Latent Human 
Potentialities” in The Human Situation, ed. Ferrucci (London: Harper and Row, 1977), 
263-73. Also see “Human Potentialities: A Series of Talks on “The Human Situation,” 
recorded live from the Lecture Hall, vol. 1, produced by Laura Archer Huxley, distribut-
ed by Giffard Associates. This recorded version is currently available from a merchant 
at “Big Sur Tapes,” with code 01101. See http://www.bigsurtapes.com/merchant.mv82.
htm, last accessed 22 April 2014. Also see Bernfried Nugel, “Aldous Huxley’s Concept 
of “Human Potentitalities,” in Literatur und Lebenskunst: Festschrift fur Ger Rohmann 
[Literature and the Art of Living: Essays for Gerd Rohmann], ed. Eva Oppermann (Kassel: 
Kassel University Press, 2006), 146-156nn2 and 3. On Huxley’s conceptualisation of 
“human potentialities” more generally, see the “Human Potentialities” series, edited 
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In the history of ideas, this mythos is a relatively recent development—
although it is also perhaps what we might call another “transhumanist deic-
tic.” It is a philosophy that expresses a more general and longstanding belief 
in the limitlessness of human potential and capability than any others. Trac-
ing its birth to early nineteenth-century debates about the localised function 
of the brain, commentators have identified the notion in the intellectual 
concourses of Franz Gall and his disciple Johann Spurzheim, as well as in 
certain strands of the phrenological science that these physicians’s methods 
inaugurated. 124 
The proposition has also been attributed to William James, whose The 
Energies of Men (1907) appears to have catalysed the widespread adoption 
of this view. In this work, James enunciates an instinct about the self that 
is also almost universally acknowledged in holy or scriptural texts. There 
is, James asserts, the possibility of some revelation of another life and an-
other space—if only we could look within, and meditate productively well 
enough on our waking consciousness. What Jung calls the “collective un-
consciousness,” and what is often elsewhere spoken of in terms of a “divine 
presence,” is for James to be found within our own bodies—in our human 
“resources.” 125
While Professor of Philosophy at Harvard, James wrote that 
Compared with what we ought to be, we are only half awake... We are making 
use of only a small part of our possible mental and physical resources. 126 
by Nugel, and published by LIT Verlag.
124 On the contributions of these eighteenth-century physicians to neuroscience through 
such surgical methods as cranial palpation, see Donald Simpson, “Phrenology and 
the Neurosciences: Contributions of F.J. Gall and J.G. Spurzheim,” ANZ Journal of Sur-
gery 75 (2005): 475-82.
125 In Carl Jung’s The Red Book, Jung continually speaks of a “spirit of the depths” and 
“of the time” that shows him that what he speaks what he is “is madness.” For Jung, 
as for Dick, the other can appear without warning or welcome. See Jung, The Red 
Book (Originally titled Liber Novus [The New Book]), ed. Sonu Shamdasani (New York: 
The Philemon Foundation and W.W. Norton, 2009), esp. 229-31. I agree with Andreas 
Schule, who describes the “divine presence” trope as the “Sprachspiel” or “language 
game” of Christianity. However, Schule also argues, contrary to Aristotle’s and Hegel’s 
ideas about the Spirit, that this doctrine functions in a way that offsets the focalisa-
tion of an individual’s perception through their own limited perspective, and enables 
a larger enactment of selflessness, owing to the fact that it is not “associated with any 
form of self-reference.” See Andreas Schule, “The Spirit of YHWH and the Aura d Divine 
Presence,” Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology 66, no. 1 (2012): 16-28, 17-8; cf. 
Rolston’s comparison of molecular biology and the Spirit of God in: Holmes Rolston, 
III, “Evolutionary History and Divine Presence,” Theology Today 55, no. 3 (1998): 415-34.
126 William James, The Energies of Men (New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1914), 14.
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Perhaps it was owing to this apparently prodigious apprehension of the 
infinite that Whitehead would think of James as having put a stop to the 
self-reflective problem—that “tradition inaugurated by Locke and Descartes, 
then pushed to the limits by Kant.” This was the long tradition whose obsses-
sive concern was, in Whitehead’s words, with “reflexive consciousness,” 
and which ultimately gave in “to its pretensions to invariance.” 127 Indeed, 
in Whitehead’s introduction to Process and Reality, he defends James and 
Bergson against those who would accuse the pair of “anti-intellectualism”; 
Whitehead promotes their apprehensions of the infinite, even as Einsteinian 
physicists would seek to impede the expansion of le bergsonisme.  128
And yet, despite a promising beginning in the opening decades of the 
twentieth century, the recent advent of functional neuroimaging techniques, 
such as optical and calcium imaging, have offered precious little advances 
beyond the speculations of Whitehead and Bergson. Of course, they have 
also permitted much to be discovered; many contemporary neurological 
studies leave us in no doubt of the fact that our brains are, far from being un-
derused at the macroscale, used in their entirety—that is, at least in spatial 
terms, and over predictable temporal periods, blood circulates throughout 
all parts of the brain. 129 
Ostensibly, then, what much of the blood-circulation-based imaging and 
other neurotransmissional forms of activity mapping demonstrate is that 
almost all regions of our brains are active in every instant of our lives. 130 In 
fact, the abundant liveliness and vitality of the brain’s processes seems to in-
127 Quoted in Bruno Latour, “What is Given in Experience?” (Foreword) in Stengers, 
Thinking With Whitehead,” xii; first published in boundary 2 32, no. 1 (2005): 223-7. 
128 Whitehead, Process and Reality, xii.
129 On calcium imaging, see Christine Grienberger, et al., “Imaging Calcium in Neurons,” 
Neuron 73 (2012): 8662-885; Armand Paul Alivisatos, et al., “The Brain Activity Map 
Project and the Challenge of Functional Connectomics,” Neuron 74 (2012): 970-4; Frit-
jof Helmchen, et al., eds., Imaging in Neuroscience: A Laboratory Manual (New York: 
Cold Spring Harbor Press, 2011). 
130 See the interviewed remarks of neurologist Barry Gordon in Robynne Boyd, “Do People 
Only Use 10 Percent of their Brains?” Scientific American, 7 February 2008. Available at 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/people-only-use-10-percent-of-brain/, last 
accessed 22 April 2014. On the great challenges of the Brain Activity Map (BAM) initia-
tive, also known as the BRAIN project, announced in 2013, see Armand Paul Alivisa-
tos, et al., “The Brain Activity Map,” Science 339, no. 6125 (2013): 1284-5; Joe Z. Tsien, et. 
al., “On Brain Activity Mapping: Insights and Lessons from Brain Decoding Project to 
map memory patterns in the Hippocampus,” Science China 56, no. 9 (2013): 767-79. As 
the latter article points out, while the idea that the brain may involve the “coordinated 
activity of large numbers of neurons, or cell assemblies” has been pursued “from a 
computational and cellular perspective,” the progress has “remained embarrassingly 
limited,” 767-768nn2-9.
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voke a term that is significant in pharmacology but does not precisely mean 
this in that discipline: we are thus, we could say, extremely “psychoactive” 
creatures. As I will explain in the remainder of this chapter, the microscalar 
borderlands that divide this totality of brain activity from what might be de-
scribed as its more specific and intensive points, nodes, or sites of “psycho-
activity,” however, constitutes a terrain that can be addressed in a number 
of different ways—such as in ontological or biochemical terms, or (as I have 
already spoken of it) in terms of the philosophy of subjectivity. 
In any of these idioms, however, these borderlands appear at once both 
sublimely expansive and intimately compact. This is why the mind of a mes-
caline user can appear to be so closely analogous with the mind of a schizo-
phrenic—or, at least to Huxley and those psychiatrists who tutored him in 
their 1950s psychiatric researches, such as Humphry Osmond. 131 It is also, of 
course, why psychosis can also appear so remotely foreign or alien—a con-
ception I will address in the following chapters.
The topological illusoriness of the brain and its activity is also why, clos-
er to our current moment, Dick will be readily persuaded in the 1980s by the 
“best psychiatrist [he] ever saw” of the truth of something he would never 
have grasped on his own. The psychiatrist convinced Dick, that is, of the fact 
that the massive dosages of amphetamines he had been consuming for over a 
decade had been chemically ineffectual, even despite his having thought they 
had been effectual. That is, Dick came to accept that any alteration he had 
felt in his subjective state was simply a false artefact of his imagination—a 
self-deception, or a placebo effect. 132 This explanation had been acceptable 
to Dick even when he recalled how often he had, when using the apparently 
inert or innocuous methamphetamine, remained awake all night, writing 
frantically and attentively under the impression he had been fueled by the 
drugs. But perhaps it was precisely because of Dick’s status—an author para-
noically interested in and convinced of the mind’s own deceptiveness—that 
he could accept, with apparent glee, such a counter-intuitive, positivist, and 
materialist explanation. 133 
131 Huxley, DOP, 2 and 2n1. 
132 See Paul Williams, “The True Stories of Philip K. Dick,” Rolling Stone, 6 November, 
1975, 46-7; Philip K. Dick, The Exegesis of Philip K. Dick, eds. Jonathan Lethem and Pa-
mela Jackson (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011), 21. For further discussion 
of this, see my chapter 7.
133 See Williams, “The True Stories of Philip K. Dick;” cf. Daniel DePerez, “An Interview 
with Philip K. Dick,” Science Fiction Review 19, vol. 5, no. 3 (August 1976): 6-15.
Molecular Correspondences 44
But Dick’s preparedness to accept unimaginable propositions about the 
brain’s function is also a testament to the widely acknowledged unreliability 
of “psychoactivity”—both as a clinical index of drug activity in the brain, and 
as a description of the distinction between brain activity and inactivity. It is 
perhaps this enigmatical aetiology—this fuzzy “grey matter”—that remains 
the most unwieldy subject within the psychiatric sciences; the placebo ef-
fect, that is, remains inexplicable. Defined as the “positive physiological or 
psychological changes associated with the use of inert medications, sham 
procedures, or therapeutic symbols within a healthcare encounter,” the 
placebo effect, whose cause remains largely unknown, still yields beneficial 
results in somewhere between sixty and ninety percent of known diseases. 134 
These complex typological overlappings and intersections between the 
material and the mind sciences would seem to make problematic, perhaps 
even impossible, our arrival at a totalising evaluation of the notion of “brain 
use” as such. 135 Yet, no matter how we explain the genealogy of this specific 
brain-underuse mythos—the one in which we humans are said to use only 
ten percent of our brains—it serves as a prompt for our consideration of at 
least two related points about what this mythos does not or cannot mean. 
Both of these will have importance for the theory of the writing subject that 
I will develop in the remainder of this chapter, as well as in the theories I 
develop in the chapters that follow in this part 1. In these later parts I will 
describe an authorial figure as a “scrivener,” for reasons I will explain in 
chapter 2. For the moment, however, it is important to consider the partial 
brain underuse mythos in fuller detail. 
It is firstly notable that this mythos explicitly proposes a speculative 
conceptualisation of the underuse of our brains; it is not a theory about 
what it is we can do, or cannot do with our brains in neurological or neu-
robiochemical terms, but only about what we do, in actuality, do. While 
a great deal can be learned from the brain sciences about brain function 
and its relation to intelligence and consciousness, the brain remains a 
vast lacuna, even in philosophical terms. This is so even despite Deleuze 
134 On the benefit of the placebo effect in a majority of diseases, see Herbert Benson and 
Richard Freidmann, “Harnessing the Power of Placebo and Renaming it “Remem-
bered Wellness,”” Annual Review of Medicine 47 (1996): 194; Arthur Kleinmanm Harry 
A. Guess, Joan S. Wilentz, “An Overview” in Arthur Kleinmanm Harry A. Guess, Joan 
S. Wilentz, John W. Kusek, and Linda W. Engel, eds. The Science of the Placebo: Towards 
an Interdisciplinary Research Agenda (London: BMJ, 2002), 1-32, qtd. in Franklin G. 
Miller, David Wendler, and Leora Swartzman, “Deception in Research on the Placebo 
Effect,” in PLoS Medicine 2, no. 9 (2005): 853.
135 Although see the resources cited above at nn130 and 134.
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and Guattari’s direct efforts to explain the brain in the 1980s and ‘90s, 
and despite the writings of many other recent neurophilosophers. 
Of course, it is clear to most scholars in this field that humans possess, 
as neurobiologist Gerald Edelman notes, a “higher-order consciousness,” 
one that distinguishes us, as living organisms capable of semantic and sym-
bolic utterances, from those who experience only “primary consciousness,” 
such as dogs and other mammals. However, even so, the precise differences 
in brain chemistry between humans and other mammalian vertebrates, and 
how each has evolved, is even now difficult for scientists to precisely ascer-
tain. 136 This has probably been the result of a number of technical experi-
mental limitations, many of them probably related to the new medico-ethical 
rules of surgery, which were ratified (for noble reasons) after the Nuremberg 
trials at the end of the Second World War. But any technical limitation—the 
result of an ethical rule or otherwise—may turn out to be immaterial; for 
not only are there clear limitations on what can be achieved through im-
aging techniques as they currently stand, but—more problematically—the 
brain, which is by no means static, also seems to elude examination at the 
functional level. It escapes our comprehension, that is, even in the wake of 
functional neuroimaging such as fMRI.
A common hypothesis, however, is that those changes or adaptions that 
an individual makes in response to their “internal and external” environ-
ment, which we often call “learning” are, as Michael Arbib reports, funda-
mentally also changes in the “patterns of gene expression in neurons.” Arbib 
makes the fundamental argument clear:
The cellular architecture of the adult [human] brain includes not only the un-
derlying genotype but also the social and physical milieu as refracted through 
individual experience, and this architecture includes not only the shape and 
connections of the individual cells and the larger structures they form but 
also the very chemistry of specific cells as differential experience changes the 
pattern of genes that are expressed within each one. 137 
Edelman thinks of brains much as Arbib does, which is to say in a way that 
is also similar to Whitehead: they are organs “embodied” not only within 
the human corpus, but also within the world. The brain is situated within 
136 On higher-order consciousness Gerald Edelman, Second Nature: Brain Science and Hu-
man Knowledge (London: Yale University Press, 2006), esp. chapter 2, “Consciousness, 
Body, and Brain,” 12-22.
137 Michael A. Arbib, How the Brain Got Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
152.
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bodies and within the world. 138 And while it has been demonstrated that we 
technically “use” almost all of our brain at any single moment—which is 
to say, as Edelman notes, no brain regions are ever “completely silent”—it 
is also important to note the possibility, as I have already described it, that 
we may currently be aware of approximately only ten percent of the brain’s 
actual activity. 139 That imaging cannot yet identify to what specific use or 
uses the brain is being put in each instance of its activity means that our 
definition of “activity”—however demonstrable it is by the neuroimaging of 
blood—remains limited and unrefined. 140 
It is in recognition of these intellectual and technical limits in neurosci-
ence, and more specifically in connectomics—the sub-discipline in which 
scientists identify “connectomes” or connections within an organ’s nervous 
system—that the brain initiative, or the Brain Activity Map Project, a proj-
ect begun by the US Government in 2013, has been developed. The program 
proffers the following as its motto: “record every action potential from every 
neuron in a circuit.” 141 In another locution, researchers seek to fulfill the 
goal of “Imaging every spike from every neuron.” 142 
Another similar project begun in Heidelberg—the Human Brain Project—
aims to build a comprehensive computer model of a functioning brain; seeking 
to rectify what is ultimately a philosophical problem of the logos, it focuses on 
what the brain can tell us about the gap or interstice between the subject and its 
intelligence: that is, how it is that our brains seem to speak. 143 All of these proj-
ects may be understood, in part, to share the goal of determining the longstand-
ing problem that has always been expressed in the mythos I have explained in 
this chapter: that we currently underuse—or know not how we use—our brains.
The second crucial point regarding the mythos of the underused brain 
may be understood to be merely the residuum of another proposition, howev-
er: namely, that the human subject does not, or cannot, exercise total agency 
over their bodies or brains (a notion much elucidated in the chapters to fol-
low). Just as the body, according to a microbial definition of the body’s pri-
mary constitution,  is effectively “nonhuman,” so too is the brain primarily 
constituted by a substance about which we know precious little. 
138 Ibid., 24-5.
139 Beyerstein, “Whence Cometh the Myth,” 6.
140 Alivisatos, et. al., “The Brain Activity Map and Functional Connectomics,” 971.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 The project is led by researchers from the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne 
and Heidelberg University, funded by the European Union. See the official website, 
http://www.humanbrainproject.eu/. 
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Only about ten percent of the brain’s cells are neurons, for instance, 
those primary cellular elements involved in the transfer and processing of 
information. 144 The other nine-tenths of the organ consist of various types 
of glial cells: formations whose function, apart from enveloping, protecting 
and supporting the neurons, remains largely undetermined. But if the role of 
glial cells remains mostly unexplored, the emerging evidence also indicates 
their essential role in developing our nervous systems and maintaining the 
normal functioning of the brain. It is proposed, for instance, that glial cells 
play an important role in managing our breathing. 145
The principle to be grasped from these observations is that it may yet be 
possible to think of high percentages of our bodies and brains not simply 
as “unused,” as Huxley proposed in his 1959 lecture—or even as underused. 
Rather, brains are better understood as underdetermined, for we know not 
their precise functionality, nor even their precise non-functionality. To pro-
pose as much is to acknowledge little more, perhaps, than that we are igno-
rant of the brain’s full potential, leading us almost back to the place from 
which we began. However, another point follows from this: that there abides 
a possibility abides that this huge number of glial cells plays a role in what 
we as humans experience as thinking, information processing, creativity, 
and—most important for this thesis’s purposes—writing and scrivening. 
The “what” that writes, then, may be even more complicated than something 
we ourselves, as humans, can yet (or ever come to) articulate. 
Citing Gödel’s 1931 proof, Paul MacLean notes how, as a philosophical 
problem, every semantic and symbolic expression of logic, and even math-
ematics,“leads to the conclusion... that any complex system cannot avoid 
contradictions because of self-reference.” And, as MacLean further observes, 
it was actually Jacob Bronowski whose remarks described this philosophical 
situation. In what is a remarkably Dickian image, he observed the way in 
144 See Christof Koch and Idan Segev, “The Role of Single Neurons in Information Pro-
cessing,” Nature Neuroscience Supplement, vol. 3 (2000): 1171-77.
145 This area of brain research, however, has undergone a massive transformation in the 
last few decades. While some glial cells, such as astrocytes, were once long considered 
to play only a simple, passive, and supportive role for the neurons that they enframe 
(such as providing only conducive environmental conditions for neuronal function), 
recent research challenges this classical idea. For a summary of recent data of this 
kind see: Alfonso Araque and Marta Navarrete, “Glial Cells in Neuronal Network 
Function,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 365 (2010): 2375-81; J. K. 
McQueen, “Glial Cells and Neuroendocrine function,” Journal of Endocrinology 143 
(1994): 411-15. Also see R. Douglas Fields, The Other Brain (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2009), chapter 3: “Transmissions from the Other Brain: Glia Know and Control Your 
Mind,” 48-63.
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which the question of a system’s reality “creates an endless regress, and in-
finite hall of mirrors of self-reflection.” 146 
But let us reconsider the kinds of answers that I have proposed in the 
preceding pages—where agency, for instance, is transferred to other forms 
of life, or to non-functional material entities in the body. Even these answers 
serve less to defer the problem than they, like all answers thus far in history, 
fail to address its essential nature. For to impute subjectivity to material ob-
jects about which we currently do not know enough, much as object-oriented 
ontologists have done, is also to presume that, at some future point, we will 
know enough to confirm the reality of that subjectivity adequately. Worse 
still, it is also to neglect what evidence already exists to affirm that there 
remain, and may forever remain, physical uncertainties of measurement at 
various orders of magnitude: at the particle-scale level, for example. To think 
of the problem in this way is to conceive of the so-called “quantum limit” in 
quantum mechanics, which arises in the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, 
which I address in part in relation to Huxley’s sometimes questionable allu-
sions to theoretical physics in chapter 4. 147
Such limitations also appear as the limit faced by medical imaging 
techniques, which cannot confirm even the relative number of physical neu-
rotransmitters in our brains at any one time—let alone understand each of 
these neurotransmitters’s natures or roles in each instance of this transmis-
sion. 148 Perhaps it would only be sensible—in the face of so many impedi-
ments—to nobly admit that none of these questions is actually answerable. 
There is no adequate philosophy or epistemology of life, writing, or subjec-
tivity, we might add, that is anywhere near up to the task of this exposition. 
For who could even imagine a “supernatural philosophy”—one sufficiently 
objective and omniscient—to provide satisfactory answers to these ques-
tions? Such a science would be, as Eugene Thacker observes in his After Life, 
146 Jacob Bronowski, “The Logic of the Mind,” in American Scientist 54 (1966): 1-14, 7, qtd. 
in Paul MacLean, “Obtaining Knowledge of the Subjective Brain (“Epistemics”)” in 
Anne Harrington, ed., So Human A Brain: Knowledge and Values in the Neurosciences 
(New York: Springer), 57-70, 66. Also see Gödel, “Über Formal Unentscheidbare Sätze 
der Mathematica und Verwandter Systeme.” English edition published in 1992 as “On 
Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems,” 
tr. Bernard Meltzer (New York: Dover, 1992).
147 On quantum limits see notably Vittorio Giovannetti, “Quantum-Enhanced Measure-
ments: Beating the Standard Quantum Limit,” Science 306 (2004): 1330-36.
148 On the error-proneness of radiotracing modulatory neurotransmitters in the brain 
such as serotonin, and the ineffectiveness of this kind of imaging technique for clini-
cal diagnosis, see for instance, Ramin V. Parsey, “Serotonin Receptor Imaging: Clini-
cally Useful?” Journal of Nuclear Medicine 51 (2010): 1495-8. 
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one that was equally “as skeptical of the reductionism of the philosophy of 
biology as of the dogmatism of the various theologies of life.” 149
This would be a new kind of philosophy, in other words, sullied neither 
by religion nor embodiment, perturbed neither by the uncertainty that char-
acterises life itself nor the entropy of our material situation in human flesh 
and on a fragile planet. 150 It would require, in other words again, our devel-
opment of a science and a philosophy that is not our own.
To more probingly transcode this question so that it aligns with the 
broader aims of this thesis, however, let me ask: In the context of describ-
ing these inexorably self-referring systems of the body, the brain, and their 
languages, then, what role, specifically, do drugs and molecules play? How 
do these entities “correspond” with one another? On this score, few texts 
are more instructive—nor more quotable (it is as aphoristic as any book)—
than Avital Ronell’s Crack Wars. As Ronell argues, drugs in fact not only give 
way to new kinds of explorations of these enigmatic questions, enlightening 
what is otherwise an interior of only complexity, but they also, in some cases, 
may constitute the machines or robots that do this exploratory work for us:
Crisis in immanence. Drugs, it turns out, are not so much about seeking an 
exterior, transcendental dimension—a fourth or fifth dimension—rather, 
they explore fractal interiorities. This was already hinted at by Burroughs’s 
“algebra of need.” 151 
Elsewhere in her book, Ronell writes explicitly about those revelations about 
the body prompted by psychoactive drugs. In returning the user to a kind of 
pre-subjective state—effectively regressing them, however much that seems 
anti-Freudian—drugs enable the body to be seen for what it is: as a pound of 
flesh. Ronell explains:
When the body seems destined to experimentation, things are no longer in-
trojected but trashed: dejected. The body proper regains its corruptible, or-
ganic status. Exposed to this mutability, the body cannot preserve its identi-
ty, but has a chance of seeing this fall, or ejection, sublimated or revalorized. 
Nautilus vs. the addict. 152
149 Eugene Thacker, After Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), xiv.
150 Ibid.
151 Avital Ronell, Crack Wars: Literature, Addiction, Mania (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1992), 15.
152 Ibid., 7.
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In all of these embodied interactions, the importance of “literature” in gain-
ing access to the “question of ‘Being-on-Drugs’” is not, as we might expect, 
irrelevant. On the contrary, authoring literature is entirely essential to this un-
dertaking. In fact, it stands distinguished among the sister arts as the one art 
that may offer the preeminent and most formal strategy, the most engaging 
technique, and even the best model, for drugs’s explorations within us. 
To write of a drug experience, for instance, is thus to compose a report on 
its behalf; it is a work of correspondence: an interlocution with a molecular pres-
ence whose language is, like our own, a corporeal and embodied resonance. Of 
course, as Whitehead taught us, to trace one’s body is also to trace a piece of the 
world; and so, to compose from the body is to compose from nature—to write 
from the earth. But, wherever problems arise in this formulation, they are less 
semiological, we find, than juridical. As Ronell suggests, it is the politico-legal 
aspect of literature—for literature always insists on its own “ethical fractures,” 
giving it a peculiar “relationship to the law,” which tolerates no such fractures 
(or infractions)—that enables it to dominate philosophy and other written texts 
in its fabrication of a “drug-simulation,” and one that is also ethically fractious. 
It is, of course, also for this reason that we so often find literature to 
have been made the subject of the most insidious and persecutory restraints. 
As a kind of work that is “often the accused, [and] a breeding ground for 
hallucinogenres,” Ronell writes, literature is marked as a source of poison 
from the very start, its ethical constitution forever scrutinised, its secrets 
and potential ever the subject of surveillance regimes. 153 
Among the other ways in which literature relates to the body then, it is in 
this way too that literary writers, in this metaphorology, are the producers of 
poison, and the fabricators of toxins. That Huxley and Dick, not to mention 
William James, experimented in a real and material way with drugs, then, 
may seem ultimately unsurprising—for their literatures have been among 
the most devastatingly critical of the very ethical regimes that regulate pre-
cisely the politically critical or paranoid literature that they produce. But 
such experiments are implacably bound up with the enterprise of writing 
literature at its highest, since both writing and drug use are in the business 
of dealing in comestible or ingestible goods: they produce new thoughts 
one can swallow. And yet, alas, the question concerning the genesis of these 
works remains unanswered. In all of their similarities, then, drugs and liter-
ature remain very different thinsg. So, I know ask, what proportion of an au-
thor’s work is their own, and what proportion the product of the molecule?
153 Ibid., 11.
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Chapter Two
The Psychoactive Scrivener:  
Modelling The Writer in the 
Psychopolitical World
What matter who’s speaking, someone said what matter who’s speaking?
—Samuel Beckett 1
Mono-logos is no logos at all.
—Seán Burke 2
Is it necessary to recall the unchanging pedagogical origin of dialectics? 
The ritual in which it is activated, which causes the endless rebirth 
of the aporia of being and non-being, is the humble classroom 
interrogation, the student’s fictive dialogue: “This is red; that is 
not red. At this moment, it is light outside. No, now it is dark.”
—Michel Foucault 3
however one may wish to conceptualise the relation of drugs, on the one hand, 
and the range of questions orbiting the central enquiry “Who writes?” on 
the other, it remains certain that no simple conceptualisation of this relation 
will suffice. And equally, it seems that each time an earnest and rigorous 
attempt has been made to rearticulate the difficult question of authorship, 
the very origination of the question has been complex—almost as if sim-
plicity had been excluded from the very process of the question’s enuncia-
tion. Thus, when Roland Barthes’s essay “The Death of the Author” was first 
1  Samuel Beckett, Texts for Nothing (London: Calder and Boyers, 1974), 16; quoted in 
modified form by Michel Foucault in “What Is An Author?” in Paul Rabinow, ed. The 
Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 101-20. Originally published in 
Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism, ed. and tr. Josue V. Hara-
ri (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), 141-60.
2  Seán Burke, “Who Speaks? Who Writes? Dialogue and Authorship in the Phaedrus,” 
History of the Human Sciences 10, no. 3 (1997): 49.
3  Michel Foucault,” Theatrum Philosophicum,” 185. Emphasis on “activated” mine.
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published, it was as a design-conscious pamphlet rather than a book. In a 
special two-issue production of the “fluxus kit of criticism” titled Aspen: The 
Magazine in a Box, Barthes’s essay appeared, in English, along with a range 
of flxus-inspired works of writing and art. 4 
For Barthes, it would be crucial that the question of authorship be dis-
pensed with altogether. Intervening in what John Logie calls the “diachronic 
tussle over how literary composers compose,” Barthes’s essay addresses the 
capital-A “Author,” the “Author-God” and—deploying a term that resembles 
what I will introduce in this chapter as the “scrivener”—describes authors as 
“scriptors.” 5 The scriptor, Barthes claims, deauthorises authorship, ruptur-
ing what is the syntagmatic prolepsis of “authority” that inheres in the word 
“author” itself. 6 And it should come as no surprise that Barthes produced 
this essay for an issue of Aspen that was published in honour of “Stephane 
Mallarmé,” an issue subtitled “aka: The Minimalism Issue.” 
To be a minimalist of the late ‘60s was in many ways to reduce language, 
and even authorship, to its basic materials. If we can accept this, we can 
begin to understand why in this issue we see the French symboliste so closely 
associated with minimalism. For it is a particularly linguistic association , 
one that arises because, almost a century before Barthes sensed his “death-
ly” idea, for instance, Mallarmé had thought of the book as “a spiritual in-
strument,” and of the alphabet as an inexhaustibly material system—or, as 
he put it, as “twenty-six letters so gifted with infinity that they will finally 
consecrate language.” It was also in this earlier moment, just before the 
twentieth century, that Mallarmé postulated that it was a text’s unique com-
bination of language and “typography”—its materials—that, more than any 
single author, truly “speaks” to its readers. 7 
4  I adopt this expression about Aspen’s Fluxus project from Jill Walker, “Death of the Au-
thor First Published in A Box,” jill/txt (26 September, 2006), accessed 12 January, 2014, 
http://jilltxt.net/?p=175. 
5 While I invoke Logie here, I also note that Logie argues that scholars should move 
away from their fixation on Barthes’s essay precisely as a node in this “diachronic 
tussle.” It should be conceptualised, he says, “in it synchronic moment, in a rhizom-
atic network with the other contributions to Aspen 5+6.” But Logie himself also notes 
the essay’s imbrication in this “two-millennium-long conversation” about authorship 
and, given the appearance of his own contribution to Barthes’s “cultural moment,” it 
may be now be possible, once again, to dehistoricise Barthes’s work: to read it in and 
for its ideational exemplarity. Logie, “1967: The Birth of the Death of the Author,” Col-
lege English 75, no. 5 (2013): 493-512, esp. 497.
6  Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in Image-Music-Text, tr. Stephen Heath 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 146; Logie, “1967: The Birth of the Death of the Au-
thor,” 497.
7  Stephané Mallarmé, “The Book: A Spiritual Instrument,” in Mary Ann Caws, ed. and 
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Within only a few years of Barthes’s fluxus meditation having been pub-
lished, however, Michel Foucault would also formulate what was perhaps a 
slightly more elaborate model of the “author function,” replacing the ethos of 
minimalism with what we might understand as a cold and impersonal polit-
ical functionalism. Outwardly positivist in method, but inwardly something 
other than this, Foucault’s work sought to expose the Romantic idea of the 
singular author, which was, he suggested, only a chimerical “projection”—an 
effect of our modes of “handling texts.” 8 In this context, the process of nam-
ing, identifying, taxonomising, and classifying the author in an attempt to 
understand their “privileges” and “creative role[s]”—or to know perhaps even 
what Heidegger had called these authors’s Geists—should constitute, so Fou-
cault wrote, only a secondary endeavour in this primarily functionalist task. 
For all these matters are far less important, he would argue, than the primary 
aim of understanding the position of the subject who writes: they are an itin-
erant product, a changeable effect, and a “variable function of discourse.” 9 
With this, the concomitant disavowal of authorial “subjectivity stud-
ies” in literary criticism and theory throughout the 1980s and ‘90s—in the 
wake not only of Barthes’s and Foucault’s works, but of many linguists’s 
works—will see literary scholarship take up afresh the axiom that writing is 
a “material” practice. Throwing into sharp relief the significance of materi-
al cultures—including, as I have already discussed, the political culture of 
the author’s body—this material turn aptly countenanced what had become 
an increasingly vexatious and ill-fated contestation of the author’s rights in 
their own written works. For if authors, following Barthes, were now to be 
seen as “dead,” how were we to view the culture of their corpuses—or their 
“corpses”?
tr., Stephané Mallarmé: Selected Poetry and Prose (New York: New Directions Books, 
1982), 80-84, esp. 82. Also see Thomas H. Ford, “Poetry’s Media,” New Literary History 
44 (2013): 451.
8  Michel Foucault, “What Is An Author?” in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Select-
ed Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, tr. Bouchard and 
Sherry Simon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), 113-38, esp. 127. Notably, 
there are significant and numerous differences between the Bouchard and Simon 
translation and that by Harari. This is particularly remarkable given that the publi-
cation dates of these volumes are only one year apart, and both published by Cornell 
University Press. Also see Bernard Stiegler’s discussion of science as the suspension 
of handling—a “withdrawal of the hand”—and of the hand’s subsumption by the sci-
entific instrument: Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, tr. 
Richard Beardsworth (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 266-7.
9  Ibid., 138, my emphasis. On Heidegger’s Geist, see Martin Heidegger, “The Self-Asser-
tion of the German University and The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts,” Review 
of Metaphysics 38, no. 3 (1985): 474. 
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 Just as fluxus would demonstrate the randomness of authorship both 
in art and literature, so would there appear a hint from the 1960s and on-
ward, even among conservative institutions, that the proprietary rights held 
by authors in their materials—both under law (intellectually and morally) 
and in philosophical terms—had entered a period of “flux.” 10 For instance, 
it was precisely into this quagmire of authorship and intellectual property 
disputation that Philip K. Dick’s works would descend after his 1982 death, 
his estate—held in trust by various of Dick’s relations—now the subject of no 
end of material disputes itself. 11
Recognising a number of “legal” rights held by authors in their material 
work—such as the right to be named as the author, and to be otherwise iden-
tified with the work—Foucault’s essay on authorship conceives of writing 
as the legitimate product of its creator’s creative and material labour. But 
this kind of labour, Foucault writes, is recognisable only to those socio-legal 
institutions that serve to privilege those authors who write from within a 
state—that is, within a particular state’s jurisdiction. But, since Foucault’s 
analysis tends toward an epistemological explanation, it largely elides the 
legal-economic context in which authors can also be ignored; it does not, as 
Molly Nesbit observes, focus on the way in which author’s “function... wheth-
er the state of knowledge recognizes their existence or not.” 12 
Nevertheless, Foucault’s study also provides a model of authorship in 
which we discover a renewed focus on the author’s functionality as a subject 
of a state or sovereign power. In other words, with Foucault, we do not ven-
erate authors as capital-A “Authors,” but rather accord to them only the less 
privileged status of the scrivener; they are functionaries within a disciplinary 
apparatus. And even if this very “functionality” is—taken as an undeclared 
privilege—assumed, it is nonetheless also problematic in its own right. And 
so Foucault’s argument is one that finds support not only in the history of 
literary criticism, but in the legal regimes that scaffold writing of all kinds.
Within various present-day copyright statutes, for instance, we can trace 
the aim to ratify and preserve an authors’s “individual talent” (to paraphras-
tically cite T.S. Eliot and F.R. Leavis). 13 Protecting an author’s right in their 
10  Molly Nesbit, “What Was An Author?” Yale French Studies 73 (1987): 229 and 240-2.
11  See, for instance, Michael Hiltzik, “Science Fiction, Legal Reality,” Los Angeles Times, 
27 November, 2011, accessed 3 January 2014, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/27/
business/la-fi-hiltzik-20111127.
12 Nesbit, “What Was An Author?” 240.
13  See T.S. Eliot, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” in The Sacred Wood: Essays on 
Poetry and Criticism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1921), 42-53; F.R. Leavis, “Literature 
and Society,” in Scrutiny 12 (1943): 2-11, esp. 3. Rprt. in his Common Pursuit (New York: 
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material creations, these rules—which may afford authors certain “moral 
rights” in their works, including a protection of its “integrity” and a “right 
to attribution”—enshrine in statute what has been contested, throughout 
the history of literary scholarship in the nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries. 14 
However, it is notable that, in practice, as Nesbit concedes, these statutes 
are ordinarily enforceable only at the level of civil law—and not normally 
within any criminal jurisdiction. They thus leave the author-subject exposed 
to “invasion by other interests” outside of their control: forms of political, 
economic, and ideological delegitimisation, for example. 15 At law, after all, 
an author’s rights will only ever be “private” (which is to say a civil matter) as 
between two broad parties: the author and the party who attempts to usurp 
or bid for those rights. But if the usurper or purchaser is the author’s own 
state—or, worse, an episteme—then the matter becomes public, and unlike-
ly to be recognised by a court or law as any kind of judicable matter at all. 
Now, in the technomaterial and post-digital context of the twenty-first 
century, it is possible to identify the scholarly deliberations of the closing 
decades of our last century as symptoms of the political contestation of “au-
thority” in general—as much as of authorship more particularly. Paternal 
and patriarchal, socio-legal, castrating and “decapitating” 16: all these are the 
adjectives to be placed ahead of this authority, which had always, at least 
since Plato’s Phaedrus, been the problematic of the ossified “Word” itself. 17 
New York University Press, 1952), 182-94.
14  Under Australian law, for instance, authors hold both proprietary (copyright) rights in 
their work, as well what are called “moral rights.” While an author’s moral rights are 
often “waived,” they were intended originally to be inalienable, or unassignable, and 
include the three following rights: the author’s right to be attributed as the author of 
the work; the right not to be falsely attributed; and the right to enforce the preserva-
tion of the integrity of the work. See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth.) ss. 189-95. 
15  As Maree Sainsbury notes, while the right to exercise moral rights is “unable to be 
transferred to another person,” being “designed to protect the author’s personality 
as reflected in his or her work,” moral rights have long been extinguishable, at least 
theoretically, through the insertion of a clause in a contract that specifies the author’s 
waiver of these rights. See Moral Rights and Their Application in Australia (Sydney: The 
Federation Press, 2003), 62-3. 
16  Hélène Cixous, “Castration or Decapitation?” Signs 7, no. 1 (1981): 41-55.
17  In her tremendously cogitative essay, Cixous inscribes what is a powerful passage in 
the history of écriture féminine: 
For as soon as we exist, we are born into language and language speaks (to) us, 
dictates its law, a law of death: it lays down its familial model, lays down its con-
jugal model, and even at the moment of uttering a sentence, admitting a notion of 
“being,” a question of being, an ontology, we are already seized by a certain kind of 
masculine desire, the desire that mobilizes philosophical discourse. 
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The material-symbolics and valences of the psychoactive drug—which were 
perhaps for a time the most culturally pernicious, politically vexed, and le-
gally interdicted of cultural signifiers qua brain-influencers—can be read 
(equally with the efflorescence of feminist, queer and other minority—albeit 
largely scholarly—voices throughout the late twentieth-century), as an ex-
plosive metalepsis for a renewed—and newly generalised—resistance to this 
authority. 18 
As with the Socratic procedure in Plato’s Phaedrus, this resistance seeks 
to reinstall a dialectic of contestation, although it takes the form of a renewed 
interrogation of “the Word’s” sacrosanctity. 19 Destabilising the monologic 
writer—the singular authorial body—drugs can be thought to produce a new 
form of “dialogic speech-act.” 20 Generating an interdialogical ritual in which 
the author corresponds not with another human—nor with a human fiction 
(like Socrates), and nor even with a language-speaking entity—but with an 
often-synthesised alkaloid, drugs initiate a dialogue between the subject 
and their myriad atomic affiliations. And if, as Seán Burke argues, Socrates 
serves in Phaedrus to challenge the “intention” of the speaker or writer, then 
Plato’s text may be read as a denouncement of writing precisely insofar as 
it replicates what had become the author’s unquestioned intentions. Unre-
sponsive, potentially dogmatic, and immune to dialectical interrogation, the 
written word is now condemned for its monologic propensity—for its per-
versity even—and for its constitution of a technology that may less atrophise 
the minds of its users or authors than amplify the voices and identities of its 
aphasic apostates: it is a technic that bespeaks the minds of its non-authors. 21
Like the Socratic interlocutor, the drug that is used by an author serves 
to dialogically recenter that “self-generating, self-referential discourse” 
that David Lenson identifies in the “clinical literature” of modern science. 
Composing their written works according to an increasingly positivistic and 
empirical rule system, these clinicians’s authorial methodologies constitute 
only one half of the institutionalised “self”—albeit the self to which their 
discourses persistently refer. The other half of these clinicians’s “self” ob-
tains precisely—and paradoxically—in that subjective optic through which 
 See Cixous, “Castration or Decapitation?” 45.
18  On the disreputability of drugs generally, and specifically in relation to literature, see 
Lindsey Michael Banco, Travel and Drugs in Twentieth-Century Literature (London: 
Routledge, 2010), 4-5; and Lenson, On Drugs, xviii.
19  Seán Burke, “Who Speaks?” 42.
20  Ibid.
21  Ibid., my emphasis.
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controlled experimentations and data are believed to exclude anything that 
is, as Lenson suggests, personally significant to the author. Thus functions 
the clinical writing of biochemists and other scientists:
To enhance its objectivism, it depersonalizes the author, who is usually plu-
ralized anyway, behind a deadpan narrative whose tone implies that the data 
has been gathered and interpreted correctly. 22
It is really an erasure of authorship, then, to which—through a valorisation 
of method—clinical writing aspires. But this is a goal not simply to eradi-
cate authorial intentionality; it is also a strategy to speak both for and as a 
newly enshrined authorial-subject: as the enactor, declarer, and dictator of 
nature’s laws. 23 Of course, in a post-Enlightenment and highly scientificised 
twenty-first century, the clinical literatures of biochemistry and psychophar-
macology need not be understood as the only kinds of writing that engage 
in this mode of positivistic self-correction and self-referentiality. In fact, any 
and all writing whose labours enact the monologism that the Phaedrus an-
ticipates—even if only then to repudiate this monologism as fixed—found-
ers under the fixity of what Burke calls the “unilateral.” 24 For in “ironically” 
inaugurating this unilateralism, and in so “making the written oeuvre a 
discursive paradigm for all thinkers in the western tradition,” 25 authors of 
all kinds of writing begin a long process of sprawling recursivity. When it 
becomes newly oriented to a disipline—or even to “disciplinarity”—in the 
nineteenth century and onward, often precisely to adumbrate the battle lines 
across which a range of different authors will compete, writing will hence-
forth produce only the “simplistic attitudes” that are so “deeply rooted” in 
what Guattari—in an interview titled “Socially Significant Drugs”— called 
the “medicalized” and other “specializations.” 26
22  David Lenson, On Drugs, xi, emphasis in original.
23  A brief but insightful history of the application of laws to brains (and in physics) is 
offered in Isabelle Stengers’s “The Power of Physical Laws,” in Cosmopolitics I, 87-97.
24 Seán Burke, “Who Speaks?” 52.
25  Ibid.
26  See Guattari, “Socially Significant Drugs,” tr. Mark S. Roberts, in Anna Alexander and 
Mark S. Roberts, eds. High Culture: Reflections on Addiction and Modernity (New York: 
State University of New York, 2003), 199-208, 199. On scientific rhetoric—a subject to 
which I shall return in chapter 3—see James P. Zappen, “Scientific Rhetoric in the 
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries: Herbert Spencer, Thomas H. Huxley, and 
John Dewey,” in Charles Bazerman and James Paradis, eds. Textual Dynamics of the 
Professions: Historical and Contemporary Studies of Writing in Professional Communities 
(Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 145-169. 
The Psychoactive Scrivener 58
In this context, it becomes difficult to speak about the effects of drugs 
in any way other than in scientific terms. And so vexing has this difficulty 
become, that those who do speak of drugs outside of the domain of science 
must “be fortified, as Lenson puts it, “with an antidisciplinary attitude.” 
Dismissing all extant rhetorical orientations, scholars of narcosis must 
thus become generalists, for in making their subject the “unspeakable”—
both the subject and the substance having now become things to which we 
should “Just say no” 27—these writers on (as in about) drugs at once deem 
and prove themselves the producers of unsuitable reading. 28 Unlike those 
“written words” of which Socrates had spoken—those which “seem to talk 
to you as though they were intelligent” but simply “go on telling you the 
same thing forever”— the psychoactive scrivener speaks in a language 
whose genealogy expresses much of this very otherness and strangeness: 
that which chimerically reverberates, albeit fugitively, through the empty 
monologism of the entire Western tradition. 29 Conspiring against its power 
and its otherness, the West seems now to have failed to come to grips with 
this language, dismissing it either as conspirator or, worse still, a conspir-
acist qua conspiracy theorist. 30 
27 “Just say no,” of course, is the refrain introduced by Ronald and Nancy Reagan at the 
Reagans’s televised joint address of 1986, inaugurating the “War on Drugs,” a war 
whose effectiveness and raison d’être would remain, until the 2000s, mostly unques-
tioned (or unquestionable). An interesting study of the expression’s negative rhetorical 
valency, deploying Kenneth Burke’s work on the negative in language, appears in Su-
san Mackey-Kallis and Dan F. Hahn, “Questions of Public Will and Private Action: The 
Power of the Negative in the Reagans’s “Just Say No” Morality Campaign,” Communica-
tion Quarterly 39, no. 1 (1991): 1-17, esp. 6-7. On shifting attitudes to the War on Drugs 
over the last few decades we need only consider the legalisation of cannabis under two 
US state law regimes. On this, see Dwight Mark Anderson and Daniel I. Rees, “The Le-
galization of Recreational Marijuana: How Likely is the Worst Case Scenario?” Journal 
of Policy Analysis and Management 33, no. 2 (2014): 221-31. 
28  Lenson, On Drugs, x, my emphasis. 
29  Christopher J. Rowe, Plato: Phaedrus, with Translation and Commentary (Warminster: 
Aris & Phillips, 1986), 275d, quoted in Seán Burke, “Who Speaks?” 42. Cf. Robin Wa-
terfield’s newer translation of Phaedrus, where Socrates refers to the written word as 
being capable of doing no more than jogging the memory of those already familiar 
with the discussion topic. See Plato, Phaedrus, tr. Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford Universi-
ty Press, 2002), 275, 69.
30  Around both Huxley and Dick, for example, the strangeness of conspiracy theory 
abounds. In Huxley’s case, it is the author who is accused of conspiracy. In a range 
of books associated with the Lyndon LaRouche Organisation, Huxley is postulated to 
have been the architect or “case officer” of Britain’s Opium War, and the initiator of 
“the Aquarian Conspiracy”: see Marilyn Ferguson, The Aquarian Conspiracy: Personal 
and Social Transformation in the 1980s (Los Angeles: J. P. Tarcher, 1980), 52; Konstan-
dinos Kalimtgis, David Goldman, Jeffrey Steinberg, DOPE, INC. Britain’s Opium War 
Against The US (New York: New Benjamin Franklin House, 1978) 182n12, 213, 366-78. 
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But if we are to speak of the relationship between the author and the 
text as a binary or as a dialectic, then we must also surely wonder why this 
particular bifurcation should so often take precedence in studies of author-
ship—especially when it is so syntonic, so harmonious, with a range of other 
equally applicable, and yet largely unarticulated, dichotomies: subject and 
object, psychology and biology, soft and hard, among so many others. In 
expanding the model to account for these other forms of bilateral organi-
sation, this thesis embraces authorial psychobiographies just as vigorously 
as it seizes on the actual literary works of both Huxley and Dick. And while 
the latter half of this thesis will directly address the psychobiographies of 
only these two authors, it also invests preponderantly in questions related 
to these authors’s psychopathological states, their individuated person-
hoods, and their altered or “damaged” selves in tandem with what might 
be understood as particular biographical events: the loss of a loved one, the 
tensions of marriage, and so on. Its concern, in other words, is to identify 
what is most important in the lives of Huxley and Dick in relation to their 
fictions, but not to draw the line simply there. If this thesis may be regarded 
as overselective in the authors it examines—or too restrictive—it does, in its 
defence, also aim to remain cognisant of these figures’s representativeness of 
all kinds of authors; it proposes ways, that is, in which these authors’s works 
can encapsulate the historical narrative of authorship itself. 
The chapters in part 2 will also particularise the work of this and the fol-
lowing chapter, which treats psychopathology not as aberrant but as another 
way of being in the world—however much such a claim may seem inimical to 
certain politico-philosophies of public health, or even to those intellectuals 
Also see Criton Zoakos, “The Aquarian Conspiracy’s Road to George Orwell’s 1984,” 
Executive Intelligence Review 7 (1980): 19, 21-39, esp. 38. Huxley’s collaboration with the 
CIA in their mind-control Project MKULTRA is relatively well known, although there 
is apparently no evidence to suggest that Huxley was ever himself a CIA agent. This 
is in spite of the claims of Jan Irvin, who argues that Huxley was part of a CIA plot to 
drug the world. For a response to Irvin’s claims, which are broadcast in the form of 
video recordings on his “Gnostic Media” platform, see Simon G. Powell, “An Outbreak 
of Fear and paranoia in the Psychedelic Mushroom Community,” Reality Sandwich, 
5 October, 2012, last accessed 12 January, 2014, http://realitysandwich.com/162177/
paranoia_psychedelic_mushroom_community/. (This article embeds Irvine’s video). 
On Huxley’s collaborations, see Martin Lee and Bruce Shlain, Acid Dreams: The Com-
plete Social History of LSD: The CIA, The Sixties and Beyond (London: Grove Press, 1985), 
45-6. In Dick’s case, conspiracy theory is deployed by the author as a narrative device, 
such as by “drug-enhanced psi powers,” mining the “angst ridden folklore of mind 
control.” As Peter Knight argues, Dick’s fiction so conspires at the same time as it pro-
duces “the superficially more hopeful folklore of alternate realities.” Peter Knight, ed. 
Conspiracy Theories in American History: An Encyclopedia, 2 vols. (Oxford: ABC CLIO, 
2003), 1: 222-4.
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or ethicists who would claim to advance “the public good.” 31 More gener-
ally, the thesis frames authorial identity as an agon between environment 
and phylogenesis—nature and nurture—and, in the twentieth century, as 
a range of more particular contests between psychoanalysis (qua psycholo-
gy) and psychiatry (qua neurobiology). “Writing on drugs” or “psychoactive 
scrivening” now becomes the apotheosis of a history of questions about the 
origin of textuality; this history prompts us to think of works of fiction that 
are written on, about, or otherwise associated with drugs, as instances of 
fabrication in which both the subject and the object produce material ev-
idence of a certain psychological and biological interaction—an interdia-
logue between self and other, or a molecular correspondence.
As I briefly addressed in the last chapter, Ronell’s identification of the 
conjugation of literature and drugs as a relation that animates “questions of 
law” and generates “ethical fractures” permits us to see writers not simply as 
agents of a ceaseless unfolding—or as the “voluntary” effacers of their own 
subjective identities, as Foucault postulates. 32 It allows us, rather, to under-
stand writers as the producers of documents that are implacably bound up 
with juridico-legal processes; these interlocuters, always already engaging 
with the formalistic procedures of the rule of law, are nomadic respondents, 
reacting to the exigencies of “nomacracy.” 33 To understand the delimitations 
that those writers in this position face—which is all of them—however, is 
important; and on these “occupational hazards,” Foucault’s essay on author-
ship is particularly instructive. 
For Foucault, it is essential that we understand what “works” are before 
we can begin to recognise in any precise way the status of their authors. A 
second, and perhaps even more significant prerequisite, however, involves 
our specifying the presuppositions that readers bring to the question of what 
writing does. Intrinsic in these two initial acts, of course, is the assumption 
that an author’s definitive attributes—their “empirical characteristics”—may 
be vaporised or transformed in and through the process of writing, so much 
so that they themselves, as authors, may vanish “into a transcendental ano-
nymity.” And since we still employ, as Foucault notes, religious and critical 
31  On the increasingly overlying fields of the so-called classical or conservative defini-
tion of public health as the provision of health-related public goods and related fields, 
previously not regarded as part of public health’s rubric, like social work, see Jonny 
Anomoly, “Public Health and Public Goods,” Public Health Ethics 4, no. 3 (2011): 251-9.
32  Ronell, Crack Wars, 11; Foucault, “What Is An Author?” 102.
33  On nomocracy and its differences to fascism, see Luciano Pellicani, “Fascism, Capital-
ism, Modernity,” European Journal of Political Theory 11, no. 4 (2012): 394-409, esp. 404.
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methods to read a text (methods through which we putatively strive to iden-
tify these texts’s “hidden meanings,” their sacred presences), we also sustain 
the privilege of anonymity that is so readily accorded to those authors. For 
they are now those personages whose disappearance, through their produc-
tion of a text, soon becomes inaccessible in itself: a status and identity that 
is always already “subject to a set of transcendental barriers.” 34 
This impasse at the periphery between reader and author is maintained 
by what Foucault calls the “historico-transcendental tradition of the nine-
teenth century.” 35 And while the significance of an author’s name may ap-
pear to vitiate this readily apparent distantiation (the name’s recognisability 
rendering the author almost anything but anonymous), a name, as Foucault 
asserts, serves also—and perhaps only—to classify the text. That is, if it 
props up anything, it props up what he calls the “author function.” The name 
is thus less an expression of a work’s origin than its socio-legal status. And at 
least under the nineteenth century’s textual systems, the name is an always 
potentially penalistic device—at least as much as it is a mode of compensa-
tion for those participants in the text’s creation. While names have always 
partly ensured that “discourses could be transgressive,” they now also allow 
for transgressivity only so much as these discourses are trafficked among 
their reading publics as “systems of property” or as ideological products. 36 
Thus the history of authorship changed, Foucault argues, as “scientific dis-
courses began to be received for themselves,” which had already begun by the 
time the opening decades of the nineteenth century commenced, and had done 
so at least since the seventeenth century, when science had been institution-
alised as an author in its own right. Science then had become a homologous 
singularity, no longer an amorphous assemblage of individuated practitioners. 
At this point, scientific texts became enshrouded in “the anonymity of an estab-
lished or redemonstrable truth,” 37 and—where they appeared—they were soon 
imbued with a glossy patina: the indelible imprimatur of institutional laws. 
Between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries, then, scientific texts 
were not written by authors so much as enunciated by nature in what, Fou-
cault argues, remains conceivable today as their revelatory and omniscient 
narrations of truth: the voice of the enlightenment. Yet this shift within the 
sciences—from authorial to methodological truth—only amplified the need 
we still have to authenticate and to ascribe ownership to literary or non-scien-
34  Foucault, “What Is An Author?” 104-5.
35  Ibid.
36  Ibid.108.
37  Ibid., 109.
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tific works—and especially to those for which “literary anonymity is not toler-
able.” 38 Averring that the “author function” characterises literary texts most of 
all (since they are the most transgressive of texts), Foucault organises author-
ship into a schema of functionality that anticipates, at least grammatically, 
what he would just a half-dozen years later describe as the “Psy function.” 39 A 
systematic code of functionalising operations or forces that generate the tax-
onomic horizon of the author, the “author function” conditions the author’s 
status and their categorical determination. Foucault schematises the code’s 
components, enumerating the author function’s operations as follows:
(1)... it is linked to the juridical and institutional system that encompasses, 
determines, and articulates the universe of discourses; (2) it does not affect all 
discourses in the same way at all times and in all types of civilization; (3) it is 
not defined by the spontaneous attribution of a discourse to its producer, but 
rather by a series of specific and complex operations; [and] (4) it does not refer 
purely and simply to a real individual, since it can give rise to simultaneously 
to several selves, to several subjects—positions that can be occupied by differ-
ent classes of individuals. 40 
Drawing on Foucault’s insights, and in the spirit of Félix Guattari’s Schizoan-
alytic Cartographies—a book comprising no less than 75 diagrams—I want 
to suggest that the author function may be modelled or tabularised so as to 
generate a rubric through which we may more clearly identify what Foucault 
here specifies as the normative influences on a writer or author. 41
Thus, in my model below (figure 2.1), each of Foucault’s enumerated 
functions are described as “operants,” and denoted thus by the letter “O.” 
This model enables certain of Foucault’s functions to be analysed in terms 
of quantitative and qualitative variations, allowing the formulation of more 
particularised author functions, including those by non-ordinary authors— 
such as those whom I call “scriveners”—as well as other non-ordinary modes 
of authorship, such as what I will call “psychoactive scrivening.” 42
38  Ibid.
39  See Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the College de France, 1973-74, ed. 
Jacques Lagrange, tr. Graham Burchell (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 85; also 
see Mario Colucci, “Foucault and Psychiatric Power after Madness and Civilization,” 
in Michel Foucault and Power Today: InternationalMultidisciplinary Studies in the His-
tory of the Present, ed. Alain Beaulieu and David Gabbard (Oxford:Lexington Books, 
2006), 61-69, 67.
40  Foucault, “What Is An Author?” 113.
41  See Félix Guattari, Schizoanalytic Cartographies, tr. Andrew Goffey (New York: Blooms-
bury), xi-xiv.
42 One weakness of using Foucault’s model as a starting point for a model of the author 
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In figure 2.1, above, Foucault’s first function is represented as O1. This is 
an “institutional” or institutionalising force that programmatises those sub-
ject matters on which an author may write; it determines their general asso-
ciative, political, and ethical coordinates, and contours their constitutional 
and immanent impulse to commit to writing. As with Guattari’s “machinic 
discursivity,” this node in Foucault’s schema acknowledges the material (or 
immanent) engineroom of authorial expressivity: the external or worldly 
power under, and often because of which an author labours. 
is that this quotation derives from Rabinow’s translation of Foucault’s French, rather 
than the original French. It is no less, I propose, valuable and comprehensive in and of 
itself, however, for my purposes: producing a contemporary normative model. 
Figure 2.1 A Foucauldian schema of the traits of the author function. 
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Unlike John Searle’s “internalism,” which I will address in a moment, 
Foucault seems to exteriorise this pre-structuring operant, locating what is 
determinative of authorship in a place outside the body: that is, in the “uni-
verse of discourses.” In accordance with the “stratified determinations” of 
writing that Guattari apprehends as those that enable the subject to fabricate 
a “plane of reference” out of chaos, this node also dissimulates and reorgan-
ises what exceeds it: the supraphysicality of “the real” in nature, or the phy-
sis. It does this through an institutionally foregrounded dictum—whether it 
is socio-economic, legal, scientific, or similar. Through this “encompassing, 
determining and articulating” function, authors of various stripes situate 
“limit concepts,” including—as Guattari notes in Chaosmosis—the Big Bang, 
the speed of light, absolute zero, and Planck’s constant. The institutional op-
erant also brings into order the realm of mental chaos that may arise in en-
dogenous disorders—as in certain “limit” psychopathologies—or that may 
be engendered by mind-changing drugs. Classifying and semiotising these 
ineffable zones of silence—what is usually unenunciated—this operant re-
configures these artefacts and phenomena as facts, constants, and laws. 43
The second operant (O2) functions as a “historicising” force, determin-
ing the status of an author’s work in accordance with the abiding epistemic 
or paradigmatic history in which its composition takes place. Here the “au-
thor’s name” becomes an emblem that “must be received in a certain mode 
and that, in a given culture, must receive a certain status.” 44 Concerned with 
what may be described as the systemic, nationalistic, geopolitical, epistemo-
logical, and ideological foundations of particular periodisations in time, this 
function is rarely fully perceptible at the time in which an author composes 
their work; it requires, rather, what may be named “archival” knowledges or 
researches, and must exhibit the “variety and complexity of generic practices 
across history.” 45
43  Guattari, Chaosmosis, 54; cf. Philip Goodchild, Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction 
to the Politics of Desire (London: SAGE, 1996), 69. In psychiatry studies, the expres-
sion “limit concept” describes those psychopatholgies, such as schizophrenia, which 
are defined by their place at the limit of classificatory definition. See, for instance, 
Laurence Rickels: “Act Out/Turn On: The More Complete Aversion,” in Acting Out in 
Groups, ed. Rickels (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 122. 
44  See on historicistic literary studies Margaret Cohen, “Narratology in the Archive of 
Literature,” Representations 108, no. 1 (2009): 51-75, esp. 51.
45  Gianfranco Denes offers a concise summary of the transition of gestural performanc-
es, or gestures, into language in Talking Heads: The Neuroscience of Language (New 
York: Psychology Press, 2009), 12-17. For a comprehensive analysis of the various as-
pects of the literature of dynamic language organisation, see Helmut Schnelle, Lan-
guage in the Brain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 181-212.
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The third operant (O3), which I call the “technomaterial labourial” op-
erant, functions in two ways. First, it determines the author’s work through 
a series of interiorised or embodied (biological-endogenous) mental and 
physical performances (“endoperformances”). These relate to processes of 
thought-into-language composition (“parsing”), and I call these process-per-
formances “endoperformative parsing” (EnP). Second, this operant initiates 
a string of exteriorised and gestural performances of a technical and tech-
nological nature, which give way to two further kinds of performance. The 
first of these is an immaterial cognitive writing praxis (CP), one that has 
been learned by the author, and involves semantic, lexical, grammatical, 
orthographic, syntagmatic, graphemic knowledges, such as spelling, capi-
talisation, structural phrasing, and the like. The second of these involves 
skilfully engaging with material composition technologies—such as pens, 
typewriters, computers, and similar—to perform a certain material writing 
praxis (MP). Together, these categories of process-performances, all of them 
external to the body, may be described as forms of “exoperformative pars-
ing” (ExP). 
Finally, the fourth operant (O4), which I name the “virtual-identitarian” 
operant, determines those ways in which an author and their work is creat-
ed; that is, by which the work is “risen,” referred to, and recognised. Foucault 
apprehended this operation in his description of the author-function; and 
in many ways it accords with Plato’s account of the human’s desire for rec-
ognition: their thymòs. Aware that many of us strive for recognition, Plato 
observed how important it is for individuals, including authors, to locate 
themselves within a socius. 46 The operation of the thymòs drive instantiates 
an inexorably hypothetical—and what is consequently only a very imprecise—
dialectic between socius and citizen, civic populous and private individual. 
Provisional and unknowable, this operant is virtual in the way that Deleuze 
and Guattari understand the term to consist of generalised and collective 
“surface effects,” just as those discovered by, as Deleuze notes, the Stoics. 
But these surface effects are themselves underlain by certain causes not 
necessarily coordinated with or mutually aware of themselves, but which are 
nevertheless real. The institutional and historical valorisation of authors or 
scholars, which takes place by means of a series of small procedures that 
appear only at the surface—exchanges between a prospective author among 
46  On Plato’s thymòs and the constitution of identity, see Nicolo Bellanca and Giancarlo 
Pichillo, “Identitarian Passions: The Overwhelming Power of the Human Recognition 
Need,” International Review of Economics 61 (2014): 13-38. Also see Terry Pinkard, He-
gel: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 170-1.
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their colleagues, meetings or communications with representatives of cer-
tain publishing houses—may readily determine an author’s conception of 
their status. 47 And, like Plato, Hegel understood human life to be a struggle 
for “recognition.” 48 As with the institutional operant, the virtual-identatari-
an functor is also contingent on what Lacan famously called the “Symbolic 
order.” Constituted through a set of rituals or practices articulated in dis-
course, the Symbolic gives rise to a dialectic between an author and the 
“sphere of culture” in which they participate (the space that Lévi-Strauss 
refers to as such in his Elementary Structures of Kinship). In this sphere “the 
individual always receives more than he gives, and gives more than he re-
ceives,” producing a “double disequilibrium” characterised by a tug-of-war 
between their “education” (facilitated by what I call the institutional operant) 
and their sense of “invention” (fostered through what I call their technoma-
terial labour). 49 In such a way, among others, the operants in this model (O1-
4) overlap, interact, and intersect; they generate an assemblage of causative 
specificities whose particular configurations further distinguish the sets of 
authorial modes that we may intuit in written texts.
The Workspace of the Brain 
As a general model contiguous with Guattari’s “metamodels” of the conscious 
subject, figure 2.1 organises into discrete functions a range of “worldly” op-
erants that bear upon the author and their status. Elaborating on Foucault’s 
author function, the model also permits us to comparatively envisage more 
or less specific forms or modulations in an author’s functionality. 50 Yet, as 
with all models, it may be criticised for developing an arrangement of nodes 
and indices that is as arbitrary as it is only limitedly precise. But, since this 
47  This is the “surface” of the virtuality, of the “simulacrum when it breaks its chains” 
that Deleuze speaks of in his essay “Plato and the Simulacrum,” October 27 (1983): 52-
3; cf. Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, tr. Mark Lester (London: Athlone, 1990), 4-11.
48  See Hegel’s discussion of “recognition” in the System of Ethical Life and First Philoso-
phy of Spirit, tr. George Lasson (New York, State University of New York Press, 1979), 
236n46, 236-9; Pinkard, Hegel, 170-1.
49  See David Macey, “Introduction,” in Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts 
of Psycho-analysis tr. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin 1994), xxii, xxv; Claude Lévi-
Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship, tr. James Bell, et al., ed. Rodney Need-
ham (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 30. 
50  On Guattari’s metamodels see Guattari, Schizoanalytic Catrographies, xi-xiv; Simon 
O’Sullivan, On the Production of Subjectivity: Five Diagrams of the Finite-Infinite Rela-
tion (London: Palgrave, 2012), esp. chapters 3 and 5, and 103-23; Watson, Guattari’s 
Diagrammatic Thought, 97-144 (chapter 3).
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model is tethered to Foucault’s analysis, the schema seeks to maintain fidel-
ity with the totalising and epistemic inclusiveness that Foucault’s “archae-
ologoical” thought already implies. So, if Guattari’s models are metamodels, 
then the above model might constituting a metaepistemic representation 
of the author as much as a “metamodelisation” of the subject. 51 The mod-
el does, I propose, come to grips with the Whiteheadian description of the 
individual’s “possession of the world,” which I addressed in chapter 1—at 
least insofar as it formalises that relation, and divides it into novel segments. 
Moreover, because operants 1-3 refer to what I call “worldy” operations—
namely, influences that are foisted on the author-subject “from above”—the 
model allows the author to be generalised in some ways, making them a 
figure whose status is conditioned from an outside, and reshaped externally. 
Diacritically, operant 4 accounts for the author’s independent identity, de-
marcating their individuation, and marking off a place for the author to be 
understood in their own specificity, as an idiopathic or sui generis agent.
But the model nevertheless treats the author in a way that conforms to 
Whitehead’s criterion—as a “being in the world”—comprehending identity 
formation as a secondary precondition in this important dialectical rela-
tionship between author and world (or socius). After all, authors cannot be 
cleaved, extricated, or isolated as things in themselves—for it is only within 
a dialectical circuit that authors operate: as actants in a network. 52 
The temptation to narrowcast an individual author into the “virtual-iden-
titarian” circuit, and to analyse only those ways in which the author develops 
51 Further on Guattari’s “metamodelisation,” see Simon O’Sullivan, “Guattari’s Aesthet-
ic Paradigm: From the Folding of the Finite/Infinite Relation to Schizoanalytic Meta-
modelisation,” Deleuze Studies 4, no. 2 (2010): 256-86.
52  The arbitrariness of and limitations on our models of nature, and especially of human 
cognition, are widely and diversely attested in philosophy of science. At the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, Pierre-Simon Laplace’s objections to “discoveries in me-
chanics and geometry,” and to many aspects of Newtonian physics, for example, were 
based on what Laplace saw as our inability to apprehend the totality of our own “in-
telligence”: see Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, tr. Frederick Truscott 
and Frederick Emory (New York: John Wiley, 1902), 4. Following Laplace, Gödel’s in-
completeness theorems demonstrated the inadequacy of mathematical systems (see 
Gödel, “On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related 
Systems”), and in the late twentieth-century, Bruno Latour’s landmark essay on the 
limitations of Einstein’s theory of relativity inaugurates what he will later elaborate 
as actor-network theory: see “A Relativistic Account of Relativity,” Social Studies of Sci-
ence 18, no. 3 (1988): 3-44, esp. 13; cf. Alexander Riegler, “The End of Science”: Can We 
Overcome Cognitive Limitations?” Evolution and Cognition 4, no. 1 (1998): 37-50; and, 
on Latour and science, see my “Actants at Any Depth: Bruno Latour and Henri Bergson 
at the Surface of Science,” Philament 19 (2014), http://sydney.edu.au/arts/publications/
philament/issue19_contents.html.
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a regard for themselves, is to an extent fostered by this model—and it is this 
that perhaps most represents the model’s other limitations. In any case, any 
seemingly more complex or elaborate schema of individual identity or con-
sciousness—perhaps such as those that emerge from within the cognitive 
neurosciences, or even in Guattari’s own metamodels (see figure 1.1)—are 
generally distinguishable from the above model. This is because the former 
bear little or no relation to writing practices and authorship. 53 It is in this 
context that this chapter introduces the “scrivener”: a figure who represents 
a more particularised or modulated form of what Foucault and Barthes ap-
prehended as “the author.” 
Much like the figure of the author, the scrivener is prompted to “think” 
during the act of writing; they engage in a series of cognitive practices in-
cluding what I have called exoperformative parsing (ExP). Once acquired, 
these cognitive functions—virtually automatic in human adults who have 
already acquired language skills—are lateralised to the left hemisphere of 
the brain, and remain generally unchanged throughout the adult subject’s 
lifetime—other than in cases in which a language disorder arises through 
injury or other forms of brain damage, such as by neurodegeneration. 
53  There are, of course, a number of influential models of language processing in the 
history of psychology, linguistics, psycholinguistics, and neurolinguistics, among 
other disciplines. Perhaps the most notable among these is Carl Wernicke’s original 
analysis of the functional architecture of language processing in his Der aphasische 
Symtomenkomplex: eine psychologische Studie auf anatomischer Basis (Breslau: Cohn 
& Weigert, 1974), a work that is translated into English by G.H. Eggeret in Wernicke’s 
Work on Aphasia: A Sourcebook and Review (The Hague: Mouton, 1977). Following Wer-
nicke’s model, Ludwig Lichtheim developed a variety of cognitive schematics related 
to aphasia: see Lichtheim, “Über Aphasie,” Deutsches Archiv für klinische Medizin 36 
(1885): 204-268. See also Gerhard Blanken, et al., Linguistic Disorders and Pathologies: 
An International Handbook (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1993), 238-50. For a cognitive 
model that specifies a series of discrete cognitive processes, see Denes, Talking Heads, 
42, figure 3.7. In a two-way lexical model, Denes proposes that there are five steps in 
the word processing mechanism, all of which function along a grapheme-phoneme 
system, beginning with an initial “verbal stimulus (visual)” and ending with a final act 
of “writing.” Schnelle’s functional network schema, by contrast, depicts the systems 
of gesture, attention, perception, and memory as surrounding a “global workspace.” 
In this model, Schnell adapts the model of Dehaene, Kerszberg, and Changeux, now 
known as the Dehaene-Changeuex model (DCM), and incorporates a range of different 
text types. This model is perhaps the most recent and comprehensive of them all, as it 
distinguishes between written, printed, and electronic media: see Schnell, Language 
in the Brain, 29; Stanislas Dehaene, Michael Kerszberg, and Jean-Pierre Changeux, “A 
Neuronal Model of a Global Workspace in Effortful Cognitive Tasks,” Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences 95 (1998): 14529-34. On how the DCM workspace mod-
el may be utilised in studies of consciousness, see Stanislas Dehaene and Lionel Na-
ccache, “Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: Basic Evidence and a 
Workspace Framework,” Cognition 79 (2001): 1-37. 
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Where such disorders arise—such as in expressive aphasia and alexia 
(acquired dyslexia)—the aetiology almost always relates to an originary brain 
dysfunction or a specific brain-damaging event. 54 The psychopathological 
profile of these disorders is known neither to be capable of reproduction in 
psychiatric experimental settings, nor to be reproducible by author-subjects 
themselves, such as by a non-clinical self-experiment—except where the au-
thor-subject undertakes to ingest a neurotoxic compound or drug. However, 
reported cases of drug-induced temporary language disorder have generally 
involved disfavourable medication drug interactions, and seldom do they 
involve the ingestion of only one psychoactive compound. 
Interactions between morphine and cyclosporine, for instance, have 
commonly produced aphasic symptoms; although a range of other pharma-
ceutical substances have been associated with aphasia and alexia, including 
such common substances as acyclovir: a commonly prescribed for herpes 
simplex virus, such as in cases of severe herpes labialis (cold sores). 55 Yet, 
apart from a small number of cases, it appears almost impossible to induce a 
language disorder, whether in an informal or clinical setting. In cases of neu-
rological damage, brain lesion evidence suggests that even in cases of visual 
agnosia, alexia, and in other related diosorders, language processing and 
image recognition remains possible, albeit that it is mostly unconscious. 56 
Evidence for this retained capacity appears in the various “blindsight” 
experiments that have been conducted in the last two to three decades. 57 And 
while researchers had, as early as the nineteenth century, already lesioned 
54  On lateralisation, see the neuropsychological study undertaken by Marco Catani, et 
al.: “Symmetries in Human Brain Language Pathways Correlate with Verbal Recall,” 
PNAS 104, no. 43 (2007): 17163-8. Expressive aphasia encompasses a range of signifi-
cant expression problems with respect to speaking and writing, including agramma-
tism: see, for instance, Aya Meltzer-Asscher and Cynthia K. Thompson, “The Forgotten 
Grammatical Category: Adjective Use in Agrammatic Aphasia,” Journal of Neurolin-
guistics 30 (2014): 48-68. Also see the discussion of acquired aphasia as it associated 
with Landau-Kleffner syndrome (LKS) in epilepsy: William Landau and Frank Kleff-
ner, “Syndrome of acquired Aphasia with Convulsive Disorder in Children,” Neurol-
ogy 7 (1957): 523-30, and Michael Trimble, et al., eds., The Neuropsychiatry of Epilepsy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 77, 140, 170, 230, and 248.
55  See notably Po-Chang Lee, et al., “Suspected Acute Post-Transplant Neuropsychosis 
due to interaction of Morphine and Cyclosporin after a Renal Transplant,” Anaesthesia 
55, no. 8 (2000): 827-8; Gabriel J. Martinez, et al., “Altered Mental Status from Acyclo-
vir,” Journal of Emergency Medicine 41, no. 1 (2011): 55-58, esp. 57.
56  Dehaene and Naccache, “Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness,” 5.
57 Two valuable reviews of these studies are: Basileios Kroustallis, “Blindsight,” Philo-
sophical Psychology 18, no. 1 (2005): 31-43; and Morton Overgaard, “Blindsight: Recent 
and Historical Controversies on the Blindness of Blindsight,” Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Cognitive Science 3, no. 6 (2012): 607-14. 
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primary visual cortices in animals (only to discover that visual discrimination 
remained intact), it was not until the early 1970s that post-trauma residual 
visual capacity was observed in humans. 58 The first “forced-choice” guessing 
experiments took place in 1973 and, in the following year, Lawrence Weisk-
rantz coined the term “blindsight” to describe the phenomenon in which vi-
sual stimuli could be detected by subjects who had sustained brain lesions in 
their visual cortical areas. 59 And, notwithstanding that a lack of “phenome-
nal consciousness” had been indicated by a number of these subjects—many 
of whom reported that they had not “seen” the objects—the phenomenon 
continues to be largely accepted as “plausible,” albeit that the vision so de-
scribed is also understood to be probably of an “abnormal” kind. 60
Recalling Huxley’s fixation on transcending his own partial blindness— 
the result of an infection that occurred when he was seventeen, and a prob-
lem from which he would never physically recover—these replicated studies 
of perception and residual visual capacity suggest two crucial points, both of 
which Huxley—by describing “central fixation” and “mobility” of the eye in 
his Art of Seeing (1942)—had anticipated (aos, 69). 
These are that awareness or consciousness of a specific object is: (1) not a 
prerequisite for the ability to comprehend or perceive it; and (2) not an index 
to predict the “accurate performance” of a task (reading, comprehension, 
writing) in relation to the object as against that of control subjects. Neu-
roscientific evidence of the late twentieth century suggests, however, that 
an “entire stream of processing may unfold outside of consciousness,” not 
only at a “perceptual, but also a semantic level,” permitting us to understand 
authorial consciousness as a field of identified and unidentified neuromo-
lecular and cognitive actions: to wit, the authorial world is a linguistic world 
composed of two strains—one comprehensible, the other not—of endoper-
formative operations (EnP). 61
58  See David Ferrier, The Functions of the Brain (New York: G. P. Putnam’s and Sons, 1886); 
Ernst Pöppel, Richard Held, and Douglas Frost, “Residual Visual Function after Brain 
Wounds Involving the Central Visual Pathways in Man,” Nature 243 (1973): 295-6.
59  Lawrence Weiskrantz, Elizabeth Warrington, M.D. Sanders, and J. Marshall, “Visual 
Capacity in the Hemianopic Field following a Restricted Occipital Ablation,” Brain 97 
(1974): 709–28.
60  Dehaene and Naccache, “Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness,” 5; on 
blindsight as a plausible but abnormal phenomenon, see Morton Overgaard, “Visual 
Experience and Blindsight: A Methodological Overview,” Experimental Brain Research 
209 (2011): 473-9, esp. 478.
61  Dehaene and Naccache, “Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness,” 5. I 
refer to the studies conducted by Ernst Pöppel, et al., “Residual Visual Function After 
Brain Wounds Involving the Central Visual Pathways in Man,” Nature 243, no. 405 
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In parallel with this dualism, the notion of two modes of writing—(a) 
scrivening and (b) psychoactive scrivening—may be proposed as distinct 
modes of inscription that modify the normative metamodel of author func-
tion that is expressed by operants (1)-(4) in figure 2.1. Each of these modulates 
that model by means of a number of demobilisations at the exoperformative 
(ExP) and endoperformative (EnP) levels. 
The range and extent of these demobilisations may be usefully described in ac-
cordance with the factors that Stanislas Dehaene and Lionel Naccache introduce 
in their “workspace” model of consciousness. 62 Variations in a subject’s attention, 
their information maintenance, intentionality, and combinative operations, for 
instance, may each affect modulations and operations at the level of technoma-
terial-labourial (O3) performance. 63 More significant than these particularities, 
however, is the manner in which, under Dehaene and Naccache’s model of a con-
scious workspace, subjects are led to retrospectively “label” an action either as 
(a) “voluntary” or (b) “automatic” (“involuntary”) in accordance with a generalist 
philosophy of free will; here, subjects will attribute or impute meaning to their 
actions only after, or at best at the same time as, they have been performed, thus 
forming a characterisation of them that relates to their place in a virtual-iden-
titarian schema. 64 But Dehaene and Naccache also propose that a subject has 
access to the information encoded in the crucible of their own nervous system, 
but only ever at three levels. They tabularise these areas into the following types: 
information that is “permanently inaccessible” (“set I1”); information that is con-
sciously amplifiable if “attended to” (“set I2”); and information that, as a subset of 
set I2, is actually mobilised at any and all times within the conscious workspace 
itself (“set I3”). 
(1973): 295-6; C. A. Heywood, et al., “Chromatic Discrimination in a Cortically Blind 
Observer,” European Journal of Neuroscience 3 (1991): 802-912. Diagrammatising the 
“connexions of the optic nerve to the brain,” and commenting on a variety of experi-
mental data, Lawrence Weiskrantz notes that there are “at least nine pathways from 
the retina” to the to the visual cortex that remain intact “after blockade or damage”: 
Consciousness Lost and Found: A Neuropsychological Exploration (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 127, and chapter 6, passim.
62  Dehaene and Naccache, “Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness.” 
63  Ibid. 7-11 (3.2, 3.3.1-3.3.3). On the meeting of what may be described as“effortless” at-
tention systems (if not (if not, as I have already described them, automatic systems) 
and free will (or subjective control), see Brian Bruya, ed., Effortless Attention: A New 
Perspective in the Cognitive Science of Attention and Action (London: MIT Press, 2010); 
and Ralph Pred, Onflow: Dynamics of Consciousness and Experience (London: MIT 
Press, 2005), 32-5, 297-300.
64  As the authors elaborate, free will cannot be seen as a physically innate or neurologi-
cal property: “free will characterizes a certain type of decision-making algorithm and 
is therefore a property that applies at the cognitive or systems level, not at the neural 
or implementation level”: “Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness,” 29.
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While the model’s first proposition (that which concerns the attribution 
of voluntariness and automaticity to various actions) amounts to an interro-
gation of what elseweher constitutes “free will” and “agency,” this chapter 
will engage with this question only inasmuch as it incidentally pertains to a 
scrivener’s will to compose a text. And while it is true that this proposition 
could have significant implications for addiction studies—or studies of other 
conjugations between drugs and questions of self-control—it is the second 
limb of Dehaene and Naccache’s model to which the following pages will 
more closely attend. As an attempt to account for the experience of conscious 
access, this second proposition may be fruitfully compared to Huxley’s own 
model of the human perceptual system, described as it is in his The Doors of 
Perception. Presented in figure 2.2 (above) is a diagram that refers to Dehaene 
and Naccache’s cognitive model of consciousness, and which includes the 
authors’s tripartite scheme of access (sets I1-3). 
Although these authors do not themselves diagrammatise their model, 
they note that it is itself an elaboration on Ned Block’s two-part model of 
access, which distinguished between what Block describes as “phenome-
Figure 2.2 Diagrammatic comparison of Dehaene and Naccache’s 
cognitive model and Huxley’s model of the “Mind at Large.”
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nal” consciousness, “(P),” and “access” consciousness, “(A).” 65 As models 
of conscious self-awareness, these figurations most directly address opera-
tions that occur during the process through which the author function is, in 
Foucault’s words—and in accordance with figure 2.1—“given rise to” at the 
level of the virtual-identitarian operant. Having regard to this, figure 2.2 is 
presented here to allow us to better intuit the distinction between scrivening 
and psychoactive scrivening in the broader sense of what the processess al-
lows one to intuit at the level of conscious or phenomenological experience. 
Combining these neuroscientific models with a model of the phenomeno-
logical principles articulated by Huxley, the figure elaborates on what is per-
haps Huxley’s most frequently cited conception of the mind. And moreover, 
it connects this model to its antecedents in an attempt to reorganise what is 
a rich but disparate lineage of psychotropes. 66 
Speaking optimistically of the potential of human cognition, Huxley 
adopted the view of C. D. Broad, who had already endorsed Henri Bergson’s 
“filtration” model of the mind. 67 As Huxley writes,
Each person is capable of remembering all that has ever happened to him and per-
ceiving all that is happening everywhere in the universe. The function of the brain 
and the nervous system is to protect us from being overwhelmed and confused by 
this mass of largely useless and irrelevant knowledge, by shutting out most of what 
we should otherwise perceived or remember at any moment, and leaving only that 
very small and special selection which is likely to be practically useful. According 
to such a theory, each one of us is potentially a Mind at Large (dop, 10-11). 68
Notably, Broad’s model does not suggest that a Mind at Large may come to 
know all that has ever happened in the universe; rather, he writes, it may 
65  See Ned Block: “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences 19, no. 2 (1995): 227-87. Also, on the controversy surrounding the dis-
tinction between perception and memory in cognitive science, see Block, “Perceptu-
al Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15, no. 12 
(2011): 567-75..
66  Dehaene and Naccache, “Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness,” 30.
67  Bergson’s theorisation of the mind is often described as a “filter” theory or “filtration” 
theory—a condensation of Bergson’s numerous theorisations as “filtered” appears in 
Francis C. T. Moore, Bergson: Thinking Backwards (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 27-31. On a discussion of how Bergsonian filtration may be extended to 
time and temporality, see Paul Harris, “Diagramming Duration: Bergsonian Multi-
plicity and Chaos Theory,” Intermédialités 3 (2004): 117. 
68  Huxley takes his quotation from Charles D. Broad, “The Relevance of Psychical Re-
search to Philosophy,” Philosophy 24 (1949): 291-309, rprd. in Broad, Religion, Philos-
ophy and Psychical Research (London: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1953), 23. Notably, 
Broad had earlier dismissed Bergson’s filtration model in his The Mind and Its Place in 
Nature (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1925), 334-5. 
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grasp “all that has ever happened” to the subject alone: “to him.” In other 
words, a Mind at Large cannot access information to which it has not itself 
already borne witness. It has limited “access” to information, even if the lim-
itation constitutes only a temporal non-access. 
In many ways, this specific formulation of Broad’s model corresponds 
with Dehaene and Naccache’s theorisation of “permanently inaccessible” 
information (I1). When Huxley thus elaborates on his Bergsonian view (by 
way of Broad), he affirms Broad’s tacit acknowledgment of Mind at Large’s 
limitations:
In the final stage of egolessness there is an “obscure knowledge” that All is in 
all—that All is actually each. This is as near, I take it, as a finite mind can ever 
come to “perceiving everything that is happening everywhere in the universe” 
(dop, 13). 69
It is here that Huxley concedes that the “finite mind” can only ever wan-
der “near” to a zone in which the perception of “everything” in the universe 
is possible; he acknowledges, that is, the constraints of this Broad-Huxley 
or Mind at Large model of consciousness. 70 Turning to Broad’s work, it is 
notable that Broad himself does not specify which of Bergson’s works his 
reader “should,” as he puts it, “do well to consider much more seriously.” He 
describes the “type of theory that Bergson put forward” rather, only as one in 
which “the brain and nervous system and sense organs is in the main elimi-
native and not productive.” 71 But Broad’s summary is possibly a reification of 
a range of Bergson’s claims, which—beginning in l’Energie Spirituelle (1910), 
and continuing to appear up to his The Creative Mind (1946)—are as cogni-
69  While writing The Doors of Perception, Huxley is already oriented to the emergent 
theorisation of psychotomimesis: to wit, the view that the true cause of psychosis in 
humans is an endogenous psychotogen whose structure or chemical compositions 
resembles mescaline. This is evidenced by the citations he gives in the book’s opening 
paragraphs to Humphry Osmond and John Smythies’s work on their original theory 
such as in their article “Schizophrenia: A New Approach,” Journal of Mental Science 98 
(1952): 3015-19. In view of this, what is interesting about Huxley’s description of ego-
lessness is the work of psychotherapist Meredith F. Luyten, in which she identifies the 
importance of egolessness in militating against psychological distress, and especially 
in patients diagnosed with borderline personality disorder: Luyten, “Egolessness and 
the ‘Borderline’ Experience,” Naropa Institute Journal of Psychology 3 (1985): 43-70.
70  While the term Mind at Large has been redeployed many times since Broad’s and 
Huxley’s usages of the expression (often erroneously attributed to Huxley as its coin-
er), the expression does not appear to have been used in this manner before Broad’s 
1949 usage. See, for instance, Charles T. Tart, Harold E. Puthoff, and Russell Targ, The 
Mind at Large: IEEE Symposia on the Nature of Extrasensory Perception (Massachusetts: 
Hampton Roads Publishing, 2002).
71  Broad, Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research, 23.
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sant of the notions of overflow and attentionality as they are of the “organic” 
limitations of the brain:
As the symphony overflows the movements which scan it, so the mental life 
overflows the cerebral life. But the brain,—precisely because it extracts from 
the mental life whatever it has that may be played in movement, whatever is 
materializable... secures at every moment that adaption of the mind to cir-
cumstances... is the organ of attention to life. 72
The crucial problem for Bergson is how precisely we should articulate the 
particular encounter in which an egoless “symphony” does not overflow, but 
can in fact be apprehended by the Mind at Large. Bergson yearns for a phe-
nomenological “dictionary” to translate “each figure” of “the cerebral into 
the mental,” lamenting the ineffability of these peak consciousness states. 73 
Ineffability, however, is perhaps also only a relative question, albeit relevant 
to the language employed among those “specializations” in which, as Guat-
tari notes, “simplistic attitudes [can be] taken toward the phenomenon of 
drugs” equally as much as toward the nature of consciousness itself. 74
Joining with John Searle in critiquing the “residual grip” that Cartesian 
dualism holds on philosophy, Dehaene and Naccache deride the continu-
ing essentialist philosophical tradition “according to which consciousness 
states are ineffable experiences of a distinct nature,” challenging the notion 
that some experiences are simply not “amenable to a physical explanation.” 75 
The authors’s critique of the “ineffability” hypothesis, however, applies only 
to normative states of mentation. Nowhere do they advert to the inarticula-
bility of altered states, for instance. And, just as they denounce the ineffa-
bility hypothesis on empirical grounds, the authors also elide the “mystic 
tradition” out of which, as Richard Doyle notes, the ineffability of certain 
states of conscious experience has been affirmed throughout history. 76 
The position Dehaene and Naccache later adopt also appears to con-
tradict their initial dismissal of ineffability. When they note, for instance, 
72  Henri Bergson, Mind-Energy: Lectures and Essays, tr. H. Wildon Carr (New York: Hen-
ry Holt and Company, 1920), 59; The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics tr. 
Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library of New York, 1946), 179-180. Also 
see Patricia Pisters’s discussion of Bergson’s conception of the metaphysics of con-
sciousness in The Neuro-Image: A Deleuzian Film-Philosophy of Digital Screen Culture 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), esp. 131-3.
73  Bergson, Mind-Energy, 42.
74  Guattari, “Socially Significant Drugs,” 199.
75  Ibid., 4.
76  Richard Doyle, Darwin’s Pharmacy: Sex, Plants, and the Evolution of the Noösphere (Se-
attle: University of Washington Press, 2011), 186.
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that “the “flux of neuronal workspace states associated with a perceptual 
experience is vastly beyond accurate verbal description or long-term memory 
storage,” the pair seem only to reaffirm the ineffability hypothesis as a real 
positivist-descriptivist problem. 77 This apparent contradiction takes place at 
the foreground of a continuing controversy in the cognitive sciences about 
whether the entirety of perceptual consciousness, following Bergson, does 
one of two things. 
Firstly, does consciousness “overflow” cognitive access and exceed “re-
portability”? If this is the case, the subject must retain highly intelligent perfor-
mance relations only through “visual iconic memory,” which is constituted by 
“rich contents” (the overflow argument). Or secondly, does consciousness allow 
us to fully apprehend an object in a first-order qualitative state? Here, as Rosen-
thal and others have argued, the subject is proposed to be capable of actually 
seeing everything but, being aware of seeing not all of the specific details, must 
focus on certain “blurry” artifacts, allowing specificity or access to be achieved 
through this selective and yet masterable focalisation process. 78 In this second 
model—sometimes called the attentional argument—what is considered to be 
ineffable is only a linguistic effect of being in a position of cognitive interstitiali-
ty between different states of focalisation. This is the state that obtains between 
the total “first-order” access one has to all the information, and the focalised, 
attentional perception of certain, selected materials with that totality. 79
Among the various historical, mystical, theological, and religious pur-
suits of ineffability, few have more directly programmatised the process than 
the 1960s Harvard University psychologists Timothy Leary, Ralph Metzner, 
Richard Alpert, and Michael Horowitz. Banded together in a Bakhtinian 
“parade of intellectuals and artists,” 80 the work of these exiled psychologists 
(men who were dismissed from Harvard for their efforts) dovetails neatly 
77  Dehaene and Naccache, “Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness,” 30.
78  See Richard Brown, “The Myth of Phenomenological Overflow,” Consciousness and 
Cognition 21 (2012): 599-604; David Rosenthal, “How Many Kinds of Consciousness?” 
Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2002): 653-65. 
79  It more broadly signals the distinction Huxley draws between “paranormal ways of 
action” (doing) and “paranormal ways of being aware” (knowing) in his essay on extra 
sensory phenomena: “A Case for ESP, PK, and Psi,” Robert S. Baker and James Sexton, 
eds., Complete Essays, V: 145-57.
80  Doyle, Darwin’s Pharmacy, 186. Timothy Leary, Robert Anton Wilson, and Antero Alli 
would later develop their “Eight circuit model of consciousness.” See, for instance, 
Timothy Leary, “The Periodic Table of Evolution,” in Info-Psychology: A Manual on the 
Use of the Human Nervous System According to the Instructions of the Manufacturers (San-
ta Monica: Falcon Press, 1987), xii; and Antero Alli, The Eight-Circuit Brain (Berkeley: 
Vertical Pool, 2009). 
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with the notion of the apperceived “incommunicability of the psychedelic 
experience.” The “symptom[s]” of this experience, Doyle suggests, appear 
“psychoactively” in the literature of the time—such as, for instance, in Wil-
liam Burroughs’s “cut up method.” And similar methodologies, of course, 
emerge in Dick’s writing, where machines, devices, and animals become sites 
at which randomly generated and “cut-up” narratives emerge, and through 
which psychoactive authorship amounts to the transcription of that which 
had, for many centuries, remained incalculable, unutterable, or ineffable. 81 
These new methods of writing may be understood to have appeared co-
temporally with certain literary movements—such as the Beat movement in 
Burroughs’s case, or the new orthodoxy of technophilic and technophobic sf 
in Dick’s case. But in each case, the psychoactive elements can also be cleaved 
from these movements and genres, and read as secondary elements—as at-
tempts, for instance, to re-express Huxley’s own model of the Mind at Large. 
Demobilising its exoperformative parsing functions, Huxley’s model demon-
strates that the mind apprehends all that it would usually exclude, so as to 
enact a dialectic not traceable to “the brain but to a kind of world soul.” 82 
Focused on the uses of drugs like mescaline, peyote, psilocybin mushrooms, 
and LSD, the author function, in the various social circumstances of these 
literary movements, becomes far more specialised. 
The operants involved in constituting authorship are now punctuated by 
the mobilisation of the virtual-identatarian (O4) functor, for at least one im-
portant reason. 83 Contouring the endoperformative (O3) and the virtual-iden-
titarian (social) operants (O4), the groupthink or hive mind theorisations of 
these movements are authorial formulations, concocted out of new experi-
ments within these operants, such as, for example, through the novel exper-
iments with telekinesis or telepathy conducted by Leary and his colleagues. 
These loose, hallucinogen-induced experiments, raging on in the “constant 
party” context of Millbrook—the large New York estate to which Leary and 
Alpert took their work following their Harvard dismissals—crucially modi-
fied the influences exerted on Leary, for instance, as an author. 84
81  See, for instance, my discussion of Palmer Eldritch in chapter 7. However, various 
animals, such as the “glucks” that appear in The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch, 
or machinic organisms (such as Dr. Smile in that same novel), are exemplary of this 
anthropomorphological representation of that which is psychically experienced yet 
ineffable. 
82  Doyle, Darwin’s Pharmacy, 186; Baker and Sexton, eds., “Introduction” in Huxley, Com-
plete Essays V, xviii.
83  Ibid., 186-7.
84  See notably Jay Stevens, Storming Heaven: LSD and the American Dream (New York: 
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Similar modifications had already impacted on Huxley’s author function. 
While Huxley mourned the disjuncture between “telepathy” and “industrial 
psychology” in his 1961 essay “Exploring the Borderlands of the Mind,” for 
example, he had already more broadly expressed his dismay about the new 
purposes to which the scientific method had been put. 85 While he passion-
ately believed in the value of science, Huxley also lamented the way in which 
certain positivistic methods displaced such “cosmic symbols” as “the Great 
Mother,” and maintained an exclusive purchase on our own “non-human 
environment and our own physical existence” (Mother, 345). With charac-
teristic wit, Huxley argues that both the scientific method and “Logical Pos-
itivism” can claim to be “perfectly right” when they assert that metaphysics 
is “sheer nonsense,” but only one condition. They are right, he notes, only if
we accept as self-evident the postulate that no proposition has meaning un-
less it can be verified by direct perception, or unless we can derive from it oth-
er “perceptive propositions,” which can be so verified (Mother, 344).
Recognising the importance of “diagrammatic” symbols and models, Hux-
ley also mourns their general absence. Some symbols have been exploited 
for pernicious purposes; “flags, swastikas, hammers, and sickles” have exer-
cised “a disastrous influence” on history, he notes. And yet, as Huxley avers, 
it remains true that in “symbolizing cosmic, rather than all too human, mat-
ters we find ourselves very poorly equipped” (Mother, 345). 
Urging his reader to take metaphysics far more earnestly, Huxley propos-
es that we allow the body to take over—and that we now faithfully submit to 
its cues and inclinations. As he writes,
If we admit—and in practice we all behave as we did admit it—that “the heart has 
its reasons” and that there are modes of understanding which do not depend on 
upon perception or logical inferences from perception, then we shall have to take 
metaphysicians and especially the metaphysical symbol makers a little more se-
riously. I say “especially the symbol makers”; for whenever we are dealing with 
a cosmic or subjective mystery, the verbalized concept is less satisfactory as a 
means of presentation than the pictorial or diagrammatic symbol (Mother, 344).
Grove Press, 1987), esp. chapter 17, “Pushing The Envelope,” 208-20. Also see the sum-
mary history of Millbrook in Colin Wark and John Galliher, “Timothy Leary, Richard 
Alpert (Ram Dass) and the Changing Definition of Psilocybin,” International Journal of 
Drug Policy 21 (2010): 237.
85  Also see Jerome Meckier and Bernfried Nugel, eds. Aldous Huxley Annual 7 (2009): 171-
8. Here the editors offer a publishing history of this essay, whose title they record 
simply as “The Borderlands of The Mind.”
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While Huxley directs our attention to symbols and diagrams in order to sug-
gest that certain universal experiences may be articulable (and destructuvely 
so), Dehaene and Naccache—while eschewing the notion of ineffability—also 
denounce the possibility in which we can ever come to understand the full 
contents of any one mind in all its diversity. They argue, that is, that we can 
neither know of nor generalise about the “details” of the “enormous combi-
natorial diversity” that constitutes the “repertoire of the possible contents of 
consciousness.” This is an impossibility because the constituents of any one 
individual’s consciousness are simply too idiosyncratic; even with advanced 
knowledge of an individual’s DNA (or even RNA), or functional knowledge 
of their brain activity, it is the intractable historical process through which 
their consciousness has arisen—“from the developmental process of epigen-
esis”—that makes it both so difficult to comprehend, and so “specific to each 
individual.” 86 
In essays such as “The Far Continents of The Mind,” Huxley experiments 
with investigating consciousness as an aspect of vision; he studies and spec-
ulates on the visual schematics by which we perceive all kinds of colours, as 
well as light and darkness. 87 And although Huxley is almost exclusively pre-
occupied with visual experience in these writings—as much as he is similar-
ly concerned with this topic in his Art of Seeing—Huxley also seems prescient 
of what would become neuroscience’s tacit endorsement of the plasticity of 
the visionary apparatus. Sensing that vision entailed more than simply the 
functioning of the organic eye, Huxley conceives of “seeing” more broadly as 
the optimisation of that modality of organic experience that we call seeing. 
Adverting to the attainment of a specific cortical “set” or orientation state, 
Huxley describes the “dynamic relaxation” through which so-called normal 
vision can be restored: 88 
At an early state in the process of visual re-education one makes a very re-
markable discovery, It is this: as soon as the defective organs of vision acquire 
a certain degree of what I have called dynamic relaxation, flashes of almost or 
completely normal vision are experienced (aos, 35, my emphasis). 89
86  Dehaene and Naccache, “Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness,” 30.
87  Also see Aldous Huxley, “Visionary Experience,” (190-209); “Downward Transcen-
dence,” (22-27) and “Disregarded in the Darkness,” (74-79), all in Horowitz and Palmer, 
eds. MOKSHA: Writings on Psychedelics. 
88 Elsewhere, Huxley writes of the attainment of similar visions under hypnosis: 
they are not random... What takes place in them follows patterns as logical internal-
ly as are the things seen in the antipodes of the external world. They are strange, but 
with a certain regularity (FCM, 59).
89  On “dynamical states” and psychedelics, see Enzo Tagliazucchi, Robin Carhart-Har-
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Huxley’s assessment of vision as a feature of human capability that remains 
relatively accessible—even after severe damage to the eyes has occurred—is 
now confirmed by ophthalmological neuropsychology. Retinal studies en-
able us to see not only how certain pathways that lead from the retina to 
specific targets in the brain “remain open after blockade or damage to the 
primary visual cortex” (as discussed earlier in relation to blindsight); rather, 
these studies also show that “words flashed into the blind hemifield can in-
fluence the interpretation of meanings of words subsequently shown in the 
intact field.” 90 
While Huxley was probably prompted to imagine the potential of vision 
after the accident that caused his own partial blindness, his willingness to 
explore and describe the deep visualities that he detected in non-detection rep-
resents but one aspect of his larger philosophy of human consciousness. In his 
enthusiasm for alternatives to the orthodoxies that inhered in the medical and 
psychiatric studies of his time, Huxley apprehends and responds to what he 
regards as the ossification of human potential. Later seeking an organisation 
to promote what he described as “human potentialities,” and the “nonverbal 
humanities,” Huxley’s metaphysical philosophy (his “philosophia perrenis”) 
ultimately served to promote a strict individualism characterised by a contin-
uous contemplation of and self-experimentation with consciousness, one that 
often involved direct adjustments to the dynamical state of the brain itself. 91
Partly in accord with Huxley’s views in The Art of Seeing, Searle postulates 
that what he identifies as “Fregean” internalism is demonstrated by the uni-
tary independence of human organisms. This is the notion that thoughts 
emerge from within the brain through “biological naturalism.” Recalling 
the epiphenomalistic perspective, Searle argues that “each of us is a brain 
in a vat,” and that “the vat” comprises the “skull and the ‘messages coming 
in.’” All of these messages are delivered “by way of impacts on the nervous 
system,” but for Searle, the biologically-necessary process of turning what I 
have called endoperformative cognition into an exoperformance of semeic, 
orthographic, and written language is occulted or “masked” when we actu-
ris, Robert Leech, David Nutt, and Dante R. Chalvo, “Enhanced Repertoire of Brain 
Dynamical States During the Psychedelic Experience,” Human Brain Mapping (23 May, 
2014, ePub ahead of print at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/enhanced/doi/10.1002/
hbm.22562/): 1-15. 
90  See Weiskrantz, Conciousness Lost and Found, 127.
91  Jeffrey J. Kripal offers a concise history of the later Huxley’s proselytisation of these 
ideas, which were to transmogrify into the “Human Potential Movement”: see Esalen: 
America and the Religion of No Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 86-
91; also see tpp, passim.
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ally communicate or write. The processes become invisible because in these 
circumstances we adopt a “third-person point of view.” 92 
Citing Searle’s argument as evidence for her own claims, Louise Barrett 
even more provocatively asserts that writing itself functions as a kind of in-
termediary; one that comes between two acts: the first a form of prelinguis-
tic intuition, and the second “thinking” itself. 93 As she writes, 
the act of writing is itself an act of thinking because it’s a way of using lan-
guage in a fashion that allows us to precisely order our thoughts and convey 
what we mean. The thought is produced by and through the act of writing. 
Without writing, we couldn’t have these kinds of thoughts. 94
But if writing is actually a mode of thinking, then what can we say about a 
mode of writing that is not used to order the writer’s thoughts, but as an 
attempt to encounter an otherness—that is, to examine what is not thought? 
What about a writing that conveys not so much what the writer means, but 
rather that which problematises and challenges meaning itself, such as in an 
experimental writing practice like Burroughs’s cut-up method? 
As this chapter proceeds, the expression “psychoactive scrivening” will 
signal the practice of writing on drugs, but it will also denote these other 
forms of writing. It signifies the authoring of a work while encountering 
thought in a uniquely free-wheeling or “deautomatised” way, in a subjective 
experience that may generally be characterised by its alterity, abnormality, 
or non-ordinariness. Casting a relatively wide net, this account of psychoac-
tive authorship apprehends what Ralph Metzner broadly describes as “ASCs” 
or “altered states of consciousness.” Working within a necessarily figural or 
suggestive cartography, I will use this term to allude and attend to a range of 
aspects of these non-ordinary ontologies as they affect the writing process. 
Some of these may be understood as contradictory or anathematic classes of 
consciousness ab initio; however, this will enable the analysis to be supple 
92  John Searle, Intentionality: An Essay In The Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 230; cf. chapter 8: “Are Meanings in the Head?” 197-230. Searle 
notes that his putative reliance on Gottlob Frege’s account of reference, making it a 
“biological concept,” differs quite significantly from Frege’s own non-biological ac-
count. See Gottlob Frege, “On Sense and Reference,” in Peter Geach and Max Black, 
eds., Translation from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Oxford: Basil Black-
well, 1952), 56-78. 
93  See Weiskrantz, Conciousness Lost and Found, 143; also see Huxley’s description of 
automatisation in terms of “letting go” in order to retrieve parts of the internalised 
memory in aos, 103-4.
94  Louise Barrett, Beyond the Brain: How Body and Environment Shape Animal and Human 
Mind (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011) 195, 167n34.
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enough to permit us to include modes of inscription that arise from impulses 
as divergent as “schizophrenia and creative inspiration,” and even to locate 
how these can fit into the “same general category.” 95 
In this way, psychoactive procedures—or psychoactivity—will come to 
mean not simply a form of writing undertaken while an author labours un-
der a drug’s neurochemical influence—nor simply a mode of writing about 
brain-drug interactions. It will also designate a mode of correspondence with 
both the self and the socius, as Deleuze and Guattari so describe the “social 
machine.”  96 It will consider a mode of writing in which the author—inten-
tionally or not—envisions the world as if they were intoxicated by drugs, and 
as if to address the immanent possibility of ontological and mental alterity, 
abnormality, drug intoxication, and madness—even if no such mental state 
has been reached or no such intention formed.
Subjective Undermin(d)ings:  
Deleuze and Guattari’s Brain-Subject
if we acknowledge that a great many individuals had developed, by the end 
of the First World War, some familiarity with the ontological possibility of 
madness and psychosis—even if only as de jure classifications—then the 
twentieth century may be understood to have itself inaugurated an increas-
ingly entrenched mode of apprehension, and even an episteme, one that was 
increasingly typified by subjective encounters with the “psychopolitical.” 97 
This, it may be argued, remains true regardless of whether these individ-
uals were capable of acknowledging or explaining such an encounter as such. 
95  Ralph Metzner, “Psychedelic, Psychoactive, Addictive Drugs and States of Conscious-
ness,” in Mitch Earlywine, ed., Mind-Altering Drugs: The Science of Subjective Experience 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 30. On ASCs generally, see Charles T. Tart, 
ed. Altered States of Consciousness (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1969). Notably, this 
volume also contains an interesting chapter on Aldous Huxley’s phenomenology of 
consciousness: Milton H. Erickson, “A Special Inquiry with Aldous Huxley into the 
Nature and Character of Various States of Consciousness,” 45-70, originally published 
in American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 8 (1965): 17-33.
96  The word socius is Latin for a kind of social gathering. Deleuze and Guattari use it to 
mean a “social machine”: Anti-Oedipus, 33, 141.
97  Jeff Pruchnic refers to the late twentieth-century’s “alteration in subjectivity” as the 
“Great Anti-Depression,” taking up the pharmaceutical consciousness of the post-
WW2 subject as an elicitation to the “neurorhetorics” perceptible in a multitude of 
twentieth-century literatures. Crucial for Pruchnic is that “persuasion”—the guerdon 
of the rhetorical arts—becomes, in the late twentieth century, a “material” influence, 
““chang[ing] our minds” in more than a figurative sense.” Pruchnic, “Neurorheto-
rics: Cybernetics, Psychotropics, and the Materiality of Persuasion,” Configurations 16 
(2008): 167-197, esp. 172.
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Among the manifold ramifications of these newly psychopolitical milieux, 
the most important developments were in cybernetics, (posthuman) calcula-
tion, computation, coding and cryptography—among a slew of other textual 
and specifically authorial modes. Of highest importance in this thesis, of 
course, are those among these developments that most closely orbit the zone 
of literary authorship. 98 And as this chapter has already underscored, authors 
have always been subject to forces that are at once interior and exterior (and 
literary authors are no exception). 
But in the twentieth century, the subject becomes instrumentalised as 
an author or agent in a different way than before, acting under an emergent 
orthodoxy that in fact becomes the totalising aegis of the brain. To invoke 
Bruno Latour’s terminology—that which he deploys in his analysis of Ein-
stein’s relativity theorems—the subject may now be named the brain’s “del-
egated observer” in that they act in accordance with the brain’s directions 
and instructions. 99 Relativity, which I will address in detail in chapter 4, now 
becomes but one example of a range of “neurorhetorics”: an indissoluble 
amalgam of particularised brain activity, and a specific language system. 100
But if such a twentieth-century development is to be genuinely believed, 
it is curious that it was not given full expression until 1991—near the end 
of that century—in a book whose title registers what becomes that century’s 
complete inversion of humanism’s historical impulse. What Is Philosophy? is 
Deleuze and Guattari’s response to the postulation, advanced by the likes of 
William James and F.C.S. Schiller, that philosophy is a pragmatic system of 
thought that relies exclusively on the “resources of the human mind” for its 
wisdom, and should therefore “be guided by [an] awareness of widely under-
stood human needs.” 101 Repudiating humanism, What Is Philosophy? sidelines 
the number of “human needs” that have been itemised during twentieth-cen-
tury philosophy’s reign, and refocuses our attention on what have become 
98  Here my argument parallels N. Katherine Hayles’s description of a “performative 
code” and “subjective cosmology” in her My Mother Was A Computer (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), chapters 5 and 9.
99  See Bruno Latour, “A Relativistic Account of Einstein’s Relativity,” Social Studies of Sci-
ence 18, no. 3 (1988): 3-44, 13; Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General 
Theory (London: Metheun, 1920), 26; Rudge, “Actants at Any Depth,” 13-14, esp. 21.
100 On these kinds of “neurorhetorics,” see Jeff Pruchnic, “Neurorhetorics: Cybernetics, 
Psychotropics, and the Materiality of Persuasion,” Configurations 16, no. 2 (2008): 167-
197, esp. 172.
101  The quotations are adopted from Denis Donoghue’s selected dictionary definition of 
“Humanism,” (the “predominant one”) from the Oxford English Dictionary (uncited), 
in Denis Donoghue, “Introduction,” in “What Humanists Do,” ed. Denis Donoghue, 
special issue, Dædelus 143, no. 1 (2014): 5-18, 5, my emphasis. 
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the implacable needs of the brain. 102 The authors revise the old postulation in 
which the brain and the human compete: “Man thinks, not the Brain.” Thus 
laying a new emphasis on the materiality of communication (so that now, it is 
less a “virtualization”—a virtus that is “fully real” 103—than a crucible through 
which the mind itself is assembled, an “actualization”) Deleuze and Guattari 
insist that “The brain is the mind itself.” 104 Deleuze and Guattari thus collapse 
into one category the human subject and the brain itself, outlining the “co-
presence or equipotentiality” of these previously separate objects, and illus-
trating how “[c]erebral movements also give rise to conceptual personae.” 105 
But if the brain and the human are now one and the same, it is significant 
that Deleuze and Guattari had already drawn what is perhaps a much more 
forceful distinction—at least for them—between two very different kinds 
of concepts to these. In their dualistic analysis of time or temporality in A 
Thousand Plateaus, the pair divide time into either a specifically nonhuman, 
or “evental” time, called “Aeon,” and the measurable or chronometric time 
that is accessible and in fact constitutive of the human, called “Chronos.” 106 
Situating “things and persons” in relation to one another, and placing 
events into forms that are differentiated and associable with the memory’s 
temporal orderings, Chronos constitutes a metrical system that relativises 
objects in the world according to durations. By contrast, Aeon time, which is 
also expressed as a “haecceity,” is a phantasmic force of materialisation and 
dematerialisation, determining what is understood as present (or as “now”) 
and what is absent (or as “then”) through a cognitive mechanism that is “un-
seen in ordinary perception.” Aeon is a kind of time, then, that is visible to us 
only insofar as we may “see” the specter that self-evidently and inexplicably 
verifies our own consciousness. It appears, quite simply, as spaces, speeds 
and durations. 107 In What Is Philosophy? the brain becomes the same such 
102  Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, tr. Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson 
(London: Verso 1994), 210-219.
103  Ibid., 210. 
104  Ibid. 211.
105  Ibid. 
106  Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 262; on those “events” that “make lan-
guage possible,” see Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 181-85.
107  Ibid. I adapt this summary of Deleuze and Guattari’s development of the Aeon and 
Chronos times from a paper that I prepared for the 2012 Annual Meeting of the So-
ciety for Literature Science and the Arts, titled “Madness in Mad Time.” See http://
www.rudge.tv/blog/madinmadtimes/, accessed 10 October, 2014. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the “other time” of which Deleuze speaks in Difference and Repetition, see 
Jay Lampert, Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History (London: Continuum, 2006), 
31-52. On Deleuze and time generally, also see Todd May, “When is A Deleuzian Be-
coming?” Continental Philosophy Review 36 (2003): 139-53.
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kind of unconditionally distinctive or sui generis “haecceity” (thing or object) 
as the Aeon time of the authors’s earlier work had been. Its “composition” 
takes place less in the virtual than the actual world; it continually renews 
itself, ever “becoming” itself, and marking, exhibiting, and visiting on the 
subject its discrete characteristics. 108 
What Is Philosophy? thus begins to articulate in a philosophical dis-
course the same “reorganization” of the subject that would be described by 
epigeneticists and neuroplasticians in the opening decade of the twenty-first 
century. This is a reorganisation that “might be demonstrable at the level of 
behaviour, anatomy, and physiology, and [continues all the way] down to the 
cellular and molecular levels.” 109 But Deleuze and Guattari have to dismantle 
the object of philosophy and phenomenology, which has now descended into 
“chaos,” in order to fabricate such a philosophy. The brain is now recognised 
as a “state of survey without distance, at ground level.” Its contact with the 
world is so radically proximate and local—and yet so incarnate in the sub-
ject—that no phenomenological artifact may be regarded as extrinsic to it, 
not even the human. It is a “self-survey,” the authors argue, “that no chasm, 
fold, or hiatus escapes.” 110 
A symptom of the decline of Jamesian humanistic phenomenology, the 
Deleuzoguattarian “Thought-brain” emerges out of the chaos of a century 
riven by a largely misguided culture war. Fought between the “human” of 
the humanities—a being with a mind—and the organicism of the scienc-
es—which identifies little more than an organism with a brain—the war 
has been largely a detour, perhaps all but the outline of dualism’s shadow. 
Through what Guattari elsewhere describes as “chaosmosis,” the brain now 
becomes the preeminent and in fact only “faculty” worthy of interest to phi-
losophy, taking the place of what had for many decades and centuries been 
the mind. The authors’s formulation of the “brain-subject” repudiates what, 
108  As Deleuze writes, “The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual 
is fully real insofar as it is virtual.” Difference and Repetition tr. Paul Patton (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), 208. Also see May, “When is a Deleuzian Becom-
ing?” 148; and Patricia Pisters, “Delirious Cinema or Machines of the Invisible?” in 
Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema, ed. Ian Buchanan and Patricia MacCormack 
(London: Continuum, 2008), 103-15. 
109  Alvaro Leone-Pacual, Amir Amedi, Felipe Fregni and Lofti B. Merabet, “The Plastic 
Human Brain Cortex,” Annual Review of Neuroscience 28 (2005): 377-401, 378. On neuro-
plasticity, also see notably: Dean V. Buonomano and Michael M. Merzenich, “Cortical 
Plasticity: From Synapses to Maps,” Annual Review of Neuroscience 21 (1998): 149-86. 
Also see David Goldman, Our Genes, Our Choices: How Genotype and Gene Interactions 
Affect Behaviour (London: Academic Press, 2012), 13-4.
110  Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 210.
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in their view, has been an overextended trajectory in the wrong direction: the 
“ascent of phenomenology beyond the Brain.” Having reached “toward a Be-
ing in the world,” Deleuze and Guattari seek now to direct philosophy away 
from its phenomenological concerns and toward the materiality of thought, 
conceiving of humanism’s history as yet another Barthesian mythology: “an 
Urdoxa posited as original opinion, or meaning of meanings.” 111 
Consonant with the psychoactive scrivener, the “brain subject” is not a 
subject at all, but an “eject.” 112 If their “principal characteristic is distinction 
[and] discrimination,” it is important to recall what agent allows these pro-
cesses occur: it “is the brain that thinks and not the man—the latter being 
only cerebral crystallization.” 113 But this does not mean that the twentieth 
century’s engagement with the phenomenology of mind is a complete redun-
dancy. Along this itinerant pilgrimage, what punctuates the journey toward 
the thought-brain is the variety of important identifications that organise 
the very process of “man’s” neurological morphologisation. Among these, 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s The Future of Man maps out the “anatomical” 
and “social” phases of what he calls “transhominization.” 114 It thus serves as 
an engine text for what would soon emerge as a range of companion texts 
to de Chardin’s work, often organised under the appellation “transhuman-
ism.” 115 An early-adopter of this locution, Julian Huxley would himself write 
in an essay titled “Transhumanism” that the “human species can, if it wish-
es, transcend itself... in its entirety, as humanity.” 116 
111  Ibid. I refer to Roland Barthes’s Mythologies here only in passing; yet is notable that 
Barthes devotes a short chapter in this book to Einstein’s brain: Barthes, Mythologies, 
tr. Annette Lavers (New York: The Noonday Press, 1957), 68-70.
112 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 215.
113  Ibid., 210.
114  Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man, tr. Norman Denny (New York: Double-
day, 2004), 273.
115  On the moral problematics arising from the disavowal of a Jamesian humanism and 
the adoption of a transhumanism, see appositely Ingmar Persson and Julian Savules-
cu, “Moral Transhumanism,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (2010): 656-69. Ex-
amples of contemporary transhumanists include, for instance, Ray Kurzweil, Francis 
Fukuyama, and James Hughes. For an up-to-date explanation of transhumanism, see: 
Humanity+, “Tranhumanist FAQ 3.0,” accessed 27 March, 2014, http://www.humanity-
plus.oeg/philosophy/transhumanist-faq/.
116  Julian Huxley, “Transhumanism,” in New Bottles For New Wine (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1957), 13-17, rprd. in The Journal of Humanistic Psychology 8 (1968): 73-6. As 
Alison Bashford points out, Nick Bostrom copies James Hughes’s erroneous citation 
to Julian Huxley’s 1927 volume of essays Religion Without Revelation (London: Benn, 
1927) when seeking to identify the coinage of the term. See: Alison Bashford, “Julian 
Huxley’s Transhumanism,” in Crafting Human: From Genesis to Eugenics and Beyond, 
ed. Marius Turda (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2013), 153-68, see 155n14; 
and Nick Bostrom, “A History of Transhumanist Thought,” Journal of Evolution and 
The Psychoactive Scrivener 87
But traces of Julian Huxley’s transhumanism had already appeared even 
before this essay, such as in the initiating document for UNESCO, published 
in 1946, little more than a decade earlier. 117 The morphological transition 
in which the subject becomes a Deleuzoguattarian eject or “brain-subject” is 
not a universal condition, contingent simply on the human’s place in a pe-
riodised history, where all twentieth-century subjects transform into what I 
call “psychoactive scriveners.” This transition, rather, is tied to the particular 
educational, scientific and cultural institutions that foreground the subject, 
in accordance with the influence of the “institutional” operant described at 
O1 in figure 2.1. And as increasing number of institutions, of which UNESCO 
is an exemplary kind, emerge after the Second World War, so there appears 
an increasing number of brain-subjects. 
More generally, however, a battery of changes begins to appear in each 
operant category in the ecology or environment of authorship after the Second 
World War. And if we can accept that each of our subjective brains is a kind of 
“haecceity” whose environment is in large part determined by its sui generis 
formation or idiopathic “composition” through a series of similar but unique 
“gene-environment correlations,” then we may see the whole of human history 
as a range of novel ontological modes for which the subject’s brain has nev-
er in fact been prepared. 118 This is a phenomenon that has been emphasised 
ever since the personality psychologists of the 1960s observed the great many 
number of practices that impede or vitiate automatic or inattentional brain 
behaviour. 
These same practices, they observed, mandate focalisation and attention-
ality, such as executory decision-making, abject compliance with prescribed 
rules, highly-organised scientific work, and even wholly novel experimental 
practices with formerly unidentified biochemical materials. 119 In this context, 
a psychoactive scrivener is a subject whose authorial works may be read not 
only as records of these very deliberations, but also as accounts of the author’s 
morphologisation into the Deleuzoguattarian “eject” or “brain-subject.” In 
Technology 14, no. 1 (2005): 1-25, esp. 6; and James Hughes, Citizen Cyborg: Why Dem-
ocratic Societies Must Respond to the Redesigned Human of the Future (Cambridge, MA: 
Westview Press, 2004), 158.
117  Julian Huxley, UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy, Preparatory Commission of the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (Washington: Pub-
lic Affairs Press, 1946), accessed 11 January, 2014, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/imag-
es/0006/000681/068197eo.pdf. 
118  Goldman, Our Genes, Our Choices, 14. 
119  So observe Sara R. Jafee and Thomas S. Price in their introduction to “Gene-environ-
ment Correlations: A Review of the Evidence and Implications for Prevention of Men-
tal Illness,” Molecular Psychiatry 12 (2007): 432-42.
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these works, we encounter vivid literary illustrations or unfoldings: ritualisa-
tions of the processes in which calculations of, and meditations on and about 
the eject’s “neural environment” are tried, trevailed, and traduced.
The Long Road to the Writing Subject:  
A Short Scribal History
Madness is equinox between the vanity of fantasies of the 
night and the non-being of judgements of the light.
—Michel Foucault 120
long before the brain-subject of the twentieth century, however, there is the 
personage of what I call the “scrivener.” Their work is to “scriven”—that is, 
to engage in a mode of writing, inscription, or reproduction by which they 
effect the production of documents under the instructions of an external 
entity. Such documents often memorialise a special event or occasion; and 
these documents are perhaps most frequently legal or administrative in na-
ture. The title of “scrivener” denotes the relative disempowerment of that 
composer, who may otherwise be described as a scribe, amanuensis, clerk, 
hansard, or even a technical writer. In all of these cases, the composer la-
bours under a fractured, diffused, or distributed subjectivity. 121 A “multilo-
cal self,” the scrivener’s contemporary instantiations include, for instance, 
those who operate such “telepresent” technologies as performance capture 
animation and remote surgery with the aid of an electronic camera or op-
tical enhancement device. As Drew Ayers notes, these kinds of agents find 
themselves distributed across a plurality of corporeal planes. 122 
Considering these kinds of roles, it is arguable that the metaphysics of 
the scrivening subject are now even more complex than those that Heidegger, 
as Derrida observes, humanistically reduced to the “Spirit” (Geist). Unavoid-
ably “double,” the Geist is the haunting other itself, multiplied and repro-
duced; and the one Geist always includes another: they are “Geist as the Geist 
120  Foucault, The History of Madness, 246.
121  Bernard Stiegler’s analysis of the “techncization” of science and the consequent emer-
gence of a “technical being [who/that was] considered a complex of heterogenous forc-
es” is relevant to the development of the scribal subject—the psychoactive scrivener. I 
will attend to Stiegler’s work in more detail in the next section. Stiegler, Technics and 
Time, 1, 2.
122  See Drew Ayers, “The Multilocal Self: Performance Capture, Remote Surgery, and Per-
sistent Materiality,” Animation: An Interdisciplinary Journal 9, no. 2 (2014): 212-27.
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of Geist, [and the] spirit as spirit of the spirit.” 123 Like the Geist and spirit, 
though, the scrivener “always comes with its double”—for just as the “Spirit 
is its double,” so is the scrivener its own twin. 124 But if the metaphysics of the 
scrivener are even more complicated now—and even more so than Derrida’s 
“awesome equivocality” in the face of Heidegger’s Geist—it is because the 
scrivener ventriloquises not simply a spirit “in the sense of a revenant,” but 
is ghosted by a living agent far less mysterious than Heidegger’s Geist. They 
are consigned to produce words that are not simply not their own—in the 
sense that they are instead those of a Heideggerean Geist—but compelled to 
produce their work as the invention of another non-scrivener, thus taking on 
this non-scrivener’s Geist a the same time as they vitiate or otherwise also 
come to grips with their Geist. 125 
The etymological associations of the term “scrivener” denote its moral-
istic and expiatory valences. It derives from the Old English scrifan, which 
means “to prescribe a penance on,” and which itself morphed into the Middle 
English scriven, schriven, and finally, shriven. Associated with these words are 
the irregular Middle English schroftide and tide: the “time of confession be-
fore Lent.” The term also has antecedents in the fourteenth-century French 
word escravain, as well as the vulgate Latin word “scribanem,” which is the ac-
cusative of scriba, “a scribe.” And it is from this that we derive the anglophone 
“scriber.” 126 However, as John Jackson points out, even more ancient origins 
are available to us to examine—not only etymological but categorical:
The English Scrivener and the French Greffier may be related by descent as well 
as profession; both words being thus referable to the same origin, the Greek 
γρϕωα. 127 
Although no work has been singularly devoted to its history, the term scriv-
ener, and the profession of scrivening, is almost always described as writing 
that is done in the service of an institution or sovereign as a “professional 
penman,” a “copyist.” 128 
123  Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, tr. Geoffrey Benington and Ra-
chel Bowlby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 40-1; Heidegger, “The Self-As-
sertion of the German University and The Rectorate,” 474n6.
124  Derrida, Of Spirit, 40
125 Ibid.
126  The word may also have roots in the Medieval Dutch, schriver, and the Dutch schrijver: 
Eric Partridge, Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English (New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 597.
127  John Jackson, A Treatise on Wood Engraving: Historical and Practical (London: Charles 
Knight and Co, 1839), 2.
128  OED Online, Oxford University Press, s.v. “scrivener” accessed 28 March, 2013, http://
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Fulfilling secretarial or administrative duties, the “scrivener” has also 
been the name of those who maintain business, judicial, historical, and re-
lated records for aristocratic or parliamentary agents. 129 In ancient Greece, 
the scrivener’s dispersed identity was literalised in their collaboration with 
the calligraphus:
anciently a Copist or Scrivener who transcrib’d fair, and at length what the No-
taries had taken down in Notes, or Minutes; which comes pretty near to what 
we call Ingrossing. The Minutes of Acts, &c. were always taken down in a kind 
of Cypher, or Short-Hand; such as the Notes of Tiro in Gruter: by which means 
the Notaries, as the Latins called ‘em, or the Σημειόγραφοι and Ταχύγραφοι, as the 
Greeks called ‘em, were inabled to keep pace with the speaker, or Person who 
dictated. These Notes being understood by few, were copy’d over fair, and at 
length by Persons who had a good Hand, for Sale, &c. and these were call’d 
Calligraphi; a Name frequently met with in Primitive Writers. It comes from 
the Greek κάλλος, beauty, and γράφω, I write;...  130
One of the earliest extant appearances of the word “calligraphus” seems to 
be in the name or title of John Calligraphus. It is he who is otherwise known 
as John Psaltēs, abbot of Ken-neshrē convent, who is known to have written 
the Cratylus of Plato, for instance, for Bishop Arethas in AD 895. 131
As in ancient times, the task of the twentieth-century (as much as the 
contemporary scrivener) is characterised by an investment in a set of praxes 
designed to inscribe in official orthographic structures what are the “autotel-
ic” or “flow” experiences of certain venerated rituals, or performed interac-
tions. In the case of the hansard, for instance, attentional modulations are 
necessary to optimise the accumulation and condensation of information. 132 
Engaged to produce orthographic outputs rapidly and in response to audito-
ry and other inputs, the scrivener works within a system whose conventions 
psycholinguists have described as involving certain “nonlexical phonology to 
orthography conversion (POC) rules.” 133 Hansards, notaries, note-takers, and 
www.oed.com/view/Entry/173623?redirectedFrom=scrivener.
129 Ibid.
130  Ephraim Chambers, Cyclopaedia, or, An Universal Dictionary of Art and Sciences (Lon-
don: Printed for J. and J. Knapton [and 18 otrs.], 1728), 144, accessed 16 March, 2014, 
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/HistSciTech.Cyclopedia01. 
131  See Francesco Ademollo, The Cratylus of Plato: A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 22; Ademollo, “Cratylus 393b—c And the Prehistory of Plato’s 
Text,” Classical Quarterly 63, no. 2 (2013): 595-602, 596n6.
132  On these cognitive operations, see Arne Dietrich and Oliver Stoll, “Effortless Atten-
tion, Hypofrontality, and Perfectionism,” in Effortless Attention, ed. Brian Bruya (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 2010), 159-78.
133  For an excellent analysis of these processes, see Zaizhu Han, Luping Song, and Yan-
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similar scriveners prepare compositions that seek to capture the mind while 
it is “live” and at work, graphing and mapping the speech or stimulus of the 
body that is its master. 
When the word “psychoactive” adjectivally modifies the term “scrivener,” 
it functions in a number of ways, including in the way that this chapter has 
already described: as a signification of the scrivener’s engagement with their 
transhumanising and “altered” brains. However, this syntagmatic relation 
may also describe the moment-to-moment neuromotor executions and ad-
justments that are characteristic of the following: 
 • the scrivener’s discrete “material writing praxes” that are described as MP 
in figure 2.1; and 
 • the striated, multi-dimensional, yet rule-based “cognitive writing praxes” 
that are described as CP in figure 2.1. 
The latter processes may be understood to constitute the possibly (but not 
confirmably) conscious operations that this chapter has already described 
in terms of the Mind At Large—in terms, that is, of Rosenthal’s descrip-
tion of a kind of “first-order” consciousness, and in relation to the eject or 
brain-subject. 134 In all instances, the scrivener’s mental engagements with 
the materials that initiate these processes become differentiated as an array 
of mechanistic operations that are typical of “implicit information-process-
ing systems.” Many of these processes have been described by researchers 
as “preconscious” motor actions emerging from out of a “primitive and evo-
lutionarily ancient system that does not form higher order representations.” 
If this description is accepted, then these processes must remain occulted, 
even from the brain-subject—at least for as long as they cannot also be ob-
served and then explicated by them. 135 
But these preconscious operations are also routinised through an “ex-
plicit information processing” system. 136 It is this proprioceptive mechanism 
chao Bi, “Cognitive Mechanism of Writing to Dictation of Logographic Characters,” 
Applied Psycholinguistics 33 (2012): 517-37. Also see notably the original description 
of these specific rules in Simona Luzzi, Marco Bartolini, Michela Coccia, Leandro 
Provinciali, Massimo Piccirilli, and Julie S. Snowden, “Surface Disgraphia in Regu-
lar Orthography: Apostrophe Use by an Italian Writer,” Neurocase: The Neural Basis of 
Cognition 9, no. 4 (2003): 285-96. These rules are here called “Phoneme-to-grapheme 
conversion rules,” at 285.
134  Dietrich and Stoll’s explanation of these “implicit” and “explicit” processing systems 
is both comprehensive and uncomplicated: see “Effortless Attention, Hypofrontality, 
and Perfectionism,” 161-2.
135  Ibid., 161.
136  Ibid.
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that constitutes the scrivener as brain-subject or as, in at least one sense, 
“psychoactive.” Relying on the prefrontal cortex for memory, on the hippo-
campus for the consolidation of information, and on an array of cortical net-
works for “permanent storage,” the scrivener’s CPs are substantially brain 
operations. 137 Of course, the methectics and maieutics between the implicit 
and explicit information processing systems (IPSs) are further shaped, if not 
completely determined, by the medial and technical forms (the technics) or 
MPs wielded by the scrivener. 138 Psychoactivity obtains in the experimental 
and self-reflexive performance of the MPs in the knowledge of their relations 
to, and contingency on, the above described CPs. 
Of course, to be “psychoactive” may mean different things at different times. 
We can imagine an ancient moment, amid the emergence of “script-literacy” 
perhaps around 450 BC, for instance, when those scriveners who received oral 
dictation from their masters or sovereigns would have been required to sharpen 
their aural senses in order to do their jobs well. 139 The lead-up to such a moment 
would have marked a new trajectory in the phenomenology of hearing and lis-
tening, for now the aural senses were to be directed to a concrete end: that is, 
toward the routine inscription of sound as text. Karel van der Toorn’s claim that 
the Hebrew Bible was the work of a small scrivening (“scribal”) elite—and the 
bible itself a book “born and studied in their scribal workshop of the temple” 
where “scholars and teachers... wrote, edited copied, gave public readings, and 
interpreted” their work (sometime between 500 and 200 BCE)—indicates the 
centrality of scrivening to the authorship of even the most ancient texts. 
It is at this time that scrivening becomes more important than oral 
literacy. Even more fundamentally important, though, is the concretising 
function of the scrivener in presenting the words of another as if they had 
been uttered by the external agent. To incorporate the scrivener’s voice or 
the traces of his or her hand in the work would be fatal to its purpose, as if 
137  Ibid.
138  As I will address later in this chapter, Stiegler’s postulation that the writing subject 
evolved through a process of epiphylogenesis, as the technical process of the “exteri-
orization of memory,” the methexis between the human and “flint” in what Stiegler 
names a “technical maieutics,” corresponds neatly with my own analysis of the emer-
gence of the psychoactive scrivener. See Stiegler, Technics and Time 1, 140, 175, 257.
139 450 BC is the date that Eric Havelock ascribes to the transition to script-literacy in 
classical Greece—the moment in which the “ability of the average person to pick up a 
manuscript and read it” arose. See Eric A. Havelock, The Literature Revolution in Greece 
and its Cultural Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). The above 
quotation, summarising Havelock’s “script-literacy,” is taken from John D. Harvey, 
“Orality and Its Implications for Biblical Studies: Recapturing an Ancient Paradigm,” 
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 45, no. 1 (2002): 99-109, esp. 100.
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to reveal its trickery. As van der Toorn notes of these scriveners: “If the Bible 
became the Word of God, it was due to their presentation” of this Word. 140 
Tracing the “co-presence” of orality and literacy, Marcel Detienne’s study of 
ancient Greece’s Orphic tradition focuses on Orpheus as the figure through 
whom the Greeks could represent the rise of literacy. 
A poet who courses through that vexed easement splicing the borderlands 
between speech and writing, Orpheus reveals much about the problematics 
and tensions associated with this transition in the Greek imaginary. 141 The 
persistent tension between oral and written may be understood precisely 
through Orpheus’s character, representative as it is of Greek civilisations’s 
primary psychopathological hamartia: a cultural malaise or syndrome 
caused by a long mourning process over the perceived loss of the certain 
“intermediated” procedures. An oral myth transcribed in the “immediacy of 
ritual,” the story now becomes fatally divested both of its sacred mystery and 
the dialogical or “semiotic energetics”—those that are expressed through 
and by merely this solitary author. 142 This feeling of loss would continue to 
haunt representations of authors throughout the Early and High Middle 
Ages, up until a crucial shift in European iconography began to occur in the 
late thirteenth century, where the scrivener and the author were united in a 
move that monadised the composer. 143 
While authors of biblical works had been represented in the visual arts 
since at least 800 AD, they were predominantly portrayed as the dictators of 
their written works, “dictating to their secretaries or transcribing the voice of 
God themselves.” But now they were depicted differently, “almost exclusively 
reading and writing silently” on their own. These images, Lee Honeycutt ob-
140  Karel van der Toorn, Scribal Culture and the Making of the Hebrew Bible (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 2. Cf. John Van Seters, “The Role of the Scribe 
in the Making of the Hebrew Bible,” Journal of Ancient Near Eastern Religions 8, no. 1 
(2008): 99-129.
141  Marcel Detienne, The Writing of Orpheus: Greek Myth in Cultural Context, tr. Janet Lloyd 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). While Detienne’s study, which con-
cerns writing more generally may, be summarised in a number of ways, I adapt this 
summary of chapter thirteen of Detienne’s book from Elizabeth Marie Young’s article, 
“Inscribing Orpheus: Ovid and the Invention of a Greco-Roman Corpus,” Representa-
tions 101, no. 1 (2008): 1-31, 10.
142  Walter Burkert, Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical, tr. John Raffan (Cambridge, MA: 
1985), 297. I deploy this term after Guattari’s description of “Freud’s Semiotic Energet-
ics” in his Schizonalytic Cartographies, 49. 
143  Lee Honeycutt, “Literacy and the Writing Voice: The Intersection of Culture and Tech-
nology in Dictation,” Journal of Business and Technological Communication 18, no. 3 
(2004): 294-327. Also see, for variation and exceptions to this shift, Michael T. Clanchy, 
From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307, third ed. (London: Wiley-Black-
well, 2013), 117-19.
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serves, may be seen to culminate a “centuries-long shift from oral literacy to 
silent composing processes.” 144
The monadisation of authorship, as Philip K. Dick would later come to 
realise, meant that by the time the acme of late-capitalism arrives, around 
the mid-1960s, individuals had become little more than solipsistic agents or 
programs, scrivening in much the same way that “a barrel” rolls on water 
(ex, 131). Amplifying this recursive image of the rolling barrel, Dick postu-
lates in a letter to scholar and companion Claudia Bush 145 that the entire 
project of writing is reducible to the construction of a mind and its records:
“The barrel,” when studied carefully, consists of the aggregate civilization 
pattern we’re developing: all our ideas, our thoughts, the entire Picture we 
carry with us both inside our minds, in each monad-like mind, and external-
ly, in or records (ex, 131).
But Dick’s conception of the barrel represents more than an image of joviali-
ty or labour. The image is also a metalepsis for the combustibility of writing, 
time, and history—each of which continues, albeit through newly psychotic 
optics, the long Grecian commiseration of orality. 
Radically desubjectivising the collective authorial project, and dis-
embodying the pantheon’s corpus, Dick compares the “rolling around 
and around of the cylindrical barrel” to a “rotational time” that—akin to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s “abstract time” (“equal for haecceities and for subject 
or things” 146)—is crucially related to human activity, or psychoactivity. The 
drudging process by which a subject is compelled to reproduce the universe’s 
“tropisms” now becomes critically assessed by the scrivener; and here these 
tropes cease to be psychotropes: they are images now less of external events 
than of the mind or brain itself. 
Epiphanistic, Dick imagines that “our combined total output forms a 
gestalt in and of itself,” a move under the force of which our ultimate place 
in the universe can be transformed:
Oddly, no one before me has realized that the very drudgery of the human 
(and of all) life indicates that we are rising; we think of rising as a weightless, 
144 Honeycutt, “Literacy and the Writing Voice,” 294.
145  According to Dick scholar Frank Bertrand, Claudia Bush went on to become Claudia 
Krenz, writing a master’s thesis (MA) on Dick, and a PhD in education. See my blog en-
try: “Beginning The Exegesis,” The Philip K. Dick Reading Group, accessed 20 June, 2014, 
http://pkdreaders.wordpress.com/2014/03/27/meet2/. Also see Krenz’ website, accessed 
18 May, 2014, http://www.claudiax.net/.
146  Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 261.
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effortless thing, but a more mature study (a non-fantasy study) shows that it 
must occur with actual expended effort. And we are certainly doing that. The 
whole goddam barrel is rising. One day it will reach point B, which probably 
jumps it—and us—into another universe entirely (ex, 131).
Many centuries after the long commiseration of the supplantation of orality, 
then, Dick now reunites oral and literal as a “combined total output.” No 
longer is God, a master or sovereign, translated by the scrivener; rather, the 
master hears and understandsthe scrivener at another level: now with “head-
phones on... listening to our civilization” (ex, 131).
In the book production processes of ancient Rome, large numbers of 
scribes were used to develop the Roman library, as well as for writing let-
ters, and for producing other short documents. 147 As I intimated earlier, 
scrivening entailed developing increased levels of acoustic and sonic at-
tention, focusing on a dictating voice less as the expressor of ideas than a 
phenomenological artifact-object that prescribed instructions and rules. It 
was in scriveners’s minds or brains that “critical literacy” would have first 
appeared—long before it would have been encountered by or been developed 
in any others, even though, of course, many specific interpretative practices, 
even when practised by scriveners, would have been eschewed. 148 
But, just as much in Roman civilisation as in the Middle Ages, the domi-
nance of the oral tradition meant that literacy was not adjudged by the abil-
ity to write, but 
involved being learned in Latin, whereas writing was the process of making 
a fair copy on parchment, which was the art of the scribe. Some authors did 
their own writing, but they are the exceptions and they distinguished that ac-
tivity from composition. 149
As Andrew Brown notes, the etymology of “scribbling” shares a similar genealo-
gy with “scrivening,” and permits us to ask whether writing, then as now, involves 
147  See Theodore C. Skeat, “The Use of Dictation in Ancient Book Production,” Proceedings 
of the British Academy 42 (1956): 179-208, esp. 189.
148  On literacy as technology, see Jean Searle, Discourses of Literacy (Queensland: Lan-
guage Australia, 1999), 11; on literacy as “critical literacy,” see Uta Papen, Adult Lit-
eracy as Social Practice: More Than Skills (London: Routledge, 2005), 10-11; and Kevin 
Harris, “Critical Literacy as Political Intervention: Three Variations on a Theme,” in 
Critical Literacy: Politics, Praxis, and the Postmodern, ed. Colin Lankshear and Pater L. 
McLaren (New York, State University of New York, 1993), 57-80. For a comprehensive 
overview of the many frames of literacy, see Deborah K. Marrott, “Defining Literacy: 
How Basic Writers Define and are Defined by Literacy,” PhD diss., The University of 
Utah, 2008, ProQuest: AAT 3305688, esp. 16-45.
149  Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, 272-3.
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“addition or subtraction, scribbling or scrubbing—or, indeed, the other form of 
scraping known as sculpting?” 150 At parallel to this productive assemblage of 
material praxes (MPs), is Barthes’s formulation of writing as a subtraction. 151 
Similar anticipations of these scenes of composition—tableaux in which 
scriveners call attention to the “presence” of their “others”—appear in the 
works of both Derrida and Walter Ong. 152 This “other,” as I have argued in 
chapter 1, may be understood to exist within the body. However, for Derri-
da—as for Ong—the “other is present” in those traces of orality we can read 
in texts. For Ong, the presence of language derives from its phonocentric or-
igin, where the “voice [is] the paradigm of all sounds for man.” Reaching an 
apex at which “sound thus of itself suggests presence,” writing’s otherness 
is constituted in its aural origin. 153 Derrida, in his 1973 Speech and Phenom-
ena—a critique of Husserl’s Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness 
(1928)—underscores the importance of aurality and listening for writing: 
what make the history of the phōnē fully enigmatic is the fact that it is insepa-
rable from the history of idealization, that is, from the “history of the mind,” 
or history as such. 154
Elaborating on his early-1970s formulation of the phonocentric writer, Derrida, 
more than a decade later in an interview titled the “Rhetoric of Drugs,” expands 
on these views, now speaking not of writers, however, but of drugs as the incor-
porable “other.” These drugs are not limited to simply “stuff that is patently 
comestible, smokable, or shootable,” he remarks, but are tethered to the “ex-
perience” of otherness—that experience whose phenomenology is defined pre-
cisely by the increased indistinguishability of external from internal valences. 
Drugs can thus engender a corporealised Socraticism, and usher in an 
experiential dialogism:
150  Andrew Brown, Roland Barthes: The Figures of Writing (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 
152.
151  See Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, tr. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1975), 40; Barthes, The Grain of the Voice, tr. Linda Coverdale (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1985), 179.
152  For an apposite summary of Ong’s and Derrida’s convergences and divergences in 
relation to phonocentrism, presence and otherness, see John D. Schaeffer and David 
Gorman, “Ong and Derrida on Presence: A Case Study in the Conflict of Traditions,” 
Educational Philosophy and Theory 50, no, 7 (2008): 856-72, esp. 858-62.
153  Walter J. Ong, The Presence of the Word: Some prolegomena for Cultural and Religious 
History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 114. Also see Ong, Orality and Litera-
cy: The Technologizing of the Word (New York: Methuen, 1982),
154  Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, 
tr. David B. Allison and Newtown Garver (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1973), 75.
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There is no doubt, at least for orality, for the hearing and the hearing-one-
self-speak, a zone of experience where giving and receiving, inspiration and 
expiration, impression and expression, passivity and activity can only be op-
posed to one another, or even distinguished. 155
Understood in the clinical psychiatric context as verbal auditory hallucina-
tions (AVHs)—or what clinical patients describe variously as “brain talk[ing],” 
“voices in the whole body,” “voices of conscience,” and “inward voice in the 
thoughts”—the voice-hearing of the kind Derrida speaks refers precisely to 
the oral tradition of scrivening. Here, dialogism with a voice, or an “inner 
monologue,” becomes of apiece with psychoactivity: “Phonic signs... are 
heard by the subject who proffers them in absolute proximity of their pres-
ent.” The scrivening subject possesses a “transcendent dignity” that places 
them in a special category, above “every other signifying substance.” 156 
In an innovative cross-disciplinary study on these matters, Angela Woods 
asserts that while science has observed an empirical continuity between clinical 
and nonclinical voice-hearing subjects, no scholar has fully addressed wheth-
er a “continuum of phenomenology” with respect to AVHs has been outlined. 
This omission has resulted, Woods observes, in “circular arguments” about the 
voices of others, making it unclear which of these “are to be counted as “patho-
logical” and “non-pathological.” 157 
This circular confusion is mesmerically described in Avital Ronell’s Tele-
phone Book, where schizophrenia is understood as never having “had an easy 
access code.” 158 Even in its incipient period, Eugen Bleuler (following Emil Krae-
pelin) recognised how “the study of dementia praecox” had been often “shown 
to be too precocious to form as yet a system of closure; it exhibits resistance to 
totalization.” 159 As Ronell implies, if certain diagnostic categories are too open 
155  Jacques Derrida, “The Rhetoric of Drugs,” tr. Michael Israel, in Alexander and Roberts, 
eds., High Culture, 19-42, 33. This interview with Autrement was originally published as 
“La rhetorique de la drogue,” in a special issue of Autrement 106 (1989), “L’Espirit des 
Drogues,” edited by Jean-Michel Hervieu. This version was then translated (by Israel) 
and published in differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies: On Addiction 5, no. 
1 (1993): 1-25. 
156  Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, 77.
157  See Angela Woods, Nev Jones, Marco Bernini, Felicity Callard, Ben Alderson-Day, Jo-
hanna C. Badcock, Vaughan Bell, Chris C. H. Cook, Thomas Csordas, Clara Humpsten, 
Joel Krueger, Frank Larøi, Simon McCarthy Jones, Peter Moseley, Hilary Powell, An-
drea Raballo, David Smailes, and Charles Fernyhough, “Interdisciplinary Approaches 
to the Phenomenology of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations,” Schizophrenia Bulletin 40, 
no. 4 (2014): S246-S254, esp. S246. 
158  Avital Ronell, The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech (Nebras-
ka: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 111.
159  Ibid.
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to close themselves off from “other” phenomenological artifacts—too eruptive 
or embryonic to circumscribe their own peripheries—then they themselves 
becomes circular, like “telephone calls.” Such an uncanny and circular symp-
tomatology always requires a receiver at the other end whose task comprises 
mediating these questionable voices. It needs, that is, an “operator on the line” 
who must switch off, or reconnect with what Carl Jung called “the ‘stupid chat-
tering’ about which so many schizophrenics complain.” 160 
From the start, then, the diagnostic description assigned to the schizo-
phrenic hews these figurations and psychotropes of circularity and looping. 
Jean Pierre Falret would describe the psychotic disorder as le folie circulaire or 
“circular insanity” in 1851, only a few years before Jules Baillarger appeared 
before the Paris Academy of Medicine to nosologically formalise his own 
description of the condition as a “double-shaped madness” or folie à double 
forme. 161 Charecterised by the “rotation” between hyperactive feelings and 
melancholic depression or acedia, Baillarger proposed that the pendulous 
arc that swings between these affective phenomena (“soudées”) should be 
properly regarded as a singlular attack (“accès”) rather than two distinct ill-
nesses. 162 Of course, Baillarger’s formulation inherits its nosological proto-
cols from Jean-Etienne Esquirol’s even earlier 1838 description of “a pain that 
keeps quiet, that has no tears, that remains passive,” and yet is paradoxically 
an “attack.” 163 It is in this context of the incipient development of psychiatric 
160  Carl J. Jung, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, tr. R.F.C. Hull, in The Collected Works 
of C.J. Jung, Bollingen Series 20 (Princeton: Princteon University Press, 1974), 95. I note 
that a slightly different translation appears—with Jung speaking of the “unintelligible 
medley... which probably sounds similar to the ‘stupid chattering’ with which many 
patients are affected”—in Jung, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, tr. Frederick Pe-
terson (New York: The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, 
1909), 95. 
161  Pierre Falret, Jules Baillarger, “Notes sur un genre de folie dont les accès sont charac-
térisés par deux périodes régulières, l’une dépression, l’autre d’excitation,” [Notes on a 
type of insanity in which attacks are characterised by two regular periods, one of de-
pression, the other of excitation], Bulletin of the Academy of Medicine 19 (1854): 340, and 
Annales médico-psycholgiques 6 (1854): 369. See Francois-Regis Cousin, Jean Garrabe, 
Denis Morozov, eds. Anthology of French Language Psychiatric Texts (Le Plessis-Robin-
son: Institut Synthélabo pour le Progrès de la Connaissance, 1999), 127-44.
162  Falret and Baillarger, “Notes sur un genre de folie,” 340.
163  So argue Thierry Haustgen and Hagop Akiskal in “French Antecedents of “Contem-
porary” Concepts in the American Psychiatric Association’s Classification of Bipolar 
(Mood) Disorders,” Journal of Affective Disorders 96 (2006): 149-63, 150-1; Etienne Es-
quirol, Des maladies mentales considérées sous les rapports médical, hygiénique et médi-
co-légal, 2 vols. (Paris: J.B. Baillière, 1838), 1: 414; also see Esquirol, Mental Maladies: 
Treatise on Insanity, tr. E. K. Hunt (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1845). Esquirol 
characterises all mania as “attack[s],” so that “rage is but an attack of anger prolonged 
[and] suicide is an attack of despair” (26, my emphasis). Also see Robert Castel, The Reg-
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studies of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder that Baillarger conceives of a 
Lévinasian or Lacanian “other.” And it is in this way that he anticipates how 
psychosis and madness may in fact injure the subject, characterising this 
double-shaped structure not simply as “psychoactivity,” but as “attacks.” 164 
These developments in French medicine and psychiatry brush produc-
tively against the historical institutionalisation of a range of principles relat-
ed to psychoanalysis and individual psychology, which had been developed 
about a century earlier in Germany—but by means of a markedly different 
axiomatics. 165 Germans privileged the figure of the “artistic genius” that had 
been developed in the Classical Age, venerating this figure over that of tech-
no-medical “maniac” that had been nosologised by physicians like Bailliarg-
er and Falret. 166 The transition from inside to outside, same (monologism) to 
other (dialogism), or from scrivener to psychoactive scrivener, is signified by 
one aspect of Germany’s fin de siècle shift—the one in which the “demonic 
force” of Genius gives way to the new valorisation of the singular Genie. Rain-
er Nägele describes the shift in clear terms:
The shift from Genius to Genie in German takes place in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, and it indicates not only the point of a fundamental shift 
in aesthetic and poetological conceptions, but also the point where psycho-
analysis radically differs from psychology. [This shift] can be described as an 
internalization of creativity, as a claim for creativity of the individual subject 
that in turn is located in the ego. One can also describe it as a grammatical dif-
ference: one can have a Genius, but one can be a Genie—at least, so it is said. 167
ulation of Madness: The Origins of Incarceration in France, tr. W. D. Halls (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1988), 94. Foucault dismissively asserts that Esquirol “adds nothing other 
than the new family of monomania to the traditional pattern of mania, melancholia, 
dementia and imbecility.” Foucault, History of Madness, 201.
164  See Haustgen and Akiskal, “French Antecedents of “Contemporary” Concepts,” 151; 
Edward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry (Wiley: New York, 1997), 104-5; A. Pacheco Pal-
ha and Manuel F. Esteves, “The Origin of Dementia Praecox,” Schizophrenia Research 
29 (1997): 99-103, 101; Cousin, et al., eds. Anthology of French Language Psychiatric 
Texts, 55-90.
165  Later, Germans such as Bleuler and Krapelin will also seek to recuperate this intellec-
tual loss to the French medical fraternity, integrating these French psychiatric defi-
nitions into their own programs of reification. On this recuperation, see Adityanjee, 
Yekeen A. Aderibigbe, D. Theodoridis, and Victor R. Vieweg, “Dementia Praecox to 
Schizophrenia: The First 100 Years,” Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 53 (1999): 
437-48. 
166  After all, these Frenchmen were physicians at the Salpêtrièr hospital—not psychia-
trists. See Haustgen and Akiskal, “French Antecedents of “Contemporary” Concepts 
in the American Psychiatric Association’s Classification of Bipolar (Mood) Disorders,” 
151.
167  Rainer Nägele, Reading After Freud (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 16, 
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 If, as Nägele argues, the mid-eighteenth century marks a moment in which 
the essence of talent—the demoniacal Genius—is suddenly internalised, in-
jected into the subject’s nervous system, morphologising and transforming 
them into a singular Genie, then it may be less surprising that this comes-
tible Genie—now reterritorialised and relocated in the body—should then 
become psychoactive, as if crossing the blood-brain barrier to produce the 
psychoactive scrivener. 168 Hereafter the scrivener slowly becomes a psycho-
active brain-subject; and where the notion of “poetic madness as divine 
inspiration” had been previously endorsed, now what Silke-Maria Weineck 
describes as “poetic madness as an individual pathology” supplants the for-
mer, together with a new shift to nosographic classification. 169 
This relates to that anomie, melancholy, weltschmerz, torpor, or acedia 
that Thomas Aquinas had distinguished as “the sorrow of the world,” rather 
than a sorrow “according to God.” 170 This same kind of affect, which had also 
been previously associated with the figure of the genius in the Romantic writ-
ings of Lord Byron, Wordsworth, and Giacomo Leopardi, now also becomes 
ripe for pathologisation. 171 In Bénédict Augusten Morel’s 1852 neologism 
démonce précoce, it is precisely this “kind of torpor akin to hebetude”—con-
spicuous in its contradistinction from the “brilliant intellectual faculties” 
that precede it—that is subsumed into the itinerary of medical epistemology, 
leading to the category of schizophrenia. 172 
quoted in Silke-Maria Weineck, The Abyss Above: Philosophy and Poetic Madness in Pla-
to, Hölderlin and Nietzsche (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), 12.
168 See Irina Sirotkina, Diagnosing Literary Genius: A Cultural History of Psychiatry in Rus-
sia, 1880-1930 (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Albert Rotherburg, 
Creativity and Madness: New Findings and Old Stereotypes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1990); Hans Eysenck, Genius: The Natural History of Creativity (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); David W. Chan, “The Mad Genius Contro-
versy: Does the East Differ From the West?” Education Journal 29, no. 1 (2001): 1-15, esp. 
6-7.
169  Weineck, The Abyss Above, 12.
170  See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 5 vols. (New York: Cosimo, 2013), 3: (Part 2), 
1339-1342, 1341.
171  Harold Bloom, for instance, argues that Wordsworth and Leopold, while different, 
share in the tradition of the High Romanticist “crisis-poem,” in which the “poet saves 
himself from acedia if only to write the next poem, to make it possible.” Bloom, The 
Anatomy of Influence: Literature as a Way of Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2011), 164.
172  This is how Morel describes a 14-year-old patient with “premature dementia” in his 
Etudes Cliniques sur les Maldies Mentales [Clinical Studies on Mental Diseases], 2 
vols. (Paris: J.B. Baillière, 1852), 1: 7-8. Also see Bénédict Augusten Morel, Traité des 
dégénérescences physique, intellectuelle et morale de l’espèce humaine [Treatise on the 
Physical, Intellectual, and Moral Degenerations of the Human Species] (Paris: J.B. 
Baillière, 1857); also see Michel Foucault, The History of Madness, ed. Jean Khalfa, tr. 
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The pendulous arc by which genius appears—and then disappears—in 
the taciturn figure of the scrivener will now be apprehended as a circular 
whole, or as le folie circulaire. 173 Revaluating Dryden’s claim that genius and 
madness are neighbours, Esquirol will insert a pointed caveat: Dryden’s 
statement is “correct,” he writes, only if Dryden means that genius presents 
an analogy with madness. If Dryden means that “great intelligence predis-
poses to madness,” however, “then it is wrong.” 174 As a kind of surrogate dic-
tator for Dryden—and a scrivener in his own right—Esquirol plays down the 
conjugation between madness and genius, which is wrong, he avers, in every 
way expcept as a wooly analogy. 
Earlier in the century, Sydenham had noted (as Foucault also points out), 
that meloncholics were 
People who are very prudent and judicious; and who must excel, from Deep 
Thought and Wisdom of Speech... so that Aristotle was right, when he said, 
That melancholy People are the most ingenious. 175
But as with the Romantics’s emphasis on “divine illness” as inspiration, and 
Plato’s enthusiasmos, Aristotle’s defence of meloncholia’s “Wisdom” will 
now be systematically reduced by nineteenth-century medicine to an inter-
nalised aberration, one that gifts “nineteenth-century physicians” with the 
power to “transform both ‘divine illness’ and artistic genius into medical 
categories.” 176 
Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa (London: Routledge, 2009) 375-6. 
173  On the subsequent emergence of bipolar disorder and schizophrenia out of German 
psychiatrist Karl Kahlbaum’s 1874 description of “catatonia,” see David Healy, Mania: 
A Short History of Bipolar Disorder (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 
67-8; Karl Kahlbaum, Catatonia, tr. Y. Levij and T. Pridan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1973); Katatonie oder das Spannungsirresein (Berlin: Verlag von August 
Hirschwald, 1874).
174  Esquirol, Mental Maladies, 41. Also see Neil Kessel, “Genius and Mental Disorder: A 
History of Ideas Concerning their Conjunction,” in Genius: The History of an Idea, ed. 
Penelope Murray (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 196-212.
175  Thomas Sydenham, “Of Hysterick Diseases,” in The Whole Works of Thomas Sydenham, 
ed. John Pechey (London: for W. Feales, 1734), 306-7.
176  Sirotkina, Diagnosing Literary Genius, 3. Cf. Michael Neve, “Medicine and Literature,” 
in Companion Encyclopedia of the History of Medicine, 2 vols., ed. W.F. Bynum and Roy 
Porter (London: Routledge, 1993), 2: 1530; on “pathography,” a mode of criticism that 
has lively and obvious resonances with my own project of psychopharmacography, see 
Anne Hawkins, “The Two Pathographies: A Study in Illness and Literature,” Journal 
of Medicine and Philosophy 9 (1984): 231-52; Francis Schiller, A Möbius Strip Fin-de-siè-
cle Neuropsychiatry and Paul Möbius (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); 
George Becker, The Mad Genius Controversy: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance (Cali-
fornia: Sage, 1978).
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Intrinsic to the linguistic structure of these classifications—such as in 
the monologism of the appellation “double insanity”—appears an impulse to 
singularise the dialogical exchange between excited, stimulated production, 
and its retournement: that is, a retreat into torpor. But cognitive linguistics 
also confirms that it is precisely this pendulous back-and-forth that charac-
terises the “fits and starts” and the “messy” protocols of writing itself. 177 And 
of course, while none of these psychiatric texts explicitly seeks to erase the 
Romantic, and even Platonian, conception of literary genius, which is itself 
defined by an impulse to write, the erasure of this drive—achieved through 
pathologisation—is tied up with this history. 
French physician Louis-François Lèlut’s 1836 work, Du Demon de Socrate, for 
instance, specifically attends to Socrates’s practices of phonology to orthogra-
phy conversion (POC). Lèlut’s names Socrates’s “inner voice” an actual hallucina-
tion, and describes Socrates as “un fou” (a fool), even before the psychiatric cat-
egory of madness—as démence precocé—had been given its name. 178 But if, with 
Irina Sirotkina, we adopt the view that the development of French psychiatry 
represents a benign, and indeed even a Hippocratically defensible attempt to he-
al—a work aiming less to redress the Romantic notion of genius than to further 
the Victorian goals of progress, reason, and civilisation—then works of “pathog-
raphy” such as Lèlut’s may be seen, in their combination of literary-critical and 
medical methodologies, as undertaking a critical interdisciplinary work. And of 
course, this is a kind of work on which this thesis, for instance, extends. 179
177  Tomas Quinlan, Marielle Leijten, and Luuk Van Waes, “Coordinating the Cognitive 
Process of Writing: The Role of the Monitor,” Written Communication 29 (2012): 345-
368, 346. 
178  Gunvant K. Thaker notes that, in the last century, the method by which psychiatrists 
classify three broad categories of psychotic illness—as organic, affective, and poor 
outcome—has “taken root.” Here, Morel’s “poor outcome” category (by which he in-
vented the prognostic method) has had great influence in distinguishing schizophre-
nia and bipolar. Thaker notes that the prognostic (“poor outcome”) category often di-
acritically indicates schizophrenic illness, so that bipolar affective disorder or autism, 
for instance, when combined with the “poor outcome” criterion, will be so diagnosed 
as schizophrenia. See Thaker, “Neurophysicological Endophenotypes Across Bipolar 
and Schizophrenia Psychosis,” Schizophrenia Bulletin 34, no. 4 (2008): 760-73, esp. 760. 
See François Lèlut, Du Demon de Socrate: Specimen d’une Application de la Science Psy-
cholgique (Paris: Trinquart, Libraire-Editeur, 1836), 8. George Becker, for instance, ar-
gues that Lèlut’s book is the first pathography in history: The Mad Genius Controversy, 
28. Also see the relatively well-argued pathographic assessment of Socrates’s writing 
in Morris J. Karpas, “Socrates in the Light of Modern Psychopathology,” The Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology 10, no. 3 (1914): 185-200, esp. 188. On French psychiatric thought 
generally, see, Pierre Pichot, “The Diagnosis and Classification of Mental Disorders in 
French-speaking Countries: Background, Current Views and Comparison with other 
Nomenclatures,” Psychological Medicine 12 (1982): 475-92.
179  Sirotkina, Diagnosing Literary Genius, 5-7.
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There is a diacritical point, however, that distinguishes the French psy-
chiatric fraternity’s topologically circular descriptions of the emergent neu-
rological disorders of bipolar affective disorder and schizophrenia from the 
historical image of the literary genius. The drawn-out, prolonged, and circu-
lar processions of melancholy that affect the hebephrenic constitute a torpor 
so long and morose—and for that time so distant from ingeniousness—that 
recovery through the restoration of some excitation eludes any reasonable 
expectation. 180 Looking for an evolutionary explanation, Morel tethers his 
nosography, démence precocé, to an “overtly Lamarckian” theory of degener-
ation, one that is “inspired in the concept of the original sin.”
Morel thus becomes one of the first psychiatrists to introduce a “course 
of illness” or prognostic criterion into the system of psychiatric diagnosis. 181 
While ostensibly disreputable for its allusion to Lamarckism, Morel’s detec-
tion of pathogenic inheritance was almost immediately endorsed by Kraepe-
lin. It had also always been intrinsic to the topological model of psychotic 
illness as circular in that it witnesses the biogenetic or “bionic” retournement 
of the pre-literate, non-scribal subject as the appearance of a “psycho-pas-
sive” machine, which follows after the previous appearance of the acute and 
unadulterated “psychoactive” scrivener. 
After all, such a subject had not always written or spoken—at least not 
phylogenetically. Either as a human technic, a pharmakonic invention, or a 
gift from a god, the Word had been developed only after the human actually 
themselves appeared. 182 “Precocious dementia” thus names the disorder’s 
two polar valences—excited precocity and demented madness—only in 
order to form a “unicity” that reflects the evolutionary oscillation between 
pre-Word and post-Word consciousness. And it does this while relying on the 
prognostic, temporal, or “course of illness” criterion for its diagnosis. 183 
Of course the word “dementia” itself registers a methexis between sur-
face and depth, presence and absence, and one that is entailed by the disease 
itself. Yet ironically, when it names the condition thus, psychiatry performs 
180  As Howells importantly asserts, under Morel’s model, precocé means rapid deteriora-
tion rather than early age of onset: John G. Howells, ed., The Concept of Schizophrenia: 
Historical Perspectives (Washington: American Psychiatric Press, 1991); also see An-
thony Clare, Psychiatry in Dissent: Controversial Issues in Thought and Practice (Lon-
don: Tavistock, 1976), 121.
181  Adityanjee, “Dementia Praecox to Schizophrenia,” 438; German E. Berrios and Domi-
nic Beer, “The Notion of a Unitary Psychosis: A Conceptual History,” History of Psychi-
atry 5 (1994): 13-36, esp. 28-9.
182 See Plato, Phaedrus, tr. Waterfield, 69.
183  “Bionic” is a term that Ronell deploys here to register the seemingly increasingly 
machinic nature of those patients under the psychiatric gaze: The Telephone Book, 118.
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a hallucinated logic that is also characteristic of that disorder—almost as a 
way to compensate for its erasure. This is because it names those “present” 
symptomatic affects that appear in the patient—and seemingly arise from ac-
tions in the mind or brain—and then from these takes the word “dementia,” 
a word that comes from the Latin dēmēns, meaning “out of one’s mind.” 184 
However, the description also names the kind of carceral or irremediable 
(phylogenetic) relation to heredity and embodiment that is always, in Morel’s 
and Kraepelin’s formulations, identifiable as the patient’s association with 
old age, with death, and other “morbid forms”—it deploys, that is, the word 
by which we identify, in our present nomenclature, the long-recognised asso-
ciation of dementia with old age, degeneration, and decay. 185 
For all these terminological striations, what becomes problematic in the 
disorder’s essential rubric—as Jung recognises—is its uncanny effect on the 
body. Continuing to work as if a “bionic unconscious”—even after the ap-
parent “degeneration” of the subject’s mind—the body of the schizophrenic 
contrasts visibly with the patient’s mood, which has now entered into the 
requisite torpor. 186 But how does a process of phonological transcription still 
occur—by hand or through “the mouth”—in instances of dementia praecox? 
184  OED Online, Oxford University Press, s.v. “dement, adj. and n.” accessed 14 January 
2014, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/49628/.
185  Describing a “periodic and circular insanity,” for instance, Kraeplelin hypothesises 
in his Manic-Depressive Insanity and Paranoia that this condition was “a single mor-
bid process” and that “all morbid forms brought together here as clinical entity, not 
only pass over the one into the other without recognizable boundaries, but that they may 
even replace each other in the same case.” Emil Kraepelin, Manic-Depressive Insanity and 
Paranoia, tr. George M. Robertson (Edinburgh: E & S Livingstone, 1921), 2, emphasis 
in original. Also see David Healy, chapter 3, “Circular Madness,” in Mania: A Short His-
tory of Bipolar Disorder (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 52-88, esp. 
61-2.
186  Ronell, The Telephone Book, 118. The potential for what Ronell calls the “bionic uncon-
scious” perhaps achieves its most extraordinary narrativisation in the story of James 
Tilley Matthews, the first person to insist that his mind had come under the control 
of a machine. What is incredible about Tilley’s psychiatric history is that, as Mike Jay 
points out, almost all of the conspiracies in which Tilley claimed he was involved were 
revealed to have a basis in fact. See Mike Jay, The Influencing Machine: James Tilly Mat-
thews and the Air Loom (London: Attractor Press, 2012). Tilley’s case predates Morel’s, 
Kraeplin’s, and even Bailliarger’s and Falret’s, classificatory systems. Matthews was 
treated by John Haslam, who described many of the features of schizophrenia in 1809, 
before the aforementioned French psychiatrists adumbrated the category. But nota-
bly this was not before Philippe Pinel’s first integrated definition of schizophrenia in 
1801. See Pinel, A Treatise on Insanity, 1806 (New York: Hafner, 1962); John Haslam, Ob-
servations on Madness and Melancholy (London: J. Callows, 1867); Adityanjee, “Demen-
tia Praecox to Schizophrenia,” 438; Nigel M. Bark, “On the History of Schizophrenia,” 
New York State Journal of Medicine 88 (1988): 374-83; Foucault, The History of Madness, 
201-2
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As Jung detects, both organs still function (for they usually belong to a young 
person), and they remain gestural and deictic “in spite” of the schizophren-
ic-disaffective body relation, which now afflicts the subject, causing them to 
articulate an “anonymous flow of speech.” 187 
Accentuating the automatisation of the schizo-hebephrenic, Jung mim-
ics the “precocious dement,” and tells us, by way of illustration, that they 
“might talk” in this way:
For four months I have had queer ideas; it seems to me that I am obliged 
to think and say them; someone makes me speak, someone suggests to me 
coarse words and it is not my fault if my mouth works in spite of me. 188
It is striking that, in Jung’s imitation of the psychotic’s attitude toward their 
own language, the mouth is imagined as having taken over the “work” of 
externalising the subject’s “queer ideas.” 189 For it is here that we see a kind 
of subjective automatisation in speech by or through a robotised body—one 
that recalls Bernard Stiegler’s notion of “epiphylogenesis,” at least in that 
this form of evolution resembles a technical or technological evolution (or 
devolution), which affects the scrivener’s voice. 190 
As cognitive studies suggest, a range of endo- and exoperformative prax-
es of the kind here exhibited now become “ballistic,” so that the scrivener 
is—as an increasing number of tasks attenuates their role and capacity—no 
longer able to use their executive function—their cerebral cortex—to moni-
tor all of them. 191
187  Jung, The Psychology Of Dementia Praecox, 81-4; I take the “anonymous flow of speech” 
from Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 174. Also see, in this same essay, Fou-
cault’s discussion of the mouth and Deleuze’s “phonodecentering” at 179-80. On the 
mouth as an “organ of depths,” see Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 181, 187-8, 196, and 
esp. 223.
188  Ibid., 84. This passage is also quoted in Ronell, The Telephone Book, 118 (Ronell’s note 
cites a different edition and translation of this work).
189  Ronell also notices the strikingness of this passage, asserting that here “there exists 
an accentuation on the physiological organization of the mouthpiece, a kind of mech-
anized vision of the body in response...” Ronell, The Telephone Book, 118.
190  See Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1, 266-7; Andres Vaccari and Belinda Barnet, “Prole-
gomena to a Future Robot History: Stiegler, Epiphylogenesis and Technical Evolu-
tion,” Transformations 17 (2009): http://www.transformationsjournal.org/journal/is-
sue_17/article_09.shtml/ 
191  Cf. Cohen and Poldrack’s study of writers in which they found “the ability to inhibit 
a motor response does not decrease with automaticity, suggesting that some aspects 
of automatic behaviour are not ballistic.” Jessica R. Cohen and Russel A. Poldrack, 
“Automaticity in Motor Sequence Learning Does not Impair Response Inhibition,” 
Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 15, no. 1 (2008): 108-15, esp. 108, emphasis mine. In 
contrast, previous studies have shown that error correction may be inhibited—that is, 
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No longer simply a scribe, the scrivener is now responsible for more than 
phoneme to orthographeme conversion (POC); they must also switch be-
tween multiple praxes, and this makes the scrivener increasingly subject to a 
new form of cognitive depletion: namely, to torpor, fatigue, acedia, and “au-
tomatisation.” 192 Now a “machinic assemblage,” the scrivener confronts what 
Guattari calls their “territorialised genome”; they are continuously pushed 
beyond their “perfectly circumscribed” potential, and must reveal their de-
generacy and dementedness, becoming the Deleuzoguattarian “Body With-
out Organs”—or, as Ronell alternatively offers, a “bionic unconscious.” 193 
Now when the scrivener opens their automatic mouth they reveal the 
place “where cries are broken into phonemes, morphemes, semantemes,” a 
place “where the profundity of an oral body separates itself from incorporeal 
meaning.” 194 Acting as if on a kind of drug—or else as if in need of some 
recuperative medication—these mad beings who have “queer ideas” and feel 
“obliged to speak them” become at once present and absent, energetic and 
morbid, dual yet singular, circular yet static. Their unicities, which were once 
dispersed, have no become the schizzes and flows that begin to encumber 
and attenuate the psychoactive scrivene. This new personage who could be, 
in Heidegger’s words, an “Anyone,” Verfallen—a degenerated figure, living 
writers will not adjust their behaviour, and will “automatically” continue scrivening: 
Mariëlle Leijten, Sarah Ransdell, and Luuk Van Waes, “Correcting text production 
errors: Isolating the Effects of Writing Mode from Error Span, Input Mode, and Lex-
icality,” Written Communication 27, no. 2 (2010): 189-227; Mariëlle Leijten, Luuk Van 
Waes, and Daniël Janssen, “Error correction Strategies of Professional Speech Recog-
nition Users: Three Profiles,” Computers in Human Behaviour 26 (2010): 964-75. Also see 
Donald Norman and Tim Shallice, “Attention to Action: Willed and Automatic Con-
trol of Behaviour,” in Richard J. Davidson, Gary E. Schwarts and David Shapiro, eds., 
Consciousness and Self-regulation: Advances in Research and Theory (New York: Plenum 
Press, 1986), 4: 1-18.
192  As one study proposes, the writer undertakes at least four processes, acting as “a pro-
poser, which generates ideas; a translator, which converts them into strings, a tran-
scriber, which converts them to strings; and an evaluator/reviser, which evaluates 
proposed and written language”: John R. Hayes and N. Anne Chenoweth, “Is working 
Memory Involved in the Transcribing and Editing of Texts?” Written Communication 
23, no. 2 (2006): 135-141; cf. Hayes and Chenoweth, “Working Memory In an Editing 
Task,” Written Communication 24, no. 4 (2007): 283-294; and Hayes and Linda S. Flower, 
“Identifying the Organization of Writing Processes,” in Lee W. Gregg and Erwin R. 
Steinberg, eds., Cognitive Processes In Writing (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1980), 3-30. 
193  Disinclined to fully anticipate the dubious advent of Lamarckian epigenetics, Guattari 
articulates the difference between the human and machine thus: 
The reproducibility of the technical machine differs from that of living beings, in 
that it is not based on sequential codes perfectly circumscribed in a territorialized 
genome. 
 Guattari, Chaosmosis, 42.
194  Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 179.
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under “the conspicuous domination of [those] Others”—is now the being 
most likely to produce the most curious combination of psychotropes. 195 
For now, these others are no longer simply the scribe’s dictating sover-
eigns—their employers—and nor are they simply their Gods. Rather, these 
others are precisely a field of compositional praxes, which—so developed 
and refined—are apt to reflect and induce the symptomatology of demented 
precocity within the scribal space as well as the brain’s own workspace; here 
they harness and repudiate the progressively entrenched psychopolitical 
milieu, shaping the way in which the scrivener will henceforth fluctuate be-
tween precocious genius and torporific dementia. 196
This chapter has offered a history of the psychoactive scrivener, and 
has concluded by attending to the ways in which an increasingly diagnostic 
and psychiatrised West has imposed new and material constraints on the 
scrivener’s avocation. In the contemporary world, we are all partly subject 
to these influences; and we are thus, perhaps, all at least part psychoactive 
scriveners too. To “deautomatise” from these newly “automatised” influ-
ences, then, would be to disengage from these normative and imperial con-
straints—even if this means that one, ironically, is more likely now to be all 
the more violently condemned or excluded as aberrant and non-normative. 
Refelecting on this scenario, the next chapter focuses on precisely this kind 
of “deautomatisation,” charting the ways in which such deautomatisations 
have arisen in twentieth-century literary history, and on how others may 
arise in the future.
195  Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, tr. Joan Stambaugh (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 133n3, 241-2. Also see Peter Sloterdijk, 
Critique of Cynical Reason, tr. Michael Eldred, Theory and History of Literaure 40 (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 200, 212n47.
196  Criticising the “immanentist” critical- and anti-psychiatric theorists of the late twen-
tieth century, Peter Sedgwick argues that “physical medicine” does not simply belong 
“to the world of Fact [and] natural substances” while “psychiatry,” on the other hand, 
“belongs to the world of Value [and] of ethical judgements.” Unwilling to concede 
medicine’s “value-free, apolitical, and objective character,” Sedgwick reconceives ill-
ness altogether, making visible the extent to which, while le folie circulaire has been 
treated as a “disease,” it is less a medical than an anthropocentric description of the 
body. See Sedgwick, Psycho Politics, 28-30. Foucault makes a similar point in his “The 
Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century,” when he argues that the eighteenth 
century “prescribed new rules, and above all transposed the practice onto an explic-
it, concerted level of analysis such as had been previously unknown.” At this point,” 
Foucault argues “the age is entered not so much of social medicine as of a considered 
noso-politics”: The Foucault Reader, 273-291, 274, my emphasis.
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Chapter Three
(De)automatising Subjects: 
Scrivening in Modern Literary History
To all the scribes and artists and practitioners of magic 
through whom these spirits have manifested... NOTHING 
IS TRUE. EVERYTHING IS PERMITTED. 
—William S. Burroughs 1
while much adumbrated in modern literary history, the image and nature of 
the scrivener remains little assessed. Scriveners appear in literary fiction 
ranging from Herman Melville’s “Bartleby, The Scrivener: A Story of Wall 
Street” (1853) 2 to Neal Stephenson’s postmodernist science fiction novel 
Cryptonomicon—a work in which a “computer,” a close relative to the scriv-
ener, “is a human being.” From around the 1850s and onwards, modern con-
ceptualisations of the scrivener elaborate an increasingly diffuse network of 
pluralised articulations, illuminating the peculiar psychopathology of what 
initially seems a newly machinic author. By contrast, these figures are also 
increasingly the utterers of polyphonous voices, endowed with progressively 
more liberal political freedoms, and given greater and intellectual capac-
ities, including “critical literacy.” 3 And yet, as I will argue in this chapter, 
the scrivener operates as a deauthorised author; that is, as a newly enhanced 
model of the pre-modern scribe. 
1 William S. Burroughs, Cities of the Red Night (London: Picador, 1982), xviii. Quoted in 
Polina Mackay, “Authorship in the Writings and Films of William S. Burroughs,” in 
Kyriaki Hadjiafxendi and Polina Mackay, Authorship in Context: From the Theoretical to 
the Material (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 111. 
2 Melville’s short story first appeared serially without his name in the November and 
December 1853 editions of Putnam’s Magazine under this title. It was reprinted with 
minor amendments under the shortened title “Bartleby” in The Piazza Tales (New 
York: Dix & Edwards, 1856). All references hereafter are given to the following edition: 
Herman Melville, “Bartleby,” in The Piazza Tales (London: Constable and Company, 
1923), 19-65. 
3 On the scrivener’s mental capacity, see my chapter 1.
Despite their new capacities, the scrivener’s still-limited freedom pres-
ents a problem, one that is taken up in a range of texts focalised through 
the distinctive voice of a dissatisfied scrivening protagonist. 4 In these works, 
scrivening becomes an authorial performance covertly undertaken; it occurs 
in secret, and without the consent or authorisation of a dictating other. These 
are countertexts, then, about countertexts, conceived of as interdialogical 
meditations by renegade writers. Elaborately and systematically analysed by 
N. Katherine Hayles in My Mother Was A Computer (a study of the “Regime 
of Computation”), Stephenson’s novel, for instance—not unlike Melville’s 
story—may be understood as a lamentation on writing, one that is narrat-
ed by a thoughtful protagonist whose intellectual capacities have been, and 
continue to be, reduced, curbed, and redirected to the ends of a dominant, 
authorising voice embedded in an exteriorised power structure. 5
A mathematical genius, Cryptonmicon’s protagonist, Lawrence Pritchard 
Waterhouse, exhibits his commitment to authorship in his willingness to 
persist with the technomaterial labour with which he is tasked, a drudgery 
that involves the performance of successive computer-aided decryption and 
encryption operations. In Stephenson’s novel as much as Hayles’s critical 
volume, we learn of how the implacable imposition of power from above 
affects writing, narrowing the field of possibility within which an agent, pro-
tagonist, or an author freely operates. 
Michiel Heyns’s The Typewriter’s Tale (2005) hews similar territory, fab-
ricating the story of a narrator who charts the ontological manoeuvrings of 
protagonist Freida Wroth, an amanuensis to American literary realist Hen-
ry James. 6 Conceiving of her position as “neither guest nor servant”(TT, 6), 
Wroth feels as though she has become merely a machine, one that James 
operates to bring into material existence his not-yet-materialised thoughts— 
4 Melville’s novel is almost certainly the capsule text of this genre, and it is for this rea-
son that I shall examine it in detail in chapter 4, the chapter that follows.
5 N. Katherine Hayles, My Mother Was A Computer (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), 1. It is notable that in Stephenson’s novel it is a Lieutenant superior to 
Waterhouse, a Colonel Earl Cornstock, who insists that “A computer is a human be-
ing.” As Hayles points out, this observation alludes to the etymology and usage of the 
term “computer,” whose usage in the 1930s and ‘40s varied so as to denote to those 
professionals who were employed to perform calculations. But Hayles’s etymological 
analysis only scarcely suggests the way in which this scene demonstrates how their 
term “computer” may traffics in both derogatory and delegatory meanings in the con-
text of present-day (and futurological) digital discourse. See Neal Stephenson, Crypto-
nomicon (New York: Avon, 2002), 599-600.
6 Also see Karen Scherzinger, “The Jouissance of Influence: Being and Following The 
Writer in Michiel Heyns’s The Typewriter’s Tale,” Journal of Literary Studies 26, no. 1 
(2010): 1-19.
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a scrivener merely of “type”: “She was a typewriter, tout court, and persons of 
quality did not as a rule dine with their typewriters” (TT, 33). Here as in other 
formulations of typists, secretaries, notaries, and the like, the scrivener is 
subjectively reduced to a machinic body whose ontological functions 
are wholly integrated with their authorial tasks. It is as Heinz Hartmann 
writes: an instance in which the “integration of the somatic systems 
involved in the action is automatized, and so is the integration of the 
individual mental acts involved in it.” 7 
Politicising this complex institutionalisation of lexical servitude as it 
subsists in the late twentieth century, Hayles identifies, in what she calls the 
Computational Universe, a malignant compulsion that serves only to curtail 
the typewriter or calculator’s freedom in a metaphysical sense. The “Regime 
of Computation,” Hayles asserts, 
reduces ontological requirements to a bare minimum. Rather than an initial 
premise (such as God, an originary Logos, or the axioms of Euclidean geom-
etry) out of which multiple entailments spin, computation requires only an 
elementary distinction between something and nothing (one and zero) and a 
small set of logical operations. 8
Hayles’s implicit averment that these “multiple entailments” spin out of an 
initial premise—such as some “originary Logos” of the kind traced (and 
inaugurated) by Derrida’s “transcendental signified”—relies on a view of 
written material as itself “transcendental.” It relies, that is, on a conception 
of this typographic matter as constitutively different to digitally- or electron-
ically-produced media. But the distinction rings with the aporia of Kant’s 
notion of the transcendental subject. 9 In need of an a posteriori “working 
out” or decoding, writing is that particular art, argues Hayles, which has 
always allured novelists to itself by its promise to function as a decodable 
cryptogram that, at the same time as it is enigmatic, is also productive of 
an affective jouissance in lay readers as much as literary critics and scholars.
Computation’s investment in binary code offers no such promise of inter-
7 Heinz Hartmann, Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation (New York: Interna-
tional Universities Press, 1958), 88-91; also see Arthur J. Deikman, “Deautomatization 
and the Mystic Experience,” in Tart, ed. Altered States of Consciousness (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1969), 23-43, 30.
8 Hayles, My Mother Was A Computer, 21-22.
9 See Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, tr. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1952), 50-51; and Seán Burke, “Reconstructing the Author,” in 
Authorship: From Plato to the Postmodern (London: Edinburgh University Press, 1995), 
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pretative pleasure, since what triggers and constitutes its emergent complex-
ity is precisely its status as “knowable and quantifiable phenomena,” that— 
freed both from the mysteries of the Logos and the complexities of discur-
sive explanations dense with ambiguities”—relieves readers of the task of 
decoding and decryption. 10 
Such a distinction between computation and metaphysics not only di-
vests computers of their metaphysical potentiality, however; it also downplays 
the automatising or “computational” economy out of which the scrivener, 
a computer in their own right, may be thought now capable of producing, 
enacting, or performing something like an originary Logos. Disabusing from 
this machinic author the power to reappropriate, redeploy, or experiment 
with these technics in as-of-now unimaginable, metaphysical ways, Hayles’s 
distinction delimits—albeit as it deftly organises—our metaphysical under-
standing of computative or computational authorship.
Wielding what individual power is afforded to all subjects—or perhaps, 
to invoke Latour, to all “actants”—the scrivener yet remains partially com-
promised by his or her duty to write, a duty that is enforced by a surfeit of 
socio-legal interdictions at the primary level of the institutional operant (see 
“O1” in Figure 2.1). 11 It is arguable that an inexorable trace of some malaise 
(speaking in affective terms), or simply an imprecisely expressed orientation 
to “loss,” develops in the scrivener’s particularised and circumscribed act 
of writing here—a trace that derives from the abnegation of their individual 
agency. Now the evidence of little more than their self-sacrifice, the scriven-
er’s work is not simply contoured by what has been spent, for instance, in 
terms of the writer’s metrical (Chronos) time; it is also a dessication of the 
event, or a disoccasion of the moment (a never-occasioned or never-occasion-
ing instant), in which the scrivener’s own self-directed memorialisation of 
history—their own “exteriorization” or record of “the past”—accedes to its 
own supplantation under the weight of an exteriorised force. 12 
When Huxley, by way of Broad, indicates the end limit of the “Mind at 
10 Ibid., 41.
11 A clear introduction to actor-network theory appears in Bruno Latour’s Reassembling 
the Social: an Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 10-11.
12 I use “exteriorization” here after Stiegler, who conceives of writing, through technics, 
as “the pursuit of life by means other than life.” If Stiegler’s formulation is accepted, 
then we may also posit that the scrivener is the subject (X) through whom another be-
ing (Y) pursues life. The formulation may thus read as follows: X pursues life by means 
“other than their life,” but by what means exactly? By means of Y’s life. See Stiegler, 
Technics and Time I, 17.
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Large,” he explains that, far from apprehending the universe’s past, this 
Mind at Large has access only to that past which is actually witnessed by 
the subject; here, the scrivener’s mind becomes a cipher (or perhaps a “Mind 
at Small”) through which precisely this inaccessible but universal past (what 
I call “Infinitude” in Figure 2.2) is made apparent to their controller—now 
the master or critical reader of the writer—as their past. Brought under the 
umbrage of some externality—some remote and foregone periodisation— 
the scrivener produces a set of inscriptions that, if they are to be dutiful-
ly accomplished, must be written at the expense of their own memorial 
recollection, their own memory. The unwritten past of the scrivener now 
suddenly becomes the universal past with respect to which even the Mind 
at Large remains barred and excluded; it thus constitutes the Deleuzoguat-
tarian conception of Aeon time: the inexpressible, common, ontological 
past shared between subjects and objects alike. When Stiegler identifies a 
similar expanse of time in Heidegger’s “l’historical,” he names this duration 
the “temporality of Dasein.” For him, it is the past “that I never lived but is 
nevertheless my own.” 13 
Imbricated in material technics as much as in transient moments, this 
apparently inaccessible-yet-universal time also limns a phenomenology of 
epigenetics and, as Stiegler so radically asserts, inherits much from the “La-
marckian dimension” of evolutionary philosophy. Lamarck’s for-two-cen-
turies marginalised program for evolutionary adaptation is not, however, 
simply brought into the Stieglerian fold for the French thinker’s own archaic 
or esoteric reasons. Recuperated as vociferously by modern scientific studies 
as it is re-enchanted by Stiegler’s study of time, renewed interest in Lamarck-
ism opens the door to a novel conceptualisation of incarnate memory whose 
dimensions may yet ramify as the rediscovery of his theory, a realisation that 
transgenerational genetics do indeed involve the transfer, through some im-
perceptible media, of certain acquired or even “misremembered” character-
istics and experiences developed during one’s lifetime. 14 
13 Stigler, Technics and Time I, 140.
14 See, for example, Warren W. Burggren, “Epigenetics as a Source of Variation in Com-
parative Animal Physiology—or—Lamarck is Lookin’ Pretty Good These Days,” The 
Journal of Experimental Biology 217 (2014): 682-9; and (less recently) Eva Jablonka 
and Marion J. Lamb, Epigenetic Inheritance and Evolution: The Lamarckian Dimension 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). Cf. Edith Heard and Robert Martienssen, 
“Transgenerational Epigenetic Inheritance: Myths and Mechanisms,” Cell 157, no. 1 
(2014): 95-109. Lamarck’s original theory is outlined in his 1809 work titled Philosophie 
zoologique, ou exposition des considerations relatives à l’histoire naturelle des animaux 
[Zoological Philosophy. An Exposition with Regard to the Natural History of Animals], tr. 
Hugh Elliot (London: Macmillan, 1914).
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For Stiegler, the universal time of the past is the “aporetic” moment in 
which the scrivener, as much as their tools, emerges not “from a conscious-
ness present to itself, [the] master of matter,” but will “pursue a process 
engaged long before the rupture” between “inside and outside,” the break 
between sovereign-dictator and scribe. While it represents only one break 
after another, this new schism “nevertheless constitute[s] a rupture,” Stiegler 
notes, and allows for “a new organization of différance.” 15 Such a univer-
sal past is, or has been, transmitted not simply epigenetically, though, but 
through what Stiegler calls the “epiphylogenesis of man”—meaning “the 
conservation, accumulation, and sedimentation of successive epigeneses, 
mutually articulated.” 16 Reenchanting the evolutionary process, Stieglerian 
epiphylogenesis casts a disorienting shadow over the history of writing; it 
implies the way in which the scribe’s origin may be now reduced to a distinc-
tion—to a newly organised différance—between subjects. 
Pivoting neither around a Marxian (dialectical material) nor a Foucauld-
ian (biopolitical) institutional difference (See “O2,” in Figure 2.2), however—
nor around a difference grounded in subjective biological or phylogenetic 
potentialities (“underlying ability” 17)—Stiegler’s conceptualisation of tech-
nics and time proposes that the writing subject acquires characteristics, in a 
Lamarckian fashion, through a methectic frottage between “mechanics and 
biology.” 18 This mechanism of evolution, Stiegler avers, is enacted precisely 
through writing or scrivening. And, as Stiegler indicates, the evidence for 
this proposition could be no more clearly apparent than in the very fact of 
the extantness (the existence) of certain texts—together with the lacunae 
that mark the absence, the omission, of others. Yet, it is in the absence of cer-
tain kinds of work that we can perceive not simply a non-work, but the trace 
of the scrivener’s unarticulated knowledge: that is, the very “inaccessible 
infinitude” that now represents the scrivener’s own supplanted memories. 
15 Stiegler, Technics and Time I, 178.
16 Ibid.
17 This is how “potential” in literacy has been described for over a century. See, for in-
stance, Charles Spearman, The Abilities of Man (London: Macmillan, 1927) though to 
Robin Naylor and Jeremy Smith, “Schooling Effects on Subsequent University Perfor-
mance: Evidence for the UK University Population,” Warwick Economic Research Papers 
657 (2002): 1-26. Aldous Huxley writes that “Ability is of two kinds—general and spe-
cial. Special ability may be combined with general ability, or it may not.” Huxley, “The 
Importance of Being Nordic,” Baker and Sexton, eds. Complete Essays, Volume 1: 383-7, 
386.
18 Stiegler derives this conjunction from his analysis of Lamarck’s distinction between 
the “physicochemistry of inert beings and, secondly, the science of organic beings.” 
Stiegler, Technics and Time I, 2-3.
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In other words, what is not written, as a kind of material that can itself be 
examined and intuited, represents not, in the negative valency, what has not 
been written, but rather, in the positive, the “unwork” or even the “may-have-
been work” that destroys memory by transforming it. 19 
As Stiegler puts this Platonian formulation: “Technicization is what pro-
duces a loss of memory... hypomnesic logography menaces the anamnesic 
memory of knowledge, and hypomnēsis risks contaminating all memory, 
thereby even destroying it.” 20 Hypomnesic writing, of course, is defined as 
note-taking or scrivening; it is not, to be sure, analogous with the meta-
physical writing to which Haynes refers, but is rather an unreliable form of 
memorisation. But if it this writing is not hypomnesically or mnemonically 
preserved, then “technicization through calculation” will drive, as Stiegler 
cautions, “Western knowledge down a path that leads to a forgetting of its 
origin, which is also a forgetting of its truth.” 21 If hypomnesic logography is 
now a sovereign grammar, though—one that is sanctioned by the Regime of 
Computation, and glorious in its displacement of prior epistemes’s transcen-
dental writing—then to enact a mode of psychoactive scrivening might be to 
treat writing as a mnemonic in its own right. 
That is, to psychoactively scriven would now be to evacuate “the word” of 
its metaphysical presence (its “originary Logos”) in order to accomplish, like 
the scribe, an orthographical automatisation, one that is not anymore hewed 
to an assymetrical dyad—which is to say one that is not about master and 
slave, sovereign and scribe, nosologist and patient. But to be so independent, 
writing would also need to become deautomatised; it would need, somehow, 
to enable a syntonic integration and incorporation of that authority that has 
always constituted it. It would need to enculturate itself to, or inure itself 
against, the torpor that threatens to afflict it—to comport itself in such a way 
as to find itself defended against the weight or threat of that antagonism that 
also enlivens it. 
Envisaging a similar break with the history of writing, Deleuze and Guat-
tari will come to name this mode of deautomatisation “schizoanalysis”—a 
form of writing that is as analytical as it is schizophrenic. But schizoanalysis 
is Deleuze’s own creation: it first appeared in his book Difference and Repeti-
tion, there appearing as a means of encountering Antonin Artaud’s method 
of bringing into being “the terrible revelation of thought without an image.” 
19 On extantness, see Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, tr. Albert 
Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 70-2.
20 Stiegler, Technics and Time 1, 3.
21 Ibid.
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Going after “the conquest of a new principle which does not allow itself to be 
represented,” schizoanalysis conceives of schizophrenia as the acme of this 
deautomatisation process, the nadir of insight, the break that finally affords 
a real “possibility for thought.” 22 
Rendering Artaud’s revelatory procedure in terms that indicate its imbri-
cation with evolution and biology, Catherine Dale proposes that while—in 
all his naïve sincerity “Artaud is an embarrassment to philosophy”—his “sin-
cerity” also
becomes a theatrical phylogeny, a set of vibrations designed to connect all the 
audiences that have ever lived. Infectious thought staves off the dictation of 
reason, just as disease repudiates the liberal parasite of medicine. 23
The “dictation” of reason, as the dictator of the Classical Age, has always 
hung low above the scrivener like so many blades of Damocles. But reason 
now sounds the echo of French psychiatry, which Foucault—in his “Theatrum 
Philosophicum”—encodes precisely as that futile “symptomatologizing” 
that is carried out as another means of discovering the “substantial truth” 
that lies behind reality’s phantasms, lurking amid its unwritten history. 24 
Adopting Deleuze’s formulation of the “pure Event” to recount what he ex-
periences as an emergent, Artaudian schizoanalytics, Foucault petitions his 
reader to reconceive phantasms as corporeal materialities, encrypting his 
own nosopolitical protest in the metaphoricity of spatial condonation 25:
Phanstasms do not extend organisms into the imaginary; they topologize the 
materiality of the body. They should consequently be freed from the restric-
tions we impose upon them, freed from the dilemmas of truth and falsehood 
and of being and nonbeing... they must be allowed to conduct their dance, to 
act out their mime, as “extrabeings.” 26
But Foucault’s recommendation that these phantasmatic mimeses—those 
that recall those ‘demons of Socrates’—should be allowed to play out their 
“dance” as “extrabeings,” is a censure that extends further than to those 
22 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, tr. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994), 147-8. These lines are for the most part also quoted in Catherine Dale, 
“Cruel: Antonin Artaud and Gilles Deleuze,” in Massumi, ed. A Shock to Thought, 87.
23 Dale, “Cruel,” 87.
24 Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 169.
25 See Gilles Deleuze, “What is an Event?” in The Fold: Leibniz, and The Baroque, tr. Tom 
Conley (London: Continuum, 1991), 15, 86-94. Deleuze’s discussion of “hallucinatory 
perception” as a precursor to the “event” is also apposite here, especially in relation to 
Foucault’s premonition of LSD, seemingly avant la survenue: 107-108.
26 Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 170.
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lenticular ghosts that are resident in the ordinary or “sober” material body. 
Turning to drugs, and taking particular care to render the effects of LSD in 
an arrestingly fertile dialect, Foucault illuminates in his description of the 
emergent experience of the acid-trip those contours of thought that “invari-
ably” awake into “contemplation.” 
These are those embryonic flashes that as soon as they arise become re-
cathected by what Isabelle Stengers names an “event [that] does not have the 
power to dictate how it will be narrated,” and which serve only to advertise 
the acid-trip as a fixall for acedia. 27 Recalling Philip K. Dick’s conceptualisa-
tion, in the Exegesis, of the rising “barrel” (Ex, 131)—the procedure in which 
one becomes aware of an oblique apperception of elevation and mobility—
the hallucinogen “presents” an event that is difficult to put into words, and 
is nearly, like the unwritten history of the scrivener, ineffable. Nevertheless, 
the acid trip produces what Foucault describes as a
univocal and acategorical mass not only as variegated, mobile, asymmetrical, 
decentered, spiraloid, and reverberating but causes to rise, at each instant, as 
a swarming of phantasm events. As it slides on the surface at once regular and 
intensely vibratory, as it is freed from its catatonic chrysalis, thought invari-
ably contemplates this indefinite equivalence transformed into an acute event 
and a sumptuous, appareled repetition. 28
But if Foucault’s descriptions of acid’s effects illustrate what subjectivity looks 
like “on acid” (as the argot runs), it also accords with this idiom’s potential to 
restructure ontological categories. As Boothroyd highlights in his study of the 
locution, to describe any single event or subject as “on acid” concomitantly 
renders precisely the counter-locution or “counter-memory” of the subject thus 
described, bringing to mind all that is constitutive of the subject not “on acid.” 29 
Already notable in the history of critical scholarship for its direct and luminous 
27 See Isabelle Stengers, The Invention of Modern Science, tr. Daniel W. Smith (Minneap-
olis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 67. On the event as an “actant,” see Bruno 
Latour, The Pasteurization of France, tr. Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1984), 156; Rudge, “Actants at Any Depth,” 8.
28 Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 190-1.
29 As Boothroyd argues, if the “popular idiomatic expression, ‘like X on acid’... means 
anything at all, [it] means something only in relation to its opposite, ‘X not on acid’—
as if the ‘not on acid’ is something constant, identifiable and normatively coherent or 
‘straight.’” Boothroyd, Culture On Drugs, 157. I use Foucault’s term “counter-memory” 
here to signpost the development of his idea about resurrection, which he had devel-
oped in the 1970s, and around the time he would write “Theatrum Philosophicum.” 
See José Medina, “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance,” Foucault Studies 
12 (2011): 9-35, esp. 24 and 29.
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description of an uncommon drug experience, Foucault’s dizzying description 
also functions as the author’s indirect admission to using the drug, “showing” 
but not “telling” another short story in the wider corpus of psychopharmacog-
raphic literature. But if this high-fidelity image represents what Foucault might 
call, as in the essay volume’s title, a “counter-memory,” then it also represents 
the “deep implantation” of what is called, in Dick’s story, “We Can Remember It 
For You Wholesale,” an “extra-factual memory,” or an “extra-factual trip” (WCR, 
208, 214); after all, Foucault had, at this time, not yet ever used LSD. 
Rather, Foucault’s “first and reportedly only LSD experience” would not 
take place until five years after the publication of “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 
when the philosopher visited Eastern California’s Death Valley. 30 When his-
torian and Foucault’s American correspondent, Simeon Wade suggested that 
they should use the drug—that they should, quoting Artaud, together become 
“suspended among the forms hoping for nothing but the wind” 31—Foucault 
excitedly agreed, and would then undergo what Deleuze would later describe 
as Foucault’s “most severe exercise in depersonalization.” Experiencing that 
which he had already said “we can easily see” as an obliteration of the “ground 
of indifference,” 32 Foucault’s acid trip functions as a kind of corroboration of his 
own instincts. But Foucault’s instincts are themselves indebted to the clarity 
of Deleuze’s psychotic optic—the one that was rendered firstly in 1968 as that 
“schizophrenia in principle which characterises the highest power of thought” 
and, approximately twenty years later, rendered as the “hallucinated gaze” of 
Leibniz and De Quincey. It was in the wake of these Deleuzian descriptions of 
psychosis, that is, that Foucault so vividly renders his own portrait of sensorial 
psychosis, one all the more tantalising for its status as avant l’heure. 33 
30 See Boothroyd, Culture on Drugs, 166-7. Also see James E. Miller, The Passion of Michel 
Foucault (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 274; Michel Foucault: Be-
yond Good and Evil, dir. David Stewart, 1993 (London: BBC2, broadcast as a part of a 
series titled The Late Show, 29 June 1993), accessed 23 July, 2014, http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=xQHm-mbsCwk/. 
31 Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault, 274. The lines of Artaud quoted by Simeon are 
often miscited as having appeared in Artaud’s “Voyage to The Land of the Tarahu-
mas.” These lines actually appear in Artaud’s short piece titled “Address to the Dalai 
Lama.” See Jack Hirschman, ed., Antonin Artaud: An Anthology (San Francisco: City 
Lights Books, 1965), 64-5.
32 Quoted in Boothroyd, Culture on Drugs, 166, and cited by Miller, The Passions of Michel 
Foucault, 245. Foucault elaborates on his acid trip:
We can easily see how LSD inverts the relationship of ill-humour, stupidity and 
thought; it no sooner eliminates the supremacy of categories than it tears away the 
ground of its indifference and disintegrates the dumbshow of stupidity... 
 “Theatrum Philsophicum,” 191.
33 See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 58; The Fold: Leibniz, and The Baroque, 107-8.
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Writing Madness into Reason
beyond the problematics of the torqued and chiasmic relation between Fou-
cault’s articulated premonition of the LSD experience and the actual trip, 
no personal account of which exists, the description of the subject-on-ac-
id is in many ways even more significant as an axiomatic of recalibration. 
Long before the “spiraloid” appearance of the notably “contemplative” 
subject-on-acid, Foucault had projected a punctiliously detailed vision of 
what is now, today, legible as acid’s “other” in the form of the “madman.” 
Rendering in an expansive and projective blazon a catalogue of rationali-
ty’s motific counter-figures (its “Figures of Madness”), Foucault’s History 
of Madness apprehends the spectrum of subjugated personages that have 
borne, and continue to bear, madness’s name. Increasingly powerless before 
the systematic and “empty form of positivist thought” imposed on them, 
the mad have been subject to psychiatry’s disciplinary episteme ever since 
the social reform that unchained the mad in Pinel’s and Turk’s asylums, 
and which signaled these institutions’s long overdue deaths. It is out of a 
repressed drive to discipline and punish, however, that such places’s chains 
have been refabricated and, as with Freud’s “return of the repressed,” have 
transformed into the “anatomo-clinical method” that has been pursued in 
the positivistic structures constitute “classificatory medicine” since at least 
as early as the nineteenth century. 34 
Delivering the mad unto the increasingly divergent axioms of “unrea-
son,” positivistic medicine became the arbiter of “the ultimate meaning of 
madness,” just as “rationality” had before it developed into the incontestable 
“form of its truth.” 35 Within these early epistemological striations of mad-
ness, Foucault locates both subject on acid and the mad subject, for both 
have the capacity of at least “partial thought.” An exoperformative praxis, 
Foucault’s description of this ontological operation observes how each of 
these personages substitutes the “rare flash” of genius with an enigmatic 
and repetitive mode characterised by a “continuous phosphorescence.” 36
34 Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, tr. Alan Sheridan 
(London: Tavistock, 1973), 4.
35 Foucault, History of Madness, 510, 251. Foucault’s Part III, “Figures of Madness,” runs 
from 251-96.
36 It was precisely after this line that Deleuze Guattari add a note (n20): “What will peo-
ple think of us?” Foucault had said the following:
... if it is given to thought to confront stupidity, the drugs, which mobilize it, which 
color, agitate, furrow, and dissipate it, which populate it with differences and sub-
stitute for the rare flash a continuous phosphorence, are the source of a partial 
thought—perhaps.
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Drugs represent not simply a break in subjective thought, then, but a 
dehiscence in the historical notion of “thought.” Calling on a motific history 
not of mad subjects but of all those thought-personages that preceded the 
twentieth century—and prior to the appearance of psychoactive drugs—Fou-
cault avers that it is what drugs precipitate in the thought-subject that has 
allowed pharmacology to resurrect and revivify the old dialectic of torpor 
and mania. The modern state has subsumed that methectic conjunction in 
which the thought-subject, in a bipolarising and circular madness, had pre-
viously oscillated between the Platonian regime of excitation—through in-
different dialogica (Genius, enthusiamos)—and immobility, in an Aristotelian 
condition of melancholic “superiority.” 37 Now the “philosopher” is reconfig-
ured in a parallel bipartition of these ancient ills; they have sufficient (1) “ill 
will,” which, now in place of a manic enthusiasmos, 38 repudiates such abiding 
“neopositivism[s]” as psychiatry’s nosological “categories;” and (2) they are 
sufficiently “ill humored” to persist in the confrontation with stupidity, to re-
main motionless to the point of stupefaction in order to approach it success-
fully and mime it, to let it slowly grow within himself. 39
But, even we accept the impact of Deleuze’s “schizoanalysis,” what will have 
so changed for Foucault by 1970 to lead him to see a way to install, in place 
of the psychiatric partition of mania and melancholia, the twin ills of the 
philosopher? 
It was Foucault’s historicisation of madness, with its transcription of 
nosology’s history, and its influential apprehension of what he will later call 
“medical perception,” that permitted Foucault to reimagine psychiatry as 
itself an act of scrivening. It is a form, that is, of note-taking about mental dis-
ease in hypomnesic shorthand; a method of transcription by which the words 
of a spectral, mythic sovereign are composed. Thus, what Pinel discovered 
in fevers are “not the diseases” themselves, but what Foucault sees only as 
 See Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 191nn19-20. 
37 Aristotle, “Brilliance and Melancholy,” in Radden, The Nature of Melancholy, 55-60.
38 On the imbricated semiotics of mania and enthusiasmos, see Gregor Rohmann, 
“Fundamente einer Semiotik von mani und enthusiasmos zwischen Antike und Mit-
telalter,” in Tanzwut: Kosmos, Kirche und Mensch in der Bedeutungsgeschichte eines mit-
telalterlichen Krankheitskonzepts [Dancing Feet: Cosmos, Church, And Man in History: 
The Meaning of a Medieval Disease Concept] (Gottinghen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
2012), 97-107. On enthusiasmos in Philip K. Dick, see Samuel J. Umland, “To Flee from 
Dionysisus: Enthusiasmos from “Upon the Dull Earth” to VALIS,” in Samuel J. Umland, 
ed., Philip K. Dick, Contemporary Critical Interpretations (London: Greenwood Press, 
1995), 82-99.
39 Foucault, “Theatrum Philsophicum,” 190.
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“the signs” of the illness. Madness is not “an original origin,” but a “signal” 
that permits psychiatry to manipulate the “causal and temporal chain,” and 
to proceed from “disease to lesion” where it had formerly proceeded only 
from “lesion to disease.” 40 In rehearsing so many analyses of this kind, anal-
yses that abound in a metaphorology of emptiness and deception, 41 Foucault 
challenges positivism by means of a novel “method in the confused, and 
ill-structured domain of the history of ideas.” 42 And while this method tends 
toward its own kind of anti-psychiatry, the usefulness of Foucault’s history 
inheres in the space it makes for a critical study of classificatory medicine in 
terms that are essentially outside its own specialist lexicon. 
Reinstating the classical age’s ratiocination of madness in a new and 
apparently ludic language, Foucault’s history also distances itself from that 
period’s “figures” by leveling history under a primary bifurcation. Foucault 
thus speaks of the “ill wills” and “ill humors” that arise in a drugless socius; 
he does so in what is an undecidable, paranomastic frisson with the four 
Hippocratic humors: 
In a state deprived of drugs, thought possesses two horns: one is ill will (to 
baffle categories) and the other ill humor (to point to stupidity and transfix 
it). We are far from the old sage who invests so much good will in his search 
for the truth that he can contemplate with equanimity the indifferent diver-
sity of changing fortunes and things... But we are also distant from the “mel-
ancholy” that makes itself indifferent to the world, and whose immobility—
alongside books and a globe—indicates the profundity of thought and the 
diversity of knowledge. 43
Doing away with those persistent figures that had been previously brought 
into order by nineteenth- and twentieth-century psychiatry, both drugs and 
Foucault—or drugs qua Foucault—exteriorise these symbolic valences and 
denude these bipolar pulsations. Contemplating the “indefinite equiva-
40 Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, 183. In this semiotic conceptualisation of Foucault, it 
is possible to see the legacy of Saussurean linguistics, which a range of scholars (and 
most notably Mark Bevir) have associated with the “postfoundationalism” of Ernesto 
Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Antonio Gramsci, Nikolas Rose, and others: see Mark Bevir, 
“Political Science After Foucault,” History of the Human Sciences 24, no. 4 (2011): 81-96, 
85-6; and Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999).
41 In the concluding paragraph to The Birth of the Clinic, for instance, Foucault speaks of 
the “hidden” figures of positivism—those which are “hidden by it, by it also indispens-
able to its birth” (199).
42 Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, 183.
43 Ibid., 191.
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lence” of these “horns,” Foucault altogether eliminates “the old necessity for 
a theatre of immobility,” making legible through epideictic allusion at least 
two kinds of “theatres.” The first is the medical theatre, so characterised by 
its patients’s immobile bodies; the second is the Artaudian theatre of the 
monological scrivener’s cruelty and turmoil. While the latter may be just 
as readily characterised by immobility as the former, the latter is immobile 
only insofar as it expresses the “weaknesses of a mind that has not pondered 
its weakness.” 44 Of course, Foucault’s allusion to the “old theatre of immo-
bility” also suggests more than just the dynamic nature of these theatres: it 
perhaps even more explicitly indicates the graphic theatre of the memorised, 
exteriorised, and hyperstasised word on a page.
Equivocally stopping short of schizophrenia, Foucault’s history of mad-
ness barely even scrivens a note on the rich forelives of the psychoses and 
neuroses, omitting the important topological French texts of Baillarger 
and Falret altogether. 45 If these works remain unfit for archaeological dis-
interment, though, it is perhaps because they falsely “mask” that species of 
“alienation” that has always been consubstantial with the awkward power 
play intrinsic to the “reality of the doctor-patient couple.” And the alienation 
of the patient in particular will remain “suppressed” until Freud, the ur-doc-
tor of the twentieth century, begins to concentrate reason’s energies on psy-
choanalysis. Incarnating reason in his own oftentimes-cocaine-fuelled body, 
Freud will come face to face with the unheimlich of madness itself, attend-
ing to it and assembling it in an exhaustive proliferation of observations. 46 
44 I take these lines from Artaud’s fascinating correspondence with Jacques Rivière, 
which is notable for its influential illustration of the Deleuzoguattarian “brain-sub-
ject.” Describing his weak mind, Artaud says that if his mind truly had pondered its 
weakness, then “it would render that weakness in dense and forceful words.” Here 
the act of writing is consubstantial with classifying the weakness of the mind. At the 
end of this letter, Artaud writes one of the most illuminating passages, explaining to 
Rivière how the psychoactive scrivener comes to identify themselves, both by and as 
their brain’s (psycho-) activity:
These foolhardy works often seem to you the product of a mind which is not yet 
in possession of itself, but who knows what brain they conceal, what power of life, 
what mental fever which circumstances alone have reduced. Enough about myself 
and about my works that are still unborn. All I ask is to feel my brain.
See Artaud, “Antonin Artaud to Jacques Rivière, June 6, 1924,” in Antonin Artaud: An 
Anthology (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1965), 21.
45 I have addressed these psychiatrists’s works in detail prreviously in chapter 2.
46 Foucault’s genealogy of psychoanalysis (and its psychosis/neurosis dialectic) traces 
it not to the dementia praecox texts, but to the influence of Pinel’s Bicêtre, a Paris 
mental institution exclusively for men, and William Tuke’s York Retreat, a Quaker-run 
institution. The influence of Tuke’s retreat on nineteenth-century psychiatry can be 
measured in the major reforms that followed its establishment, and by the popularity 
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For Foucault, the modern positivism inaugurated by Morel’s formations 
represents no more than “psychiatric theory merely attempting to keep in 
harmony with the rest of medical knowledge,” and is undeserving of serious 
attention. 47 Ever the “epistemic” historian, Foucault ascribes the genesis of 
schizophrenia only ever approximately to those periodised centuries under 
whose labour its identification is proposed to have become slowly but surely 
possible. It is only after the nosopolitically homogenous “classical age,” for 
instance, that psychiatrists could finally “pin down” disorder through the 
“patient work of observation.” 48 
Thus psychosis can emerge only after nineteenth-century medicine has 
so ardently yet seemingly only-ever-mimetically constructed its nosological 
“edifice of paranoia and dementia praecox,” a structure that will itself remain 
only an approximate impersonation of physical science. 49 But this edifice, 
of a publication by Samuel Tuke, William’s grandson, which contains a programmat-
ic description of its modes of treatment. See Description of the Retreat: An Institution 
Near York for Insane Persons Containing an Account of its Origin and Progress, the Modes 
of Treatment and a Statement of Cases (Philadelphia: Isaac Pierce, 1813). On these in-
stitutions, also see Anne Digby, Madness, Morality and Medicine: A Study of the York 
Retreat 1796-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); on Pinel’s Bicêtre, 
see James C. Harris, “Pinel Orders the Chains Removed from the Insane at Bicêtre,” 
Archives of General Psychiatry 60 (2003): 442; on Pinel and French psychiatry generally, 
see Dora B. Weiner, Comprende et soigner: Philippe Pinel (1745-1826), and Lad dicine de 
L’esprit (Oaris: Fyard, 1999); Jan Goldstein, Console and Classify: The French Psychiatric 
Profession in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). In 
terms of Pinel’s hypotheses about ingestible substances, hunger, the nervous system 
and mental health (considerations that are seldom addressed), see Elizabeth A. Wil-
liams, “Stomach and Psyche: Eating, Digestion, and Mental Illness in the Medicine of 
Philippe Pinel,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 84, no. 3 (2010): 358-86. As Williams 
argues, these proposed somatic aetiologies are little heeded in the scholarly literature, 
and almost completely elided in Foucault’s history. This is perhaps because of the pre-
dominance of an “ancient view [of] the insane” that, as Williams explains, maintains 
that since the mad were “bestial in nature and lacking in normal sensitivity, [they] did 
not feel hunger” (360n3). Evidencing the existence of this view, Williams cites Fou-
cault’s originally published Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique (Paris: 
Plon, 1961), 185-6. (This citation corresponds to pages 148-9 of the The History of Sex-
uality (London: Routledge, 2006), which I cite throughout this chapter). Notably, how-
ever, Foucault’s discussion of Pinel’s emphasis on the bestiary nature of the insane in 
these pages, and the quotation that he takes from Pinel’s work, relates only to their 
sensitivity to “extremes of cold,” and not at all to food or hunger. See Philippe Pinel, 
Traité Médico-philosophique sur l’aliénation Mentale [Medical Philosophical Treatise on 
Mental Alienation of Mania] 2nd ed. (Paris: Brosson Libraire, 1809 [1801]), 60-61 [at 73]. 
No publication details beyond “Paris. Year IX” are given for this volume in Foucault’s 
“original bibliography,” which was presumably compiled by the editors by way of their 
consultation of Foucault’s original PhD thesis. See the History of Madness, 673. 
47 Foucault, History of Madness, 510.
48 Ibid., 201.
49 Ibid.
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Foucault suggests, marks an epistemological rupture that allows psychiatry 
to debut as medicine, now resplendent before a “backdrop of the qualitative 
depth of medical perception,” glittering at the outset of its voyage, and ready 
to qualitatively develop and test its discursive parameters. 50 
Critiquing Morel’s foundational work on degeneration only as much as 
it represents madness as a social exteriority—as a “Hegelian philosophical 
theme” that attaches only uncomfortably to biology—Foucault avers that 
“Madness, and all its powers that were multiplied by the ages, lay not in man 
but in the milieu that he inhabited.” 51 But in its inattention to Morel’s pro-
totypal modelling of an interiorised madness (a model that itself anticipates 
present-day definitions of schizophrenia), Foucault’s book suffers from a se-
rious elision: it elides not only Morel’s work, though, but the temporalising 
structurations that begin to develop in medicine precisely during this peri-
od. This is the prognostic component of madness, which, in Morel’s study, 
involves the “course of illness” (and outcome) element; and this element will 
become crucial for Morel’s influential description of démonce précoce as a 
unitary psychosis or Monopsychose. 52 Betraying what is Foucault’s broader 
political imperative, Foucault’s elision of Morel’s prognostic work affirms— 
perhaps more powerfully than any explicit or positive utterance in his 
book—the social and moral valency, an at-times almost Marxian impulse, 
that underlies Foucault’s madness history. 
Typified by his scrupled tendency to anti-historicistic reading—a meth-
od that is itself associated with Foucault’s desire to periodise or temporalise 
knowledge only in terms of historical ideas, and not in terms of the body’s 
operations—the omission of Morel’s temporal psychiatry also brings into 
view one element of Foucault’s anti-psychiatrism. 53 In what Peter Sedgwick 
calls an “Anti-History” of psychiatry, Foucault’s deeply encoded socio-poli-
tics, wooly though they sometimes seem, do become rather fuzzily apparent 
in these elisions. 54 But these politics are perhaps even more clearly legible 
50 Ibid., 202.
51 Ibid., 376.
52 The French Monopsychose or Psychose unique is different to Esquirol’s “monomania,” 
the latter of which Foucault dismisses as only a meagre contribution to psychiatric 
knowledge. See notably G.E. Berrios and D. Bear, “The Notion of a Unitary Psychosis: 
A Conceptual History,” History of Psychiatry 5 (1994): 13-36; and Foucault, History of 
Madness, 201.
53 On Foucault’s anti-psychiatry and its reconfiguration as theorisation of power (for in-
stance, psychiatric power and biopower) from the 1970s, see Pat Bracken and Philip 
Thomas, “From Szasz to Foucault” On the Role of Anti-Psychiatry,” Philosophy, Psychi-
atry, and Psychology 17, no. 3 (2010): 219-28, esp. 225.
54 Sedgwick, Psycho Politics, chapter 5, “Michel Foucault: The Anti-History of Psychiatry,” 
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in Foucault’s more fervidly anti-authoritarian protestations—such as in his 
claim that psychiatry had, in the same moment it shut down the “fetters and 
bars of the old madhouses,” replaced these places with “the sealed order 
of a [new] asylum system founded on a gigantic moral imprisonment... the 
medical superintendence of insanity.” 55 Preceded by the traitement moral 
that had been inaugurated by the mad’s “great unchaining” at Pinel’s and 
Tuke’s institutions, the conversion to the new system is ultimately spear-
headed, Foucault argues, by the alienating yet attentive gaze of the doctor. 
To be specific, though, this system is brought into being under the auspices 
of the psychoanalytic profession’s represntative de jour—its sin qua non: the 
one-time neurologist Sigmund Freud. 56 
For Foucault, what lies between these two grand orders of punitory 
control—between the asylum and the psychoanalytic session—are so many 
positivistic rearticulations of the “esoteric, almost demoniacal secret” of 
psychiatry. Full of “dense mystery” and “obscure to even those who used 
it,” psychiatry must ultimately be acknolwedged only as a “moral tactic... 
covered over by the myths of positivism.” 57 Psychiatry’s long history is now, 
for Foucault, reducible to the dyadic interlocution between sovereign and 
scribe, dictator and scrivener; it is structurally registrable as the apparatus 
at the frontline of Europe’s moral and cultural imperatives. If it is disguised 
as positivism, it remains “not yet unravelled,” and in this manner consti-
tutes the “dark, but firm web of our experience.” 58 
Signaling a return to dictation and silence, the advent of this nosolog-
ical classification system withdraws from the psychoactive scrivener their 
critical literacy—just as rapidly as Europe’s industrialisation and civilisation 
had imparted it to them. It serves only to colonise the bounds and potentials 
of that power, of that force by which writers had finally come to articulate 
themselves in their own voices. 59 Inaugurating a new technical discourse of 
classification whose violent potential would materialise in the brutal, insti-
tutionalised methods of the twentieth-century clinic—in electroconvulsive 
125-148.
55 Sedgwick, Psycho Politics, 133; Foucault, History of Madness, 510.
56 Foucault, History of Madness, 510-11.
57 Ibid., 508-9.
58 Ibid., 510-11; The Birth of the Clinic, 199.
59 As Foucault argues, the Enlightenment itself “has determined, at least in part, what 
we are, what we think, and what we do today.” Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” 
in The Foucault Reader, 32-50, 33. For scholars of the enlightenment such as Graeme 
Garrard, Foucault’s claim, is “beyond dispute.” Garrard, “The Enlightenment and Its 
Enemies,” The American Behavioral Scientist 49, no. 5 (2006): 664-80, esp. 664. 
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shock therapy, for instance—the “ever-perilous freedom of dialogue” at this 
point is “muted,” so that “All that remains is the calm certainty that mad-
ness should be reduced to silence.” 60
Antonin Artaud’s correspondence with Jacques Rivière, the editor of Nou-
velle Revue Françoise, emblematises the equivocation of the twentieth-centu-
ry scrivener’s avocation; it reveals how, that is, following the First World War, 
a new category of scrivener appeared. Suffering “from a frightful disease of 
the mind,” this new period is contoured precisely around the processes in 
which the scrivener converts the “simple act of thinking to the external act 
of its materialization in words.” As Artaud expressed the process:
Words, forms of phrases, inner directions of thinking, simple reactions of the 
mind—I am in constant pursuit of my intellectual being. Hence, whenever I 
can seize upon a form, however imperfect it may be, I hold it fast, lest I lose 
the entire thought. I am beneath myself, I know it, it makes me suffer, but I 
accept the fact in the fear of not dying entirely. 61
Two years after writing this letter to Rivière, and only five years following 
Aldous Huxley’s publication of his first collection of fiction, titled Limbo, Ar-
taud would publish his own collection of writings under a title that echoed 
Huxley’s book: The Umbilicus of Limbo. Here Artaud declared that “where 
others present their works, I claim to do no more than show my mind.” 62 
Huxley’s book had introduced, in both its title and contents, one of the 
most important (psycho)tropisms in his oeuvre: the chiasmus. Indicated by 
the interstitial locus or the “in-betweenness” connoted by the word “lim-
bo,” the chiasmus represents the young English author’s turning away from 
nature’s embrace—an act that represents the extent to which which he at-
tributed his partial blindness to a sense of being only ever half-present, and 
“between two worlds.” 63 (I will address this in detail in chapters 4, 5 and 6.) 
For both authors, however, the titular word “limbo” operates as a metonym 
for their subjective liminality; both writers feel as though they are situated at 
the centre of an agon between truth and disorder, discovery and distraction. 
It is a space in which the comfort of narrative coincides with the horrific 
60 Foucault, History of Madness, 165. On the history of electric shock, see Edward Shorter 
and David Healy, Shock Therapy: A History of Electroconvulsive Treatment in Mental Ill-
ness (London: Rutger University Press, 2007), esp. 9.
61 “Antonin Artaud to Jacques Rivière, June 5, 1923,” in Antonin Artaud: An Anthology, 7. 
62 Aldous Huxley, Limbo (London: Chatto & Windus, 1920); Antonin Artaud, Antonin 
Artaud: Selected Writings, ed. Susan Sontag (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1976), 59-76, 59.
63 I elaborate on this in detail in chapter 6 and 7. See especially Figure 7.1. 
(De)automatising Subjects 
126
disillusion of fantasy; it is a feeling that one is important and unimportant 
that Louis A. Sass suggestively describes as a “curious combination insignif-
icance and significance.” 64 
Reconfiguring the classical psychiatric (Morelian) conceptualisation of 
psychotic illness—the configuration in which psychosis combines in a du-
alism dementia and primitive regressivity—Sass, in his Madness and Mod-
ernism, introduces a modified elliptical schematic. Consisting of a conflux 
of hyper-reflexia or “hyperreflexivity,” one that is constituted by the insistent 
and unrelenting “attenuation of ‘reflective thinking’” and “alienation,” this 
schema describes the psychotic’s affective state as predominantly torporific. 
They suffer “devitalisation, fragmentation, and disconnectedness,” he ar-
gues, and they experience a sense of “diminished self-affection.” 65 
Yet, the psychotic remains destined, even in Sass’s reconfiguration, to 
oscillate between the hyperreflexive and alienated outlooks; and the melan-
cholic Huxley of the ‘20s, much like the ever-alienated Artaud, will grapple 
with this undulation precisely as it becomes increasingly anathematatic to 
normalised pathological structures. After all, it was only in the late-nine-
teenth century that psychiatry had begun to combine these outlooks into 
a syndromal “unicity.” Sharing what Pérez-Álvarez describes as a “poetic” 
temperament, both Huxley and Artaud will commonly identify this undula-
tion as a “limbo,” and in so doing, indicate their own difficult positions, or 
situations, between these polar outlooks. 66 
64 Taking up Karl Jaspers’s criteria for “true” delusions, this is how Sass describes the 
combination of apathy (acedia) and certitude. Sass, Madness and Modernism, 291.
65 Sass, Madness and Modernism, 229, 531n42. For a commentary on what the reviewer 
calls Sass’s “remarkable reconstruction of schizophrenia,” see Robert J. Barrett, “The 
Schizophrenic and the Liminal Persona in Modern Society,” Culture, Medicine and 
Psychiatry 22 (1998): 465-498. On hyperreflexivity, see Marino Perez-Alvarez, “Hyperre-
flexivity as a Condition of Mental Disorder: A Clinical and Historical Perspective,” Psi-
cothema 20, no. 2 (2008): 181-7; and on “diminished self-affection,” see Sass,”Self-dis-
turbance and Schizophrenia: Structure, Specificity, Pathogenesis,” Schizophrenia 
Research 152 (2014): 5-11, 6. 
66 Appealing to the history of Saturn as “the planet of melancholy” under which “the 
Renaissance took refuge,” Pérez-Álvarez argues that hyperreflexivity and mental dis-
orders only become understandable as such in the nineteenth century: “Thus, reflex-
ivity under the sign of Saturn renders melancholy an aesthetic—poetic—emotion, 
and under the clinical sign turns it into a clinical—prosaic—emotion, which is what 
comes to constitute depression.” Pérez-Álvarez , “Hyperreflexivity as a Condition of 
Mental Disorder,” 186. Also see, notably, Emily Brady and Arto Haapala, “Melancholy 
as an Aesthetic Emotion,” Contemporary Aesthetics 1, http://www.contempaesthetics.
org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=214; Judith Misbach and Henderikus J. 
Stam, “Medicalizing Melancholia: Exploring Profiles of Psychiatric Professionaliza-
tion,” Journal of the History of Behavioural Sciences 42 (2006): 41-59.
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In another context, Sass recalls Foucault’s description of the subject-on-ac-
id’s perception of “phosphorescence”; he asserts that Artaud’s description of 
reaching a “phosphorescent point” in his short piece “An Actor You Can See,” 
for instance, signals the poet’s awareness of the “ipseity dimension”—which 
is to say his acute familiarity with an experience of himself as a subject. 67 
From the Latin for “self” or “itself,” Sass follows Paul Ricoeur in introducing 
the term ipseity into his study of the self; and for Sass, this term denotes “a 
fundamental feature of normal awareness.” At the same, to define “ipseity” 
is to challenge us to articulate something that is largely ineffable, precisely 
because our sense of self or ipseity is, as Sass writes, “such a pervasive and 
obvious aspect of consciousness.” 68 Hypothesising that disturbances in a 
subject’s “ipseity model” ordinarily symptomatise as the twin symptoms of 
“hyperreflexivity and diminished self affection,” Sass describes these symp-
toms as simply “aspects of a single whole”; they work, he explains, in an 
“equiprimordial” way, as a “unicity.” Their association, he continues, involves
something more than causal interaction; they are, in a sense, different as-
pects of the very same phenomenon, but described from two different stand-
points. 69
Huxley’s Limbo, Artaud’s The Umbilcus of Limbo, and later, Dick’s duplica-
tion of himself in (or as) “Horselover Fat”—the protagonist of his 1981 novel 
VALIS—each become textual operations that may be correlated with Sass’s 
reformulation of the positive and negative syndromes of schizophrenia. 70
67 Artaud, Antonin Artaud Anthology, 35. While Sass does not explicitly give the title of 
this short essay in his article, it is this work that he cites: Louis A. Sass, “”Negative 
Symptoms,” Schizophrenia, and the Self,” International Journal of Psychology and Psy-
chological Therapy 3, no. 2 (2003): 153-180, 156. Of interest here is Breton’s claims that 
Artaud’s La Révolution Surréaliste attained the “highest point of phosphorescence” 
in the magazine’s entire series—whether this was uttered before or after is unclear: 
qtd. in John H. Matthews, André Breton: Sketch for an Early Portrait (Indiana: John 
Benjamins Publishing Company, 1986), 110. On “ipseity” see Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as 
Another, tr. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 2-3. Also 
see Shaun Gallagher, Stephen Watson, Phillippe Brun, Phillippe Romanski, eds., Ip-
seity and Alterity: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Intersubjectivity (Rouen: Université de 
Rouen Press, 2004); and in terms of ipseity’s central place in Sass’s recently refined 
“self-disorder model” of schizophrenia, see Sass, ”Self-disturbance and Schizophre-
nia,” 5-11, 6; and Sass, “‘The Catastrophe of Heaven’: Modernism, Primitivism, and the 
Madness of Antonin Artaud,” Modernism/Modernity 3 (1996): 73-91.
68 Louis A. Sass, “”Negative Symptoms,” Schizophrenia, and the Self,” 156; Ricoeur, One-
self as Another, 2.
69 Ibid.
70 The word “Horselover Fat” is characteristic of Dick’s tendency to employ paronoma-
sia, and especially German plays on words. “Dick” is a German adjective for “fat” 
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While having a less explicit phenomenological relation to this liminal or 
“limbotic” ipseity, “Huxley’s trip,” which Sass and Barnaby Nelson analyse 
in an article on psychosis, was a drug experience triggered by the author’s 
consumption of four tenths of a gram of mescaline; it is that experience that 
Huxley recorded faithfully and illuminatingly in his The Doors of Percep-
tion. Comparing Huxley’s trip to his own constructed model of a “psychotic 
break,” Sass underlines the “strong overlap between the [respective] expe-
riences with regards to ‘mere being.’” 71 In view of the history and theory in 
which hallucinogenic drugs like mescaline and LSD have been understood as 
“psychtomimetics”—that is, as psychosis imitating susbstances 72—it is un-
surprising that mescaline, a phenylalkylamine-class hallucinogen that, like 
LSD, functions as a selective agonist of a range of 5-HT2 serotonin receptor 
subtypes, should be understood by Sass as a drug that engenders effects that 
are psychosis-mimicking. As with Foucault’s description of the LSD experi-
(thick; stout; swollen), and Philip, derived from the Greek Φίλιππος or Phillipos, lit-
erally means “lover of horses.” See Oxford Dictionaries, Oxford University Press, s.v. 
“dick, adj.” accessed 25 November, 2014, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/trans-
late/german-english/dick/; M.G. Easton, Illustrated Bible Dictionary (New York: Harper 
& Brothers, 1893), s.v. “Philip,” 546. But what is perhaps even more important about 
Dick’s life and work concerning these positive and negative syndromes, and about 
Valis’s relation ship to them, is what Dick determines articulates in a recorded inter-
view during the making of the so-called “Platt tape,” of 1979. After a long dialogue of 
questions and answers about his mania, schizophrenia, manic depression, catatonic 
excitement, and so forth, which symptomise as what Dick describes as an “AI” [or 
artificial intelligence] voice,” Dick concludes that the Vast Active Living Intelligence 
System, or VALIS, so painstakingly portrayed the novel VALIS, is in fact “female,” “on 
the other side,” and, most importantly, his “twin sister Jane.” See Dick, VALIS, passim; 
Ex, 518-21; and Dick, In Pursuit of VALIS: Selections from the Exegesis, ed. Lawrence Su-
tin (California: Underwood-Miller, 1991), 161. 
71 Sass and Nelson cite Sass’s Madness and Modernism as their reference point for Sass’s 
conception of the psychotic break; however, Sass does not explicitly develop a new 
model of the “break” in that work, but rather offers only a general description of psy-
chosis. See Sass and Barnaby Nelson, “The Phenomenology of the Psychotic Break and 
Huxley’s Trip: Substance Use and the Onset of Psychosis,” Psychopathology 41 (2008): 
346-55, esp. 351.
72 The term “psychotomimetics” was coined, as Osmond points out, by Ralph W. Gerard. 
See Gerard, Neuropharmacology: Transactions of the Second Conference (New York: Jo-
siah Macy Jr. Foundation, 1956), 123 (also see my chapter 1). Cf. Humphry Osmond, 
“A Review of the Clinical Effects of Psychotomimetic Agents,” Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences 66 (1957): 418-34; Steven J. Novak, “LSD Before Leary: Sidney Co-
hen’s Critique of 1950s Psychedelic Drug Research” Isis 88, no. 1 (1997): 87-110, esp. 
90-92; Humphry Osmond, “Chemical Concepts of Psychosis,” in Chemical Concepts 
of Psychosis, ed. Max Rinkel (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1958), 3-26, esp. 10-11; 
Jonathan O. Cole and Martin M. Katz, “The Psychotomimetic Drugs: An Overview,” in 
David Solom, ed., LSD—The Consciousness–Expanding Drug (New York: G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1964), 231-40, originally published in The Journal of the American Medical Associ-
ation 187, no. 10 (1964): 758-61.
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ence, these drugs are understood to modulate the ipseity or “mere being” 
figures that Sass develops throughout his phenomenology of psychosis. 73 
While the standardised psychiatric instrument for measuring these 
negative and positive syndromes had been proposed in 1987 in the Positive 
and Negative Syndrome Scale for Schizophrenia (PANSS), it is Sass and Joseph 
Parnas’s task to focus on the socio-cultural—rather than the clinical—reso-
nances of this bifurcated syndrome scale. 74 Identifying the prevalence of the 
“distinction between positive-versus-negative symptoms,” which is “typical-
ly used in the Anglophone literature,” the authors assert that this division 
is only a synecdoche for a broader distinction between human “excess and 
lack.” 75 But if, as Sass and Parnas argue, “thought blocking or deprivation” 
may be interpreted as a negative symptom—and “thought-insertion” 76 re-
garded as an exemplary positive symptom—then the process in which Fou-
cault describes the subject becoming “contemplative” in a kairotic moment 
of “continuous phosphorescence,” represents the latter: the insertion of a 
thought, a positive symptom. Finally gaining access to what Foucault calls 
“a partial thought”—precisely by confronting and, in an important way, re-
classifying “stupidity”—it is also in this instant that the subject ceases to 
automatically dismiss stupidity. And here, the subject perhaps even begins 
to “disrecognise” otherness altogether, as well as to dismiss or question the 
73 What is surprising, however, is that Sass’s article, while advising that it should be 
read as an “exploratory effort,” seems to omit this historical theory, the primary work 
on which was undertaken by Huxley’s personal friend Humphry Osmond. On this 
friendship, see Joel Deshaye, “The Psychedelic History of The Doors of Perception and 
Island,” Aldous Huxley Annual 2 (2002): 181-202; Ronald W. Clark, The Huxleys (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 347-8; David King Dunaway, Huxley in Hollywood (New York, 
Bloomsbury, 1989), 285-6; Humphry Osmond, “May Morning in Hollywood,” in Mi-
chael Horowitz and Cynthia Palmer, eds. Moksha: Writing on Psychedelics and the Vi-
sionary Experience (1931-1963) (New York: Stonehill Publishing, 1977), 32-39; Humphry 
Osmond, “Foreword,” in Brian Wells, Psychedelic Drugs (New York: Jason Aronson, 
1974), 7-12; Also see chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. On the pharmacological action 
of hallucinogens, see notably David E. Nichols, “Hallucinogens,” Pharmacology and 
Therapeutics 101 (2004): 131-181, esp. 138-168.
74 Stanley R. Kay, Abrham Fiszbein, and Lewis A. Opler, “The Positive and Negative Syn-
drome Scale (PANSS) for Schizophrenia,” Schizophrenia Bulletin 13, no. 2 (1987): 261-
276; Victor Peralta and Manuel J. Cuesta, “Psychometric Properties of the Positive and 
Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) in Schizophrenia,” Psychiatry Research 53 (1993): 31-
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75 Louis A. Sass and Joseph Parnas, “Schizophrenia, Consciousness and the Self,” Schizo-
phrenia Bulletin 29, no. 3 (2003): 427-444, 431.
76 On thought insertion, see Johannes Roessler, “Thought-Insertion, Self-Awareness, and 
Rationality,” in K. W. M Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard Gipps, George Graham, John 
Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini, and Tim Thornton, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Philos-
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reality of that much grander and critical category of human otherness, the 
definition of which is so crucial to Foucault’s project: “illness.” 
Deautomatising the incarnate drive toward negativity—toward what 
Ricoeur names “thought in its negative form”—LSD and its related com-
pounds begin to temper or militate against that basic reflex or deictic whose 
“beginning implies that the movement of thought is halted in pursuit of a 
prior cause.” 77 Foucault’s seemingly uninitiated description of LSD’s effects 
is an account avant l’heure that, given its language, seems anchored in Ar-
taud’s, not to mention Breton’s, description of the “phosphorescent point.” 
In a crucial way, it also indicates how LSD’s phenomenology may, for Fou-
cault himself, operate in such a way as to rouse the melancholic from their 
lethargy and acedia.
In some ways, Foucault’s and Sass’s analyses of madness and drugs are 
compatible—even complementary. While Sass argues that schizophrenia 
becomes, with Modernism, a “self-deceiving condition... that is generated 
from within rationality itself rather than by the loss of rationality,” 78 Fou-
cault articulates a parallel view, asserting that madness, in the nineteenth 
century, entered a new cycle that was “now uncoupled from unreason,” but at 
the same time intimately and “secretly” bound up with history and culture. 
Now, madness is simply—but also invisibly—“the counterpart to the history 
of reason.” 79 For both scholars, reason is itself constitutive of madness—at 
least in its most recent cycle—since, as Foucault asserts, and as Derrida will 
later affirm—the “wild state” of an originary madness (a madness ex nihilo) 
possesses an “inaccessible primitive purity.” 80 
Protected by virtue of its being inassimilable into the language of rea-
son, this originary form of madness can, Derrida postulates, be repatriat-
ed—brought out of the anchorage of its barely undetectable silence—only 
by “convoking the first dissension” in which, by a “fiat, a decree, and as a 
schism” a division arose within “the very act of sentire.” 81 For only “a single 
77 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 104.
78 Sass, The Paradoxes of Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the Schizophrenic Mind 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 12.
79 Foucault, History of Madness, 376-77. 
80 Ibid., xxxiii, qtd. in Jacques Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” in Writ-
ing and Difference, tr. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 2002 [1978]), 43. On the agon be-
tween Derrida and Foucault about the question of madness’s articulability, see Slavoj 
Žižek,”Cogito in The History of Madness,” in Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow 
of Dialectical Materialism (London: Verso, 2012), 327-58.
81 Madness is protected, Derrida suggests, precisely “Because the silence whose archae-
ology is to be undertaken” by Foucault “is not an original muteness or nondiscourse, 
but a subsequent silence, a discourse arrested by command, the issue is therefore to 
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act... links and separates reason and madness” and thus, in the moment 
of that act, “the exterior (is) the interior.” Such a tension now generates a 
“fission that produces and divides [madness] along the lines of the Hegelian 
Entzweiung,” 82 so that the category itself remains trapped within Hegel’s di-
alectical quarrel. Echoing the words in which Foucault adumbrates his own 
ambition, Derrida asserts that the remit of Foucault’s “projected archaeolo-
gy of silence” leads—or aims to lead—to no less than his
discovering the common root of meaning and nonmeaning and to unearth-
ing the original logos in which a language and a silence are divided from one 
another...  83
On one reading, Derrida’s criticism of Foucault’s project treats the idea as 
incredulous on reasonable grounds, for it insists that the History of Madness 
requires Foucault, its author, only to do as much as he, in this “archaeology 
of silence,” promised to deliver its reader in its introduction. And yet, it is 
difficult to remain blind to the ironical contours of Derrida’s assertions: 
in reiterating the requirement that Foucault’s work should discover the 
“common root of meaning and nonmeaning” as it had promised, Derrida 
seems to join Foucault in imagining that such a discovery might yet be pos-
sible. For all their ironies, though, Derrida’s remarks remain emblematic 
of the torqued inextricability of that originary, “wild,” pre-medicalised, and 
pre-classified madness on whose behalf Foucault deigns to speak. Thus 
Derrida, despite his reservations, thinks like Foucault; both of them sense, 
that is, that the ab initio impulse that prompts the scrivener to write, or to 
speak, in itself, can be re-written—or, at least, “critically read.”
It is directly toward this definitive connection between one’s impulsive 
resolution to commit to writing, and the madness induced by this instanta-
neous endoperformative operation, that the twin epigraphs at the head of 
Derrida’s essay—one from Kierkegaard, the other from Joyce—will hence-
forth direct us. In what will become as much a “watchword or slogan” in 
Derrida’s essay as a fixture in his writing more generally, Derrida quotes a 
Kierkegaard line: “... L’Instant de la Decision est une Folie”—“The instant 
reach the origin of the protectionism imposed by a reason that insists upon being shel-
tered... ” Derrida,” Cogito and the History of Madness,” 46. 
82 Ibid.
83 Derrida, “Cogito and The History of Madness,” 51. Foucault’s incisive essay in re-
sponse to Derrida’s criticism, titled “Michel Foucault Derrida e no Kaino,” would first 
appear in Japanese magazine Paideia 11 (1972); 131-47, and later be elaborated as “My 
Body, This Paper, This Fire.” See Foucault, History of Madness, Appendices 2 and 3, 
550-90.
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of decision is madness.” Derrida thus inscribes what Geoffrey Bennington 
characterises as his “signature” thought, what will become, for him, an im-
placable idée fixe. 84 In a 1983 interview, for instance, Derrida will elaborate 
on the dynamical state of undecidability out of which such a mad decision 
must arise, from which it must always inexorably appear. Referring again to 
Kierkegaard, Derrida reconfigures this inexorably mad decision by asserting 
the following: 
the only decision possible is the impossible decision. It is when it is not possi-
ble to know what must be done, when knowledge is not and cannot be deter-
mining[,] that a decision is possible as such. 85
Impossible or not, decisions will always involve any number of performances 
or practices—and knowing each of these is crucial. It is, however, by com-
bining his translation of Kierkegaard’s words with the words that he then 
takes from James Joyce—repurposing the latter quotation in his second epi-
graph—that Derrida conjoins madness to the practice of writing. Here, Der-
rida affords this performance a singular status, rendering it an “exemplary 
madness.” As the Joycean epigram reads: 
In any event this book was terribly daring. A transparent sheet separates it 
from madness. (Joyce, speaking of Ulysses). 86
In its emptiness and nudity, the transparent sheet metonymises that which 
is absent in the madness equation: the irretrievable silence that Derrida crit-
icises Foucault for pursuing in his own history of the subject. If any such 
transparent sheet serves to cordon off the book from rationality, its invisi-
bility also effectively vaporises the distinction, reconverting the sheet into 
nothingness itself: an eminently pourous boundary. 
But of course, it is not this absent sheet that actually exists, but the 
far-from-transparent—even instensively opaque—passages contained in Ul-
ysses itself that, in their very “givenness” and material presence, distinguish 
the work from madness—even as madness may lie always orthogonally to or 
adjacently by the book. If for Derrida, though, the instant of the decision to 
write such a book is madness, then whatever evidence remains of this origi-
84 Geoffrey Bennington, “A Moment of Madness: Derrida’s Kierkegaard,” The Oxford Lit-
erary Review 22, no. 1 (2011): 103-127, 104 and 104n4. 
85 Jacques Derrida, “Dialangues” in Elisabeth Weber, ed., Points de suspensions: Entre-
tiens (Paris: Galilée, 1992), 157, tr. Catherine Porter and Edward P. Morris as “The Prin-
ciple of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils,” diacritics 13, no. 3 (1983): 2-20.
86 Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” 36.
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nary madness takes the form only of a ringing in our ears—an apparition or 
chimera of that transparency, absence, invisibility, and undecidability, that 
this madness itself has become and will be read as in the book.
The act of writing, and the production of words, by contrast, brings such 
a “decision” into order by writing across and through this “transparent sheet,” 
a boundary whose non-presence signifies a decision provisionally begun but 
not yet acted upon, cognised but not yet operationalised. It is a decision that 
remains undecidable in the divisiveness of its transparency—an “impossi-
bly” invisible sheet that lies between presence and absence, parchment and 
carbon dioxide. For Derrida, it is in writing itself that the madness of the 
“decision” to write is escaped or transcoded. What is in Sarah Woods’s terms 
“alarmingly permeable”—or in Andrew J. Mitchell and Sam Slote’s idiom a 
“permissive... boundary”—now divides madness from reason; and it does so 
by leavening the very pages upon which madness’s history—a work of writ-
ing in its own right—is produced. 87 
It is because of this essential différance, the one that distinguishes “the 
virginity of the yet unwritten page” from the “present unveiling of the pres-
ent”—this “monstration, manifestation, production, [and] alēthia”—that 
Derrida cannot accept Foucault’s archaeology of silence. For to write what 
is otherwise unwritten, and to enunciate the “unspeakable” language of 
madness, would be to move away from the “instant of decision,” from that 
zone wherein the acme of undecidability is reached, and to move elsewhere, 
toward the instant of “the decided” or “the decidable,” where madness can 
only ever be abortively represented, or meaninglessly retraced. 88
For all its faultiness, it is Derrida’s engagement with the origin of writing 
as a decision—so well emblematised here by his questionable translation of 
Kierkegaard’s aphorism—that distinguishes his work from, as Bennington 
suggests, Foucault’s madness history, as well as from perhaps any other phi-
losopher’s history of the subject. 89 It is only in Derrida’s writing, for instance, 
that the word’s first invention is so emphatically and pervasively portrayed as 
87 Sarah Wood, Derrida’s Writing and Difference: A Reader’s Guide (London: Continuum, 
2009), 47; Andrew J. Mitchell and Sam Slote, “Derrida and Joyce: On Totality and Equiv-
ocation,” in Mitchell and Slote, eds. Derrida and Joyce: Texts and Contexts (New York: 
State University of New York Press, 2013), 5.
88 Derrida, “The Double Session,” in Dissemination, tr. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: Chi-
cago University Press, [1970] 2008), 222, 216; On Derridean “undecidability,” and its 
relation to, for instance, some of the concepts addressed in my introduction, such as 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, see Paul Livingstone, “Derrida and Formal Logic: 
Formalising the Undecidable,” Derrida Today 3, no. 2 (2010): 221-39.
89 Bennington, “A Moment of Madness: Derrida’s Kierkegaard,” 104-5. 
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the ur-inauguration of madness; it becomes for him an ancient event whose 
reverberations and remembrances may be recognised, however disorient-
ingly, for the primal rituals and technics they have always been, and as the 
charged (cathected) and fraught practice that writing thus remains. Writing 
is, in other words, a technical process, one that is unthinkingly reperformed 
and reproduced in a grand, transhistorical mimesis of that originary mo-
ment. Writing is grasped as the ab original incarnation of all that it means 
to be mortal, a decision of reason in the face of death—and thus the work 
of mad reason, one whose object is inimical to reason ordinarily defined. 90 
In direct reference to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems—and in less di-
rect reference to the binaristic conjugation of signifier and signified, which, 
as in Sausurre’s semiology, reduces language to a series of dualisms divided 
by virgules 91—Derrida emphasises the actual practice of writing over what 
might be described as its “extrasubjective” elements. Ever composed and 
decomposed, language’s 
“Undecidability” is not caused here by some enigmatic equivocality, some in-
exhaustible ambivalence of a word in natural language, and still less by some 
“Gegensinn der Urwrote” (Abel)... .What counts here is not lexical richness, 
the semantic infiniteness of a word or concept, its depth or breadth, the sed-
imentation that has produced inside it two contradictory layers of significa-
tion (continuity and discontinuity, inside and outside, identity and difference, 
etc.). What counts here is the formal or syntactical praxis that composes and 
decomposes it. 92
Out of Derrida’s fixation on Kierkegaard’s words, madness becomes an ef-
fect that is overcome or violently transgressed by the “praxis” of writing, by 
the repetition of that originary schism in which the “dehiscence, finally is 
repeated and partially opened.” It occurs, says Derrida, in “a certain “lit,” 
which is a pun, he notes, on both “bed” and “reads”—at least as it so ap-
pears in Mallarmé’s Mimique. Here writing is “painstakingly set up”—in 
no small part through these very plays on words, where “lit” is both sexual 
90 On the faultiness of Derrida’s translation, see Bennington, “A Moment of Madness,” 
121. That Derrida himself may have felt particularly plagued by the undecidability of 
writing is indicated by Foucault’s compliment to him: “No doubt the primary act of 
philosophy is for us—and for some time to come—reading: yours clearly presents it-
self as such an act. Which is why it has that royal honesty.” Michel Foucault, to Jacques 
Derrida, 27 January, 1963, qtd. in Benoît Peeters, Derrida (Paris: Flammarian, 2010), 
164, and Bennington, “A Moment of Madness: Derrida’s Kierkegaard,” 122n1.
91 On the virgule or slash as, for instance, a “wall of hallucination,” see Barthes, S/Z, 106-
7.
92 Derrida, “The Double Session,” 229 (emphasis in original).
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(“bed”) and enlightening (“lit”)—and precisely signifies that moment when 
the double-meaning “lit” transforms into “literature.” 93 But Derrida’s view of 
writing as a “praxis that composes and decomposes undecidability” shares 
in a range of significant associations with Foucault’s description of LSD’s ef-
fects. These effects are those effects of LSD that Foucault implies can enable 
“partial thought” and can trigger a novel mode of “contemplation”—one in 
which “stupidity” and even “thought” itself are irremediably repudiated and 
displaced as categories or ideas. 94 
If LSD triggers a displacement of the idea avant le lettre—that is, before 
even the act of writing, this composing and decomposing praxis, has com-
menced—does it then become possible, decision being madness, for the sub-
ject on acid not just to perceive “decision-as-madness” as an idea in itself, but 
rather to displace this idea? To manipulate it? Is it possible, in other words, 
that the subject on acid may assume a position in which they may formulate 
a view of decision-as-madness, and thus grasp and to dissociate madness 
itself from “undecidability,” for a moment, before it all disintegrates, or is 
“written through” by writing? And might they, then, in that moment, also 
find themselves to be so situated as to more freely apperceive the very praxis 
that erases madness through composition?
Since both are adjoined to “the imaginary,” Derrida’s quotation of Ki-
erkegaard’s words and Foucault’s premonitory description of LSD’s effects 
may themselves be decoded as kinds of precisely this hallucination, this 
apperception of madness. If Foucault’s phenomenology of the acid trip con-
stitutes a writing that substitutes a lack, fabricating a description of an event 
that in fact never even occurred, then Derrida’s quotation of Kierkegaard’s 
words similarly substitutes for an event that, should it have ever taken place, 
is now forgotten or misremembered. Lacking a citation, the passage already 
floats within an abyss of scholarly imprecision, its penumbraic figuration 
suggesting no more than Derrida’s own misremembrance. But such a delir-
ium is even more amply illustrated, as Bennington notes, by the traumatic 
nature of the quote itself, which
gives one the impression that it is a memory of his “early” reading of Kierke-
gaard, of a moment of reading, precisely, something like a snapshot or screen 
memory of a (traumatic) event rather than a scholarly reference.
But even more important than this “screen memory” is what Bennington’s 
93 Ibid., 231.
94 Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 191.
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perspicacious reading discloses more implicitly: that Derrida’s epigraph 
must be leavened by the almost certain philological evidence that his epi-
graph quotation is itself a mistranslation of the Kierkegaard passage. 95 
While the operative word that is written in Kierkegaard’s Philosophi-
cal Fragments—the original Danish Daarskab (Dårskab)—had indeed been 
translated into the French as folie or “madness” in the edition that Benning-
ton guesses would have served as Derrida’s consultation text (a translation 
by Paul Petit), the word is, in apparently every other edition of Kierkegaard’s 
essay, translated quite differently. 96 In the German, for instance, the Dan-
ish word is made into Torheit, which is “foolishness,” or “stupidity,” and in 
the wider context of Kierkegaard’s argument, as Bennington punctiliously 
demonstrates, the word denotes not so much madness as such, but sinful-
ness; at least, these are the words spoken by Climacus to St. Paul on the 
subject of pedagogy, and on other related themes involving the moral integ-
rity of intellectual work—the subject on which Kierkegaard’s essay discours-
es. And what is more, the thematics of Kierkegaard’s subject in its original 
context are also limned by the “repeated motifs of foolishness,” so that this 
instant of decision is in this essay less a madness or insanity than an auto-
matic or pre-instinctual reflex. It is not so much an aporia, then, as it is (in 
Bennington’s words) 
something unthinkable like a passive decision, a decision not taken by me but 
by the other in me, the event of alterity itself, a reading in which it is not exact-
ly I who reads, something unreadable to me as supposed subject of reading. 97 
Bennington’s disinterment of Derrida’s epigraph concludes by suggesting that 
if Derrida’s Dårskab, translated most faithfully as “foolishness,” is now possible 
to be read—with Derrida and Petit—as folie (madness), then it must also com-
municate what lies in the other direction: namely “stupidity.” 98 Such a reading 
rushes Foucault’s LSD experience into sharp relief, as it is here that foolishness 
and madness are viewed as opposite sides of the same coin, as performances 
both sprung from the originary axiomatic of “stupidity.” And “stupidity” is 
precisely the descriptor that Foucault continually employs, both as stupide and 
95 Bennington, “A Moment of Madness,” 110-22.
96 The English translation is as follows: Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, ed. 
and tr. Howard V. Hing and Edna H. Hong (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1985), 52. This is the version cited in Bennington, “A Moment of Madness,” 124n15. 
The French translation that Bennington imputes to Derrida’s (mis)reading is Les Mi-
ettes philosophiques, tr. Paul Petit [1947] (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1967), 96.
97 Bennington, “A Moment of Madness,” 121.
98 Ibid.
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bêtise, to elucidate that which is reconfigured by the LSD experience. 
Associated as it is with that breathless state of ineffability that this 
chapter has already addressed, the moment of stupefaction finds a cognate 
descriptor in the derogatory “moron,” which Bennington is swift to clarify 
“would, many centuries later, in 1910 to be precise, be adopted as a clinical 
term by the American Association for the Study of the Feeble-minded.” 99 Fi-
nally quoting from his own translation of Derrida’s The Beast and the Sover-
eign, Bennington redeems Derrida’s translation of Kierkegaard by claiming 
that, whatever misprisions may have appeared therein, Derrida’s “last explic-
it iteration of this Kierkegaardian reference” pays homage to Avital Ronell’s 
elucubration on the subject in her own book, Stupidity. 100 As Derrida writes, 
stupidity, perhaps like madness,
makes your head spin. The point is that it is a matter of indecision or an in-
determinacy between a determinacy and an indeterminacy. So that to link up 
more visibly and clearly with the problematic of sovereignty that actually has 
not left us, I would be tempted to say that any decision... is both mad (every 
decision is madness, says Kierkegaard) and bête, or stupid, that it involves a 
risk of, or a leaning toward bêtise. 101 
And while Foucault’s description of LSD’s potential to reconfigure stupidity 
is meant only as the barest of encomias, Foucault’s work can now be under-
stood to have deftly anticipated stupidity’s power, which is now as much as 
confirmed in its consonance or syntonicity with madness by Derrida. 
But just as Foucault’s foreknowledge of the ergoline substance (LSD) was 
itself expressed, at least arguably, as a misreading of Deleuze or, perhaps 
more formally, as a pre-reading of the drug, so now is stupidity a kind of 
repressed other of post-Enlightenment discourse—a corollary not of reason, 
but of consciousness itself, one only arrived at by way of Derrida’s misread-
ing of Kierkegaard through Petit. And so elusive is stupidity in all of this 
that Derrida’s inattention to it is barely repairable—for so aphoristic is the 
epigraph that marks stupidity’s elision that it barely even registers. And 
while Derrida reconciles himself to the subject of stupidity, the reconcilia-
tion must itself always be subject to an enquiry in metaphysical philosophy: 
Was Derrida’s atypically non-philological reference to Kierkegaard’s words 
constitutive, for instance, of his negligence in relation to the geneaology of 
99 Ibid., 122.
100 Avital Ronell, Stupidity (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2002).
101 Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign I, tr. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2009), 173
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the idea that “decision is madness”? Or does this ambiguous quotation rep-
resent a more forceful disavowal, however unconscious, of the very stupidity 
that Kierkegaard had himself called out to be named? 
As Ronell observes, naming stupidity can do as much to exclude the cat-
egory, both as a being and as a becoming, as its complete omission can. 
Socialisation, for Ronell, requires one to disavow stupidity in at least one of 
a number of mandatory ways. It is, she writes, “the ur-curse” to renounce 
stupidity, “the renunciation of which primes socialization in this culture.” 102 
And it is perhaps by virtue of these kinds of considerations or formulations 
regarding stupidity’s unspeakability, that the word itself, as bêtise, does not 
appear among Derrida’s recurrent epideixes to Kierkegaard; in fact, it will 
never appear in this context—not until, at least, Ronell directly identifies the 
category as having been so unspoken. 
If Derrida’s disavowal of stupidity is an erasure, though, then Ronell is 
Derrida’s restorative Geist, the one who “writes the book” on stupidity, and 
provides what is precisely a Joycean “transparent sheet” for Derrida, or one 
to lie between Derrida’s critique of madness and the madness of critique 
itself. Thus providing exactly the “verso” to Derrida’s work, in a way that pre-
cisely accords with Derrida’s intimate characterisation of Ronell herself as 
his “metaphysics” and his “verso,” Ronell also inherits “stupidity” from her 
post-structuralist master—not so much in a pathological way as in a topi-
cal or nominal manner. 103 Published exactly a decade following her book on 
drugs, Ronell’s book on stupidity opens its second part with what is an im-
placably literary—and ineluctably Derridean—reading of Foucault’s History 
of Madness; it attends to what she reveals as Foucault’s peculiar adoption of 
Pascal and Dostoesvsky as his exempla. Recombining Foucault’s and Derri-
da’s mad histories, Ronell’s book performs a work whose function is to 
disorient—and to disorient in precisely the way that Foucault had, in his 
“Theatrum Philosophicum,” observed LSD to disorient. 104 
If Foucault’s essay provides an example of what it might mean to become 
stupid or to know stupidity, then—to bear witness to a fool, but to see them 
102 Ronell, Stupidity, 10.
103 In a letter of 23 June, 1979, Derrida wrote to Ronell, recalling his meeting her at a 
conference. “You have always been,” he wrote, “‘my’ metaphysics, the metaphysics of 
my life, the ‘verso’ of everything I write (my desire, speech, presence, proximity, law, 
my heart and soul. Everything that I love that you know before me).” See “Envois” in 
The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1987), 197.
104 Ronell, Stupidity, 197. In describing Ronell’s “book on drugs,” I refer to Ronell’s Crack 
Wars.
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not so much as stupid as the official “scapegoat” of a sovereign reason (as “the 
pharmakos, marginalized and blamed for the crimes of all”)—then it also 
offers a description of stupidity’s possible recalibration. 105 It makes clear, for 
instance, that while, in our stupidity “we are distant from the ‘melancholy’ 
which makes itself indifferent to the world,” we are also at this time closer 
to that torpor within which madness becomes more approximately within 
reach. 106 Diametrically, Derrida’s resistance to countenancing this “other,” 
unintentional though it may be, relates to his assertion that we have pre-
cisely stupidity to blame for that disorder or disaffection that enchains the 
melancholic. For, try as they might, those inured in the dirge of melancholia 
cannot bring themselves to compose words on a page. And it is in this torpor 
and hebetude that the scrivener, then brought under reason’s dictation—
and asked to reason, but then refusing, not abiding by its law—is driven to 
madness. For it is in the performance of writing that reason accrues, and it 
is by such a performance that the subject is cleared, sanitised and, finally, 
assessed as not mad at all. 
In an inversion of Carl Jung’s impatient criticism of the “stupid chat-
tering” of the schizophrenic 107—or even in a reversal of Deleuze’s irritation 
with the mentally ill (expressed by the apocryphal question that Deleuze 
once posed to Guattari, “How can you stand these schizos?” 108)—Foucault’s 
text on the subject of acid indicates how “stupidity” itself might prompt one 
to “contemplate” what might be called, after Isabelle Stengers and White-
head, an “evental” moment. This is a moment in which catatonia, acedia, 
or melancholy are seen for what they are: as depersonalised collusions with 
stupidity. 109 Melancholy is, after all—as Branka Arsić notes in her description 
105 Dale Pendell, Pharmako/Gnosis: Plant Teachers and the Poison Path (Berkeley: North 
Atlantic Books), 307.
106 Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 191.
107 See my chapter 2, and Jung, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, 95. 
108 In François Dosse’s biography of Deleuze and Guattari, Alain Aptekman, a friend of 
Deleuze, recalls how Deleuze asked this question of Guattari having heard that a pa-
tient at La Borde—the institution at which Guattari was a clinician—had set fire to 
the chateau chapel, and had run into the woods. According to Aptekman, Deleuze 
“couldn’t bear the sight of crazy people.” See François Dosse, Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari: Intersecting Lives, tr. Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010), 8 and 526n30. On idiocy and stupidity, also see Slavoj Žižek’s typology of 
the inverse forms of idiocy in Living in the End Times (London: Verso, 2010), 365-66.
109 Stengers, The Invention of Modern Science, 67; Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), esp. 14-5. As Whitehead writes, “sky-blue is 
seen as situated in a certain event.” Also see Whitehead, Process and Reality, 80-1; and 
Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Free Press, 1967 [1933]), 187-8. Deleuze also discuss 
Whitehead and the event in “What is an Event?” in The Fold: Leibniz, and The Baroque, 
86-93. Also see, apropos my discussion of the “decision” and its relation to eventual-
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of Melville’s Bartleby (the ur-scrivener, ur-meloncholic, or ur-stupid scriven-
er)—precisely that which is 
capable of giving reason a fright... not only because it shows how its extreme 
truth is madness but because it makes clear that it is in collusion with stupid-
ity. 110 
Expanding on this conspiracy between madness and stupidity, Arsić offers a 
genealogy of depersonalisation; here she contextualises the “psychopathol-
ogizing tendencies” that tempt both the scrivener and dictator. As with Fou-
cault’s “theatre of immobility,” 111 Arsić argues that the meloncholic’s identi-
ty, or ipseity, is wrested away by a theatre of catatonia:
In contrast to a stupidity that tries to penetrate deep into thought but fails 
to do so because it cannot manage to follow the movement of differences—
which is why its truth is the catatonic theatre of the dead black brick wall—
melancholy succeeds at that very thing. It arrives deep with the interiority of 
thought, at its very “center.” But in order to reach that center it stops its mo-
tion and collapses into it, thus losing its own “I.” Stupidity and melancholy 
are two different forms of impoverished and depersonalized thought. 112
While both categories, as Bennington suggests, may run across parallel vectors, 
straddling either side of the central axiom of madness, where stupidity fails to 
enter the interiority of thought, melancholy cannot return from this interiori-
ty. Ever thus in the middle, “madness must watch over thinking,” structuring 
both its “stupid” and “melancholic” satellites. 113 But what if the melancholic’s 
pathway out of this interiorisation—out of this ineffable stupefaction that pre-
cludes rich and personalised thought—requires no less than an “event,” one 
that itself, as Justin Clemens and Oliver Feltham suggest, inspires “new forms 
of thought that cannot be resolved except at the cost of inconsistency”? 114 
ity and stupidity (or stupefaction), Justin Clemens and Oliver Feltham’s essay, “The 
Thought of Stupefaction; or, Event and Decision as Non-ontological and Pre-political 
factors in the Work of Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou,” in Roland Faber, Henry Krips, 
and Daniel Pettus, eds., Events and Decision: Ontology and Politics in Badiou, Deleuze, 
and Whitehead (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 16-47.
110 Branka Arsić, Passive Constitutions, or, 7 ½ Times Bartleby (Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 2007), 65-6.
111 Pérez-Álvarez, “Hyperreflexivity as a Condition of Mental Disorder,” 186; Foucault, 
“Theatrum Philosophicum,” 191.
112 Arsić, Passive Constitutions, 66.
113 Jacques Derrida, “A Madness Must Watch Over Thinking,” in Elisabeth Weber, ed. 
Points…Interviews, 1974-1999, tr. Peggy Kamuf and others (Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 1995), 339-64.
114 Clemens and Feltham, “The Thought of Stupefaction,” 20.
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Conceiving of such an event refocuses attention on the scrivener’s origi-
nary desire or “wish” to write, which itself generates an impasse. Addressing 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit, Blanchot remarks that those who wish 
to write are “stopped by a contradiction.” The would-be writer has “no talent 
until he has written, but he needs talent in order to write.” 115 The compulsion 
to overcome this morass may require either the beneficent strength of the 
Hegelian “spirit,” which may appear only under the psychopolitical power 
of the scribe’s dictating sovereign, but it may also mark and mandate the 
subject’s becoming-automatised. The writer’s “talent,” to use a term that 
T.S. Eliot once invoked, is molecularised as both impulse and invention, 
and as methexis qua cathexis (that is, as participation as a retained break-
through). 116 “To work [oeuvre],” as Stiegler writes, is then precisely “to forget 
the self, to let one’s other be—but an other who is not a self, nor one’s own, 
but quite other.” 117 The “quite other” whom (or that) we are required to “let 
be,” however, consists ironically in that assemblage—molecular, neurobio-
logical, micro-organic, and possibly even enspirited—that is the seemingly 
unitary impulse to write. But this is also the impulse that, following the lib-
eration of the scrivener from the master, and the birth of the Augustinian 
“metaphysical” author, appeared as madness—as a form no less trauma-
tising, chimerical, or unpredictable than that in whose guise this impulse 
had previously appeared: as the sovereign master, God, a Divine Will, or as a 
“frenzying visitation.” 118 
It is perhaps unsurprising that impulse control disorders, or ICDs, have 
been proposed as one of the possible aetiologies for obsessive and productive 
outputs of material writing, such as in cases of hypergraphia—a condition 
often imputed to Philip K. Dick (Ex, xix-xx). Overlapping in its behavioural 
symptomatology with addictive illnesses—such as pathological and compul-
115 Maurice Blanchot, “The Gaze of Orpheus,” and Other Literary Essays , ed. P. Adam Sit-
ney, tr. Lydia Davis (New York: Station Hill, 1981), 23, qtd. in Stiegler, Technics and Time 
1, 264 (although this work’s editor’s name, Sitney, is given as “Stirney” in Stiegler’s 
citation on 291).
116 See T.S. Eliot, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” in Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, ed. 
Frank Kermode (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1975), 38-9.
117 Here Steigler’s analysis echoes my discussion in my introductory chapter 1 of “the 
other,” and notably, as Stiegler writers, this relates to the “Lévinasian arguments con-
cerning the death of the other.” Stiegler, Technics and Time 1, 265; Emmanuel Lévinas, 
La Mort et le temps (Paris: Editions Grasset & Fasquelle, 1993). Published in English as 
God, Death and Time, tr. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: University of Stanford Press, 2000), 
16-20, 140-3. 
118 For a short history of such conceptions of this impulse, see Burke, “Reconstructing 
the Author,” xv-xxx, xvii.
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sive gambling—repetitive and hypomanic acts that involve the prolific out-
put of writing, drawing, and painting have, throughout the last decade, been 
tied to the subject’s underlying experience of (or reaction to) a hyperstim-
ulation. This is linked to acute and persistent “agonisation” of the brain’s 
dopamine receptors (dopaminergia). 119 In more recent research, ICDs have 
been dismissed as a correlate of this writing activity—or, more specifically, 
have been understood only as useful as a metaphor for these comprehension 
and creativity tests. This is because dopaminergic agonists, such as most 
specifically the drug L-DOPA (or L-3,4-dihydroxyphenylalanine), have been 
found to cause a “genuine change in [the] neuropsychological processes un-
derlying creativity.” 
Producing “enhanced originality, flexibility, and elaboration” in Parkin-
son’s disease (PD) patients undergoing dopamine therapy, the importance 
of dopamine is demonstratable in these studies, where the PD patients’s 
performance in the “TACT-Visual” and the “novel metaphor” comprehen-
sion tasks improve markedly. Performing better on tasks that tap into major 
components of creative thinking, these patients exhibit higher skills in “di-
vergent thinking” as well as in “combinatorial novelty.” 120
Blanchot identifies the tension that emerges at the point when a writer’s 
“wish” or impulse to write enters into exchange with the question of wheth-
er they have the requisite “talent” to do so; but these neurological findings 
suggest Blanchot’s formulation should be reframed, for it now seems at least 
119 See, for instance, Stanley R. Kay, Abraham Fiszbein, and Lewis A. Opler, “The Posi-
tive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) for Schizophrenia,” Schizophrenia Bulletin 
13, no. 2 (1987): 261-76, esp. 261; Tim J. Crow, “Molecular Pathology of Schizophrenia: 
More than one Disease Process?” British Medical Journal 280 (1980): 66-8. As the au-
thors of one study put it, it was “debated that obsessive drawing or writing might 
be interpreted as another ICD associated with dopaminergic therapy.” See Ach-
inoam Faust-Socher, Yoed N. Kenett, Oren S. Cohen, Sharon Hassin-Baer, and Rivka 
Inzelberg, “Enhanced Creative Thinking under Dopaminergic Therapy in Parkinson 
Disease,” Annals of Neurology 76, no. 6 (2014): 935-42, esp. 936. Such a debate or prop-
osition was postulated in studies including the following: Daniel Weintraub, An-
drew D. Siderowf, Marc N. Potenza, Joseph Goveas, Knashawn H. Morales, John 
E. Duda, Paul J. Moberg, Matthew B. Stern, “Association of Dopamine Agonist Use 
with Impulse Control Disorders in Parkinson Disease,” Archives of Neurology 63 
(2006): 963-73; Margherita Canesi, Maria Luisa Rusconi, “Artistic Productivity and 
Creative Thinking in Parkinson’s Disease,” European Journal of Neurology 19, no. 3 
(2012): 468-72; and Ruth Walker, Robin Warwick, and Stephen P. Cercy, “Augmen-
tation of Artistic Productivity in Parkinson’s Disease,” Movement Disorders 21, no. 
2 (2006): 285-6.
120 Achinoam Faust-Socher, Yoed N. Kennett, Oren S. Coehn, Sharon Hassin-Baer, Rivka 
Inzelberg, “Enhanced Creative Thinking under Dopaminergic Therapy in Parkinson 
Disease,” Annals of Neurology 75, no. 6 (2014): 938-9.
(De)automatising Subjects 
143
partially a molecular problem. The placation or dampening of the will to 
write may also be understood as an encounter, perhaps, with dopamine 
dysregulation syndrome (DDS)—or the generalised downregulation of do-
pamine, which augurs a sense of loss and interest in exhibiting or even un-
derstanding “talent” as such. 121 In such a neurological or molecular formu-
lation, it is conceivable that the effect on the writer of such a contradictory 
exchange is to tussle with, and to begin to reterritorialise, this contradiction, 
this authorial frisson, at as microscopically small a plane as the molecular or 
atomistic levels. Thus, again, to write is a molecular correspondence, and so 
writing is at least partially the product of a molecular becoming.
From Acedia to Acid,  
From Injunctions to Adjuncts 
in his 1961 Light Through Darkness, Henri Michaux suggests that hallucinogen-
ic drugs enable subjects to directly perceive or transcribe the interiorised 
vibrations of their brains. 122 These same kinds of psychic waves or vibrations 
are today measured as voltage fluctuations in ionic current flows by electro-
encephalographic (EEG) machine recordings. Like Timothy Leary’s similar 
claim—that psychedelic drugs may facilitate the “direct awareness of the 
processes which physicists and biochemists and neurologists measure” 123 (a 
comment which Leary uttered in 1964, only a year following the US publica-
tion of Michaux’s book)—Michaux’s hypothesis calls into view the contem-
porary function of dopamine receptor antagonists that are used to “block 
hallucinations and delusions.” 124 Can or does dopamine upregulation buffer 
121 On DDS see, for instance, Pera Schwingenschuh, Petra Katschnig, Ronald Saurugg, 
Erwin Ott and Kailash P. Bhatia, “Artistic Profession: a Potential Risk Factor for Dopa-
mine Dysregulation Syndrome in Parkinson’s Disease?” Movement Disorders 25, no. 4 
(2010): 493-6.
122 Henri Michaux, Light Through Darkness: Explorations Among Drugs (New York: Orion 
Press, 1963), 7-9.
123 Timothy Leary, “The Religious Experience: Its Production and Interpretation,” Psyche-
delic Review 1 (1964): 324-46, 330-9. On the increasing emphasis in neuroscience on a 
distributed visual processing system, as opposed to an emphasis on visual perception 
as a function of the eye, see Daniel Collerton, Rob Dudley, and Urs Peter Mosimann, 
“Visual Hallucinations,” in Jan Dirk Blom, Iris E.C. Sommer, eds., Hallucinations: Re-
search and Practice (New York: Springer, 2011), chapter 6.5 (“Mechanisms of Visual 
Hallucinations”), 83-5. 
124 Cristina Missale, S. Russel Nash, Susan W. Robeinson. Mohamed Jaber, Marc G. 
Caron, “Dopamine Receptors: From Structure to Function,” Physiological Reviews 78, 
no. 1 (1998): 189-225, esp. 190; Daniel P. Czech, Joohyung Lee, Jeanne Correia, Hannah 
Loke, Eva K. Moller, and Vincent R. Harley, “Transient Neuroprotection by SRY Upreg-
ulation in Dopamine Cells Following Injury in Males,” Neuroendocrinology 155, no. 7 
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or protect psychotic subjects from something like the direct perception of 
these ionic current flows? And if this is so, how might these interiorised 
molecular adjustments relate to the contemporary efflorescence of “bioin-
formatic” devices? 
Increasingly affordable and accessible, EEG brainwave monitors—“for-
merly seconded to science labs and hospitals”—are now available to 
“gamers” and “DIY users,” permitting us to encounter the orthographic 
representation of our ion fluctuations. Legible, or perhaps decodable, as the 
body’s own scrivenings, these representations signal not the emergence of 
a new author, but the appearance of a new philosophical method, one that 
is practiced not by philosophers, but by “consumers engaged in personal 
data collection.” 125 It is arguable that, for Deleuze and Guattari, such a praxis 
would have instantiated only a reterritorialisation of movement within the 
subject’s body; it is not, after all, a “pure” apprehension of the body’s actual 
movements. Considering what Deleuze and Guattari would have made of the 
body’s movements within virtual reality (VR) devices, for instance, Andrew 
Murphie notes the way in which “movement’s significance” is reduced when 
“removed from its position in a small space”; in such spaces as in the brain, 
for instance, it exists as no more than an ionic pulse—a “schizz” or a “flow,” 
produced in the room in which the VR machine resides. 126 Now “shifted to a 
virtual space of any ‘size,’ and then largely perceived through the head (the 
ears and the face),” the body’s movements are transfigured through VR as 
a “reterritorialisation of the body.” Transplanted “on to the face,” the VR-
body inaugurates an “enhanced way of seeing, [and] of determining signifi-
cations.” 127
In a crucially haptic way, then, the complex and paradoxical conditions 
under which the will to write proceeds—and by which the “wish” to write 
(about which Blanchot cautions) arises—may be understood to be overrid-
den, or even overwritten, by the scrivener’s utilisation of, for instance, an 
EEG device. Now tracking and apprehending the same otherness, mysteri-
(2014): 2602-12. 
125 A very thoughtful and rigorous study of these developments is offered in Paula Gar-
dener and Britt Way, “From Lab to Living Room: Transhumanist Imaginaries of Con-
sumer Brain Waves Monitors,” Ada: A Journal of Gender, New Media and Technology 3 
(2014): http://adanewmedia.org/2013/11/issue3-gardnerwray/.
126 On the figures of the “schiz” and “flow,” used often for the ruptures in the body with-
out organs, see Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 39, 242, 315, 351.
127 Andrew Murphie, “Putting the Virtual Back into VR,” in Brian Massumi, A Shock to 
Thought: Expressions After Deleuze and Guattari (New York: Routledge, 2002), 188-214, 
204; Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 181, 479.
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ousness, and strangeness that had previously been traced through the am-
bulative procedure of authorship and textual production, the particularity 
of this new automatisation represents, as Sherry Turkle points out, only 
another node in the history of self-care devices. 128 What Foucault would later 
call a “technology of the self,” or, more generally, a mode of “the Care of the 
Self” (epimeleia heatou) becomes, at least in this instance, a vitiation of the 
same madness that writing has always also soothed—or a mitigation of that 
impulse that, at other times, as Derrida would have it, writing invented. 129
But Blanchot’s impasse could also be more conventionally overcome, 
such as when a scrivener is endowed with (or burdened by) a sense of stress— 
whether eustress of distress. 130 Here the drive to write obtains in an anxi-
ety or urgency that, as in what Freud calls a trieb, the subject is implacably 
incited to write away, compelled to write right away. 131 Such an impulsive 
assemblage could arise, of course, in the context of a range of mercantile, 
political, biopolitical, or other heterogeneous socio-materialist stressors (see 
Figure 2.1), each of which may then animate the scrivener’s performance 
as they realise they must “write to survive”—for their livelihood or even for 
their life, as Dick might have sometimes felt (see chapter 7). And it is at this 
originally socio-cultural rather than molecular level, where the whole pro-
cess becomes, as Barthes puts it, a “labor”—and where it is deployed like a 
function whose dividends remain entirely divorced from the performance 
itself—that it is automatised, brought over the edge of the Kierkegaardian 
128 See Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, Inc. 1984). Taking up Zygmunt Bauman’s conceptualisation of a “liq-
uid” modernity, where society is viewed less as a structure than a network or “matrix 
of random connections, “Gardner and Wray argue, echoing Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conception of the human subject as machinic assemblage, that “the age of the cy-
borg is past and we are now living in the age of machine augmentation.” See Bauman, 
Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty (London: Polity, 2007), 1-4; and Gardener 
and Way, “From Lab to Living Room: Transhumanist Imaginaries of Consumer Brain 
Waves Monitors.”
129 See Foucault’s essays on this subject, “Technologies of the Self,” and “Self Writing,” 
both in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 
One), ed., Paul Rabinow, and tr. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin, 2000), 223-52, and 
209-14; and Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1981-82, tr. Graham Burchell and ed. Frederic Gros (New York: Picador, 2005).
130 On the various forms of stress, including “remembered stress” from childhood and 
creativity (“divergent thinking”), see notably Joye W. Shanteau, “The Relationship of 
Locus of Control and Remembered Stress to Creativity as a Cognitive Process,” PhD. 
diss, University of Southern Mississippi, 1987. ProQuest (AAT 8806636). 
131 On triebs, see Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes,” Standard Edition of the Com-
plete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14, ed. James Strachey (London: Hoga-
rth Press, 1957), 111-40.
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decision (and I refer to Derrida’s Kierkegaard). Here, where the writing in 
and of itself bears no fruit for the scrivener: this is where writing, as a pro-
fessional duty, substitutes for another lack altogether, which is the lack of 
material credit. 132 After the Second World War, and along the corridor to late 
capitalism, the post-industrial scrivener inaugurates the professionalisation 
of writing, which is programmatically institutionalised by a vast network of 
educational systems throughout the West, all designed to reify and norma-
tivise this compulsion, this mandate, to write. 
In an uncanny echo of the early twentieth-century’s efflorescence of 
group psychology, the latter half of the twentieth century thus ushers in a 
psychological or psychopolitical regime in which the writing profession is 
imagined as more than simply a surrogate union or guild association. To be 
a writer is now to enter into a new psychopolitical ecology of its own, and to 
collectively militate against the writer’s characteristic malaise: the scourge 
of acedia. 133 As Thomas Pynchon sardonically illustrates, the pervasiveness 
of this melancholic illness elicited from members of the writing profession a 
newly organised approach to the problem of their slovenly and acedic turns 
of mood. In this new system, enforcement and justiciability, however encod-
ed, play vital roles:
Writers of course are considered the mavens of Sloth. They are approached all 
the time on the subject, not only for free advice, but also to speak at Sloth Sym-
posia, head up Sloth Task Forces, testify as expert witnesses at Sloth Hearings. 
The stereotype arises in part from our conspicuous presence in jobs where 
pay is by the word, and deadlines are tight and final—we are presumed to 
know from piecework and the convertibility of time and money. In addition, 
there is all the glamorous folklore surrounding writer’s block, an affliction 
known sometimes to resolve itself dramatically and without warning, much 
like constipation, and (hence?) finding wide sympathy among readers. 134
Pynchon’s metaphorology of the writing profession’s collective action 
132 Barthes, S/Z, 140.
133 I use the term “psychopolitical” here, and throughout this thesis, insofar as it is em-
ployed by Peter Sedgwick to denote the politics of the psyche in his invaluable Psycho 
Politics (London: Pluto Press, 1982), esp. 38-40. Sedgwick asserts that all illnesses are, 
to a degree, social and ephemeral constructions. Also see Mark Creswell and Helen 
Spandler, “Psychopolitics: Peter Sedgwick’s Legacy for Mental Health Movements,” 
Social Theory and Health 7 (2009): 129-47. An equivalent term that Foucault sometimes 
deploys is “noso-political”: see “The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century,” in 
The Foucault Reader, 273-291, 274; and Monica Greco, Illness as a Work of Thought: A 
Foucauldian Perspective on Psychosomatics (London: Routledge, 1998), 65-72.
134 Thomas Pynchon, “The Deadly Sins/Sloth: Nearer My Couch to Thee,” The New York 
Times Book Review, 6 June, 1993.
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against what Huxley once clarified as “Acedia, or, in English, Accidie,” is 
testament to the persistence of the illness in the late twentieth century—
notwithstanding Huxley’s 1923 view that “With us [the twentieth-century 
Moderns] it is not a sin or a disease of the hypochondries,” but “a state of 
mind which fate has forced upon us.” 135 
But more than Huxley cares to admit, Pynchon’s vignette acknowledg-
es the extent to which writers are lazy “sloths,” and workers whose labours 
are presumed to develop at least two expertises: one, a special knowledge 
about the avoidance of dread that is associated with scribal work, and two, 
a proficiency in writing itself, which arises not simply in the work, but in 
the folkloric (Kantian) “recognition” that writers, at one historical point or 
another, have felt the relief of having overcome writer’s block. Eliciting only 
as much respectability for their skills as attracting “sympathy” for their 
“af-fliction,” acedia, in fact, begins to emerge in the 1730s, according to 
Huxley's historicisation of the illness, as a “literary virtue.” It will remain 
so at least until the appearance of romanticism, when, 
Accidie in its most complicated and most deadly form, a mixture of boredom, 
sorrow, and despair, was now an inspiration to the greatest poets and novel-
ists... an essential lyrical emotion, fruitful in the inspiration of much of the 
most characteristic modern literature. 136
How could acedia, from the Greek ἀκηδία, meaning “noncaring state,” and 
deriving from κῆδος, which means care or accuracy, now be reformulated by 
the romantics as “inspiration”? 137 And how could it then be reformulated by 
Huxley himself, among other “cynics” of the 1920s, as a reification of what 
he calls “fate”? 138 Why, in other words, is for Huxley acedia the “inevitable 
evil” that he and his contemporaries “can [now] claim with a certain pride 
that we have a right to... ”? 139 
The incongruity between, on the one hand, this depressed state of con-
135 Aldous Huxley, “Accidie,” Baker and Sexton, eds. Aldous Huxley, Complete Essays, Vol-
ume 1: 1920-25, 351-4.
136 Huxley, “Accidie,” 353.
137 See Jennifer Radden’s introduction to Cassian’s “Accidie,” in Jeniffer Radden, ed. The 
Nature of Melancholy: From Aristotle to Kristeva (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
69. For a comprehensive account of the usages of the term acedia, from Evagrius Pon-
ticus through to Gregory the Great and Thomas Aquinas, see Patricia Murphy, “Aqui-
nas’s Teaching on Acedia: Flight From God As Friend,” PhD diss., Boston College, 
2003. ProQuest: AAP: 3103298, 245-306.
138 On Huxley’s cynicism, see David Ayers, “Sexual Cynicism and Intellectual Despair,” in 
English Literature of the 1920s (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 162-5. 
139 Huxley, “Accidie,” 353.
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sciousness—this “sinful” moral torpor or listlessness—and, on the other 
hand, the (Kantian) “transcendental” or “dopaminergic” impulse to write, 
suggests that it could only be through an alchemical or “enlightened” meth-
od that a transformation from the former to latter might be possible. 140 
As the epigraph at the head of this chapter—a quotation from William 
S. Burroughs’s Cities of the Red Night—suggests, “scribes and artists,” like 
“practitioners of magic,” must subscribe to a belief or faith in their own abil-
itities; in doing so, they revivify themselves amid the automatisation that 
results from repetitive motor behaviours, deautomatising. 141 If “unusual per-
cepts” involving highly unusual “sensations and ideation[s]” are required to 
inaugurate the “mystic deautomisation” that allows writers to carry on, then 
it is mysticism itself that provides, as Huxley would conclude in his final 
years, the perceptual strategies for overcoming demotivation and depression 
that are needed. It is also only in mysticism that we might imagine a way of 
overcoming what Sass describes as “the numbing of perception that accom-
panies the automatizing of actions frequently performed.” 142
For Huxley, this deautomatisation—or, as Thomas Aquinas named it, 
this “flight from God”—constitutes the pursuit of an ontological condition 
in which all meaning and knowledge can be suspended, as in under hypno-
sis. 143 As Burroughs suggests, this is a place in which “nothing is true,” and 
which, in Huxley’s life, involved a refinement and amplification of his ini-
tially cynical anti-individualism as he accepted the wisdom of mysticism; it 
was a slow-forming belief that had transformed Huxley while he had been a 
young twenty-year-old, who wrote of Aquinas in a letter to his brother Julian. 
“Individuality in the animal kingdom,” Aldous would note, “is nothing more 
than a question of mere matter... One cannot escape mysticism, [which] pos-
itively thrusts itself, the only possibility, upon one.” 144 Thus traced to our 
bodies as “matter,” mysticism recognises that all animals are alike and that, 
140  Of course, in the psychiatric or psychotherapeutic setting, acedia qua depression 
can be, and is, treated with anti-depressants such as the SSRIs (selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors), among other drugs and treatments. On the relation between 
acedia and depression, see Robert W. Daly, “Before Depression: The Medieval Vice of 
Acedia,” Psychiatry 70, no. 1 (2007): 30-51.
141 Burroughs, Cities of the Red Night, xviii.
142 Deikman, “Deautomatization and the Mystic Experience,” 36-7; Sass, Madness and 
Modernism, 63. Sass also refers to the Czech critic Jan Mukařovský’s deployment of 
this “de-automatization”: see Jan Mukařovský, On Poetic Language, tr. John Burbank 
and Peter Stiner (Lisse: Peter de Ridder Press, 1976). 
143 Murphy, “Aquinas’s Teaching on Acedia: Flight From God As Friend,” 249.
144 Aldous Huxley, Letters of Aldous Huxley, ed. Grover Smith (New York: Harper & Row, 
1969), 88.
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“potentially at least, though habit of matter has separated us,” all animals 
are “unanimous.” 145 But despite these indications of Huxley’s mid-1940s turn 
to mystical thought, Huxley’s early novels treat acedia and disillusionment, 
as June Deery avers, “with a cerebral and restless cynicism.” 146 
In Those Barren Leaves (1925), Calamy’s positive but churlish advertence 
to mysticism’s virtues is emblematic: 
... it’s not fools who turn mystics. It takes a certain amount of intelligence and 
imagination to realize the extraordinary queerness and mysteriousness of the 
world in which we live (Tbl, 298.)
Formulating a theory of science fiction in a letter to John Betancourt, Philip 
K. Dick would similarly describe how he felt compelled to provide a “shock 
of dysrecognition” for the readers of his novels, revealing to them that 
same “queerness and mysteriousness” of which Huxley’s Calamy speaks. 147 
Becoming the very mystic to whom intelligent readers could turn in order 
to apprehend the alterity of the world, Dick invents his own allohistories, 
and reimagines the political societies of the future precisely to imbue the 
present with mystical or gnostic elements. 148 Despite their differences in 
education and temperament—and even in their distinct psychopatholo-
gisations—both Huxley and Dick conceive of acedia in phenomenological 
terms, producing in an oft-cynical mysticism as a means of perceptual 
reintegration. 149 
In her 1986 Dictations, a book whose subtitle, On Haunted Writing, antic-
ipates the sense of “otherness” that Ronell will impute to the work of scriv-
ening, Ronell repurposes Lévinas’s conceptualisation of the other as a face, 
145 Ibid.
146 June Deery, Aldous Huxley and the Mysticism of Science (London: Macmillan Press, 
1996), 104.
147 Philip K. Dick, Beyond Lies the Wub: The Collected Short Stories of Philip K. Dick, 6 vols. 
(London: Gollancz, 1988), 1:9-10. This Letter to John Betancourt is dated 14 May, 1981. 
Also see my detailed analysis of Dick’s conceptualisation of sf (science fiction) in chap-
ter 7.
148 On mysticism in VALIS, for instance, see Rickels, “Endopsychic Allegories,” Postmod-
ern Culture 18, no. 1 (2007); and on Dick’s “mystical episodes,” see James Burton, “Ma-
chines Making Gods: Philip K. Dick, Henri Bergson, and Saint Paul,” Theory, Culture & 
Society 25, nos. 7-8 (2008): 262-84.
149 Recent phenomenological studies of depression and motivation, for instance, have 
emphasised the association of perceptual and affective conditions in the disorder. See 
for instance, Benedict Smith, “Depression and Motivation,” Phenomenological Cog-
nitive Science 12 (2013): 615-35. Also see, less recently, Jennifer Church, “Depression, 
Depth and the Imagination,” in James Phillips and James Morley, eds. Imagination 
and its Pathologies (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 335-60.
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reading the interlocution between self and other as a “non-violent transitivi-
ty” that Lévinas names “Conversation.” For Ronell,
Conversation tells us, among other things, that writing never occurs simply 
by our own initiative; rather, it sends us. Whether one understands oneself to 
be lifted by inspiration or dashed by melancholia, quietly moved, controlled 
by muses or possessed by demons, once has responded to remoter regions of 
being in that circumstance of nearly transcendental passivity that I am call-
ing “Dictations.” 150
Typologised and anatomised in four ways—as inspiration, melancholy, 
muse, and demon—the “other,” which this thesis has previously located 
in the body and the brain, and has described throughout as a “sovereign 
dictator,” is now a being with whom or with which a writer’s engagement is 
inexorable; it will occur “no matter how isolating, untimely or recondite” 
their “obsession with writing” may become. 151 Figuring the dictating other 
as “a neighbouring companion,” as “the future,” or even as “some unheard 
of tracking instrument that could capture the secret signals in your text,” 
Ronell organises the relationship between dictator and scrivener in a new 
way, not simply so that the relation can take the form of a Socratic meieu-
tics—a sifting out of the wisdom from a harvest of possibility—nor even so 
that it may mimic a Deleuzoguattarian engagement of apparent equanimi-
ty, however falsely symmetricalised as a relation between “diamond-min-
er” and “polisher.” The experience is configured, rather, as “an 
experience of common but asymmetrical deterritorialization.” 152 
While Ronell’s work makes no explicit allusion to Dick, her figure of the 
“tracking device” seems exemplary of the figures that apppear among 
Dick’s own intimations of that which haunted his writing, such as those 
that surface in his Exegesis, for instance—as well as in the novel Radio Free 
Albemuth (1976)—in the form of an “electronic boost of telepathic 
suggestion via satellite” (Ex, 100-106). 153 
150 Avital Ronell, Dictations: On Haunted Writing (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1986), xiv.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid. I take the “diamond-miner” and “diamond-polisher” analogy from a comment 
Deleuze himself made about the relationship between he and Guattari. As friend Ar-
lette Donati remarked in an interview, Deleuze said the Félix was the diamond miner 
and he was the polisher. So he [Guattari] needed only to send him the texts as he wrote 
them; that’s how it went.” Dosse, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives, 8 
and 526n29.
153 Dick, Radio Free Albemuth (New York: Arbor House, 1985). Originally titled Valisystem, 
this novel was written in 1976, but not published until 1985, three years following 
(De)automatising Subjects 
151
While Dick’s conceptualisation of a satellite “tracking device” is only 
one among the myriad extremities that constitute Dick’s moribund psycho-
pathological engagement with exteriorised, pre-authoring, and dictating 
technologies, 154 it is a prediction that has also largely materialised in the 
form of contemporary technologies: for instance, GPS instruments and Goo-
gle Earth. But the modern writer remains more than simply the “modern 
surveillant subject” that Dick so often feared he himself had become; rather, 
it is through these devices that the writer can also, as Paul Kingsbury and 
John Paul Jones III note in their essay on Google Earth, overcome their sense 
of self—they may use these technologies to call forth “an array of pulveriz-
ing, Dionysian, ego-transcending influences.” 155
When Dick was interviewed in 1982, in his last interview before his death, 
he was asked whether he had experienced writer’s block. Characteristically 
effusive and yet just as “truly sincere,” Dick’s response affiliates him with 
fellow resistor to the “image of thought” Antonin Artaud, who conceived of 
writing as a suspended ligne de fuite. 156 Alluding to acedia as a “blessing” and 
suggesting that writer’s block functions as a source of authorial sustenance, 
Dick’s particular line of flight models the condition as what Deleuze once 
called a “dark precursor”to the act of writing itself: 157 
... for me, it’s a blessing. Because I’m an obsessive writer, and if I didn’t get 
writer’s block, I’d overload, short circuit, and blow my brain out right away... 
If I didn’t get writer’s block, I would die. I mean, it’s the greatest relief to me. 
Now, when most writers get writer’s block, they get frantic. I know that on an 
Dick’s death.
154 On the “surveillant subject” under the “imperial gaze” of Google Earth’s satellite im-
ages, see Chad Harris, “The Omniscient Eye: Satellite Imagery, ‘Battleship Awareness’, 
and The Structures of he Imperial Gaze,” Surveillance and Society 4, nos. 1-2 (2006): 
101–122. On the intoxicating potential of “tracking devices” or similar technologies, 
like Google Earth, see Paul Kingsbury and John Paul Jones III, Walter Benjamin’s Dio-
nysian Adventures on Google Earth,” Geoforum 40 (2009): 502-513, esp. 504-5.
155 Surveillant eyes also appear, for instance, in Dick’s novels Eye in the Sky (New York: Ace 
Books, 1957), Flow my Tears, The Policeman Said (London: Doubleday, 1974), and Our 
Friends From Frolix 8 (New York: Ace Books).
156 Consider, for instance, Dale’s description of Artaud as “truly sincere” and the way in 
which this modality is tautologous in Artaud’s writing of “truth.” For Dick, sincerity 
and truth is, in fact, shocking, and it is precisely the exemplary status of his narratives 
as romans à clef –mimetic fiction with a “key” to the truth—that enables his sincerity 
to be, with Artaud’s, an overperformance of the truth. It is by “pulverizing the fatal 
oneness of a true sincerity,” that Dick’s fiction, as Artaud’s writing, anticipates the 
radical multiplicity of individual truths in the world. It is this reversal of truth, that is 
precisely Dick’s sincere truth. And this is why Dick can say, sincerely, as in the quoted 
lines above, that without writer’s block, he would die. See: Dale, “Cruel,” 85-6.
157 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 126.
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unconscious level, my mind is sorting through all different possibilities and 
a day will come when I will know how to begin. And the second the first sen-
tence is down on paper, the book is begun. If you look up “writer’s block,” it 
means that the writer has something that he knows about but he can’t figure 
out how to write. Although, I suppose, it’s possible that writer’s block could 
consist of not having anything to say, and could occur at any point. 158
Modeling writer’s block as writing’s mysterious, saturnalian augury, Dick’s 
reflections adumbrate an opaquely melancholic fatalism—“If I didn’t get 
writer’s block, I would die.” They fabricate what Ronell identifies in Goethe 
as a “traumatism of sorts.” 159 Here the micro-praxes and micropolitics of in-
scription recursively fold in on themselves so that knowing “how to begin” 
can only ever approximately be mapped onto a work’s first sentence, and on 
which occasion the “book is begun.” 
Automatised and given over to knowledge “on an unconscious level,” 
Dick, of course, fails to artciulate the specificities of that authorial history in 
which he had written “16 novels in five years, [and] sold every one of them” 
(“Plus a lot of stories too. And they were all publishable.”). This was a spell 
of composition that had been brought on, of course, by the psychostimulat-
ing enthusiasmous of speed. As works of the superego, these novels suddenly 
seem even more prone to automation; they become, as Lenson points out, 
“as immediately self-justifying as those [desires] of the libido.” Here, as I will 
address in far more detail in chapter 7, we can perceive how the “motivation 
to work” becomes all at once “conflated with or empowered by a sublimated 
mechanism of desire.” 160
As productive a vector may be traced across the analytical thematics of 
Ronell’s critical corpus—although one hastens to note that Ronnell’s spells 
of writing have been brought on, presumably, by no chemical enthusiasmos. 
Beginning with her encomiastic treatment of Goethe’s Apollonian transcen-
dence in her 1986 Dictations—a book in which Goethe’s exemplary works 
are imagined to surface at the membrane of a Léviniasian otherness—her 
oeuvre stretches to what becomes the materialisation or molecularisation of 
this otherness in her 2004 Crack Wars. Deleuze and Guattari, of course, had 
already inaugurated a critical response to the molecular revolution in their 
158 Gwen Lee and Doris E. Sauter, “Worlds of Sound and Colour,” Starlog 165 (1991): 51-57, 
51.
159 Ronell, Dictations, xxi.
160 Lenson, On Drugs, 118. On amphetamine culture generally in the US throughout the 
1950s and ‘60s, see Nicolas Rasmussen’s On Speed (New York: New York University 
Press, 2008), esp. 87-180.
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Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, books of a particular psychopolitical 
critique more recently formalised and rearticulated by the likes of Eugene 
Thacker, Nikolas Rose, and Paul Rabinow. 161 Like Ronell, these scholars’s 
teleologies extend to that node in which the site of “the other” must be rec-
ognised as interior, and where the home of that distant other, the dictator, is 
acknowledged as altogether more proximate than had been thought previ-
ously. As Ronell writes in her Dictations:
A translation of Dichtung, “Dictations” implies that writing always comes from 
elsewhere, at the behest of another, and is, at best a shorthand transcription 
of the demand of this Other whose original distance is never altogether sur-
mounted. 162
But this insuperable proximity is not simply the effect of the other’s near-
ness; this spatial distance is itself constitutive of it as an “other.” It is only 
“near,” that is, because it is not “in.” Crucial to the identity of the very thing 
whose demands are written by the scrivener, then, is the question of its spa-
tial orientation. What bearing does the other’s presumed insuperability, its 
impossibly distant position, have on the act of writing when the “mediatic 
spaces” of composition are dissolved and, becoming no longer “zoned out-
side of you,” but inscribed on the body itself—directly on its organs from 
within—are of apiece with the writer? 163 This is the question that implicitly 
appears when Ronell’s works on writing are put into dialogue. 
The nearly two-decade breach between Ronell’s Dictations and Crack 
Wars, however, marks a dizzying trajectory in which the author migrates 
from body to body. It begins with Goethe who, as an “awesome signifier” 
and an insuperable phallus-mountain text, may yet be “like the phallus... 
effectually powerful but empty”; but it ends with a narcoanalysis of Gustave 
Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, an analysis through which Ronell trespasses into 
161 See, for instance, Rose, The Politics of Life Itself (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007), 12-13; Thacker, The Global Genome: Biotechnology, Politics and Culture 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); and Rabinow, Essays in the Anthropology of Reason 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). On Deleuze and Guattari’s analytic of 
molecularisation, see Philip Goodchild, Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the 
Politics of Desire (London: SAGE, 1996), 186.
162 Ronell, Dictations, xiv.
163 Ronell’s science fiction narrative in Crack Wars recalls the present in these terms: 
It used to be that mediatic spaces were zoned outside of you... It was bizarre back 
then, everyone hoping they were autonomous, but in fact more or less hypnotized 
by these allotechnologies, held off at a distance that was just that much more fasci-
nating. 
 Ronell, Crack Wars, 67 (my emphasis.)
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Bovary’s empoisoned and toxic body itself. 164 
This shift from the other as exterior to interior—metonymised by Ronell’s 
movement from exteriorised (yet impotent) phallus to Bovary’s interiorised 
(and poisonous) central nervous system—demonstrates how literary theory 
and criticism has itself had occasion over this period to discover that, as 
adjuncts to both automatisation (in the case of amphetamines) and deau-
tomatisation (in the case of hallucinogens), psychoactive drugs allegorise 
the writing subject in an exemplary manner. And whether prescribed as 
dopemine agonists for those suffering from Parkinson’s disease, or as an-
ti-depressants for those diagnosed with depressed mood disorder—or when 
not prescribed at all, such as when hallucinogens are used illicitly by experi-
mental psychonauts—in each case drugs deautomatise the subject; for habit 
is normative, and drugs dehabituate. They restructure not the logos, which 
we take to be an invisible technology, but what Guattari so clearly recognised 
as our machinic unconscious, making it less and less machinic. 165
Read in isolation, Ronell’s claim that “drugs thematize the dissociation 
of autonomy and responsibility that has marked our epoch since Kant” sug-
gests that drugs function only as cultural or phenomenological signifiers. 
They appear to be compounds whose actions and interactions are capable 
of inducing a kind of social or even politico-moral thematics that, ironically 
and self-reflexively, sharply underscores the interdependence of the sub-
stance itself and the “responsible” subject who ingests it. If autonomy and 
responsibility have been dissociated, however—or at since Kant—then in 
what way do drugs threaten any further dissociation? 166 Read as biopolitical 
anthropology, Ronell’s remarks reflect Kant’s analysis of “the values of civic 
strength as they are affected by toxicating foods,” a project that Ronell astute-
ly detects in Kant’s Anthropology. Here “autonomy” becomes a metalepsis for 
the erosion or loss of individual freedom, and “responsibility” a signifier of 
society’s installment of a formalised and normativised sobriety.  167 
But sobriety is explicitly not, as Lenson observes, “‘pot sobriety,’ ‘caffeine 
sobriety,’ ‘psilocybin sobriety,’” or any sobriety in the “long string of sobri-
164 Ronell, Dictations, ix. And see, for instance, those pages in Crack Wars in which Ronell 
emphasises Emma’s intoxication and “the literary fact... that [she] swallowed poison, 
not her pride” (84). 
165 See Félix Guattari, The Machinic Unconscious: Essays in Schizoanalysis (California: Se-
miotext(e), 2011), 9-22. 
166 Ronell, Dictations, xxi.
167 See Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, tr. Robert B. Louden 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 62-5; Ronell, Crack Wars, 59.
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eties” crudely defined under the “single category called ‘drugs.’” 168 Just as 
“drugs” is a crude term, however, so is the reductive contours of “sobriety” 
signify only ever very obliquely those freedoms granted to a normativised, 
and automatic state of consciousness. The work of defining these terms has 
been not simply an instantiation of consciousness regulation, however, but 
as Ronell argues, an exercise of power that itself proceeds under the aegis or 
control of a new ontic, one that is itself instituted by the drug. 169 
So if it is obvious that, as Ronell argues, De Quincey’s opium use in his 
Confessions of an Opium Eater “perturbs ontology” only “in order to institute 
something else,” then what exactly is entailed by this “ontological revision”? 
What does it produce that is “not subject to the regime of alèthia,” that ex-
cuses it from truth-telling, and makes it “not dependent upon a prior unveil-
ing”? 170 It may ensure, in Timothy Leary’s indelible turn of phrase, that the 
hallucinogen-using subject, for instance, can “turn on, tune in, and drop 
out.” 171 And while in Leary’s formulation, dropping out defines not a radical 
break from society or from “responsibility” so much as a “solution to the 
problem of escape,” dropping out may yet have a side-effect: that of “vision-
ary revelation.” And while such a vision may answer what Leary calls the “es-
cape question,” it also restructures the full battery of Derridean binaries and 
Manichean oppositions: “off-on, in-out, start-stop, light-dark, flash-delay.” 172 
In the face of such a psychosis, or in what became known as the “bad trip,” 
the “terrorized reluctance to go with it” can be, as Leary remarks, fatal. One 
must submit to the very notion that one’s narratorial voice may be silenced 
or erased, and must come to grips with acedia and ego-loss—despite one’s 
“Frantic grabbing for the intangible switch” and even as one frets and pan-
ics, as the “Ego cries, keep it on!” 173 
The very different perturbations of ontology occasioned by the ingestion 
of opium might similarly guarantee, in Ronell’s cognate explanans, that 
one can find a “discreet if spectacular way out” of acedia through opium. 
As “an atopical place of exit” in which the drug forces “decision upon the 
subject,” opiates enable the subject to witness ab extra “the internal conflict 
of freedom,” and “the cleave of subjectivity where it encounters the abyss of 
168 Lenson, On Drugs, 3.
169 Ronell, Crack Wars, 60.
170 Ibid.
171 See Timothy Leary, Turn On, Tune In, Drop Out (California: Ronin Publishing, 1999), 
3-9.
172 Timothy Leary, The Politics of Ecstasy (New York: Ronin Publishing, 1980), 42-3.
173 Ibid.
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destructive jouissance.” 174 In the specific case of each drug, and even (if not 
especially) in the case of the SSRI-class anti-depressants, it is precisely by 
means of reconfiguration of perceptual experience—one that deautomatis-
es—that these myriad topoi of egress and decision, these psychotropes of in 
and out, are engendered. 175
And so if the writer who suffers from acedia is troubled, as Walter Benja-
min describes, by an “indolence of the heart,” then they perhaps also suffer 
from the “saturnine” and slow process of “indecisiveness” at whose root 
lies a particular style of thought; it is a tropism, or a psychological image of 
some description—not an illness—and it is these entities that I have thus 
far called a “psychotrope.” 176 But such an indolence, as Robert Smithson ar-
gues, also instigates a very real and “constant state of erosion”; it leads to 
“mental rivers [that] undermine cliffs of thought,” and ensures that “ideas 
decompose into stones of unknowing.” In this elaboration of acedia, further, 
the “conceptual/crystallisations break apart into deposits of gritty reason,” 
going on to produce barely an echo of the “bleached and fractured world.” 177
This chapter has sought to suggest the myriad ways in which writers, as 
subjects, can become deautomatised—rather than automatised—by alterna-
tive modes of engaging the “other” that propels their writing praxes. It con-
cludes part 1 of this thesis, which is a theoretical elaboration on the forms of 
writing—molecular correspondence, psychoactive scrivening, and deautom-
atisation—that may be induced by writing on drugs. In part 2, which begins 
with chapter 4, I will offer a series of close readings of Huxley’s and Dick’s 
work; in so doing, the models I have developed in this part 1 will be not only 
mobilised—and put into practice—but further refined and developed. 
174 Ronell, Crack Wars, 60 (emphasis in original).
175 On the historical relationship between serotonin and hallucinogen action, and the 
emergent theorisation that serotonin would play a role in configuring mood, see Nich-
ols, “Hallucinogens,” 13-140; J.H. Gaddam, “Antagonism between Lysergic Acid Dieth-
ylamide and 5-Hydroxytryptamine,” British Journal of Psychopharmacology 9 (1954): 
240-248; D. W. Woolley and E. Shaw, “A Biochemical And Pharmacological Suggestion 
About Certain Mental Disorders,” Science 199 (1954): 587-588; A. Cerletti and E. Roth-
lin, “Role of 5 Hydroxytryptamine in Mental Disease and its Antagonism to Lysergic 
Acid Derivatives,” Nature 176 (1955): 785-786. On the interest by anaesthesiologists 
such as Henry Knowles Beecher on LSD’s effect on “mood and subjective response” to 
pain, see George A. Mashour, “Altered States: LSD and the Anaesthesia Laboratory of 
Henry Knowles Beecher,” Bulletin of Anaesthesia History 23 (2005): 11-14.
176 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London: Verso, 2009), 156. Orig-
inally published as Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspields (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlan, 
1963).
177 Robert Smithson, Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings, ed. Jack Flam (California: 
University of California Press, 1996), 100.
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Chapter Four
“Born Wandering Between  
Two Worlds”: Aldous Huxley’s 
Chiasmic Enculturation
We are all parallel straight lines destined to meet only at infinity.
—Aldous Huxley, in a letter to Ottoline Morrell 1
I suppose I always had a passion for knowledge, and 
a certain gift for coordinating different fields.
—Aldous Huxley, in a letter to Sybille Bedford 2
how did aldous huxley, one of the most well-known writers and public literary 
intellectuals of the twentieth century, develop such a profound interest in 
psychopharmacological compounds and psychobiological chemistry? How 
was Huxley “encultured” to think and feel the way that he did about science, 
the arts, food, the body, and the science of vision? 3 
Holding a range of views as distinct as they are subtle about these sub-
jects, and about most subjects he considered, Huxley represents a “speci-
men case,” as Freud might have put it, for the twentieth-century polymath. 4 
1 Aldous Huxley, Selected Letters, ed. James Sexton (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2007), 107-8.
2 Sybille Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 2.
3 While I acknowledge that the term “enculturation” is often deployed in contexts relat-
ed to behaviourism, social psychiatry and social studies, I want to use it here, as cul-
tural anthropologist Margaret Mead has done elsewhere: to think about “the actual 
process of learning as it takes place in a specific culture.” Margaret Mead, “Papers in 
Honor of Melville J. Herskovits: Socialization and Enculturation,” Current Anthropolo-
gy 4, no. 2 (1963): 185.
4 Freud in fact did not use the term “specimen case,” but used the expression “specimen 
dream” when referring to his so-called Irma dream, that in which he injected one of 
his female patients. See Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, 107. On the use of the 
term “specimen cases” in the context of Freudian psychoanalysis, see for instance 
Horst Kächele, Cornelia Albani, Anna Buchheim, Michael Hölzer, Roderich Hohage, 
Erhard Mergenthaler, Juan Pablo Jiménez, Marianne Leuzinger-Bohleber, Lisbeth 
Neuder, “The German specimen case, Amalia X: Empirical Studies,” International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis 87 (2006): 809-26, 809n2.
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While the thematics of Huxley’s fiction and essays reflect his transition from 
empiricist to mystic, he is also always both of these things at once. 5 But it 
is Huxley’s lifelong affiliation with the life sciences—and particularly with 
chemistry, biology and evolutionary science—that ultimately leads him to 
formulate his speculations on the chemistry of the brain. It is his rejection 
of Freudianism and his belief that there remains so much more to discover 
about the mind, moreover, that prompts Huxley to experiment with mesca-
line and LSD, to address the pestilence of mental illness, and to enquire into 
what he called the “vast problem of schizophrenia.” 6 
To encounter Huxley’s intellectual career is to bear witness not simply to 
an exemplary case of polymathism, however, but to study a deeper structural 
tendency. His broad and often esoteric knowledge across the arts and scienc-
es betrays a drive to perform ersatz-messianic acts of revelation: a propensity 
doubtless fostered by the influence of his grandfather, Thomas H. Huxley 
(henceforth “TH”). 7 A biologist and professor, TH performed as a vociferous 
public rhetorician within the increasingly scientific intellectual landscape 
of the nineteenth century. The power of TH’s drive for recognition—or what 
I have named thymòs in this thesis—is just as apparent in his lectures on 
science as it is persistent in his grandson’s writings and performances. 8 But 
myriad scientific innovations during Huxley’s lifetime meant that even more 
was expected of those who, like Huxley, sought to champion and publicise 
the state of scientific and philosophical knowledge in the twentieth century. 
Testament to the scope of Huxley’s intellect is his having been commis-
sioned in 1945 to write an encyclopedia for Encyclopedia Britannica. And 
while Huxley’s work on this project was never published, it was a task for 
which Huxley had been well prepared. When Huxley, at fourteen years of age, 
was given an encyclopedia by Julian, his eldest brother, Huxley gave the im-
5 See Hull, Aldous Huxley: Representative Man, 241-2.
6 I borrow this phrase from Julian Huxley in his memorial essay for Aldous Huxley in Ju-
lian Huxley, Aldous Huxley 1894-1963: A Memorial Volume (London: Chatto & Windus, 
1965), 25.
7 In referencing “TH” as such, I follow Ronald Clark’s lead. See Clark, The Huxleys (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), passim. Huxley’s drive to an encyclopedic range of knowl-
edge is perhaps no better emblematised than by his anthology project, known as the 
“Encyclopedia Britannica essays,” discovered as an unpublished typescript in 2002, 
which he was commissioned to compile by the Encyclopedia Britannica in 1945. The 
document runs to 2428 typescript pages. And, as Bernfried Nugel and James Sexton 
note, the project is “formidable in scope: it covers essayists and critics not only from 
antiquity to the middle of the twentieth century but also from Europe and America to 
the Far East.” Nugel and Sexton, “Huxley’s Opus Magnum: An Anthology of Essays and 
Criticism (1946),” Aldous Huxley Annual 10/11 (2011/2012): 109.
8 See my earlier discussion of thymòs in chapter 2.
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pression of his rapid and arcane learning: “I now know everything, from who 
invented dice to the normal temperature of the sea-cucumber.” 9 To write an 
encyclopedia was thus an appropriate assignment for Huxley for, as William 
Pritchard attests,
no English writer of the last century was more encyclopedic in his range—lit-
erature, philosophy, history, mathematics, natural science, for starters—than 
Huxley; nor was there anyone who moved with such graceful ease among the 
various realms of knowledge. 10
As Pritchard’s description implies, however, Huxley is a “writer” before he 
is an encyclopedist. He is what T.S. Eliot among others names a “man of 
letters”: that is, the “writer for whom his writing is primarily an art... ” 11 But 
if Huxley is any more encyclopedic than his fellow men of letters, his wid-
er knowledge serves to amplify the principal tension that Plato’s Phaedrus 
identifies as the writer’s chief problem: the representation of this knowledge.
As Plato writes, it is apparently impossible to represent the “living word 
of knowledge which has a soul and of which written word is properly no more 
than an image.” 12 But if Plato seems pessimistic in relation to the possible 
representation of knowledge, then Socrates is positively fatalistic in his de-
nouncement of those who would profess a capacity to represent knowledge 
in any “certain” way at all: 
he would be a very simple person... who should leave in writing or receive in 
writing any art under the idea that the written word would be intelligible or 
certain; or who deemed that writing was at all better than knowledge and rec-
ollection of the same matters. 13
9 William Pritchard, “Huxley in his Letters,” Sewanee Review 117, no. 1 (2009): 121-124, 
121.
10 Huxley to Julian Huxley, Summer 1908, in Aldous Huxley: Selected Letters , ed. James 
Sexton (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2007), 14. Also quoted in Pritchard, “Huxley in his Let-
ters,” 122. 
11 T.S. Eliot, “The Man of Letters and The Future of Europe,” The Sewanee Review 53, no. 3 
(1945): 333-42, esp. 333. I also note that this is the name of a volume of essays constitut-
ing the proceedings of the third international Aldous Huxley Symposium (2004). See 
Bernfried Nugel, Uwe Rasche, and Gerhard Wagner, eds. Aldous Huxley: Man of Letters: 
Thinker, Critic and Artist (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2007). Also see LAS, 11.
12 Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, tr. Benjamin Jowett, 5 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1892), 1: 487. Also see Plato, Phaedrus, tr. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2003). Here the passage is translated as follows: “You’re talking about 
the living ensouled speech of a man of knowledge. We’d be right to describe the writ-
ten word as a mere image of this” (70).
13 Plato, Phaedrus, tr. Jowett, 537; Phaedrus, tr. Waterfield, 69-70.
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Aware that writing could never adequately represent knowledge, Huxley 
nevertheless valorises the power of artistic and poetic creation throughout 
his literary and prose works. Huxley felt that literature and art could offer 
what Maurice Spandrell describes at the end of Point Counter Point as “the 
only real proof that exists” for “all kinds of things—God, the soul, goodness” 
(PCP, 591). For Spandrell, as for Huxley, music becomes the means by which 
Beethoven is the “only one... the only man who could get his knowledge over 
into expression” (PCP, 591); for Huxley, music transcends the “monastic” fini-
tude of science, and pierces the limitations of the word underscored by Plato 
and Socrates (LAS, 11, 22). 
Huxley’s faith in Beethoven’s and all artists’s creative acts had also been 
fostered by the poetic influence of Huxley’s great-uncle, Matthew Arnold, 
who had written that “the exercise of a creative power, that a free creative 
activity, is the true function of man.” 14 In view of this Huxleyan-Arnoldian 
genealogy of scientific rhetoric and creative poesy, it is unsurprising that 
Huxley would—in words that Huxley would later use to describe life’s aim—
“make the best and the most of both worlds, representational as well as 
non-representational” (TV, 186).
It was by dint of misfortune, however, that Huxley would be drawn away 
from the empirical sciences and pulled instead toward the written word; 
he would be forced, in fact, to make the best of what was an altogether less 
promising collision of “both worlds.” In 1911, at the age of sixteen, Huxley 
lost almost all visual acuity in his eyes, becoming “for practical purposes... 
totally blind,” retaining only “faint light-perception in his better eye, the left 
one.” 15 This disaster prompted Huxley to nurture his love for literature rath-
er than to pursue the medical career on which he had previously planned to 
embark. 16 But for whatever reasons Huxley became the intellectual that he 
eventually became, what is remarkable about Huxley’s intellectualism is its 
14 Matthew Arnold, “The Function of Criticism,” in Essays by Matthew Arnold, ed. Hum-
phrey Milford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914), 11. For further discussion of the 
Arnoldian influence on the Huxleys, see: on Arnold’s and TH’s “controversial yet am-
icable” relationship and debate, David A. Roos, “Matthew Arnold and Thomas Henry 
Huxley: Two Speeches at the Royal Academy, 1881 and 1883,” Modern Philology 74, no 
3. (1977): 316-24; and on Huxley’s resolution of the “struggle waged between his pater-
nal grandfather” and Arnold “by symbiotic [chiasmic] accommodation,” see Milton 
Birnbaum, Aldous Huxley’s Quest for Values (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee 
Press, 1971), 75. Also see LAS, 5.
15 Grover Smith, ed. Letters of Aldous Huxley (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 39n23. 
16 Huxley’s ambition in his Eton days “was to be a doctor not a writer—though his later 
friend Gerald Heard claimed that his wish also was to be a painter.” Murray, Aldous 
Huxley, 29n17. Also see Smith, Letters, 38n22.
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coordination and compilation of a wide range of disparate range of knowl-
edge across both the humanistic and scientific fields. The preeminence of 
Huxley’s implacable yearning to thread and knot together what had increas-
ingly become the specialisations and sub-disciplines of institutionalised 
education allows us to posit Huxley’s ontological and epistemological for-
mation as a special kind of shape, or—to use the terminology I introduced 
in the first part of this thesis—a “psychotrope.” 
To do so is perhaps to read Deleuze’s description the “image of thought” 
quite literally; it is to project upon Huxley’s biography, and even upon his 
neurological processes, a specific image or emblem that uniquely and specif-
ically signifies his “thought” pattern. 17 In view of Huxley’s interweaving of a 
number of different fields and ideas, it is possible, I propose, to visualise this 
image of thought as a chiasmus. As a figure or model with as rich a literary 
history as a scientific one, the chiasmus is a useful visual model; it is em-
blematic, moreover, of the epistemological diversity among human learning 
for which Huxley himself is an exemplary representative. 
In biology and genetics, the chiasmus means a “crossing over”; it refers 
to the changing of the positions of certain chromosomes or chromatids. At 
once a biological process and an effect, the chiasmus was first proposed by 
cytologist Frans-Alfons Janssens. Chiasma, Janssens realised, were the cross-
like figures that, when observed under a microscope, constitute the traces 
of a perplexing microbiological event.  18 In classical rhetoric, the chiasmus 
denotes a similar idea, although its operations are syntactical rather than bi-
ological. It is a rhetorical figure “in which words and their order are reversed 
in parallel clauses,” producing an echo at the end of a clause or a phrase—an 
aural or visual trace of that which has occurred at the clause’s beginning. 19
In this chapter, I employ the figure of the chiasmus for a clear purpose: to 
more materially and practically grasp Huxley’s ontological sense of self—to 
diagrammatise what Louis A. Sass might call Huxley’s “ipseity” (from the Lat-
in ipse, for “self” or “itself”). 20 This experimental methodology, which strad-
17 On Deleuze and the thought image, see Difference and Repetition, 129-67.
18 See Frans Alfons Janssens, “La théorie de la Chiasmatypie: Nouvelle interpretation 
des cinèses de maturation,” La Céllule 25 (1909): 389–400; Romain Koszul, et. al., 
“The Centenary of Janssens’s Chismatype Theory,” Genetics 191 (2012): 309-17; James 
Schwartz, In Pursuit of the Gene: From Darwin to DNA, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2008), 182-3, 324n70. Also see Mark Taylor, Altarity (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1987), 71n12 and 71n13.
19 On the rhetorical aspects of the chiamus, see notably Patricia Lissner, “Chi-thinking: 
Chiasmus and Cognition,” PhD diss., University of Maryland, 2007, esp. 369-71.
20 See, for example, Louis A. Sass and Josef Parnis, “Schizophrenia, Consciousness, and 
the Self,” Schizophrenia Bulletin 29, no. 3 (2003): 427-44, esp. 427.
Huxley’s Chiasmic Enculturation 163
dles the visual and the textual, finds some resonance with Leah Ceccarelli’s 
deployment of the expression “cultural chiasmus” in her Shaping Science with 
Rhetoric. In this monograph, Ceccarelli underscores the importance of the 
chiasmus as both a rhetorical and a scientific shape. 21 My approach to the 
chiasmus also finds another partial antecedent in Judith Butler’s invocation 
of the term “chiasmus” in her description of the “extra-linguistic body.” The 
presence of this body, which is as a kind of other, outside of the self—a body 
that does not speak and cannot know language—“allegorizes the problem 
of the chiasmic relation between language and body.” 22 When Butler asserts 
that attempts to express what is outside of the body form allegories for what 
is the irreducible interdependence and extrication of the body and language, 
she permits us to think of Huxley as one of the twentieth-century’s foremost 
allegorists of this very phenomenon. 
In this chapter, then, the chiasmus denotes a series of strategies or fea-
tures that are visible in Huxley’s writing as investments in the disentangle-
ment of oppositional forces. These include such drives as those that obtain 
between language and the body, but also between representation and reality. 
Huxley’s writing also seeks to soften the coarse edges that demarcate these 
oppositions, as well as the many others that appear in the range of intellec-
tual, discursive, psychological, and spiritual epistemologies he addresses; 
but whatever topic he addresses, Huxley lays an instructive emphasis on the 
“psycho-physical”—on the extent to which, in all things, the “physical-in-
stinctive biological forces” serve to structure our experience. 23
While Freud’s philosophy prioritises the development of a “unity” within 
the ego—a process that is brought about, he suggests, by primary narcis-
sism—Huxley’s The Perennial Philosophy (1945) accords highest importance 
to “knowledge as a function of being” (TPP, 70). For Huxley, we “rational 
beings” who are capable of apprehending the “eternal essence” of human 
“creatureliness” see in ourselves what is already a form of “unitive knowl-
edge” (TPP, 71). And while this knowledge appears to its apprehender as a 
singular and complete entity, it is yet only “one of the infinite number of 
points where divine Reality is wholly and eternally present” (TPP, 71-72). 24 
21 Leah Ceccarelli’s phrasal neologism “conceptual chiasmus” in Shaping Science with 
Rhetoric: The Cases of Dobzhansky, Schrodinger, and Wilson (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 2001), 5-6.
22 Judith Butler, “How Can I Deny?” 4.
23 Aldous Huxley, “The Battle of the Sexes,” in Baker and Sexton, Huxley: Complete Essays 
III, 110-16, esp. 115.
24 Freud, “On Narcissism: An Introduction,” 76-7.
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Conducted in a variety of fictional and textual self-experiments, Huxley’s at-
tempt to describe this “unitive knowledge” diverges from Freud’s pursuit of 
ego unity. Unlike Freud’s asymmetrical or dialectical (analyst-analysand, fa-
ther-son) configuration, Huxley’s model is self-organising and self-reflexive. 
Transforming the dialectic between patient and doctor to the singular 
monologic of the seeker, Huxley separates himself into “the personal self 
and the Self [or] Universal Mind.” This internal schism, Huxley discovers, 
can lead to
the realization of a state of “no-mind,” which may be described as the free-
dom from the perceptual and intellectual attachment to the “ego-principle” 
(TPP, 86). 
To achieve this kind of freedom requires less a “disciplining of the will” than 
a “thorough disciplining of the consciousness” (TPP, 86). It requires a total 
and radical change of mind, typified by “a more or less sudden ‘revulsion’ 
of consciousness” (TPP, 86). Less than two decades after Huxley’s death, R. D. 
Laing will identify this kind of revulsion as a metanoia (μετάνόος): a kind of 
“After-Mind” that consists, as Treadwell Walden notes, of the “Mind in an act 
of progress,” a progress that involves “a ‘change’ taking place either by evo-
lution or revolution.” 25 Like Huxley, Laing intuits that a “metanoiac voyage” 
could be inaugurated by the use of “LSD-25”; and even despite the therapeu-
tic and other benefits elicited through this procedure, Laing concludes that 
“Mental hospitals” should “define this voyage as ipso facto madness per se, 
and treat it accordingly.” 26
Following from these preliminary considerations, I want to suggest that 
the figure of the chiasmus may be understood as resonant with the topog-
raphy of Huxley’s map of consciousness. The “no-mind” appears to exist, 
for instance, at the centre of a quadrant of vectors: self, other, perception, 
and intellect. As Huxley suggests, a combination of “carelessness” and an 
eagerness for “salvation” must strike a “delicate balance” on a “knife edge” 
to allow for the “no-mind” to be discovered. It is less a formation that can be 
thought of by the subject as an entity or intuition that permits the subject 
to “be thought by it” (TPP, 86, emphasis in original). The self-enclosure that 
thus occults metanoic experience functions like a maieutics—one between 
25 Treadwell Walden, The Great Meaning of Metanoia: An Undeveloped Chapter in the Life 
and Teaching of Christ (New York: Thomas Whittaker, 1896), 7.
26 R. D. Laing, “Metanoia: Some Experiences at Kingsley Hall,” in Hendrik Ruitenbeek, 
ed. Going Crazy: The Radical Therapy of R. D. Laing and Others (New York: Bantam, 
1972), 11-22, esp. 12.
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the careless self who wanders, and the careful self who seeks salvation. And 
while the broad mystical project of “being” is, for Huxley, a solitary path for 
“separate individuals” (TPP, 86), Huxley privileges literary artists as among 
those fortunate few who have the capacity to 
express purpose of creating a language capable of conveying, not the single 
meaning of some particular science, but the multiple significance of human 
experience (LAS, 14). 
Fabricating a heteroglossia, the artist can induce in themselves, and even 
share with others, what Huxley variously describes as the mystical “Such-
ness,” “Is-ness,” or “Istigkeit.” At the root of these descriptions lies the same 
phenomenal artifact that, when Huxley uses LSD, he will describe as the
transience that was yet eternal life, a perpetual perishing that was at the same 
time pure Being, a bundle of minute, unique particulars, in which, by some 
unspeakable and yet self-evident paradox, was to be seen as the divine source 
of all existence (DOP, 7). 27 
Ever appearing and disappearing, “reality” or “being” is for Huxley an unpre-
dictable interlocutor; its emergence and evolution is only ever as verifiable as 
it is unpredictabe, and thus momentarily discoverable. 
In an essay titled “L’entrelacs—le chiasme” [The Intertwining—The 
Chiasm], published in 1964—only one year after Huxley’s death—Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty introduces an analogous distinction between the visible and 
invisible, describing it as “chiasmic.” For Merleau-Ponty, “the seer and the 
visible reciprocate one another” in so profound a way that “we no longer 
know which sees and which is seen.” 28 But Merleau-Ponty’s description of the 
collapsing of the visible into the invisible, the visual into the visualised, is 
more than simply a phenomenological point—albeit one that Huxley’s phil-
osophical writing seems to confirm. 
Rather, Huxley’s blindness means that he himself—not in theory, but in 
reality—is less a man who sees than a man who is seen by those around him; 
the status of his perceptual ability, that is, remains always equivocal. 29 And 
27 On “istigkeit,” see, for instance, DOP, 7; TPP, 39; and Huxley to Dr Humphry Osmond, 
23 December 1955 (Letter 730), in Letters, ed. Smith, 779. 
28 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, ed. Claude Lefort, tr. Alphonso 
Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 139; also see David Levin, 
“Outside the Subject: Merleau-Ponty’s Chiasmic Vision,” in The Philosopher’s Gaze 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 216-33.
29 Christopher Isherwood’s description of Huxley’s blindness is quite remarkable in that 
it portrays Huxley to be both blind and exceptionally acute, although the latter facil-
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while Huxley’s title, The Doors of Perception (1959), quotes William Blake’s 
“The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,” it is also an unconscious analepsis—a 
quotation—of Merleau-Ponty’s The Phenomenology of Perception (1945). The 
title thus generates a syntagmatic chiasmus between these philosophical 
works, as well as a conceptual one. 30 
In Merleau-Ponty’s essay, the chiasmus is figured as what Mark Taylor 
intuits as “a complex structure of “implication” (im-pli-cation), “enfoldment” 
ity, Isherwood suggests, might not be based on clear oracular vision, but of a mental 
perceptuality or proprioception. “To me,” Isherwood writes, 
one of the most mysterious things about Huxley was what he could see and what he 
couldn’t, and how, exactly, he saw what he saw. How much did he actually see and 
how much did he cognize, by some kind of in-built radar?
 As Isherwood notes, while he “seemed like a blind man” while crossing the street, 
Huxley had also “called to Maria [his first wife] to stop the car because there was a 
clump of mariposa lilies, at least a hundred yards from the highway.” See Julian Hux-
ley, ed., Aldous Huxley: A Memorial Volume, 156. This particular anecdote is also in-
structive for recognising Huxley’s “botanising” eye. For an insightful reading of chias-
maticity, hyperreality and blindness (apropos Merleau-Ponty), see Edith Wyschorgrod, 
“Blind Man Seeing: From Chiasm to Hyperreality,” in Fred Evans and Leonard Lawlor, 
eds., Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of Flesh (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 2000), 165-76. 
30 Huxley uses Blake’s line, from The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, as the book’s epigraph: 
“If the doors of perception were cleansed everything would appear to man as it is, 
infinite.” See William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell (Boston: John W. Luce 
and Company, 1906), 26. Notwithstanding a range of similarities between the texts, 
Huxley and Merleau-Ponty’s views are in many ways very different. On the subject of 
madness and schizophrenia, Merleau-Ponty asserts that there is “no strictly elective 
disturbance” and that “the core of... disorders” such as “apraxia” and “agnosia” is “to 
here to be found in the domain of language, there in that of perception, and elsewhere 
in that of action.” Then Referring to “Schneider,” a war veteran whose visual pathology 
stemmed from a traumatic injury to the brain incurred during the First World War, 
Merleau-Ponty notes that “It was through his [Schneider’s] sight that mind in him was 
impaired,” emphasising that these disorders stem from the disturbance of the per-
ceptual apparatus for the subject rather than from some pre-perceptual neurological 
disturbance. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, tr. Colin 
Smith (London: Routledge, 2005), 144-5 (my emphasis; henceforward PP in this note). 
  Huxley, on the other hand, suggests, in his context of working with Humphry 
Osmond that while “it would be rash and premature to affirm it,” that “each one of 
us may be capable of manufacturing a chemical, minute doses of which are known 
to cause profound changes in consciousness [certain of which] are similar to those 
which occur in... schizophrenia.” For Huxley, schizophrenia thus has the broad char-
acter of originating from within—be it biochemically or biologically—whereas for 
Merleau-Ponty, the disorder originates from the subject’s relation to his body; whether 
it is an (epi)phenomenon that is linked to the “atomistic conception of time” (PP, n60) 
or visuality (PP, 145), or to “geometrical space” and the “pure constituting conscious-
ness which deploys it” (PP, 335). For a brief note on further correlations between Hux-
ley and Merleau-Ponty, see Laurie Spurling, Phenomenology and the Social World: The 
Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and its Relation to the Social Sciences (London: Routledge, 
1977), 184n4.
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(enroulement), and “envelopment” (envelopment).” 31 At the central intersec-
tion of this shape, all opposites are enfolded, one within the other, so that 
everything seems to be, as Merleau-Ponty notes, “completely turned inside 
out [retourne] under my own eyes.” 32 While Johann Fichte emphasises the im-
portance of a “synthesis” of “thesis and antithesis”—in a formulation often 
attributed to Hegel, but not expressed by him in those words—the chiasmus 
resists any such resolution or harmonisation of the dialectical concepts. 33 In 
its enfolded edges, rather, the chiasmus expresses what Huxley describes as 
“the multiplicity of life’s meanings.” These meanings “cannot be translated 
directly with a one-to-one correspondence” any more than they can be trans-
formed “into a single mot juste, or even a single ‘right’ phrase or sentence” 
(LAS, 22). Never can the abstraction of these meanings into Platonian forms, 
in other words, convey their actuality.
Such is the tenor of Huxley’s implicit critique of logocentrism, whose or-
igin he imputes to that “poor fellow” Plato. As Huxley writes, Plato
seems to have made the enormous, the grotesque mistake of separating Be-
ing from becoming, and identifying it with the mathematical abstraction of 
the Idea. He could never, poor fellow, have seen a bunch of flowers shining 
with their own inner light and all but quivering under the pressure of the 
significance with which they were charged; could never have perceived that 
what rose and iris and carnation so intensely signified was nothing more, and 
nothing less, than what they were... (DOP, 7). 
31 Taylor, Altarity, 71.
32 Merleau-Ponty, Visible and the Invisible, 143.
33 See Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), 154. 
Of interest to briefly note that Julian Huxley seems to make more explicit use of the 
(Hegelian) dialectical structure than Huxley himself would do, at least during his sa-
tirical or cynical period before the 1930s. As Julian would write apropos evolution in 
the commission documents for UNESCO (and perhaps in something of a reflection 
his belief in a “positive eugenics”): “This last point immediately recalls the thesis, 
antithesis, and synthesis of Hegelian philosophy, and the Marxist “reconciliation of 
opposites” based upon it. Indeed, dialectical materialism was the first radical attempt 
at an evolutionary philosophy. Unfortunately it was based too exclusively upon prin-
ciples of social as against biological evolution, and in any case was undertaken too 
early, before either the facts or their analysis were adequate to support any such vast 
superstructure. Today it is possible at least to begin the construction of a comprehen-
sive philosophy of evolution; and many of its conclusions will be of value in formulat-
ing.” Julian Huxley, UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy, Preparatory Commission 
of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Washington: 
Public Affairs Press, 1946), 11 and 61 (available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/imag-
es/0006/000681/068197eo.pdf)
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Now, just as Deleuze and Guattari’s generative and multiplicitous rhizome 
will “ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains [and] or-
ganizations of power,” so can Huxley’s model of “becoming” expand into in-
finity, never settling upon a single, Platonian “Idea.” If Huxley’s description 
of reality specifies any of its features, though, it names only the electrical 
locus that constitutes the bunch of flowers’s quivering “charge.” This is that 
node at which, as Denis Stone reflects in Crome Yellow (1921), a multiplicity of 
“parallel straight lines” come together and “meet at infinity” (CY, 30). 34
As in other examples of Huxley’s writing on geometry (some of which I 
will address below), Stone’s words echo Euclid’s mathematical model of the 
structure of space, which is outlined in detail in Euclid’s Elements of Geome-
try. 35 Of the five axioms upon which Euclidean geometry rests, it is the fifth 
of these—the so-called “parallel postulate”—that is the most controversial 
and yet the most relevant to Huxley’s observations. Calling on William Play-
fair’s rearticulation of the axiom, Henry Somers-Hall articulates the postu-
late as follows: “Through a point not on a given straight line, one and only 
one line can be drawn that never meets the given lines.” 36 Subtly aware of 
the possibility of a kairotic moment in which these distinctly parallel lines 
might be apperceived as bound together in a “pure and simple unity” (LAS, 
23), Huxley laments the influence of Plato’s abstracting, mathematical gaze, 
the one under whose power such a moment is no longer possible. 37 And if 
Huxley does not address Aristotle’s criticism of Plato—which involves the 
imputation that Plato could not “connect his ‘ideas’ with actual things”—it 
is perhaps because Huxley’s descriptions of reality form an even more fun-
damental repudiation to Plato than Aristotle’s notes. 
For Huxley, there is a fundamental difference between the way in which 
Platonian abstraction takes a thing in itself—such as a rose or carnation—as 
34 Sexton, ed., Selected Letters, 108.
35 See Euclid, The Thirteen Books of Euclid’s Elements, tr. Thomas L. Heath (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1908), 202-4.
36 Quoted in Henry Somers-Hall, Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation: Dia-
lectics of Negation and Difference (New York: State University of New York Press, 2013), 
93. As Somers-Hall notes, this is technically Playfair’s rendition of the axiom, whereas 
Euclid’s is more precisely written thus: “If two lines intersect a third in such a way 
that the sum of the inner angles on one side is less than two right angles, then the two 
lines inevitably must intersect each other on that side if extended far enough” (260n3). 
Interestingly, Euclid’s more specific formulation, if we interpret the focus of the line 
to be on an inevitable meeting “in infinity,” seems to befit Denis Stone’s lines at least 
equally as well as Playfair’s. Cf. William Playfair, Elements of Geometry: The First Six 
Books of Euclid (Edinburgh: Bell & Bradfute, and Stirling, Kenney and Co., 1836), 22. 
37 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 7.
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implacably distinct and separate from the personal epistemology or “per-
sonal God” that perceives it, and the alternative process in which one may 
become wholly consubstantial with that essence, becoming “directly aware 
of it” so as “to know it unitively” (TPP, 78). 38 But in Literature and Science and 
The Doors of Perception, Huxley also characterises these moments at which 
the “pure and simple unity” is witnessable as accidents of time and space. 
They constitute no more than “the experience of those who have been privi-
leged to ‘behold the One in all things,’ but have made no efforts to perceive 
it within themselves” (TPP, 81). As with Blake in his “To See A World,” Huxley 
affirms that not only is it possible for us to “find ourselves seeing a Heaven 
in a Wild Flower and holding [this] Infinity in the palm of our hand” (LAS, 16), 
but that it is only through such a chance discovery that one may find oneself 
in this state of learning and insight.  39
Expanding on this visionary procedure in Heaven and Hell, Huxley 
suggests that such an epistemological rupture or transcendental metanoia 
might be engendered by the “praeternatural significance” that is encoded in 
the “preciousness” of such objects as flowers, gem-stones, and works of art:
Indeed, we may risk a generalization and say that whatever, in nature or in a 
work of art, resembles one of those significant, inwardly glowing objects en-
countered at the mind’s antipodes, is capable of inducing if only partial and 
attenuated form, the visionary experience. At this point a hypnotist will re-
mind us that, if induced to stare intently at a shiny object, a patient may go 
into trance; and that if he goes into trance, or if he only goes into reverie, he 
may very well see visions within and a transfigured world without (HAH, 26). 
Whatever therapy might be wrested from—or put into practice by—these 
objects is “guaranteed by the fact that it exists in the Other World” (HAH, 24). 
Although it is through the same objects as these, Huxley stresses, that envi-
sioners can also find themselves entrapped in their own “negative visionary 
experience”; here they apprehend not beauty, he writes, but the “horror of 
infinity” (HAH, 49). 
For Huxley, this is an essential dichotomy, one that distinguishes be-
tween the positive and negative valences of visionary experience—and it 
hinges on one’s sense of “deindividualisation.” Associated with a “sense of 
separation from the body,” the negative experience is a condition in which 
38 Samuel Ward Boardman, “Plato’s ‘Idea’ and Aristotle’s ‘Entelechy,’” The Monist 20, no. 
2 (1910): 297-8.
39 See William Blake, “Auguries of Innocence,” in Selected Poems, ed. Gerald E. Bentley 
(London: Penguin, 2005), 295-6.
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“individulisation is intensified.” He or she who comes under the power of 
these negative visions begins to feel, as Huxley notes,
progressively more dense, more tightly packed, until he finds himself at last 
reduced to being the agonized consciousness of an inspissated lump of mat-
ter, no bigger than a stone that can be held between the hands (HAH, 50). 
Reduced to a compact and static entity, the negatively charged visionary fears 
the structural boundaries that characterise what has become their materi-
al experience of displacement. By contrast, the positively charged visionary 
embraces this transfiguration as an opening, associating it with feelings of 
transcendence. 
These protocols of visionary experience are in many ways akin to what 
Deleuze and Guattari describe as the “itinerant, ambulant sciences,” which 
“consist in following a flow in a vectorial field across which singularities are 
scattered like so many accidents.” Such a “following” confers on these itin-
erant wanderer-practitioners a “quasi-nomadic status,” one in which they are 
left to experiment, like the visionary, with what can be composed and con-
ceived of within this new “vectorial field.” 40 As Deleuze and Guattari stress, 
however, what can often detract from the transcendental view of itineration 
is a reduction of this experience to its biochemical or phenomenological op-
erations; in these cases, it is easily dismissed, like a ghost in the machine, as 
merely the “capacity of ‘technologies’ or ‘applied science.’” 41 This is, as Hux-
ley suggests, just as true of the artistic object as of other technologies—for 
its reduction to a mathematical idea can undercut its “significance” (DOP, 7).
Huxley’s Ageometry and  
the Neurochemical Self
for its part, science also displaces the operations of visionary experience and 
itineration, since it is ever compelled to underwrite into its operations the 
credo of mimesis, reproduction, and reproducibility. Just as Huxley criticises 
Plato’s mathematical abstraction, Deleuze and Guattari criticise the “auton-
omous power” of the “apodictic apparatus” of “reproduction.” It is this pro-
cess that fosters the tendency, they write, to “isolate all operations from the 
conditions of intuition,” something it does only to make those objects “true 
intrinsic concepts, or ‘categories.’” 42 
40 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 372.
41 Ibid., 373.
42 Ibid.
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Just as one’s meditation on an object can, for Huxley, engender a vi-
sionary experience, so is the pursuit of a vector (or “line of flight”) useful in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking—especially for those who wish to access an 
object in a non-Platonian form and in a “space of homogeneity.” 43 In fact, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, one is actually “obliged to follow when one is in search 
of the ‘singularities’ of a matter, or rather a material.” And while the method 
of “following” is distinct from what these authors call “Royal Science,” it is 
“Not better, [but] just different.” 44 To make the point especially clear, the 
authors explain that “following” is
not at all the same thing as reproducing, and one never follows in order to repro-
duce. The ideal of reproduction, deduction, or induction, is all a part of royal 
science, at all times and in all places, and treats differences of time and place 
as so many variables, the constant form of which is extracted precisely by the 
law... [implying] the permanence of a fixed point of view external to what is re-
produced: watching the flow from the bank. 45
Similarly critical of the tendency for reproduction to impede visionary expe-
rience, Huxley adopts multiple perspectives in his own analytical writing, 
ensuring the regular appearance of “invitations to further personal effort in 
the direction of the inner height” (TPP, 81). In this way Huxley functions as an 
ambulant scientist, engaging in “a continuous variation of variables, instead 
of extracting constants from them.” 46 
Much like the itinerancy entailed by Deleuze and Guattari’s model of the 
follower, Huxley’s method allows him to continuously recalculate all that 
he apprehends and visualises. In his 1927 essay “Varieties of Intelligence” 
(1927), Huxley observed that this kind of recursive thinking was simply part 
of the analyst’s procedure when, under the heading “Geometers and Ana-
lysts,” he compared the “difference between [the] visualizer and non-visu-
alizer” to the parallel distinction that “separates the geometrical from the 
analytical mind” (VOI, 179). The “reason of the born geometer is not the same 
as the reason of the born analyst,” Huxley would assert, anticipating not only 
Deleuze and Guattari’s description of “reproducing” and “following,” but 
what he would himself describe as the difference between “visionary experi-
ence” and “epistemology” some thirty years later in Heaven and Hell. 
43 Ibid., 372-4.
44 Ibid., 372.
45 Ibid., 372 (emphasis in original).
46 Ibid.
Huxley’s Chiasmic Enculturation 172
But if it is surprising that the Huxley of the 1920s partly dismisses vi-
sualisation in Varieties of Intelligence—where he notes that “a pronounced 
visualiser is to a considerable extent at the mercy of his visualizations” (VOI, 
179)—it is equally notable that such a dismissal is less abandoned than more 
precisely expressed in Heaven and Hell. With the emergence of late capital-
ism in the 1950s—a period that gave rise to a moment when, as Huxley notes, 
it often appears as though “We have seen too much pure, bright colour at 
Woolworth’s”—it can be difficult for truly visionary experiences to remain 
“intrinsically transporting” (HAH, 34). Accordingly, Huxley asserts, “modern 
technology has tended to devaluate the traditional vision-inducing mate-
rials,” (HAH, 34) prompting potential mystics to seek out newer and more 
impactful adjuvants. 47 
It is in this context of visual hypersaturation that individuation takes on 
an even more critical significance. In post-industrial economies, the abun-
dance of “vision-inducing materials” ironically means that “transportation” 
is so much the rarer. But even more influential than the inundation of bright 
lights and the ever more various forms of colour displays is the range of po-
litical and psychochemical changes available to the visionary. And this devel-
opment explains what Huxley sees as the ever shrinking dearth of visionaries 
in the Western world of the 1950s (HAH, 59). In the then “fashionable picture 
of the universe,” Huxley notes, “there is no place for validly transcendental 
experience” (HAH, 59). The contemporary picture of the world is an utterly 
transformed neurochemical milieu. As Huxley writes, 
it is not only our mental climate that is unfavourable to the visionary... it is 
also our chemical environment—an environment profoundly different from 
that in which our forefathers passed their lives (HAH, 59).
That humans are neurochemically determined, and experience what is es-
sentially a chemical subjectivity is, for the Huxley of the 1950s, a postulate ev-
erywhere grossly understated. It is as much as omitted from twentieth-cen-
tury Western philosophy, Huxley feels, as any fact withheld or suppressed 
for political purposes. But if Huxley is more willing than his contemporaries 
to accept biological determinism, he is also more critical of the dilution 
of the metaphysical. It is in the context of recognising a devaluation of the 
metaphysical and mystical that Huxley laments: “To be a mystic is no longer 
creditable” (HAH, 59). 
47 See Daniel Dinello, Technophobia!: Science Fiction Visions of Posthuman Technology 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 53, 152-3.
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So, while the Huxley of the 1920s proposes that “varieties of intelligence” 
are divisible across such binary schemata as visual/non-visual, geometric/
analytic, and talented/untalented (VOI, 177-80), the Huxley of the ‘50s in-
clines to a different orientation. The older Huxley feels that almost any kind 
of intelligence can be brought to the surface under the appropriate chemical 
conditions. Following his experiences with psychoactive drugs and psychia-
try, Huxley now zealously adopts an optimistic view of biochemical interven-
tion; he asserts that “by appropriate biochemical methods we can transform 
[adults and children as they are] into superior individuals” (DTSMM, 299). 
This transition in Huxley’s thought coincides with a more general shift 
within the life sciences in the twentieth century, one that moves from a 
Freudian (or neo-Platonian)—and even a behavioural view of the human 
(with B.F. Skinner among others)—to a primarily chemical and molecular 
theory of the individual. It represents the beginning of what Nikolas Rose 
identifies as the “molecularization of psychiatry.” 48 From the 1960s onward, 
as Rose and Joelle Abi-Rached note, the “neuromolecular vision of the brain 
was fundamental to the rise of psychopharmacological societies over the 
closing decades of the twentieth century.” 49 Similarly for Deleuze and Guat-
tari, the “molecular”—and what they call the “molar”—are always in compe-
tition. While the former articulates the fugitive, non-linguistic, rhizomatic, 
and chemical aspects of the human—all of which occur at the micro-level—
the latter, an earlier form of conceptualising the human, articulates those 
macrobiological forces that have a tendency to encourage “simple binaries 
and oppositions.” 50 
But in Huxley’s writing of the 1920s, what is true of the molar is also true 
of the molecular. While orthodox thinkers may impugn heretics as “unsta-
ble-minded,” as scholars who “take pleasure in all that is new and revolu-
tionary,” it is to these heretics, Huxley argues, that “we owe progress in all its 
forms” (VOI, 185). These are those molar figures—those nomads—who, even 
if they are “[l]ess subject to the habits of thought formed in youth,” also now 
utter a “singular opinion,” which is to say “an opinion” that has not “been 
sanctified by general acceptance” (VOI, 185). By the 1950s, however, it was in 
psychopharmacology that Huxley intuited “another plane along which the 
48 Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached, Neuro: The New Brain Sciences and the Man-
agement of the Mind (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 6; also see Nikolas 
Rose, “The Neurochemical Self and its Anomalies,” in Richard V. Ericson and Aaron 
Doyle, eds. Risk and Morality (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 407-37.
49 Rose and Abi-Rached, Neuro, 47; also see 200-2.
50 See Paul Elliott, Guattari Reframed (London: I.B. Taurus, 2012), 25.
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mass of humanity may be divided” (VOI, 184). Focusing now on the molecular, 
he sought to experiment more directly with chemical brain interventions. 
When Huxley spoke with a friend who had undergone LSD testing and had, 
when sat in front of a stroboscope, seen new visions, Huxley was impressed 
by his friend’s report that the drug and device conspired to produce in him 
the image of a “Japanese landscape... charged with praeturnatural signifi-
cance” (HAH, 56). Whereas Huxley had always meditated on “the mystery” by 
which visions could and do appear, this process had now become “merely a 
particular case of a larger, more comprehensive mystery—the nature of the 
relations between visionary experience and events on the cellular, chemical, 
and electrical levels” (HAH, 57). 
The prohibition of LSD—and, ultimately, its related triptamines, ergo-
lines, and phenythalamines—from the mid-1960s and onwards, however, 
ensured that the nature of these events at the microbiological levels would 
remain almost entirely a mystery—at least, that is, for the next four to five 
decades. 51 Nonetheless, this was a mystery that might ultimately prove, as 
Huxley suggested, a problem less of biochemistry than philosophy. Con-
founding the distinctions between self and other—between psychoactive 
substance and psychoactive subject—together with its problematisation of 
inside and outside—the question of a final substance persists in subjectivity 
studies even today, where the dominance of a Cartesian framework remains 
distinctly apparent. This is, of course, despite the fact that Descartes’s ideas 
have been repudiated by so many philosophers—Leibniz, Spinoza, Deleuze, 
among many others—almost all of whom want to amplify the principles by 
which “numerical and real distinctions” are not identified in nature, but pro-
duced, and then transplanted onto it. 52 
But this “substance problem” is also an epistemological one—and one 
anticipated in the pre-molecular and even pre-chemical history of the philos-
ophy of science. When Hegel, in his Science of Logic, for instance, described a 
particular mode of thinking as “chemism,” he posits that “chemically differ-
entiated objects,” in distinction to the mechanistic and Newtonian objects 
of physics (namely atoms and molecules), 
51 On the history of LSD prohibition, see Erika Dyck, Psychedelic Psychiatry, 128-32; Drug 
Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, 89 P.L. 74; 79 Stat. 226. 19 July 1965; and Matt 
Oram, “The Trials of Psychedelic Medicine: LSD Psychotherapy, Clinical Science, and 
Pharmaceutical Regulation in the United States, 1949-76,” PhD diss., University of Syd-
ney, 2014, 94-5.
52 See Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, tr. Martin Joughin (New York: 
Zone Books 1990), 17-39; also see Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in 
Philosophy (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1993), 59-63.
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are explicitly what they are, only through their difference, and they are thus 
the absolute drive to integrate themselves through and with one another. 53 
With the emergence of quantum physics after the advent of Einsteinian and 
Reimannian geometry in the early twentieth century, atoms and molecules 
could no longer be seen as the mechanistic elements that Hegel had per-
ceived them as. If chemical objects were able to integrate themselves with 
one another, that is, then so too—as Einstein would proposed in his 1905 
PhD thesis—could atoms and molecules interact and transform. 54 Never-
theless, the distinction between physics and chemistry sustains itself even 
today; and, even at the “molar” level of the university curriculum, these dis-
ciplines remain distinct, their procedures and practices designated to and 
contained in segregated buildings and rooms. 
Less a consequence of the abandonment of physical theories of the 
brain than representative of the enthusiastic adoption of molecular models 
of the self, this division between physics and chemistry is reflected in the 
constituency of ideas that are today a part of what Rose calls our “styles of 
thought of biological psychiatry.” In competition with one another, various 
styles of thought, and various “thought images”—and the chiasmus among 
them—produce varying models of the modern, chemical self: for instance, 
the synaptic self, the molecular self, “brainhood,” and so forth. 55 
As already intimated in the first part of this thesis, Deleuze and Guattari 
chart a philosophical trajectory of these very changes—these very chemical 
models—in What is Philosophy? There the authors reject Freudian mod-
els of the neurotic self, and privilege the new neurological models of the 
brain-subject. Almost in reverse to Hegel, the authors speak of the brain as 
an individual “cogniser” in its own right: “Philosophy, art, science are not the 
mental objects of an objectified brain, but three aspects under which [the] 
brain becomes subject, [or] Thought-brain.” Elsewhere, the authors declare 
that “the brain is the mind itself.” 56 But more than this, What is Philosophy? 
53 George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic 
Outline, Part I: Science of Logic, tr. Klaus Brinkmann, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 274. 
54 See, for instance, Jos Uffink, “Insuperable Difficulties: Einstein’s Statistical Road to 
Molecular Physics,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 37 (2006): 36-
70.
55 See, for instance, Nikolas Rose, “The Neurochemical Self and Its Anomalies,” in R. 
Ericson and A. Doyle, eds. Risk and Morality (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2006), 
407-37; Rose, “Neurochemical Selves,” Society 41 (1): 46-59; Rose and Abi-Rached, Neu-
ro, 272n3.
56 See Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, tr. Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlin-
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also surveys the “successive challenges” that “philosophy confronted” (such 
as in the form of “psychoanalysis”) throughout the twentieth century; they 
describe each of their advocates as the “insolent and calamitous rivals that 
Plato himself would never have imagined in his most comic moments.” 57 In 
this chaotic context, it is ironic that the authors conclude the book with a 
chapter titled “From Chaos To Brain”—for it is not the chaotic status of phi-
losophy to which this chapter refers, but rather to “chaos theory”: the system 
of views that arose out of what might be regarded as the far-from-chaotic 
collaborations between philosophy, chemistry, and physics of the 1980s. 
Order Out of Chaos—the product of a prolific collaboration between 
chemist-turned-philosopher Isabelle Stengers and Nobel Prize winning 
physicist Ilya Prigogine—appears in 1984 as one of the founding texts of cha-
os theory. 58 It represents an attempt to unite physics and chemistry, and to 
undertake an analysis of biochemical phenomenology, an undertaking that 
could now be understood as a physiochemical elaboration of Einsteinian 
spacetime. 59 Some years later, and elaborating on Stengers and Prigogine’s 
work, Deleuze and Guattari will begin their own chapter on chaos by em-
phasising the necessity of “molar” forms of “order” within this underlying 
disorder. In fact, they will acknowledge the drive to order as the basis of all 
ideational associations: 
We require just a little order to protect us from chaos... all that the association 
of ideas has ever meant is providing is with these protective rules—resem-
blance, continuity, causality—which enable us to put some order into ideas, 
preventing our “fantasy ” (delirium, madness) from crossing the universe in 
an instant, producing winged horses and dragons breathing fire. 60
But the “order” of which Foucault writes in his History of Madness is even 
more explicit than this: Foucault is attentive to the impact of “nosological 
reason” and positivism on nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought, and 
similarly, in his Birth of the Clinic, Foucault emphasises the importance of 
the “clinical gaze” in an attempt to underscore this new optic’s impact on 
psychotherapy and medicine in the twentieth century. 
son (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1994), 210-19; also see Ian Buchanan and 
Gregg Lambert, Deleuze and Space (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 6.
57 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 10.
58 See Stengers and Prigogine, Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1984).
59 Ibid.
60 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 201.
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In an analogous fashion, Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy book now 
proposes that the materiality of the brain is constitutive of a general order of 
thought in the twentieth century, one that militates against fantasy. 61 But if 
this is a crude physical theorem, it is nonetheless an effective metaphysical 
and or metaneurological model that represents how influential Guattari’s 
“metamodels” have been on what the pair now offer as their answer to their 
book’s eponymous question. Now understood as a coherent and physical struc-
ture, thought is the product of what Naomi Goldblum calls the “brain-shaped 
mind.” If the mind obviates chaos, it does so to the extent that it is a material, 
physical presence, bringing a specific form of “brain order” out of the chaos, 
perhaps through nothing more than its brute, physical obstructionism. 62 
This order takes the form of the mind’s rules—resemblance, continuity, 
causality—all of which, Deleuze and Guattari note, are also its actual mate-
rial: its sensible, thinkable contents. To produce order is the brain’s singu-
lar and constitutive function, then; and it is in the exercise or discharge of 
this function that a brain’s “functionality” is determined. And it is in such 
a matrix of functionality, that we come to see some brains dominate oth-
ers, and the domination of “brain-people,” therefore, over “chaos-people.” 63 
The schizophrenic, Deleuze and Guattari attest, can be either “a conceptual 
persona who lives intensely within the thinker” or “a psychosocial type who 
represses the living being and robs him of thought””—or both. 64 However, in 
either case, the brain functions chaotically rather than “functionally”; it is 
robbed, for instance, of “thought” itself. 
While Huxley is never explicitly critical of psychiatry—and largely re-
mains optimistic about its potential, faithful of its procedures throughout 
The Doors of Perception, for instance—Huxley also appears inclined to con-
jugate the world of the schizophrenic and that of the visionary. In doing so, 
Huxley prefigures a range of arguments in critical- and anti-psychiatry, such 
as those postulated by the Dutch critical-psychiatrist Jan Foudraine in the 
1970s. In Foudraine’s 1974 Not Made of Wood, for example, the psychiatrist 
alludes to the power of mysticism; and in a 2011 address, Foudraine argues 
that “Eastern mystics have told us that the world indeed is ‘maya.’” Quot-
ing Jiddhu Krishnamurtia—a friend and colleague of Huxley—Foudraine 
declares that “the word is not the thing,” and thus lays an emphasis instead 
61 See Foucault, History of Madness, 158-9; Foucault, Birth of the Clinic, 120.
62 See Naomi Goldblum, The Brain-Shaped Mind: What The Brain Can Tell Us About the 
Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 2-3.
63 Ibid., 218.
64 Ibid., 70.
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on the thing in itself, which is to say that to which the word refers—not its 
signified but its referent. 65 In this way, Foudraine promotes a view similar to 
that which Huxley proposes: Huxley, ever intent to see things as they really 
are, intently pursues the “Is-ness” or Istigkeit of the object, and is uninter-
ested in the way in which representation itself functions in the ontological 
economy of objects (DOP, 7). 
Comparing altered mental states and psychotic episodes in phenom-
enological terms, Huxley cites an article in the Journal d’une schizophrene 
in his Heaven and Hell. This work presents an “autobiographical record of a 
young girl’s passage through madness,” one in which, from the point of view 
of the apparently psychotic young girl, her surroundings become a “le Pays 
d’Éclairement [or] ‘the country of lit-upness’” (HAH, 48-9). Huxley argues that 
this description suggests the ostensible similarity of psychosis to visionary 
insight; and he notes that the “country of lit-upness” is “a name which a 
mystic might have used to denote his heaven” (HAH, 48-9). 66 But the field of 
light is also encoded with a transitive or transversal intensity that diverges 
from the visionary’s realisation; and this diacritical distinction denotes the 
two states’s underlying phenomenological differences. As Huxley concludes, 
the autobiographical description, unlike the visionary account, is “charged 
with a hateful significance” that is “negatively transfigured”:
Everything that, for healthy visionaries, is a source of bliss, brings to Renée 
[the young girl] only fear and a nightmarish sense of unreality. The summer 
sunshine is malignant; the gleam of polished surfaces is suggestive, not of 
gems, but of machinery and enamelled tin; the intensity of existence which 
animates every object, when seen at close range and out of its utilitarian con-
text, is felt as a menace (HAH, 49).
The negative inversion of the visionary experience is, for Huxley, typified by 
“punishments of pressure and constriction,” carceral pressures of a kind also 
“described in the various accounts of hell.” The sinners in Dante’s Inferno, 
Huxley notes, are “buried in mud, shut up in the trunks of trees, frozen solid 
in blocks of ice, crushed beneath stones” (HAH, 50). It is in these passages, 
near the end of Heaven and Hell, that we can begin to sense the collision of 
65 See Jan Foudraine, Not Made of Wood: A Psychiatrist Discovers His Own Profession, tr. 
Hubert H. Hoskins (London: Quartet Books, 1974); Foudraine, “On the Power of Med-
ical Maya: An Update of ‘Not Made of Wood,’” Keynote address at the Critical Psychia-
try Network conference, Sheffield, 27 April 2001, see http://www.critpsynet.freeuk.com/
Foudraine.htm. On Foudraine and critical psychiatry, see D.B. Double, ed. Critical Psy-
chiatry: The Limits of Madness (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 6-7. 
66 Also see HAH, 52.
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physics (pressure, gravity, interment), as well as chemistry, in Huxley’s work 
on psychosis, where “negative visionary experience” can arise especially “at 
the moment of death” (HAH, 52).
For Laing, psychosis cannot be reduced to any one discipline: not to 
chemistry, physics, or a combination of the two. The negative visionary, 
Laing argues, follows too idiosyncratic a procedure for psychiatry alone to 
account for it. 67 “Psychopathology,” Laing writes, 
by the very nature of its basic approach precludes the possibility of under-
standing a patient’s disorganization as a failure to achieve a specifically per-
sonal form of unity.
What should supersede the psychopathological practices that appear in the 
“molecularising” decades of the 1960s and ‘70s, Laing posits, is a “genuine 
science of personal existence.” 68 While it is arguable that no “existential-phe-
nomenological” schema could adequately do away with the Platonian ten-
dency to construct “forms” out of the phenomenal world—no more for the 
“charge” of a flower than for a person—Laing’s critique is foregrounded in 
a sociological principle of contested human relations. Classificatory or cat-
egorical psychiatry, he argues, isolates and disavows the psychotic subject’s 
“actual experience”—in much the same way as the schizophrenic disavows 
the psychiatrist’s world. The pair—at loggerheads with one another, and 
equally as motivated to dismiss one another’s epistemological positions—
nurture their similarly strong mens’s or “willing minds” to overcome the 
other. Diagnoser and diagnosed are thus locked in a contest of wills. Thus, 
the whole notion of “depersonalization in a theory that is intended to be a 
theory of persons is,” for Laing, “as false as [the] schizoid depersonalization 
of others and is no less ultimately an intentional act,” aimed at nothing less 
than total power and control. 69 
What Laing identifies as depersonalization, Deleuze and Guattari de-
scribe in topographical terms as deterritorialization. And similarly to Hux-
ley, Deleuze and Guattari focus on the apprehension of a flower in seeking 
to distinguish their model of perceptual operations from what they regard 
as the “triumph of the logos or the law over the nomos.” 70 But while Huxley 
only obliquely adverts to the sort of “mathematical abstraction” that might 
67 See R.D. Laing, The Divided Self, chapter 1, “The existential-phenomenological founda-
tions for a science of persons,” 18-26.
68 Ibid., 24.
69 Ibid.
70 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 373.
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brought to bear on the visual plane in Heaven and Hell, Deleuze and Guattari 
unwittingly function as the elaborators of Huxley’s nascent geometrical phi-
losophy, engaging with Euclid’s conception of space as it is “founded on the 
famous parallel postulate.” As the authors assert, Euclid’s postulate takes 
gravity as the universal constant that governs all forms. 71 Knowing this, we 
can detect in Huxley’s description of the “quivering” bunch of flowers a sub-
tle deduction of this Euclidean principle: what is a quiver of significance for 
Huxley may now be read as an artifact of gravity’s forces. But an emblematic 
question—and one that disrupts such an appeal to physical explanation—is 
this: to what extent do the flowers actually quiver under a gravitational force 
rather than merely appear to quiver? And from Huxley’s perspective, in his 
lucid apprehension of the flowers, to what extent is this quiver the product of 
the mescaline intoxication? 
These questions are epideictic; not in that they praise or blame, but 
that they gesture at possibility. That is, their enunciation is in itself a per-
formance, one that yearns less for any conclusive explanation than serves 
to illustrate the impossibility of any positive answer. Dividing physics from 
language, the question can elicit only answers that are already charged with 
the very methodological presuppositions that Huxley’s observations attempt 
to transcend. Rather than seeking answers, Huxley valorises itinerancy; he 
“ambulates” in the hope of hitting upon one of those inexplicable and ac-
cidental processes that “come unsought” and yet lead to an experience of 
“cosmic consciousness” (TPP, 81). Attempts to distinguish between the flow-
er’s gravitational charge and its apprehension are, as Huxley time and again 
affirms, constitutive of the most vital answers themselves; for it is only ever 
within the intrinsic limits of the logos, such as they are, that questions of 
this kind can be engendered and, ultimately, answered. 
Thus, Huxley will conclude his Literature and Science with a resigned de-
scription of language’s limits: 
Words are few and can only be arranged in certain conventionally fixed ways; 
the counterpoint of unique events is infinitely wide and their succession in-
definitely long (LAS, 99). 
Huxley’s view of the relative power of nature and language—of logos and 
physis—underscores Mallarmé’s essay slogans on the finitude of language, 
which I addressed in chapter 2. While only “twenty-six letters” are enough to 
71 Ibid., 370. Huxley also directly discusses Euclid and Riemann in Do What You Will 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1929), 262-3.
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“consecrate language,” it is always the text itself (and in fact its typography), 
rather than its author, that speaks. 72 But for Huxley, scientific language is 
even less promising than the comparably richer language of literature:
That the purified language of science or even the richer purified language of 
literature should ever be adequate to the givenness of the world and of our ex-
perience is, in the very nature of things, impossible (LAS, 99).
While restrained in his excoriation of science, Huxley’s criticism of scientific 
discoveries accords with the abiding attitude espoused by his cynical works 
of the 1920s. Like Huxley’s cynicism, his pessimism about the potential of 
science stems from his larger political objections to constraints on liber-
ty—such as those that are depicted in Brave New World, but which, from the 
1940s and onwards, are increasingly focused on science’s devalorisation of 
the mystical, visionary experience. It was early as 1928, however, that Huxley, 
in Point Counter Point, channeled his skeptical view of science through the 
figure of Spandrell, a man who describes the “laws of nature” simply as “use-
ful conventions of strictly human manufacture.” It is also clear, as Spandrell 
continues, “that space and time and mass themselves, the whole universe of 
Newton and his successors, are simply our own invention” (PCP, 213). 
While scholars such as Deery criticise Huxley’s grasp on the details of the 
science, highlighting his “proclivity for inferring universals from specific con-
texts,” such scholars crucially understate not only Huxley’s attempt to pervert 
and satirise science’s political ecology, but also seem to ignore Huxley’s cri-
tique of science’s grasps at and plays for power. 73 Trenchant in his critique of 
the politics of science, for instance, Point Counter Point’s Spandrell describes 
precisely the view that Deery advances in criticising Huxley’s scientific knowl-
edge: that Newtonian mechanics is a human invention. But Spandrell does 
not hold this view. Rather, this is the view he attributes to the collective of 
“communist” ideologues that Spandrell now blames for manipulating his 
friend Illidge, for it is they who have prompted him to adopt this view for 
political reasons—whereas he is otherwise an exemplar of positivism. 
Since Illidge is now at once a communist and a scientist, however, Span-
drell perceives as “exquisitely comic” the awkward position in which he finds 
himself, now unable to distinguish empirical findings from propaganda. 
Not only must Illidge remain “committed to nineteenth-century material-
72 See Thomas Hope, “Poetry’s Media,” 451; Stéphane Mallarmé, “The Book: a Spiritual 
Instrument,” 82.
73 Deery, Huxley and the Mysticism of Science, 60.
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ism” and feel “sadly worried by Einstein and Eddington,” but—since “He’s a 
scientist”—he must also maintain “principles” that “make him fight again-
stany scientific theory that’s less than fifty years old” (PCP, 213). 
Tethered to these political ideals, Illidge must 
believe that the only fundamental realities are space, time and mass, and that 
all the rest is nonsense, mere illusion and mostly bourgeois illusion at that 
(PCP 213). 
This is far from a serious attestation of the displacement of Newtonian me-
chanics by Einsteinian special relativity—a view that Deery attributes to 
Huxley. Rather, this scene offers an acerbic critique of communism’s politi-
cal influence over science—an observation that signals Huxley’s rejection of 
the interference of politics in science. 
Published in 1916—only twelve years before Point Counter Point—Ein-
stein’s Theory of General Relativity will again be subjected to Huxley’s ludic 
undermining in Do What You Will (1929). Here the political power of science 
is now imbued with an altogether venerable piety, its dictates now governing 
the laws of creation themselves: “God is no longer bound, as he once was, to 
obey the decrees promulgated by Euclid in 300 B.C.,” for he can “now take his 
choice among a variety of geometries” (DW, 263). Amplifying the scientist’s 
power above that of any godhead—and even above nature—Huxley renders 
the relationship between God and science as chiastic. But if Einstein’s and 
Riemann’s “[g]eometries and laws of nature are among the latest products of 
the human spirit” (DW, 263-3), they have also been harvested, against all odds, 
out of what is the fraught crucible of science’s political contestations.
For Huxley, then, to be a scientist is to be human; and to be human is to be 
ineluctably political. The human spirit is just as much a sign of one’s fallibility 
as a reflection of its prejudices. Sensing this, Deery rejects Huxley’s claim that 
“all geometries have therefore been shown to be merely arbitrary creations or 
‘products of the human spirit (GENIUS, 38).’” Moreover, Deery also posits that 
“Huxley is wrong to conclude” that Euclid’s theory represents a “vicious circle” 
in “classical reasoning.” Yet Huxley’s view of the human spirit is hardly as arbi-
trary as Deery claims. As Huxley explains in Heaven and Hell, the human spirit is 
an axiom, continually constituted and reconstituted by the technical materials 
that chemically infuse it: “it is,” he writes, “a matter of chemical record that 
most contemplatives worked systematically to modify their body chemistry with 
a view to creating the conditions favourable to spiritual insight” (HAH, 63-4). 
The spirit and the soul are “nurtured,” he writes in “One and Many,” by a 
“direct participative knowledge of things, by an immediate physical contact, 
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[and] by a relationship involving will, desire, feeling.” This is a micropolitical 
description of desire. For Huxley, it is this methectic or “direct, participative 
knowledge of the world’s diversity” from which “the poetic imagination of 
man extracts the deities of polytheism.” 74 In other words, in many instances, 
more can indeed be more; and it is only out of a true diversity of experiences 
and views that we may come to discover both the polysemous complexity that 
is there to be seen: both in the real world and in what Marcus Boon describes 
as the “imaginal realms.” 75 It may seem untenable that Huxley imbues scien-
tific discoveries with a mystical or visionary genealogy of the “human spirit,” 
especially when it is one that is—far from arbitrary—itself constituted by a 
manipulation of a technological and political context in an effort to makes it 
more “favourable.” But if it this is an untenable association, it is not because, 
as Deery argues, Huxley’s understanding of science is deficient. It is rather, 
as Deery concedes at a later point of her study, because there are “certain 
flaws in the parallelism Huxley and others mount.” 76
The problem lies, then, in Huxley’s chiasmic thought, in his drawing 
together these disparate fields. Deery rejects Huxley’s realignment of sci-
ence and religion; she asserts that all that Huxley and the other so-called 
“misty-scientists” seek to do is to ensure that “human involvement” is not 
overlooked when we encounter the nonhuman alterity of scientific laws. But 
this aim is merely a dream, Deery writes. More than this, though, it is pre-
cisely
the mental-physical connection promised in mystical philosophy. Alienation 
and reification, the emblematic curses of the twentieth century, are alleviated 
by dematerializing reality with science’s apparent approval. 77
And yet, however assiduous Huxley and his fellow “misti-scientists” are in 
their wish to dematerialise reality, they less dissuade their readers of reality’s 
material construction than advance a metaphysical assessment of science’s 
inadequacy as a conceptualisation of reality. If science alienates the human—
and does so in the same breath that it privileges the immaterial or demateri-
alised—it is not because it excludes the subject or freezes the subject’s words 
in a static logos. It is, rather, because science omits and excludes parts of 
74 Aldous Huxley, “One and Many,” in Robert S. Baker and James Sexton, eds., Aldous 
Huxley: Complete Essays, Volume II: 1926-1929 (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), 302-19, esp. 
314-16.
75 Boon, The Road of Excess, 218.
76 Deery, Huxley and the Mysticism of Science, 159 (my emphasis).
77 Ibid., 160.
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reality: “God thinks neither in terms of Euclid nor of Riemann” (ALONG, 108). 
Science is not simply an inadequate way of representing “absolute reality” 
(ALONG, 108), then, but also insufficiently well narrativised; it is “lacking in 
the obvious attributes of the picturesque” (LAS, 90). Threatening to become 
ever more influential, however, science also equips “the political bosses who 
control the various national states with unprecedentedly efficient instru-
ments of coercion” (SLP, 6). Less an alleviation for the alienated individual 
than their increasingly punitive and sovereign master, the applied sciences 
are pharmakonic. They are predisposed to political exploitation and expro-
priation, even as they denude the operations of previously unseen structures.
While Huxley’s engagements with the geometrical and physical sciences 
of Einstein, Euclid, and Riemann are by no means as technical as Deleuze 
and Guattari’s commitments to these sciences, Huxley’s writing alludes to 
the shockingness of the shift augured by general relativity, and particularly 
by its adoption of a Riemannian—that is, a non-Euclidean, model of space-
time. This is a shift whose effects ramified in the social world as acutely as 
they also reshaped the social sciences; for Riemannian physics began to 
deploy metaphors, for instance, from the “human community” to illustrate 
its propositions. As Arkady Plotinsky notes, Reimann’s incorporation of the 
language-concept of the “neighbourhood” suggests “a kind of sociological 
definition of space.” 78 Elaborating on this newly socialised mathematical 
space, Plotnitsky describes how general relativity enshrined “at least a cer-
tain conception, topos, of a spatial type,” one that had been also “developed 
in the so-called ‘topos theory’ introduced by Alexandre Grothendieck.” In 
its introduction of the concept of the manifold or manifoldness (Mannig-
faltigkeit), moreover, Riemannian spatial mathematics repudiates crucial 
limbs of Euclid’s geometry; it enables spatiality to become “a primary con-
cept”—and an even “more primary” concept than that which later became 
known as “set theory,” a mathematical formulation introduced by George 
Cantor, shortly after Riemann’s death, in 1866. 79 
For Deery, Huxley’s response to Einstein’s relativity theories appears in 
the decades following those theories’s publications. What are apparently 
78 Arkady Plotnitsky, “Bernard Riemann’s Conceptual Mathematics and the Idea of 
Space,” Configurations 17 (2009): 105-30; Yuri I. Manin, “George Cantor and his Her-
itage,” in Mathematics as Metaphor: Selected Essays of Yuri I. Manin (Providence: 
American Mathematical Society, 2007), 45-54. 
79 Plotnitsky, “Manifolds: On the Concept of Space in Riemann and Deleuze,” in Simon 
Duffy, ed. Virtual Mathematics (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2005), 187-208; Plot-
nitsky, “Bernard Riemann’s Conceptual Mathematics,” 122.
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allusions to Einsteinian relativity also serve as evidence, Deery claims, of 
Huxley’s fatal misunderstanding of the physical theorems. In a line in Jesting 
Pilate, for instance—Huxley’s 1926 travel diary—the author illustrates the 
regularity of his experience of culture shock: “in the traveller’s life these lit-
tle lessons in the theory of relativity are daily events” (JP, 23). Deery claims 
that Huxley understands general relativity as the “total relativism of all view-
points,” and allows for a “cultural or moral relativism” in his thinking. In 
adopting such an understanding, she writes, Huxley repeats what has been 
the “most popular”—and yet also the most inaccurate—“application of Ein-
stein’s ideas.” 80 
But the context in which Huxley’s appeal to the “theory of relativity” is 
rearticulated in this diary—in a foreign place, characterised by new discov-
eries—suggests how the reference might function as more than simply an al-
legory for “cultural relativism.” Uttering these lines as he observes the recital 
of “some verses in Urdu,” Huxley explains how he has become “indignant” at 
the thought of an “Arab occupation” of Sicily. He reflects on this seemingly 
automatic political disdain for the poem he hears, the one that is sentimen-
tally recited by the “young Mohammedan of Arab descent.” And while Hux-
ley finds himself contemptuous at first, he promptly realises that his offence 
is only “just as indignant no doubt, as the poet had felt at the sight of those 
once Mohammaden shores now polluted by Christians” (JP, 23). For Huxley, 
the moment represents an unpleasant case of repulsion—but one that is also 
curiously instructive—for it is this affect and sense of abjection that allows 
him to conceive of Einstein’s theory. 
Deery concedes that even a physicist as formalistic as Werner Heisen-
berg had anticipated the usefulness of Einstein’s general relativity theory for 
theorisations of moral relativism; although what Heisenberg envisages, she 
notes, is not a “scientific” relativism of difference—and less still a Diltheyan 
“social anthropology”—but a means of identifying discrete differences in a 
world of social constants. 81 It is directly to this Heisenbergian formulation, 
however—this legitimate proposition—that Huxley refers in his Literature 
and Science. There he observes how well Heisenberg’s formulation reveals 
that the “division of the world” is in fact illusory, much like the co-presence 
of two objects belies their separation over vast distances and times. For Hux-
ley, physical models of reality are “no longer applicable”—for each of them 
80 Deery, Huxley and the Mysticism of Science, 62.
81 On the origins of social anthropology and of cultural relativism in William Dilthey, 
see Maria Baghramian, Relativism (London: Routledge, 2004), 66-8. 
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“raises difficulties” and, as for the discovery of reality: this is, he argues, “no 
longer [even] the aim of the research” (LAS, 64-5). 82 The problem now, Huxley 
suggests, is to explain those ineradicable fingerprints left by the human on 
the apparently nonhuman processes of the sciences themselves. For what is 
the point of a “nature subjected to human questioning” when, after all the 
trials and operations, “man, once again, meets only with himself” (LAS, 65)? 83 
It is true that Huxley’s “little lesson” in relativity is less a product of Hux-
ley’s studies of Einstein’s theory than his own means of identifying the so-
cial constants that—much like light or gravity themselves—order the social 
context out of which the Mohammaden’s poem arises. For Huxley, Einstein’s 
processes function as detectors of difference in a given context; but whereas 
Einstein strives to detect physico-material differences, Huxley is tasked with 
identifying those that are historical, religious, and most of all social. Relativ-
ity represents another means by which Huxley can communicate not a static 
theorem but propose that—“in spite of science,” and “in spite of unpurified 
language”—it remains possible to effect “the creation of a comprehensive 
philosophy in which... reality remains forever whole, seamless, and undivid-
ed” (LAS, 67). Both the poem that teaches Huxley his lesson and Einstein’s 
theory itself offer what Philip K. Dick calls a “shock of dysrecognition” to 
those who apprehend it. Like the metanoic voyage, Huxley’s “dysrecogni-
tion” of the poem allows him to access the “direct physical knowledge” of 
the Urdu versification; it offers him a kind of apprehension that is distin-
guishable from the “intellectual knowledge, abstracted and generalized out 
of the physical knowledge” (SPINOzA, 314).
Such a distinction is congruent with Einstein’s Equivalence Principle, 
where a kind of dysrecognition is occasioned when an indistinguishable 
mimesis—or “equivalence”—between two uniformly accelerated frames of 
reference can be recognised for what it is: the expression of an underlying 
order, that of “curved spacetime.” Now, constant speed can be recognised 
as such—notwithstanding that it appears homologous with stasis. As a con-
ceptualisation through which a direct knowledge of these relative frames 
may be encountered afresh, general relativity thus operates to powerfully 
illustrate the dissolution of subject and object, self and other. All the while, 
82 On Huxley’s vitalism or “sensitivity to the ‘life of the body,’” see Nicholas M. Williams, 
“‘The Sciences of Life’: Living Form in William Blake and Aldous Huxley,” Romanticism 
15, no. 1 (2009): 41-53.
83 Abraham Pais, ‘Subtle is the Lord... ’: The Science and the Life of Albert Einstein (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982), 182n45. Also see Werner Heisenberg, Philosophic Problems of 
Nuclear Science (London: Faber and Faber, 1952), 117; Baghramian, Relativism, 63-7. 
Huxley’s Chiasmic Enculturation 187
it underscores the human’s ensconcement in a field that, like all things, is 
directly affected by “curved spacetime.” 84 
Of course, both the poem and curved spacetime are themselves clas-
sifications: the former is a kind of writing structure, and the latter a kind 
of molecular architecture. But it is Einstein’s amplified reconstruction of 
Aristotle’s—and then Newtown’s—definition of gravity, verified in part by 
its prediction of new kinds of gravitational forces (for instance, changes in 
the motion of binary pulsars), that begins to define all that is gravitational. 
Now understood as a “natural kind,” Torretti suggests, Einstein’s conceptu-
alisation may be interpreted in only one way; all the while, the Urdu poem 
remains simply another poem, interpretable in any number of ways. That 
the poem is equally as “true” as Einstein’s theory guarantees it no particular 
veneration; rather, it confirms only its existence. And of course, general rela-
tivity is only also another mathematical abstraction of the kind that Huxley 
devalorises as merely a Platonian “Idea.”
 Spacetime may thus also be revealed as a “grotesque mistake”: a theory 
that attests to the truth of a state of “Being” while it also dismisses the possi-
bility of any variation. The theory thus repudiates the notion that the nature 
of spacetime itself—apparently immune to change—might also transform 
and fluctuate, and in this way represent its own kind of “becoming” (DOP, 
7). And while spacetime geometry is determined, at least in physical terms, 
by the energy and momentum of the matter and radiation present within 
a given field, the affective experience of spacetime for the human observ-
er is—much like the charge of gravity in the bunch of flowers—difficult to 
ever finally demonstrate: How, for instance, may one ever really determine 
whether they, as humans, are in free fall or at rest? 
When the first version of the Equivalence Principle initially occurred to 
Einstein in 1907, even he acknowledged that, in a subjective encounter with 
equivalency in spacetime, the observer would be conferred no more than a 
“right” to “interpret” different states in certain ways. As he suggested, 
The gravitational field has only a relative existence in a way similar to the elec-
tric field generated by the magnetoelectric induction. Because for an observer 
falling freely from the roof of a house there exists—at least in his immediate 
surroundings—no gravitational field. Indeed, if the observer drops some bod-
ies then these remain relative to him in a state of rest... independent of their 
84 Roberto Torretti, “Gravity as Spacetime Curvature,” Physics in Perspective 2 (2000): 118-
34, esp. 119.
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articular chemical or physical nature... The observer therefore has the right to 
interpret his own state as “rest.” 85
As Torretti suggests, for Einstein to speak in terms of “rest” and “falling free-
ly” is actually to continue to think of spacetime in Euclidean terms—and to 
imagine that, for instance, a particle falling in a field would fall in a straight 
line, one that runs exactly perpendicular to the earth’s surface. It is akin to 
thinking that the city of Manhattan, as Torretti suggests, “appears to be di-
vided into rectangular blocks, although no true rectangle can ever be drawn 
on the curved surface of the planet.” 86 Realising that objects do not fall in 
these kinds of straight lines in the coming years, Einstein would soon incor-
porate Riemannian geometry into his model of the problem of equivalence. 
Inspired by the work of Carl Friedrich Gass, who had proposed that particles 
move in “geodesics” (that is, along the shortest possible distances across a 
surface), Riemann’s manifold model had shown how the rate at which adja-
cent geodesics converge toward, or diverge from, each other depends on the 
dimensions of the local curvature between them. 
As Torreti argues, it was this discovery that enabled Riemann to see 
that “the apparent mutual attraction of nearby particles under the influence 
of gravity turns out to be, on this view [only] a manifestation of spacetime 
curvature.” 87 Such a model of what Torretti describes as the movement of 
particles—of those that run “parallel to themselves along their respective 
worldlines”—is analogous to the way in which Huxley would defend Crome 
Yellow (1921). Parts of the novel only resembled certain events and personag-
es from his real life at Garsington, he would argue, a defence that became all 
the more axiomatic in the context of his dispute with Lady Ottoline Morrell. 
In 1921, Huxley would write a letter to Morrell, one in which he would 
express his apparently sincere regret that she had taken offence to his novel’s 
depiction of her and the other guests for whom she had played host while 
Huxley lived with them in her manor. Huxley would also refer in his letter to 
the words of the character Denis Stone, whose words he describes, interest-
ingly, as his own:
I said in the book: we are all parallel straight lines destined to meet only at 
infinity. Real understanding is impossibility. I write something which seems 
85 Pais, ‘Subtle is the Lord... ’, 178. As Torretti notes, this is Pais’s own translation of the 
passage; it appears on a manuscript of circa 1920, archived in the Pierpont Morgan 
Library: Torretti, “Gravity as Spacetime Curvature,” 133n16. 
86 Torretti, “Gravity as Spacetime Curvature,” 126.
87 Ibid., 127.
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to me immediately and obviously comprehensible for what it is. You, running 
on your own parallel, read into meanings I never so much dreamt of. Others, 
on their parallels, find other meanings and contemptuous portraits of people 
unknown to you. 88
In defending Crome Yellow’s resemblance to Garsington, and the novel’s 
personae to Garsington’s guests, Huxley evokes an explanation that is, at 
least at first blush, consistent with Einstein’s Equivalence principle. The 
mathematical thought experiment in which a particle falling in freefall can 
come to resemble a particle at rest, represents, at least for Einstein, a le-
gitimate quandary. However, it also instantiated a “result”: it illustrates, for 
instance, the way in which a “real understanding” of the particle’s status 
remains impossible to determine, at least in Euclidean terms. 
It was precisely this impossibility that led Einstein to embrace the Rie-
mannian principles of non-Euclidean geometry. For Riemann, as Somers-
Hall points out, endlessness and infinity are crucially different: while the for-
mer refers to the outline of a circle, which one can trace forever, the outline 
is not “infinite in length” for “the circumference of any circle is of a finite 
magnitude.” 89 Thus, in Euclidean terms, as Somers-Hall observes, “We can 
therefore say that parallel lines are lines that meet at infinity.” 90 
While this Euclidean formulation is almost precisely what Denis Stone 
means to say in Crome Yellow, it is also notably precisely what Huxley means 
to say to Morrell: literary interpretation can never truly be the same, he as-
serts, as between two individuals. It is, in other words, “equivalent to say-
ing that no matter how far we extend [these parallel lines], they will never 
meet.” 91 By contrast, in Riemannian terms, there are “no parallel lines” 
at all; rather, as Somers-Hall asserts, “the notion of a straight line is to be 
interpreted in terms of a great circle.” 92 Huxley’s “parallel lines” formula-
tion, therefore, clings to the Euclidean notion of certainty, even as Huxley 
dismisses “Euclid’s” ideas in The Genius and the Goddess (1955); for Euclid 
is, proposes Huxley, “the classical example of reasoning based on a vicious 
circle”—although Huxley is perhaps more than mildly aware of the irony of 
this Riemannian allusion (GENIUS, 38). 
88 Huxley to Lady Ottoline Morrell, 3 December 1921, in Aldous Huxley: Selected Letters, 
ed. James Sexton (Chicago; Ivan R. Dee, 2007), 107-8.
89 Henry Somers-Hall, Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, 94.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., 93.
92 Ibid., 96.
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But the reasons adduced by the cynical Huxley of the 1920s to defend 
his fiction from such accusations as it had been directly wrested from reali-
ty—that it is an obvious roman à clef—still seem to rely on a metaphorology 
of outmoded Euclidean geometrical physics. And while Huxley’s analogy or 
apologia may be criticised for its advertence to this increasingly superseded 
theory in physics, it is also possible to see Huxley’s assertion of Euclid’s the-
ories as disingenuous or fallible in its own right, and for reasons that do not 
betray his failure to understand the science.
The problem that endures for Huxley, however, is that—no matter how 
it is expressed—Huxley’s “mystical,” “visionary,” or “artistic” philosophy of 
reality soon becomes entangled with other “totalising” philosophies that he 
purports to reject, such as those of Euclid or Riemann. In another of his trav-
el diaries, Along The Road (1925), Huxley praises Holland as a “rationalist’s 
paradise”—that is, as a nation in which one is led to conclude, “flushed with 
mental intoxication,” that
Euclid is absolute reality, that God is a mathematician, that the universe is a 
simple affair that can be explained in terms of physics and mechanics, that 
all men are equally endowed with reason, and that it is only a question of put-
ting the right arguments before them to make them see the error of their ways 
and to inaugurate the reign of justice and common sense. Those were noble 
and touching dreams, commendable inebriations! We are soberer now. We 
have learnt that nothing is simple and rational except what we ourselves have 
invented; that God thinks neither in terms of Euclid nor of Riemann; that 
science has “explained nothing”;... that instinct is the sole source of action... 
(ALONG, 108)
Disavowing any absolute correspondence between “reality” and our human 
models of reason or science, Huxley remains suspicious of the physical sci-
ences, or at least as suspicious of them as of any other claim that a “one-to-
one correspondence between an artist’s work and his character” could be 
arrived at (HAH, 80). 
And if Huxley is right to say that it is “all but impossible” to communicate 
“mental events except in similes drawn from the more material universe of 
material things” (HAH, 10), then it must also be impossible to communicate 
that which constitutes “material reality” in any better way—except, that is, 
in those “similes” of Euclid’s and Riemann’s invention. For Huxley, oversim-
plification is the central problem, for “Atoms, or... those aspects of the atom 
which scientists choose to consider, are immeasurably less complicated than 
men,” and “the atom of the scientists is simple in comparison with man in 
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his totality,” and therefore so much less representative of the human’s im-
measurable and infinitely complex ontology (PS, viii).
An even deeper problem than this, however, is a sociological one: the 
problem in which sociological theory, accepting human difference as real, 
attempts to understand those differences, and so reduces them. Neverthe-
less, as Huxley notes, even this problem can be articulated in the terms of 
Riemannian physics. As Huxley proposes in Proper Studies (1927), there are 
“organizers” and Utopians. While the organisers fail to critique the institu-
tions whose processes they seek to refine, Utopians begin from the wrong 
assumptions about these institutions. The latter behave as if they were radi-
cal astronomers, compelled to write
books about what would happen if there were no such thing as gravitation 
and if the earth, in consequence, moved in a straight line and not an ellipse. 
Such books might be very edifying if their authors began by showing that 
movement in a straight line is better than movement in a curve. (PS, x)
Conjugating the shift from Euclidean to Riemannian geometry with the so-
cio-political imperative felt by intellectuals to persuade their readership of 
the superiority above all others of their “better” model, Huxley again alludes 
to the importance of the socio-political promotion of ideas. Having learnt 
from the history of physics, it is important, Huxley claims, that impossible 
assumptions—such as Euclid’s or even Reimann’s—are not simply accepted, 
but rather made subject to contestation, trial, and justification. In his last 
novel, Huxley will summarise this tendency in an aphoristic quotation from 
Aristotle, one that serves as the novel’s epigraph: “In framing an ideal we 
may assume what we wish, but should avoid impossibilities” (ISLAND, 6).
In Huxley’s philosophy, “framing an ideal” becomes a means of intuit-
ing the world within an accepted rubric of uncertainty and approximation. 
When Huxley recounts the Urdu verses in Jesting Pilate, the fact that “the 
words of the poem were incomprehensible” does not obviate the possibility 
that Huxley, in attending to this distant language, might “recognise that 
distinguishing feature of the Euripidean chorus which Aristophanes derides 
and parodies in the Frogs” (JP, 24). Such possibilities are “real,” because they 
are contemplations; and they are true, therefore, because contemplations 
occur, for Huxley, without intentionality: they suggestively and meaningful-
ly appear like so many unconscious thoughts arising spontaneously in the 
Mind-at-Large. For Deleuze and Guattari, the tendency to acquire new data, 
and to habituate oneself to them, is singularly ingrained in English philos-
ophy. British practitioners, they claim, “treat the plane of immanence as a 
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moveable and moving ground,” accepting as true only what is  acquired—not 
because everything that is true is also an acquisition, but “because a concept 
is acquired by inhabiting, by pitching one’s tent, by contracting a habit.” 93
Huxley experimented with what he had acquired by habit in his hypnosis 
projects, the most formal of which he had conducted with Milton Erickson in 
1965. Leading the experiment, Huxley proposed to enter into “Deep Reflec-
tion,” and he described to Erickson how he had previously entered into “var-
ious states of psychological awareness.” 94 When the pair began their session, 
Huxley recalled having previously entered into various states of “hypnotic 
amnesia” while using his “Deep Reflection technique.” On one occasion, he 
recalled, he had discovered that he had answered the telephone while under 
hypnosis, but had not remembered having done so after awakening from 
the hypnotic state. He had even, Huxley claimed, been cognisant enough to 
record a message in writing—all while in a somnambulist trance. 95 
During his experiments with Erickson, Huxley at one point becomes 
excited—kairotic even—when Erickson instructs him that certain words, 
and in particular the words “vestibule,” “edge,” and “ravine,” could become 
“available” to him, but only when Erickson allowed as much. 96 The word 
“AVAILABLE”—written in Erickson’s report in capital case—functions as a 
codeword during the induced hypnosis; when uttered, it aimed to trigger in 
Huxley certain feelings, prompting him to enunciate the particular words 
mentioned above. By the end of the session, Huxley had concluded that his 
own mode of Deep Reflection was “another and entirely different category 
of experience” to that of the deep trance induced by Erickson’s mode of hyp-
notic suggestion. 97 
Huxley’s hypnosis experiments and the theory of hypnosis itself em-
blematise Doyle’s response to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of an “itinerant 
flowing,” a notion addressed earlier as what Deleuze and Guattari name a 
“following.” As Doyle affirms, 
“to be carried away” by such a flow, one must often instigate a blockage. If the 
multiple must be “made,” it is because its unfolding demands a refrain... The 
univocal identity called ‘self’ gets blocked, refrained, flattened, and this
93 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 105-106. 
94 See Erickson, “Special Inquiry with Aldous Huxley,” 45.
95 Ibid., 47-8.
96 Ibid., 64-5.
97 Ibid., 66.
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 blockage emerges precisely through an attention to something else, the ac-
quisition of a familiar. 98
To acquire a “familiar” is—much like the process of answering a phone and 
writing down a message—to flow into and follow a procedure based on in-
tuition and rehearsed codes. It is the same way in which, as Doyle confirms, 
diamond-cutting “demands a strict ‘following’ of the particular qualities of 
each stone’” and commands a particular kind of itineration. This is not a 
following that emphasises the “relativism” of the diamond’s facets, however, 
and not a methexis of the diamond’s “reflective surfaces” (for “what do they 
echo but each other, light itself?”). Rather, the process is an “iteration of light 
on light,”  a performance of an “ambulant science” of dilution, one by which 
the “self [is] made out of the difference between inside and outside.” 99 
When Huxley, only fleetingly—and apparently paranomastically—refers 
to Einstein’s theory in Jesting Pilate, it is less a serious appeal to the scientific 
theory, then—and less still a thoroughgoing explanada for Huxley’s ability to 
relativise two distinct cultural epistemes—than it is a suture for that which 
he promptly realises is his unwarranted indignation at having heard the Mo-
hammaden’s poem. Here, as in other of Huxley’s apprehensions of a “blissful 
visionary experience,” what is offered arises only by means of the resolution 
of the initial “blockage” that initiates his own “negatively transfigured” per-
ambulation on the object (HAH, 49). 
As a metalepsis for an empathic approach to difference, Huxley’s appro-
priation of Einstein’s formulation as a “little lesson” represents Huxley’s itin-
erant and doubly poetic redeployment of the physical postulate of relativity; 
it is a response to a poem, and yet it also forms its own multidisciplinary 
poesy. And for all its pharmakonic potential, Huxley’s reappropriation of 
Einstein’s theory emphasises its social and political istigkeit; it imbues the 
physical science not with ambiguity, but with what Huxley would later call a 
sense of “gratuitous grace” (DOP, 46). Now repurposed as a metonym for the 
process of discovery itself—as well as for the dispensation of long-acquired 
habits—Huxley’s “little lesson in relativity” seeks to propose only that we 
“understand before we condemn” (JP, 27). 
Revealing Huxley’s appreciation for a poem whose language he cannot 
comprehend, this reference to relativity also operationalises the itinerancy 
that is characteristic of Huxley’s belief in the “unsought” apperception of 
98 Richard Doyle, Wetwares: Experiments in Postvital Living (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003), 10.
99 Ibid.
Huxley’s Chiasmic Enculturation 194
“unity” through poetic and embodied ambulation or “indirection” (LAS, 22). 
Jesting Pilate, which is subtitled “An Intellectual Holiday”—and, in a remark-
able accident of its own, mistitled “an intellectual holyday” in one online 
archive 100—also suggests the way in which the traveller can both be trau-
matised and enlightened by new models. As Lindsey Banco suggests, travel-
ling—a mobile, transitive, and commutative process—imperils “the traveller 
with personal or cultural disruption” while permitting the collection of 
“sacred or healing knowledge.” 101 Underscoring the methodological rigor of 
the ambulant method, Doyle confirms the importance of these integrations: 
the “discipline of itineration,” he writes, “entails an ecstatic but disciplined 
receptivity to the turbulent outside.” 102 To integrate what lies outside, howev-
er, necessitates a revisionism of a kind that exceeds mentation and must be 
virtually biological:
Neither suffering nor enjoying a static “point” of view, the itinerant continu-
ally acquires novel capacities to flow, the strange capacity for invasion that bi-
ologist Lynn Margulis links to the emergence of endosymbiosis and Deleuze 
and Guattari refer to as thought. 103
Allowing for “invasion,” itineration absorbs the external; and privileging a 
new porousness, it admits freely of that which is different and alien in what 
is a kind of molar endosymbiosis. 
To extend on this physicalist view, we might even see how, in allowing 
itself to be offended or wounded, the itinerant nurtures what may turn out 
to be—as some contemporary biologists have written—an uncongenial me-
100 See “Jesting Pilate : an intellectual holyday (1957) [sic]”, Internet Archive, accessed 20 
April, 2014, https://archive.org/details/jestingpilateint00huxl.
101 Lindsay Banco, “Psychedelic Trips: Travel and Drugs in Contemporary Literature,” 
PhD diss., University of Maryland, 2007, 4, 215; cf. Banco, Travel and Drugs in Twenti-
eth-Century Literature (London: Routledge, 2010).
102 Doyle, Wetwares, 11.
103 Ibid. While Margulis’s proposition that symbiosis—or serial endosymbiotic theory 
(SET)—which engenders the origin of plastids and mitochondria, contributed much 
to the dissolution of the concept of the individual organism, the theory itself was first 
postulated by Russian botanist Konstantin Mereschkowski in his “Thoerie der zwei 
Plasmaarten als Grundlage der Symbiogenesis, einer neuen Lehre von der Entstehung 
der Organismen,” Biologisches Centralblatt 30 (1910): 253-64. Also see Lynne Margu-
lis and Gregory Hinkle, “Symbiosis and the Origin of Eukaryotic Cell Motility: Cur-
rent Status,” Endocytobiology IV: 4th International Colloquium on Endocytobiology and 
Symbiosis, ed. P. Nardon, V. Gianinazzi-Pearson, A.M. Grenier, L. Margulis, and D.C. 
Smith (Paris: Institut National de la Recherche Agrnomique, 1990), 523-5; and John Ar-
chibald, One Plus One Equals One: Symbiosis and the Evolution of Complex Life (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), esp. 50-2.
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tabolite: namely, an “Evil within.” 104 The process is allegorised in certain 
symbiotic interactions between fungi and bacterium, for example, where the 
former material expands the “metabolic potential” of the latter. Pathogene-
sis is now re-encoded as symbiosis; and what is poisonous begins to serve, 
sustain, and promote rather than prevent the recipient’s organellar life. 105 
One example of this process invites great curiosity. A species of bacteria of-
ten modelled as the bacterial ancestor of mitochondria—Rickettsia powaze-
kii—is the primary source of chemical energy in almost all organisms. It 
operates in precisely the way I have described above: by absorbing and incor-
porating uncongenial metabolites. Its example suggests that the origin of 
all mitochondrial bacteria may have evolved out of such an endosymbiotic 
interaction. In terms of language and thought, the process is remarkable 
for its parallels with the invention of the Word that Derrida describes, after 
Plato, as a pharmakonic substance; and yet it also reveals the important way 
in which poison can itself be converted into the very potion that assists in 
allowing for an organism’s self-sustainment of its life. 106
In such subfields of microbiology as mycology, similar real-world bio-
logical conversions have been observed. Fungi that are high in melatonin 
(“melanised fungi”), for instance, have been shown not only to be especially 
“radioresistant” to levels of radiation—levels that would be toxic to other 
life forms (such as humans)—but to in fact be “radiotrophic.” Studying the 
responses of fungi in highly radioactive environments, including in the fun-
gi that appeared on the walls of the damaged nuclear reactor at Chernobyl, 
biochemists have discovered that these fungi are capable of exploiting ionis-
ing radiation; they can convert what would be toxic to most forms of life into 
a food that can “provide benefits” and allow the species to “evolve genetic 
variants that have growth advantages under geotoxic stress.” 107 
104 Raphael H. Valdivia and Joseph Heitman, “Endosymbiosis: The Evil Within,” Current 
Biology 17, no. 11 (2007): R408-10, esp. R408. 
105 Examples of the operations of “cross-kingdom symbiotic pathogenesis” reveal the 
striking co-dependency of pathogens and endosymbionts. As Valdivia and Heitmann 
notes of “The interaction between Burkholderia and its fungal host [Rhizopus micro-
spores],” the relation “appears to straddle a fine line between mutualism—where both 
organisms benefit from the common exploitation of the plant host—and parasitism, 
where Rhizopus is held hostage by Burkholderia.” Ibid., R408.
106 Siv G. E. Anderson, Alireza Zomorodipour, Jan O. Andersson, Thomas Sicheritz-Pontén, 
U. Ceceilia M. Alsmark, Raf M. Podowski, A. Kristina Näslund, Ann-Sofie Eriksson, 
Herbert H. Winkler, and Charles G. Kurland, “The Genome Sequence of Rickesttsia 
prowazekii and the Origin of Mitochondria,” Nature 396 (1998): 133-43.
107 See Ekaterina Dadachoca and Arturo Casadevall, “Ionizing Radiation: How Fungi 
Cope, Adapt, and Exploit with the Help of Melanin,” Current Opinion in Microbiolo-
gy 11 (2008): 525-31; Ekaterina Dadchova, Ruth A. Bryan, Xianchun Huang, Tiffany 
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Like Huxley’s  formulation of “indirection”—a process in which what is 
unsought and seems initially harmful is reflectively ingested into the mental 
space—so can absorbing a poison sometimes prove beneficial to the health 
of the organism; it may, in fact, allow for kinds of revitalisation previously 
not imaginable. 
Huxley and the Metaphysics of Science
more than simply a metaphor for high tolerance to difference, however—and 
not merely a validated precondition for eukaryotic life—pharmakonicity may 
now be understood as an important, and perhaps even necessary, protocol in 
cellular evolution. And, more than simply an analogical tool by which biolog-
ical difference may be understood afresh at the eukaryotic and other levels, 
interactions of this kind now only begin to indicate the “vast landscape of 
transkingdom interactions, both intracellular and extracellular, that remain 
to be explored.” 108 
That these interactions are so common denotes the arbitrariness of 
those distinctions drawn along the lines of native and foreign, inside and 
outside. This is the crucial point that Huxley illustrates in his 1929 essay 
“Spinoza’s Worm,” and a point that Spinoza had already articulated, as Hux-
ley notes, in his letter to Henry Oldenburg of around 1663 (“Letter XXXII”). 
Here Spinoza wrote, in a lucid exemplification of such an interaction, about 
the “worm’s eye view” of blood. Spinoza describes a “little worm [that] would 
live in the blood” and, inhabiting this constricted zone, would be prevent-
ed from understanding how all the parts of the blood—the chyle and the 
lymph, for instance—could form a coherent whole and thus constitute the 
blood itself. 109 The worm, in other words, would be unable to perceive the co-
herent substance within which it lived; it would envision only its constituent 
parts, and remain unaware of its own parasitism. 
The worm would remain ignorant, that is, of the fact that it lived only by 
virtue of the nourishment and sustenance constituted by the blood that also 
Moadel, Andrew D. Schweitzer, Philip Aisen, Joshua D. Nosanchuk, Arturo Casadevall, 
“Ionizing Radiation Changes the Electronic Properties of Melanin and Enhances the 
Growth of Melanized Fungi,” PLoS ONE 2, no. 5 (2007): e457.
108 Valdivia and Heitman, “Endosymbiosis: The Evil Within,” R408. 
109 See A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall, eds. The Correspondence of Henry Oldenburg, 
Volume 2: 1663-1665 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 336-8, esp. 
338n1. Also see Aaron V. Garrett, Meaning in Spinoza’s Method (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 46-7. 
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represented the life force of another living being. Reflecting on Spinoza’s 
transkingdom thought-experiment, Huxley asserts that we
Ought to live and move and have our being in the infinite rather than the fi-
nite, that we should do our thinking in terms of the universal unity, not in 
terms of individual particulars. In a word, that we should cease to be worms in 
the blood and become—what? Butterflies, I suppose, winging freely through 
space (SW, 62).
Huxley’s invocation of “the molar” here allows him to articulate a means by 
which, through a perceptual reconfiguration, humans might transcend their 
biological substrates; they may become like butterflies and even “angels.” 
Tessellating intriguingly with certain work that Huxley’s brother, Julian, had 
commenced in 1921 (some eight years earlier) on the “radical enhancement 
of the flatworm,” Huxley’s essay identifies the limits of biological perception 
and transformation. 110 Working on flatworms, Julian had sought to modify 
the lifecycle of these and various other organisms through the adjustment of 
their temperatures, in among many other ways. 111
But Huxley’s vision of transcendence is less optimistic than his broth-
er’s would appear to be; after all, Julian is the one who more methodically 
pursued such subjects—even as the younger Huxley seems to have written 
more reflectively, and much more often, about them. Huxley’s meditation 
on transhuman evolution, however, is just as rapidly disavowed as it is intro-
duced: “It is only on rare occasions and with the greatest difficulty,” Huxley 
writes, acceding to the reality of human limitations, “that we can even take 
a temporary holiday from the fiction” of our world. We cannot ultimately 
overcome the world’s “too too solid illusions,” he would write, since the de-
bilitating clutches of materiality always come to be reintroduced in some 
way—such as by the body’s movements, for instance. 
The body “rumbles, with what a vulgar insistence, what low and un-Pla-
tonic sounds! Wamblingly rumbles for its dinner” (SW, 65). Always sounding 
a “vulgar” reminder of the human’s underlying mechanisms, these sounds 
appear often in Huxley’s fiction; and wherever they are apparent they remind 
us of the inexorably organic status of the human. Unable to disaffiliate them-
110 On this work, see Alison Bashford, “Julian Huxley’s Transhumanism,” 157. Bashford 
relies on typescripts comprising the Julian S. Huxley Papers, which can be found in 
Rice University’s Woodson Research Center, Fondrean Library. A report on the flat-
worm experiments can be found, as Bashford notes, in Box 6, Folder 4, Newsclipping, 
1921. 
111 Bashford, “Julian Huxley’s Transhumanism,” 157.
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selves from the “human plane,” Huxley writes, philosophers and mystics 
have, in “their search for superhuman wisdom,” sacrificed “much valuable 
human knowledge, without, however, being rewarded.” They have no angelic 
power,” for instance, and perhaps nothing like the scientist dreams of pos-
sessing (SW, 65-6). Despite that Huxley is ultimately inclined to dismiss the 
goal of transcendence or transhumanism—or what he calls “superhuman-
ism”—describing it as illusory, he also believes that no such ideal is “the 
worse of for being unrealizable” (SW, 66). Attributing the “ideal of superhu-
manness” to the influence of Christianity, Huxley asserts that humans, just 
as worms, should be permitted to “try to be superlatively [themselves],” and 
to become “Humanity perfected and consummate—[even though] it is a 
high and finally unattainable ideal” (SW, 69).
It is by adopting this pragmatic view of the human environment—with 
all the biological constraints that such a milieu imposes on humans— 
that Huxley diverges from classical metaphysics to invoke a “free and wild 
creation of concepts.” As described earlier, this is a kind of tendency that 
Deleuze and Guattari characterise as the essence of “English philosophy”; 
it expresses a wild freedom in relation to what can be thought, albeit within 
the constraints of long-acquired habit. 112 It is ironic, then, that Huxley turns 
to Eastern philosophy in order to breach the fold of Western metaphysics 
(and of English philosophy)—for as alien as such philosophical systems 
might have seemed to a British philosopher of the twentieth century, Huxley 
had always nurtured an interest in them. 
While for Huxley science and language are inadequate heuristics, mod-
els that shall forever be ill-equipped to describe the “givenness” of experi-
ence, history, by contrast, comprises the very indeces of that “givenness” in 
the form of the many inventions, technics, and models that have driven the 
adoption of our “eschatological ideas” about “Reality.” These technological 
developments, Huxley writes, structure all our phenomenological expe-
riences, just as they have also allowed for the development of increasingly 
advanced epistemologies—genealogical connections through which we 
have more “directly” perceived the world. Advances in biochemistry, such 
as knowing which endogenous biochemical compounds are generative of 
certain mental states, and ascertaining what genotypes generate what men-
tal disorders: these are the very kinds of knowledge that advance humans’s 
ability to understand reality in its totality. 
112 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 105-6.
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The lessons deduced from these technological interventions, moreover, 
may increase the chances that we, as kinds of Spinozan worms, will conceive 
of what our life-sustaining blood actually is at the molar level. 113 For Huxley, 
then, coming to grips with these realities will represent a transformation 
between two states whose differentness is akin to the distinction between 
heaven and hell. It would be, he writes, a
progress which can be described in theological terms as the passage from Ha-
des to Heaven, in chemical terms as the substitution of mescalin and lysergic 
acid for adrenolutin, and in psychological terms as the advance from catato-
nia and feelings of unreality to a sense of heighted reality in vision and, final-
ly, in mystical experience (HAH, 84).
The teleological gestalt of Huxley’s taxonomy of progress identifies the end-
game of human development as the arrival at a “mystical experience.” This 
is an arrival at a mushin (mu = “no,” and shin = “mind”) or “metanoia”: the 
moment in which one experiences an “integration of conscious and uncon-
scious [that is also] preparatory to a type of living.” After Huxley’s death in 
1963, these notions would be adopted in America and elsewhere in the West; 
Eastern philosophies of consciousness would become increasingly popular, 
and be promoted by such institutions as Esalen. 114 
113 A contemporary analogy for this kind of procedure has been the mapping of the hu-
man genome, which is now continued in research that seeks associations between 
certain diseases and disorders with a range of isoform neurotrophins. This is argu-
ably one way in which humans seek to understanding the entirety of our genetic and 
genotypic (and epigenetic) environment—the equivalent of the worm seeking to know 
“the blood as a whole.” In a much publicised study, for example (the first of its kind) 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was used to quantitatively map the isoform expres-
sion of the neurotrophin Neuregulin 1 (NRG1), specifically types I-IV, and NRG1-IVNV, 
during human neocortical development and aging. PCR was applied in real-time to 
human postmortem prefontral cortex tissue samples at 14-39 weeks gestation and 
postnatal ages 0-83 years. Having studied the association of these NRG1 expressions 
and the rs6994992 genotype, the study identified a “potential mechanism of ear-
ly developmental risk for schizophrenia at the NRG1 locus, involving a novel class 
of NRG1 proteins. See Clare Paterson, Yanhong Wang, Joel E. Kleinman, Amanda J. 
Law, “Effects of Schizophrenia Risk Variation in the NRG1 Gene on NRGI-IV Splicing 
During Fetal and Early Postnatal Human Neocortical Development,” American Journal 
of Psychiatry 171, no. 9 (2014): 979-89. Also see John M. Grohol, “8 Disorders Instead of 
One? The Role Gene Clusters Play in Schizophrenia,” PsychCentral, 16 September 2014, 
accessed 18 September 2014, http://psychcentral.com/news/2014/09/16/8-disorders-in-
stead-of-one-the-role-genes-clusters-play-in-schizophrenia/74981.html.
114 See, for instance, Kenneth R. Pelletier and Charles Garfield, Consciousness: East and 
West (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 232-3; Jeffrey J. Kripal, Esalen: America and the 
Religion of No Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 85-9. 
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Huxley’s optimism, however, remained of a constrained kind: even if the 
worm cannot ever perceive that it swims in “blood,” he suggested, it remains 
possible that it will come to sense—perhaps through a mystical realisation—a 
presentiment of its “wormness.” It might intuit that its livelihood, its body, 
and its “Reality,” for instance, all entirely depend on this blood—however 
indeterminable and incoherent the substance may remain, destined as it is 
to forever be understood only in terms of its constituent parts. But, whatever 
sense of “self-contradiction” the worm may come to feel about the relation of 
the manifold blood (as a heterogeneous object or recipe) to its self (as a uni-
fied subject), it would still seem preposterous, Huxley writes, to question the 
worm’s ability to transcend the blood so as to become, say, a “superworm.” 
Yet, it is just such a sense of self-contradiction that Huxley suggests 
prompts the “superhumanists” (of whom the proponent of Zen psychotherapy 
Alan Watts would become exemplary) to seek to become “superhuman,” or at 
least “more than what they are.” It is this idea that leads the superhumanists to 
“trouble [their] heads with speculations about what men may, but almost cer-
tainly will not, be like in A.D. 20,000” (SW, 71). For Huxley, such thinkers think 
with insufficiently clarity about their present-day reality. Knowing what are the 
specific constituents of human reality is ultimately of lesser importance, he 
writes, than knowing precisely on what the human depends within this reality. 
It is less important that the worm know their primary nutrient is “blood,” that 
is, than that it knows simply that this substance, whatever its name, is their 
primary nutrient. 
Heaven and Hell’s apprehension of a plurality of progresses—theological, 
chemical, and psychological—offers an elaboration on what Huxley had de-
veloped in “Spinoza’s Worm” as the failure of metaphysics to dispose of the 
fictionality of the “Christian ideal of superhumanness” (SW, 72). In this way, 
both essays anticipate what is perhaps more dramatically described in Jean-
François Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition as the “crisis of metaphysical phi-
losophy.” For Lyotard, the narrative of progress has lost its essential “functors”: 
its “great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal.” Now lost to a 
“heterogeneity of elements,” these narrative functors survive only as a plural-
ity of professional specialisations; they are contoured by an obsessive drive to 
“optimize the system’s performance—efficiency.” 115
While a specialisation in physics, mathematics, and engineering is useful 
in what Huxley describes as the diminution of “human misery,” these non-psy-
115 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, tr. Geoff Ben-
nington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), xxiv.
Huxley’s Chiasmic Enculturation 201
chological, and ultimately material sciences can also serve, if they are “super-
latively efficient,” only to improve the “total efficiency” of a power structure 
that increasingly leaves human needs unaddressed (UD, 209). As a means of 
cautioning against the dangers of efficiency, Huxley introduces, in his final 
novel Island (1962), the character of Mr Menon, the Under-Secretary of Schools. 
Menon evangelises a program of humanist science, or the “sciences of life”: 
Our primary emphasis isn’t on physics and chemistry; it’s on the sciences of 
life... We don’t have the money for large-scale research in physics and chemistry, 
and we don’t really have any practical need for that kind of research—no heavy 
industries to be made more competitive, no armaments to be made more dia-
bolical, not the faintest desire to land on the backside of the moon (ISLAND, 210).
It is characteristic of Huxley’s fiction that Mr Menon should allude to the 
“backside” of the moon: this emblematises Huxley’s tendency to parodically 
reduce or subvert the prestige associated with certain endeavours to the raw 
functionality or vulgarity of the body. As Huxley had written earlier, here the 
body again “rumbles” with that “vulgar insistence... ” (SW, 321), calling out 
for recognition amid the higher sounds of Royalist science. 116 
But here biological vulgarity is also associated with the bleakness of a so-
ciety so different from the utopian island of Pala. Landing on the “backside” 
of the moon becomes an emblem here for all the “dismal” drives of those cit-
izens of the West, abraded as they are by the ruthless competition between 
heavy industrial firms. Addressing Will Farnaby, a Western journalist who 
has been washed up on Pala’s shores, Mr Menon laments that 
You people have no choice... You’re irretrievably committed to applied phys-
ics and chemistry, with all their dismal consequences, military, political, and 
social (ISLAND, 210).
The “vulgarity” of a political future that is overtechnologised and obsessed 
with “specialization,” however, is even more forcefully metonymised by the 
figure of the “academic monster.” The grotesque body and immaturity of 
this figure only belies the shortcomings—and the lacunae—that are actually 
embedded in the molar systems of Western education. Of this figure, Mr 
Menon offers two viciously ridiculed exemplars:
116 On Mr Menon’s educational program as but one part of a “Rortian liberal utopia,” see 
William M. Curtis, “Rorty’s Liberal Utopia and Huxley’s Island,” Philosophy and Liter-
ature 35 (2011): 91-103, esp. 98-9.
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I was thinking of two people I met last time I was in England. At Cambridge. 
One of them was an atomic physicist, the other was a philosopher. Both ex-
tremely eminent. But one had a mental age, outside the laboratory, of about 
eleven and the other was a compulsive eater with a weight problem that he re-
fused to face. Two extreme examples of what happens when you take a clever 
boy, give him fifteen years of the most intensive formal education and totally 
neglect to do anything for the mind-body which has to do the learning and 
the living... They’re grotesquely funny... But goodness, how pathetic! And poor 
things, how curiously repulsive! (ISLAND, 208)
What is significant in this passage is Huxley’s condensation of a biological 
development (the obese body and immature mind, for instance) with an in-
creased disciplinary specialisation. 
Earlier in his life, in his essay “Vulgarity in Literature,” Huxley had crit-
icised institutionalised education as a set of “special circumstances which 
make some kinds of generally recognized vulgarity imperceptible.” Liter-
ary critics are especially prone, Huxley writes, to the “curious dullness of 
perception” and “lack of discrimination” that appears in “even apparently 
intelligent readers.” 117 Like the worm that imbibes the blood without know-
ing its macrobiological form, the human often misconstrues attention as 
comprehension: “Because we all know how to read we imagine that we know 
what we read. Enormous fallacy!” 118 And those who compare works that are 
”utterly dissimilar” are “destined,” Huxley elaborates, “to become either the 
headmasters of our most splendid public schools, or at least prime minis-
ters.” 119 For Huxley, if one remains imperceptible of vulgarity and admits of 
it into one’s life, one must also become a “curiously repulsive” candidate for 
the pedagogical vocation—or for political leadership.
But if twentieth-century education is marred by a drive to “specialization 
at the symbolic level,” and in action only leaves the “living mind-body in its 
pristine state of ignorance and ineptitude” (ISLAND, 209), its effects are not 
limited to literary degradation. It is also in the sciences that we encounter 
new depravities—such as in the more efficient achievement of ending life. 
In Science, Liberty and Peace (1946), for instance, Huxley meditates on the 
question of whether “progressive technology can be combined not only with 
security, but also with freedom” (SLP, 25):
117 Aldous Huxley, “Vulgarity in Literature,” Complete Essays, Volume II: 1926-1929, ed. 
Robert S. Baker and James Sexton (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), 19-48, 38-9. This essay 
was originally published in The Saturday Review of Literature on 27 September, 1930.
118 Ibid., 38.
119 Ibid., 39.
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Thanks to the genius and co-operative industry of highly trained physicists, 
chemists, metallurgists and mechanical inventors, tyrants are able to dragoon 
larger numbers of people more effectively, and strategists can kill and destroy 
more indiscriminately and at greater distances, than ever before (SLP, 6).
Huxley’s critique of science’s technopolitical innovations should be read, 
as James Hull notes, as a rebuttal of science’s failure to achieve a peaceful 
and healthy civilisation: “How are all men, women and children,” Huxley 
implores, “to get enough to eat?” (SLP, 75). 
But Huxley’s pacifism should also be read against the background of Hux-
ley’s “intense state of no-mind,” which I have addressed throughout this chap-
ter. This is the “long and weary process of his metanoia” that, as Hull observes, 
becomes for Huxley “a process... that stirs up the depths of the mind, calls up 
the powers of the inner world that usually lie dormant.” A prophylactic against 
the death-drive, metanoic insight thus short-circuits the “deep and enduring 
will” to self-destruction and self-annihilation—a drive that Huxley conceptu-
alises in a variety of ways, ranging from psychosis to “diabolic possession.” 120
In almost all of his philosophical and political criticism, Huxley evan-
gelises a deeply meditative mode of reflection, one that ultimately serves 
to militate against human psychic distress. As I have suggested already, 
Huxley’s own preferred method for achieving this end is to enter into “deep 
reflection”—either through hypnosis, or through other methods such as the 
Alexander Technique. 121 These are the technical body-mind or “psycho-phys-
ical” operations that share much, as I have already argued, with what Doyle 
describes as the “cultivation of the anomalous, [sic] ‘itineration’”: that is, 
with the process that “emerges from a repetition, a doubling,” featuring an 
ecstatic but “disciplined receptivity to the turbulent outside.” 122
These ideas also anticipate the way in which Derrida’s deconstruction-
ist writings prioritise the “trace” (discovered through a mode of “tracking”) 
within texts to calculate the presence of a meaning that is otherwise absent, 
and yet somewhow also operative within the text. For Derrida, attempts to 
perceive this “trace”—for instance, of an absent word or language—involve 
apprehending all of those words and languages that have not been used, do 
not appear, in the place of what is actually there. 123 In a chiastic process of 
120 Hull, Representative Man, 397; also see Huxley to John Middleton Murry, 26 May 1946 
(Letter 517), in Letters, ed. Smith, 545.
121 On Huxley and the “Alexander Technique,” see Aldous Huxley, “A Psychophysical Edu-
cation,” in More Talk of Alexander, ed. Wilfred Barlow (London: Gollancz, 1978), 1-3.
122 Doyle, Wetwares, 10.
123 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, tr. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns 
Huxley’s Chiasmic Enculturation 204
epistemology, here the multi-vectorial world is pulled into a central inter-
stice, and the subject is placed “between two worlds” in a rapturous and 
visionary moment of “divine impartiality, which is the One, which is Love, 
which is [also] Being or Itsigkeit.” 124 Such an instance of rapture also arises 
during Huxley’s meditation on the “Wild Flower” (LAS, 16). 
Echoing Deleuze and Guattari’s description of “deterritorialization,” to 
perceive the flower is now to begin a process in which two objects (or a sub-
ject and object) come together in “shared acceleration.” 125 Here the object’s 
focal displacement, and its singularisation from out of a network or assem-
blage of vectors, institutes a new vision of the relations within this field: one 
in which subject and object “must always be connected [or] caught up in one 
another.” 126 
Deleuze and Guattari similarly illustrate deterritorialisation in their de-
scription of an orchid. The “orchid deterritorializes,” they write, “by forming 
an image, [which is] a tracing of the wasp.” At the same time, however, the 
wasp is also deterritorialised, “becoming a piece in the orchid’s reproductive 
apparatus.” 127 Here the authors speak only of observing the process of deter-
ritorialisation as it occurs between two agents; and they exclude themselves, 
the third person observers of the process, from the process itself. Presuppos-
ing the possibility in which one may perceive a plane of rhizomatic activity 
without affecting it, the authors describe (and together become) an ideal 
perceiver who views the world from a “monadological point of view.” And yet 
they also concede the implausability of any such observer: their capacity to 
remain neutral or non-territorial would be “inadequate and should be super-
seded by nomadology.” 128
In other words, when Deleuze and Guattari introduce a metrical de-
scription of the “smooth space” (or Riemannian space)—the space in which 
two individuals are geometrically associated—they also implicitly suggest 
the possibility of a third agent whose role in such a space is neutral, and 
whose presence is somehow neutralised or nugatory in the dynamics of that 
perceived space. They imagine, in other words, a means by which deterrito-
rialisation may be witnessed by an agent whose presence does not also itself 
deterritorialise, and is not reterritorialising of the other agents in the space. 
Hopkins University Press, 1974), xvii, 290-1.
124 Letters, 779 [23 December, 1955, to Dr Humphry Osmond). 
125 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 142.
126 Ibid., 10.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid., 574n27.
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And, even as the authors qualify this view by asserting that the operations of 
such a perceiving force must be, following Bergson, far more “rich and com-
plex” than they can articulate, they also acknowledge that, in geometrical 
terms, one always
reintroduces parallelism between two vectors, treating multiplicity as though 
it were immersed in this homogenous and striated space of reproduction, in-
stead of trying to follow it in an “exploration by leg-work.” 129 
While they thus mourn our seemingly automatic reluctance to undertake 
the “leg-work” 130 of being both inside and outside of the space, the authors’s 
lamentation is ambiguous; it recalls Huxley’s acknowledgment that “trans-
portation” is no longer as easily induced by bright lights, for instance. If 
Euclidean geometry has meant that we always draw false conclusions, by 
means of assuming a “parallelism” or chiasmus between this pair of twin 
vectors in space—and even in the case of these non-striated, Riemannian 
“smooth” spaces—then how are we to break free from the “smooth” or “stri-
ated” spaces that, as Deleuze and Guattari confirm, we see only from the 
point of view of a space that “is occupied without being counted”? 131 
Referring to mathematician-philosopher Albert Lautman in their notes, 
the authors observe that all these spaces now “admit a Euclidean conjunc-
tion”; they thus invite us to apprehend the world’s multiplicity as a “Euclide-
an space with a sufficient number of dimensions.” 132 If Euclid’s optics are in-
eluctably also our optics, then—if his vision of the world is what we, Euclid’s 
inheritants, also must inexorably be left to see—then how might we invent 
a new way of perceiving space? Such a new way, Deleuze will later suggest, 
may be attained in the viewing of cinema, where finally “the brain has lost 
its Euclidean coordinates, and now emits other signs.” 133 
Equally aware that brains can change—not only in neuroplastic or epi-
gentic terms, but insofar as they may start to emit “other signs” (which is 
129 Ibid., 485-6.
130 Elsewhere in their book it is spelt “legwork,” without the hyphen.
131 Ibid., 362.
132 Ibid., 556n39, citing Albert Lautman, Les sch’emas de structure (Paris: Hermann, 1938), 
23-4, 43-7. Richard Doyle is one of few scholars to engage with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
description of legwork, or what he calls “itineration.” For Doyle, interestingly, compu-
tation and the calculation of certain irreducible algorithms perform a kind of legwork 
insofar as these tasks require a kind of “active waiting.” It is easy to see how Doyle’s 
description collides with Huxley’s description of “Deep Reflection” or is insistence on 
meditatively contemplating the “Isness” of things. Wetwares: 15-6. On Huxley’s Deep 
Reflection, see Erickson, “A Special Inquiry with Aldous Huxley,” 50-71. 
133 Deleuze, Cinema 2 (London: Continuum, 2005 [1985]), 266; Doyle, Wetwares, 88.
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to say symbolic ones)—R.D. Laing shares Deleuze and Guattari’s ambition 
to overcome the incapacitation that seems to prevent us from doing that 
non-Euclidean legwork. And, again, equally as much as Deleuze and Guat-
tari, Laing seeks to articulate those ways in which one might begin to “watch 
the flow” not “from the bank” but from within the flow. For Laing, howev-
er, this is a question of the phenomenology of personality rather than of 
geometrical perception within a field or manifold. In The Divided Self, Laing 
laments the unexplored “space” of personality in psychiatry; for him, such 
as space is not a physical, but a phenomenological one—and one too often 
dismissed, he writes, for not understanding this “space” may well represent 
the foremost impediment to our understanding of the psychoses.
Departing from Huxley’s and even Guattari’s commitments to molecu-
larisation, however, Laing attests to his conviction that only an existentialist 
phenomenology of personality will resolve these problems of metaphys-
ics. Only this will allow psychologists to understand how the psychotic’s 
“personality” exists in an independent way that is not also shaped by the 
psychiatric “space” in which it is perceived. The locus in which the analyst 
and analysand commune, Laing asserts, impairs the very visibility of the 
psychotic; it less exposes than obscures them. There is much in common 
between Huxley’s and Laing’s philosophies of psychiatry and psychosis, al-
though it is ironic in this sense that Laing venerates Freud as the “greatest 
psychopathologist”  evere there was, whereas Huxley so viciously devalues 
him. For Laing, Freud is a “hero” who “descended to the ‘Underworld’ and 
met there stark terrors.” 134 For Huxley, by contrast, to read Freud’s “tremen-
dously exciting and dramatic” description of “the Unconscious” is as only 
ever as enlightening as “reading a fairy story” (OCHP, 317). 
What disturbs Huxley about Freud is not the psychoanalyst’s descrip-
tion of the “Unconscious” as “a sort of den or inferno to which all the bad 
thoughts and desires clash with our social duties,” but the manner in which 
the “truth of this exciting anthropomorphic myth” is “cheerfully assumed 
by psycho-analysts” (OCHP, 318). To accept poetic descriptions and mythic 
images as forming reliable “bodies of doctrine” is, for Huxley, to give art the 
name of “science,” and to thus devalue both (OCHP, 315). 
If Huxley’s rejection of Freud underscores his pedagogical or epistemo-
logical responsibility to condemn the “pseudo-sciences,” however, it also 
expresses his disapproval of institutionalised religion, a disapproval force-
fully ventilated in his essays of the 1930s. In a remark more often quoted by 
134 Laing,The Divided Self, 25.
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atheist organisations than cited or contextualised by scholars, Huxley writes 
in “Amor Fati” (within TAP) that one “never sees animals going through the 
absurd and often horrible fooleries of magic and religion... Only man be-
haves with such gratuitous folly” (TAP, 278-9). 135
But Huxley’s experimentation with mescaline of some twenty years 
later prompts him to identify a different kind of gratuitousness: 
I am suggesting... that the mescalin experience is what Catholic theologians 
call “a gratuitous grace,” not necessary to salvation but potentially helpful 
and to be accepted thankfully if made available (DOP, 46).
This apparent evolution of gratuitous grace out of gratuitous folly signifies 
what Jerome Meckier charts as Huxley’s transition from “poet to mystic.” 
Such a transition, as Meckier makes clear, represents not Huxley’s aban-
donment of his cynical point of view, but rather his “artistic and spiritual 
growth from a parodic formative intelligence into a volatile blend of satirist 
and sage.” 136 As with his criticism of Freud, Huxley’s criticism of metaphysics 
more generally is made possible by his ability to “furnish an explanatory 
hypothesis for the nature of things provided it was negative.” 
These rational admonitions had begun, Meckier asserts, when Huxley 
first discovered he was unable to emulate the Romantics or Victorians; thus, 
this self-recognised defect engendered in Huxley a deep feeling of cynicism 
that he would possess throughout his life. Having upbraided his forebears, 
however, Huxley would soon become—following his move to the United 
States in 1937—increasingly serious about attaining spiritual enlighten-
ment, identifying as a “would-be mystic.” 137 
But if Huxley prefers Blake’s vision to Freud’s mythology—if he finds 
more merit in the description of “Heaven in a Wild Flower” than the “fairy 
135 A cursory search for this quotation on Google.com, for instance, returns a range 
of websites of atheist organisations. Similarly, a large number of non-scholarly, 
“neo-mystical” or “New Age” self-published books adopt this passage as epigraphs at 
the head of their chapters, although in almost all none of these cases is a page refer-
ence, citation, or the passage’s context offered. Like many writers described as public 
intellectuals, Huxley has become a quotable source, used both to bolster and refute 
an argument. The changing nature or historical context in which Huxley uttered his 
thoughts is rarely considered in those works that adopt his words in this way. See, for 
instance, Patricia Tesco and Rowan Hall, Animal Spirits: Spells, Sorcery and Symbols 
from the Wild (New Jersey: New Page Books, 2002), 75; V.C. Thomas, The God Dilemma: 
To Believe or Not to Believe (Bloomington, XLibris, 2009), 131; and Donald L. Avery, Re-
leasing the Bean Within: Practicing Spirituality in Everyday Life (New DeHaven: Infinity 
Publishing, 2006), 38. 
136 Jerome Meckier, Aldous Huxley: From Poet to Mystic (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006), 4.
137 Ibid.
Huxley’s Chiasmic Enculturation 208
tale story” of “Dr. Freud”—it remains true that both mythologies imagine a 
form of transportation or deterritorialisation. They are thus different of de-
gree rather than of kind. And what may in fact be “caught up” in both these 
instances of mythological perception—whether one sees “a Heaven” in a 
“Wild Flower” or a symbol in a dream—is the amelioration of psychic distur-
bance. They who perceive the wonder of the flower take nothing so material 
as its pollen (like the wasp), but they may experience a form of relief from 
psychopathological strain. While we are often “depressed from too much 
thinking, or bored by too little,” Huxley writes, “remembered daffodils flash 
upon that inward eye which is the bliss of solitude (LAS, 16). 
Thus while Freud’s “obscene allegorical interpretations of simple 
dreams” (OCHP, 316) are anathematic to Huxley’s insistence on scientific 
proof in the 1920s, he remains satisfied to endorse as palliatives for the mind 
the importance of images such as “daffodils” in later decades. And as Huxley 
suggests, scientific knowledge can often threaten to detract from this relief; 
it may regularly interrupt these peaceful scenes of ecstasy by interposing its 
own pronouncements on them: 
Very nice! comments the botanist, and proceeds to inform us that “the genus 
Helianthis contains about fifty species, chiefly natives of North America. A few 
being found in Peru and Chile.” In parts of England, he adds, “hundreds of 
plants are grown for their seeds on sewage farms” (LAS, 16).
For Huxley, the consecration of the Wild Flower is now reappropriated by 
the scientist whose taxonomical descriptions always carry with them the en-
croachments of industrialised “efficiency.” 138 That “hundreds” of the plants 
grow in “sewage farms” only compounds the vulgarity of the bathos that is 
already engendered by the anecdote; it serves to reduce whatever is transcen-
dental about the flower to its basest origin: a product of the body’s waste. This 
bathos is just another of Huxley’s vulgar images, and an analogue of Denis 
Stone’s realisation in Crome Yellow, for instance, that the word “carminative” 
means nothing so high and splendid as he first imagines. Inscribed on his 
favourite “golden liquor,” the word denotes, he discovers, not the sensation 
of “warmth and internal glow” induced by the drink (as he initially interprets
138 As Huxley wrote in “Usually Destroyed,” “The worst enemy of life, freedom and the 
common decencies is total anarchy; their second worst enemy is total efficiency.” See 
Adonis and the Alphabet (London: Chatto & Windus, 1956), 204-16, esp. 209; published 
in the US as Tomorrow and Tomorrow and Tomorrow (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1956), 213-26. 
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 it), but the potion’s status as a digestive that elicits gaseous waste, promoting 
flatulence (CY, 221-25). 139 
Different to Derrida’s différance—where meaning is to be understood as 
that which arises not simply from morphological differentiation but also tem-
poral deferrment and suspension—Huxley’s thought is “chiasmatic” in that it 
prioritises “direct experience” and “participative” observation over distanced 
analysis. Time and again Huxley acknowledges that—even if we think it im-
possible to intuit the convergence of different parallel vector lines—visionary 
moments may yet be occasioned through which a visualisation of this paral-
lelism itself appears. This is the moment in which the geometrical configura-
tion in which a vector moves through the perceiving subject, both in space and 
time, inaugurates a punctum or kairos moment, one of direct apprehension. 140 
Feeling as though he has “crossed over,” and resides interstitially between two 
“worlds” (proxies for any dichotomy, binary, or polar opposition that is seem-
ingly irreconcilable), Huxley imagines himself to be at the centre of what is a 
virtualisation of reality. His early fiction thus creates literary “puppet-shows” of 
a harmonious and “divine Reality” that, for Huxley, can never be brought into 
the reality of the present world. The characters in Crome Yellow, for instance, 
are “puppets, devoid of emotions— devoid indeed of most of the attributes of 
living humanity.” 141 This applies equally to the characters in each of the short 
stories in Huxley’s Limbo (1920), whose puppet-show qualities were captured in 
its 1924 cover artwork (see figure 4.1, below). 
In his book on Foucault, Deleuze discusses two forms of knowledge, and 
refers to this state of betweenness simply as “Being.” This state, Deleuze 
writes, “lies between two forms” and prompts one to reflect: “Is this not pre-
cisely what Heidegger had called the ‘between-two’ or Merleau-Ponty termed 
the ‘interlacing or chiasmus?’” 142 Placing emphasis on what I have in previ-
139 I will revisit this scene from Crome Yellow, and this tendency to “vulgarity” in Huxley’s 
fiction, in more detail in the following chapter. 
140 The rhizome moves within and with the forms of life (and non-living things) with 
which it participates and interacts; the chiasmus, by contrast, turns all things inside 
out and to its own interest. It moves not with life, but in precisely in the opposite direc-
tion and by the opposite movement to it. On the rhizome, see Deleuze and Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus, 7.
141 In his letter to Lady Ottoline, Huxley discussed how the characters in his works, and 
specifically in Crome Yellow, function merely as “puppets, devoid of emotions, devoid 
indeed of most of the attributes of living humanity.” As he would go on to write, “Real 
understanding [between humans] is an impossibility.” James Sexton, ed. Aldous Hux-
ley: Selected Letters (Chicago; Ivan R. Dee, 2007), 108. 
142 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (New York: Continuum, 1999), 92. Also quoted in Leonard 
Lawlor, “The Beginnings of Thought,” in Paul Patton, John Protevi, eds., Between 
Deleuze and Derrida (London: Continuum, 2003), 67-83, 82-3n12.
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ous chapters described as the “limbotic” state between torpor and hyper-
excitation, the model of the chiasmus illustrates the principle that entities, 
humans, and “actants,” are in reality always in between two states. To think 
in chiastic terms is thus to adopt a heuristic much like what Bruno Latour 
describes in his Actor-Network Theory: this is a schema in which individual 
entities or monads are determined—not by their essential substances—but 
by the entirety of their relations in a network. 143 This is why, as Huxley ar-
gues, it is the 
feeling of de-individualization which makes it possible for the Indians who 
practice the peyote cult to use the drug not merely as a short cut to the vision-
ary world, but also as an instrument for creating a loving solidarity within the 
participating group (HAH, 50). 
Disindividuation, or what I have previously named deautomatisation, leads 
to a participatory methexis; it inaugurates a heightened awareness of one’s 
“being,” and instills in participants a sense of what Huxley calls the “broth-
erhood of man” (TPP, 93). 
143 See my “Actants at Any Depth: Bruno Latour and Henri Bergson at the Surface of Sci-
ence.”
Figure 4.1 A 1924 edition of Huxley’s Limbo.
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In another context, Edward de Bono distinguishes “parallel thinking” 
from dialectical thinking; he argues that dialectical thought often seeks to 
find the “truth” of an object in a time-consuming manner, whereas what I 
call chiastic discovers this same truth relatively quickly. Eliminating possibil-
ities through trial and error—such as where one seeks to identify an apple 
among non-apples—dialectical thinking organises a group into a division of 
opposites or binaries. Chiastic or parallel thinking, by contrast—whether it is 
conducted in a group, or in a manner that permits the subject to ontologically 
think “in parallel”—allows one to conjecture the possibility that an object is 
an apple without confirming it apple by apple; this, in turn, allows the conject-
ing party to then ask “Where does this take us?’” In this modality, “We do not,” 
de Bono asserts, “have to check the apple hypothesis before we proceed to 
‘what happens next.’” 144 For in this speculative mode, we have already intuited 
the apple’s nature. 
Huxley’s Polyamorous Phallogocentrism 
as one reads huxley’s biography, it becomes clear that chiastic thinking is more 
complex a modality than one that can be accessed with the right method—if 
only one can apply the appropriate deautomising technique (hypnotism, the 
Alexander Technique). It is also more than the moment in which disindi-
viduation can be achieved—if only once can only discover the most crucial 
among those “unsought” data that arise. Huxley’s chiastic thinking, rather, 
depends on a history of socio-biological “patternation” (phylogenesis), one in 
which filiality, biology, kinship, and genealogy each allows for this genetic or 
evolutionary heuristic to be sensed, perceived, and incorporated. As Frances 
Wynn writes in an essay on “embodied chiasms,” the relationship between 
mother and infant, for example, is “formed as much by the infant’s holding 
of the mother as it is by the mother’s holding of the infant.” 145 
For Huxley, these psycho-physical relations are crucial to the evolution of 
the human mind and spirit. In a variety of dramatic moments in Brave New 
World, for instance, “savage” relationships between mothers and children 
are devalorised; they are characteristic, we find, of a kind of “madness.” In-
sanity is “infectious,” causing the “pre-moderns” of Brave New World to “feel 
strongly” (BNW, 33); however, this insanity also triggers what Huxley calls 
144 Edward de Bono, Parallel Thinking: From Socratic Thinking to de Bono Thinking (Lon-
don: Viking 1994), 178-9.
145 Frances Wynn “The Embodied Chiasmic Relationship of Mother and Infant,” Humans 
Studies 19 (1997): 253-70, esp. 253.
Huxley’s Chiasmic Enculturation 212
a “really monstrous emotional vulgarity” in the literature of Dickens. 146 No 
doubt influenced by Huxley’s own filial relations with his parents and broth-
ers, Brave New World’s representation of the devalorisation of motherhood 
represents Huxley’s concern to restore that “primeval night” (HAH, 35) under 
which individuals—labile and precarious— can in their essence lie between 
two states. Ambulant and itinerant, it is from this vantage point that each of 
us can see the “unearthly significance” of these formative relations. 
At the same time, Brave New World’s implicit critique of Ford’s and 
Mustapha Mond’s dismissal of motherhood, as well as of “strong feeling,” 
represents an elaboration of Huxley’s condemnations of Freudianism and 
the destructive efficiency of technology. When, in the climactic debate with 
John Savage, Mond diagnoses the Savage with certain “over-compensations” 
deriving from his “embryonic fixations” (BNW, 194-5), the novel directly sat-
irises “Our Freud’s” manner of pathologising the chiasmic knot between 
mother and child. 147 Part of Huxley’s “trouble with Freudian psychology is 
that it is based exclusively on a study of the sick,” and looks only for sickness; 
and hence, whether he knew it or not, “Freud never met a healthy human 
being—only patients and,” as Huxley quips, “other psychoanalysts.” 148 
Huxley objects to the myopia intrinsic in the pathological sciences or, 
as Foucault names it, the “clinical gaze”—the ever scrutinising and classifi-
catory vision from which Freud cannot escape. Distinctly satirised in Brave 
New World, Freud and Henry T. Ford are condensed into the image of “Our 
Ford—or our Freud,” the second name being that which, we are told, “for 
some inscrutable reason,” Ford “chose to call himself whenever he spoke 
of psychological matters” (BNW, 33). At the same time as the processes of 
reproduction are automatised in the novel—and divorced completely from 
the body—these new procedures also mark the mother-child relation as in-
delibly Oedipal, illicit, and incestuous. 149 For why now—other than for illicit 
purposes—the novel asks, should mothers even need to exist, with their 
wombs having now been replaced by machines?
146 Huxley, “Vulgarity in Literature,” 45.
147 See Willi Real, “Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World as a Parody and Satire of Wells, Ford, 
Freud and Beaviourism in Advanced Foreign Language Teaching (FLT),” Aldous Hux-
ley Annual 8 (2008): 167-206, esp. 197; Jerome Meckier, “Our Ford, Our Freud and the 
Behaviorist Conspiracy of Brave New World,” Tahlia 1 (1978): 37, reproduced in Jerome 
Meckier, Aldous Huxley: Modern Satirical Novelist of Ideas: A Collection of Essays, ed. 
Peter Firchow and Bernfried Nugel (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006): 131-64.
148 See George Wickes and Ray Frazer, “The Art of Fiction XXIV: Aldous Huxley,” The Paris 
Review 23 (Spring 1960), 69, qtd. in Real, “Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World as a Paro-
dy,” 197.
149 See Buchanan, “Oedipus in Dystopia,” 77.
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Huxley addresses this question in his 1956 essay “Mother,” where he 
again criticises Freudianism and its implementation as the official dogma of 
the developed world through the evolution of technology. Recounting a time 
that he found in a drugstore an “immense assortment of cards for Mother,” 
Huxley notes how inside of each of these cards he had discovered printed 
a poem in “imitation handwriting.” After citing some of the poetry, Huxley 
mocks the industrialisation of motherhood signified by these cards:
In the paradise of commercialized maternity, no Freudian reptile, it is evi-
dent, has ever reared its ugly head. The Mother of the greeting cards inhabits 
a delicious Disneyland, where everything is syrup and technicolour, cuteness 
and Schmalz. And this, I reflected, as I worked my way up along the fifty-four-
foot rack, is all that remains of the cult of the Great Mother, the oldest and, in 
many ways, the profoundest of all religions. 150
Huxley’s observations accord with what Luce Irigaray will write of the chi-
asmus: it is a figure that, she argues, is very often inaccessible to women— 
precisely because of a woman’s “nonsublimation of herself.” In the psychical 
space within which women think, work, ambulate, and perform, Irigarary 
contests that the procedures and powers of repression arise in women’s 
minds; these stem, she posits, from the woman’s inability to “capitalize” on 
the energy that she has expended in developing a “better relationship to the 
social.” This is a relationship that she has prioritised above others, and that 
she has spent time developing in a far more strenuous way than have her 
male counterparts. 151
Preventing women from freely experimenting with their “qualities or 
aptitudes,” women’s labour ensures that—as Catherine Waldby and Melinda 
Cooper argue—these skills in fact, in Irigaray’s words, “disappear without 
leaving any creative achievements.” 152 Predestined to disappearance, a wom-
an “always tends toward without any return to herself as the place where 
something positive can be elaborated.” 153 Irigaray continues:
150 Huxley, “Mother,” in Baker and Sexton, Aldous Huxley: Complete Essays V: 1939-1956 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002), 339-45, esp. 341.
151 Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, tr. Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1993), 8-9. 
152 See Catherine Waldby and Melinda Cooper, Clinical Labour: Tissue Donors and Re-
search Subject in the Global Bioeconomy (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 16-17.
153 Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, 9. Elsewhere in the book Irigaray writes the 
following: 
Whereas man must live out the pain and experience the impossibility of being cut 
off from and in space (being born, leaving the mother), woman lives out the pain-
ful or impossible experience of being cut off from or in time. (Is this their empiri-
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In terms of contemporary physics, it could be said that she [woman] remains 
on the side of the electron, with all this implies for her, for man, for their en-
counter. If there is no double desire, the positive and negative poles divide 
themselves between the two sexes instead of establishing a chiasmus or a dou-
ble loop in which each can go toward the other and come back to itself. 154
Irigaray’s analysis of sexual difference may be appropriated to the Huxley 
family history. Indeed, one of the reasons why this formulation should be 
applied to the Huxleys is because Irigaray’s ideas resonate particularly strik-
ingly with Paul White’s analysis of the relationship between TH and his wife, 
Henrietta Heathorn, a woman who appears to have, throughout her life, al-
ways deferred to the formidable will of her husband.
By “employing a traditional role... of the self-effacing Woman,” Heathorn 
could, White argues, “transform the compromising of her will into an ex-
ercise of will.” Yet the overall picture of Heathorn remains aligned with 
Irigaray’s portrait of the “nonsublimated woman.” 155 Giving not receiving, 
and expecting nothing more than some affectionate regard, “positive elabo-
ration” seems hardly possible for Heathorn. But the nonsublimated woman 
is equally apt to describe Huxley’s first wife, Maria Nys, whom Huxley would 
insensitively lampoon in Point Counter Point. Here, as the figure of Elinor 
Bidlake, the woman’s intelligence is said to be not apace with that of her hus-
band, Phillip (PCP, 122); the scene is no doubt an allusion to the longstanding 
co-transcendental chiasmus?” (61) 
 See also Irigaray’s Speculum of the Other Woman, tr. Gillian C. Gill (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1985). Here, Irigaray makes the following point on the chiasmus:
In a chiasmus of family benefits, the father is given all rights and powers over “his 
children.” Provided that they are not bastards and have sloughed off the hybrid 
character of their mortal birth, these children resemble only their sire. An optical 
chiasmus operates too. The father denies the conditions of specula(riza)tion. He is 
unaware, it would seem, of the physical, mathematical and even dialecticalcoordi-
nates of representation “in a mirror.”An optical chiasmus [that] operates too. The 
father denies the conditions of specula(riza)tion. He is unaware, it would seem, of 
the physical, mathematical and even dialectical coordinates of representation “in a 
mirror” (301, emphasis in original).
154 Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, 9.
155 Nevertheless, Clark praises Henrietta’s writing and illustrations, such as those she 
had painted for her book My Wife’s Relations. This is a children’s book that recounts 
the adventures of a homely family of pigs. Clark also notes that the lines inscribed on 
TH Huxley’s headstone, on his wishes, were those of his wife. They ran: “Be not afraid, 
ye waiting hearts that weep; For still He giveth His beloved sleep,/And if an endless 
sleep He wills, so best.” What is notable about these lines is that they would reappear 
in H. G. Wells’s book, The New Machiavelli some sixteen years later. See Clark, The 
Huxleys, 111. Henrietta A. Huxley, My Wife’s Relations: A Story of Pigland (London: J.S. 
Virtue & Co., 1884); and Herbert George Wells, The New Machiavelli (Toronto: McLeod 
and Allen, 1911).
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discomfort Huxley felt with regard to the appropriateness of his intellectual 
mismatch with Nys. 156 Figures of many “repressed” women appear elsewhere 
too, such as in the figure of Mary Bracegirdle in Crome Yellow: this woman 
is stifled in what Irigaray refers to as a “non-place.” 157 Giving voice to her fear 
of being repressed, Mary—on the subject of what her friend Anne Wimbush 
calls “Repressions; old maids and all the rest”—confesses the following:
I am afraid of them [repressions]. It’s always dangerous to repress one’s in-
stincts. I’m beginning to detect in myself symptoms like the ones you read of 
in the books. I constantly dream that I’m falling down wells; and sometimes 
I even dream that I’m climbing up ladders. It’s most disquieting. The symp-
toms are only too clear. (CY, 66)
Huxley’s fiction is often testament to Irigaray’s idea that the chiasmus is 
pre-gendered. It exhibits an awareness that it is the masculine figure who, as 
Irigaray postulates, remains impenetrable by the woman. And he remains 
impenetrable precisely because women remain so “cut off from or in time” 
from him, and the possibility of gratification or chiasmic intercession thus 
remains forever out of reach. 
156 Although few critics other than James Hull seem to have identified Point Counter 
Point’s Elinor as Maria Huxley (Nys), it is possible to conclude this is the case on at 
least two bases. Elinor, firstly, is Phillip’s wife, and Phillip is well recognised as a thin-
ly veiled representation of Huxley himself. Secondly, the kinds of feelings that Elinor 
describes about her intelligence parallel those that Maria had herself expressed in 
a range of letters that she, while troubled, wrote to Lady Ottoline Morrell. In these 
letters, Maria asks Morrell why she had ever become involved with Huxley, who she 
envisages in her letter as more adept in literary matters than she could ever be. Point 
Counter Point’s narrator describes a similar situation from the point of view of Molly: 
Molly launched into her regular description of Philip. “Whereas his wife,” she 
concluded, rather painfully aware that Burlap had not smiled as frequently as 
she should have done, “is quite the opposite of a fairy. Neither elfish, nor learned, 
nor particularly intelligent.” Molly smiled rather patronizingly. “A man like Philip 
must find her a little inadequate sometimes, to say the least.” The smile persisted, 
a smile now of self-satisfaction. Philip had had a foible for her, still had. He wrote 
such amusing letters, almost as amusing as her own. (“Quand je veuxbriller dans le 
monde,” Molly was fond of quoting her husband’s compliments, “je cite des phrases 
de tes lettres.”) Poor Elinor! “A little bit of a bore sometimes,” Molly went on. “But 
mind you, a most charming creature. I’ve known her since we were children togeth-
er. Charming, but not exactly a Hypatia.” Too much of a fool even to realize that 
Philip was bound to be attracted by a woman of his own mental stature, a woman 
he could talk to on equal terms (PCP, 122). 
 As Hull notes, offering further evidence for the connection, “aspects of Huxley’s char-
acter Maria deplored were just the same as those Elinor complains of with regard to 
Phillip.” Hull, Representative Man, 136. 
157 Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, 205.
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When Mary dreams she is falling down wells and climbing ladders, for 
instance, she expresses her ontological displacement in space—a position 
accorded to her, as in Irigaray’s theorisation, because she is a woman. This 
is, writes Irigaray, “the place of the spatial [that] women can occupy.” In this 
place, and performing “this role,” the figure of the woman is always
assisted... by her relation to the cyclical. But not in the traditional act of love 
(in which, notably, she has no access to language as temporal scansion). Even 
if she extends infinitely into space, and thereby risks losing time... this is be-
cause her sexuality does not have to obey the imperatives and risks of erection 
and detumescence. 158 
While Irigaray asks whether being distemporalised and displaced in this way 
can disqualify the woman from chiasmic relations, she also suggests that 
this may be a kind of “empirico-transcendetal chiasmus” in itself: a place 
in which woman must relate to herself and “no longer depend on man’s re-
turn... for her self love.” 159 Yet whether it is conceptualised as political, onto-
logical, biological, or otherwise, the woman’s position cannot be thought of 
as such: it is not, for instance, a chiasmus—and it is strictly not a pathology. 
That is, a woman does not, as Irigaray reminds us, experience her spatial 
cyclicality in the form that Jacques Lacan proposed: as a jouissance that is 
pathological. 160 Proposing to short-circuit woman’s predestined relegation to 
a non-place, Irigaray avows an “autotelic” or “autoerotic” love of the self that 
renounces the other as it also harvests an “innerness, self-intimacy” that is 
characteristic of the “feminine divine.” 161 
Crome Yellow appears to intuit this formation in its depiction of the wom-
en characters’s collective will to power. When Anne and Mary come together, 
for instance, their collectivisation determines who, if any, among the men 
would make an appropriate partner. While at Garsington, women such as 
Morrell, Maria (Huxley’s wife), and Mary Hutchinson—Huxley’s lover through 
the 1920s—discussed their sexual relationships with one another, and exhib-
ited their openness to various conjugations and pairings; in this way, they 
short-circuited the univocality of male homosocial relations. 162 As David Dun-
158 Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 64.
159 Ibid., 65.
160 Ibid., 64.
161 Ibid., 68. On love and the chiasmus, and on chiasms generally, see Patricia Lissner, 
“Chi-thinking: Chiasmus and Cognition,” PhD diss., University of Maryland, 2007, 
369-71.
162 For more specific details about Huxley’s relationship with Maria, see Nicholas Murray, 
Aldous Huxley, 146; Sexton, Selected Letters, 5, 6, and 120-21.
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away points out, Maria had in fact fallen “under the spell of Ottoline Morrell, 
Bloomsbury’s flambuoyant (and bisexual) hostess”—and she had once even 
“attempted suicide when she thought Ottoline had abandoned her.” 163 Accord-
ing to her sister Jeanne Neveux, Maria had been a lesbian and, for Huxley’s 
nephew, Francis, it often seemed as though Maria’s “taste for beautiful wom-
en” was what Huxley enjoyed most about her—for it was through this that he 
and Maria were able to become more intimate as between themselves. The 
situation “brought them together,” Francis remarked in an interview. 164 
Irigaray does not explicitly refer to lesbian or homosexual interactions 
when she describes the “configuration” in which a woman “remains in la-
tency, in abeyance” by fostering “love among women.” However, she does 
criticise the “nagging calculations” of orientation and sexual preference that 
“paralyze the fluidity of affect.” 165 Irigaray implores women to fabricate an 
alternative ecology of the divine through the reestablishment of greater love 
for one another: a “love of the same, within the same,” which is affirmed by 
a deep “form of innerness.” 166 When Irigaray turns to biblical stories, not-
ing how “[a] traditional reading of the gospels places very little stress on the 
good relations between Mary and Anne,” it becomes notable that these are 
precisely the names of Crome Yellow’s principle women characters—a pair 
whose good relations are made apparent other than by these aptronyms. 167 
For Irigaray, it comes as no surprise that a “love of the same” is already 
normativised or institutionalised as between father and son, man and man: 
masculinity, she writes, has always been the “traditional subject of dis-
course.” 168 But Irigaray’s analysis anticipates the extent to which intellectual 
163 David King Dunaway, Huxley in Hollywood (London: Bloomsbury, 1989), 72. 
164 Ibid., xvii-xviii.
165 Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, 103.
166 In Irigaray’s book, this is of course a reference to Anne, the mother of the Mary, moth-
er of Jesus (according to Christian and Islamic tradition); whether such a reference 
obtains in Huxley’s work is less clear, although it is certainly possible that this is the 
case.
167 Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, 68. Mary was also the name of Huxley’s Aunt 
Mary, for whom he felt great affection. See Bernard Bergonzi, “Aldous Huxley and Aunt 
Mary,” in Aldous Huxley: Between East and West, ed. C.C. Barfoot (New York: Editions 
Rodopi B.V. Amsterdam, 2001), 9-18.
168 Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, 106. A well-known and related conceptualisa-
tion of masculine discourse emerges with Jacques Derrida’s neologism “phallogocen-
trism.” A portmanteau of “phallocentrism” and “logocentrism,” this term denotes the 
privileged position of the masculine in writing. Derrida employed the locution in a 
number of his later works, and claimed in an interview of around 2002, that all the 
“deconstruction of phallogocentrism has been linked to the paternal figure.” Derrida 
had similarly attested in an earlier interview that, when speaking of “feminist polit-
icalization,” it “is important to recognize this strong phallogocentric underpinning 
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activity and “men’s business” constitutes an even more significant marker 
of difference between men and women in Huxley’s time—a notion that is 
well attested in Huxley’s writing. Huxley’s interlocution with the ideas of 
Blake, Matthew Arnold, John Donne, Shakespeare and Milton, for instance, 
function as a chiasmus of ideas, themes, events, and actants. And if they 
constitute the tissue of Huxley’s thought, then the fact that each of these 
works is authored by a man seems important. If those ideas that appear in 
what Meckier calls Huxley’s “poetry of ideas”—or in what are often called his 
“Novels of Ideas”—are anywhere circumscribed, it is by a periphery of gender 
specificity, of masculine sexual identity. 169 
Nevertheless, as Bedford suggests, while the origin of these men’s ideas 
are phallocentric, these ideas also become entangled in Huxley’s fiction; for 
there they are destabilised and become less the ideas of any one man than an 
assemblage of personages of doubtful origin. For, as Bedford writes, Huxley
had a habit of mixing up his starting points—one man’s philosophy, another’s 
sexual tastes, one trait from a member of his family, another from a charac-
ter in history—and as he did not like to stop and think that any other person 
might recognize fragments of himself in an otherwise outrageous [literary-fic-
tional] context, he took little trouble to cover up his traces. 170 
To trace Huxley’s mixed up “starting points” is to read his novels as romans à 
clef —or even as knowing self-portraits. When Huxley appears, for instance, 
in the form of Philip Quarles in Point Counter Point—as a novelist and, as 
Bernard Bergonzi notes, as Huxley’s “mouthpiece”—he advances his view 
that, when stuck with acedia, a novelist should “put a novelist into the novel” 
(PCP, 409). In this mise en abyme of starting points, a particularly congealed 
or doubled phallocentric masculinity emerges; this is the scene of mascu-
that conditions just about all of our cultural heritage.” See Derrida’s interview in Kir-
by Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman (dirs.), Derrida: A Film by Kirby Dick and Amy Zier-
ing Kofman (USA: Jane Doe Films/Zeitgeist Films, 2002), qtd. in Penelope Deutscher, 
“Derrida’s Impossible Genealogies,” Theory and Event 8, no. 11 (2005): 1. Also see Ma-
ria-Daniella Dick and Julian Wolfreys, The Derrida Wordbook (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2013), 118, 187. In The Speculum of the Other Woman, Irigaray herself 
adopts this term and coins a range of variations, including “phallosensicial,” “phallo-
tropic” “phallocratic ideology,” “phallogocratism,” and so forth: see 52, 65, 121, 229. 
Also see Ellen T. Armour, “Questions of Proximity: “Woman’s Place” in Derrida and 
Irigaray,” Hypatia 12, no. 1 (1997): 63-78. Benoît Peeters attests to Derrida’s profound 
interest in Irigaray’s work: see Peeters, Derrida: A Biography, tr. Andrew Brown (Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 2013), 270-1.
169 See, for example, Frederick J. Hoffman, “Aldous Huxley and the Novel of Ideas,” Col-
lege English 8, no. 3 (1946): 129-137.
170 Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 123 (my emphasis).
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line reproduction, a duplication of power in the male novelist’s language and 
process. 171 But in addition to questions of gender and writing, Huxley’s prop-
osition also prompts us to revisit the post-structuralist dilemma that I ad-
dressed at the beginning of chapter 2: If an author is now simply reducible to 
their gender, have we thus at least partially answered that question—“Who 
is the writer of the work?”—that we began with?
But of course, to know this for certain, we must know more about “the 
work” itself. In Point Counter Point, Quarles promotes a process of itineration 
and reduplication as a proagonist; and he compares the act of writing to the 
movement or composition of a musical score. “A novelist,” Quarles writes in 
his notebook, 
modulates by reduplicating situations and characters. He shows several peo-
ple falling in love, dying, or praying in different ways—dissimilars solving the 
same problem. Or, vice versa, similar people confronted with dissimilar prob-
lems. In this way you can modulate through all aspects of your theme, you can 
write variations in any number of different moods (PCP, 408). 172
In Quarles’s model of novel writing, precisely where the novelist begins and 
ends their work is arbitrary; of more importance is reduplication. A seeming-
ly random process of recombination, the habit of exchanging one character 
or event for another now functions less as a means of producing literary work 
than a heterodox or counter-normative manipulation of a functional system. 
It is a mode that militates against that injunction imposed on the scrivener 
by which they merely reproduce either: 
(i) an extant document (as a copyist) or;
(ii) in Aristotelian terms, an object in its own right, through a process 
of analogical reproduction: that is, through “mathematical ab-
straction” (DOP, 7). 
Through random duplication and recombination, Quarles qua Huxley resists 
simply reproducing the ready-made knowledge so intrinsic to the process 
of copying, scrivening, notarising, and other automatised modes of writing. 
But at the same time as Huxley’s writing resists these geometrical processes 
of mathematical abstraction (ALONG, 108)—thus prioritising the ambulant 
science of recombination—his fiction also fails to develop any singularised 
entity or identity. Rather, Huxley prefers to recombine, envariate, and recon-
171 Bergonzi, “Aldous Huxley and Aunt Mary,” 16.
172 Also see Woodcock, Dawn and the Darkest Hour, 127.
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figure the existing, and invariably masculine order of things. Interchange-
able and interwoven, characters in Huxley’s novels are remorphologised 
into—and fused with—those on whom they are based; thus, they are at once 
connected and disconnected from their “starting points.”
Huxley’s characteristic resistance to mimetic “reproduction” may be 
read, as Meckier argues, as a phenomenological by-product of his similar re-
jection of Enlightenment or Romanticist thought. Moving in a new direction 
from his forebears, Huxley embraces what he calls a “New Romanticism” 
in an essay of that name in Music At Night. 173 Huxley’s “awareness of being 
deceived” by his poetic and intellectual predecessors—and his ability to wry-
ly satirise his forebears through “adroit ridicule,” both in his poetry as his 
1920s novels—led him to adopt what Meckier calls a “contrapuntal frame 
of mind.” 174 There should be no doubt that this description is analogous to 
that which I have named Huxley’s chiastic mode of thought in this chapter; 
although, as Meckier stresses, Huxley’s “contrapuntalism” also reflects the 
wider tendency of Modernists, and even of proto-Modernists: to disavow 
their relations with men of previous generations: their fathers, grandfathers, 
or those who acted as their surrogates. 
Martin Green argues that this rejection of Victorianism presaged what 
would become the rise of the “men of feeling”: a group comprising those 
same men who would later become the peace-loving “Children of the Sun.” 175 
And it is probably also of some import that, while Huxley often disavows fem-
inism, 176 the emergence of women’s movements also inaugurated at this time 
a new orientation in many men towards an acceptance of different sexual 
orientations and identities, one that would influence as much as reflect the 
revaluation of masculinity of which Huxley was a part in the 1920s and ‘30s. 
173 See Aldous Huxley, “The New Romanticism,” in Baker and Sexton, eds. Aldous Huxley: 
Complete Essays III: 1930-1935 (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002), 250-4; Baker and Sexton 
describe this emergent belief system as “A celebration of Enlightenment modernity 
and an excessive faith in instrumental reason and applied science”: back dust jacket 
flap. Cf. Robert Baker, “Science and Modernity in Huxley,” in Barfoot, ed., Aldous Hux-
ley: Between East and West, 35-58, 38n8.
174 Meckier, Aldous Huxley: From Poet to Mystic, 2.
175 Martin Green, Children of the Sun, 86-113.
176 For instance, in his 1930 essay “Fatal Ladies,” Huxley writes that he “detest[s]” and 
“utterly reprobate[s]” what he, in 1930, called the “spiritual vampire.” Defining this 
creature as a “modern type” that had arisen out of both the “feminist movement” and 
the Romantic period of the nineteenth century,” Huxley chided the “vampire of the 
soul” and “spiritual adventuress” who is “only satisfied if she can persuade herself 
that she had a large soul and a large intellect—not to mention high ideals and a wide 
culture, and deep thoughts.” See Aldous Huxley, “Fatal Ladies,” in Baker and Sexton, 
Huxley: Complete Essays III, 226-9, esp. 227.
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And while Huxley might have even begun to adopt elements of those 
emergent feminist formulations about Victorianism’s male repressiveness— 
those that had been advanced at the turn of the century by a range of women 
in his company—Huxley would also reinscribe a liberal form of chauvinism 
in his writing, one that strikes us today as straightforward sexism. In “The 
Battle of the Sexes” (1929), for example, Huxley observes how “our ideas about 
sexual morality are very different from those current fifty years ago”; and he 
laments that “the modern young person,” through a “course of libertinage” 
only reproduces the “hatred and fear of sex” that affected the Victorians. 
Then, after deliberating on the changes in “consciousness” that have arisen 
as a result of “feminine patriotism,” Huxley tepidly identifies with aspects 
of proto-feministic thought, musing on the disappearance of the “fallen 
woman.” In a language whose tone is characteristically difficult to identify 
as either sincere or parodic, Huxley notes that
the modern young woman gets the best of both worlds... succeeds in being 
fashionable and rational about sex, without running any risk of being swept 
off her conscious feet by the physical-instinctive biological forces which a gen-
uine warm, wholehearted abandonment might dangerously let loose. 177
But even if Huxley cannot be described as a pro-feminist man of the early 
twentieth century, his views about these slow transformations in gender re-
lations allow him to distinguish his own period from his “fathers’ days,” the 
“time of our grandfathers” and “our great-great grandparents.” 178
If Huxley differs from his father Leonard—or from his grandfather TH—
though, then this difference partly inheres in his attitude toward women. 
For if this attitude remains unclear in his prose, his surprising “contempt for 
the traditional family” 179 can be more readily grasped—especially in light of 
the revelations and speculations proffered in Nicholas Murray’s biography 
concerning his many sexual affairs (following Sybille Bedford’s own original 
disclosures). These liaisons, Murray writes, were by and large facilitated by 
Maria, Huxley’s bisexual wife. 180 Engaging in affairs with Bedford herself, 
as well as with Nancy Cunard, Mary Hutchinson, and many other women, 
Huxley makes for an interesting examplar of twentieth-century polyamo-
177 Aldous Huxley, “The Battle of the Sexes,” 115.
178 Ibid., 110.
179 Don Lattin, Distilled Spirits: Getting High, Then Sober, with a Famous Writer, a Forgot-
ten Philosopher, and a Hopeless Drunk (London: University of California Press, 2012), 
37. Lattin identifies Huxley’s contemptuous view on traditional family from his essay 
“The Decline of the Family” (see Huxley: Complete Essays III, 116-20).
180 Murray, Aldous Huxley, 145-6, esp. 179n21; Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 132-8.
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ry. At least one of Huxley’s affairs—a daliance with “Romanian aristocrat” 
Henrietta Sava-Goiu—is confirmed to have been facilitated by Huxley’s wife, 
who herself writes to Huxley about Sava-Goiu in a 1926 letter, describing the 
way in which she had herself encouraged Huxley to pursue her. 181 
Huxley’s crude description of Sava-Goiu in a letter to Mary Hutchinson, 
however, indicates his disdain for “thoughtful” women, whom he describes 
in his “Battle of the Sexes” essay as “spiritual vampires.” 182 He describes Sa-
va-Goiu as “Tom’s [T.S. Eliot] Princess Volupine in youth—rather bitch, but 
with ideals; a philosophising cock-teaser.” 183 As Don Lattin notes, Huxley’s 
view that “the young ladies Maria brought into his chamber were sexually 
freer than they used to be, but not free enough” indicates his attitude to 
women, and his quizzical contempt for the apparent liberation of women’s 
sexuality after a long period of Victorian repression. 184 It is clear, however, 
that Huxley’s experiences with “casual intimacy” and the “physical-instinc-
tive life” were to lead him to resent the “modern young woman” who, in his 
clearly sexist view, sought not only to curb their “abandonment to passion” 
but also to “refute the old tradition that woman’s function is to bear children 
and be intuitive.” 185
Huxley’s biography and his early satirical novels disclose much about his 
relationship with his father and the father and the way he imagined fathers 
and sons to have distinctive relations to women. This thematic functions, 
like much of Huxley’s work, as roman à clef. 186 Among the characteristic fea-
tures of father-son relationships in Huxley’s novels we often see an intellec-
tual competition between two industrious and aspiring men with a common 
goal: a configuration that results in a kind of fraught triangulation. 187 Char-
181 Murray, Aldous Huxley, 179.
182 Huxley, “The Battle of the Sexes,” 114-5.
183 Huxley to Mary Hutchinson, 22 February 1926, quoted in Murray, Aldous Huxley, 179 
and 179n22.
184 Lattin, Distilled Spirits, 36.
185 Huxley, “The Battle of the Sexes,” 114-5.
186 See Melissa Boyde, “The Modernist roman à clef and Cultural Secrets, or, I Know that 
You Know that I Know that You Know,” Australian Literary Studies 24, nos. 3-4 (2009): 
155-66. It is significant that Philip K. Dick’s works are also largely based on real-life 
events rather than on “heroes”: see Uwe Anton and Werner Fuchs, eds., “So I don’t 
write about Heroes: An Interview with Philip K. Dick,” SF Eye 14 (1996): 37-46 (accessed 
at http://2010philipkdickfans.philipkdickfans.com/frank/anton.html). On Huxley’s 
attitude to the family also see Huxley, “The Decline of the Family,” Baker and Sexton, 
Huxley: Complete Essays, Volume III: 1930-35: 116-9.
187 One commentator observes that “love was routinely triangular” in the “Huxley house-
hold.” Adam Mars-Jones, “Review: Aldous Huxley, Nicholas Murray,” The Guard-
ian 2000, 8 April 2000, accessed 12 January 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/
books/2002/apr/07/biography.highereducation1.
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acterised by a strained yet liberal contestation, Huxley’s relationship with 
his father Leonard could even be understood as indicating a predisposition 
in the Huxleys’s phenotypic profile toward their maleness: that is, as a kind 
of “genetic inheritance” of masculinity (as Milton Birnbaum suggests), one 
that is constituted by what Ronell, exploring the father-son dyad, describes 
as a particular “repertoire of syndromic habits and idioms.” 188 
In the conceptualisations of masculinity threaded across Huxley’s works, 
and those of his father and TH, the residue of what might be described as 
an intellectual andreia (masculine courage) is often legible—and specifically 
as an association Huxley develops with the spoken and written word: that 
is, through performance, rhetoric, and writing. 189 Huxley’s early biography 
serves as a crucible of events whose traumatic valences will not only ramify 
in his literary writing, but also map the twentieth-century shift from a thor-
oughly masculinised intellectual tradition to a progressively more pluralis-
tic political paradigm of sexual difference. 190 
Of the range of significant events that punctuate Huxley’s adolescence, 
for instance, one of the most remarkable is Huxley’s discovery of his grand-
father’s brilliance. Similarly, the agon in which Huxley often challenges and 
excoriates his father Leonard, and the untimely death of Julia Huxley, Ald-
ous’s mother (when Huxley was only fourteen), illumine the influences that 
shaped the young Huxley. Moreover, the friendships between Huxley and 
his brothers Julian and Trevenen (and with his half-brother Andrew), as well 
as, finally, the suicide of Trevenen when Huxley was only nineteen years old 
are significant milestones in his psychobiography. As the following chapter 
will illustrate, each of these events left traces on Huxley’s psychological and 
188 See Birnbaum, Huxley’s Quest for Values, 14 (emphasis mine); Avital Ronell, Loser Sons: 
Politics and Authority (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012), 6.
189 On the origin and genealogy of this kind of combination of andreia and rhetoric, see 
Joseph Roisman, “Rhetoric, Manliness and Contest,” in Ian Worthington, ed., A Com-
panion to Greek Rhetoric (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 393-410, esp. 294. On andreia gen-
erally, see Ralph Mark Rosen and Ineke Sluiter, eds. Andreia: Studies in Manliness and 
Courage in Classical Antiquity (Leiden: Brill, 2003).
190 Ultimately, Huxley’s novel After Many A Summer Dies the Swan will appear in Tom 
Ford’s adaptation of Christopher Isherwood’s A Single Man (directed by Tom Ford), 
where the protagonist, George (Colin Firth) uses the novel’s themes to broach the sub-
ject of the denigration of homosexuals and homosexuality in history. See A Single Man, 
directed by Tom Ford, Sony Pictures Home Entertainment, 2010, DVD. In Isherwood’s 
novel, George will defend Huxley against being a “dope addict” and an anti-Semite, 
and “when someone else tries coyly to turn the clef in the roman,” suggesting a con-
nection between the plutocratic character of William Randolph Hearst, Jo Stoyte, and 
a certain “notorious lady,” George refutes these claims, calmly offering an extempo-
raneous speech on the subject of persecution: Christopher Isherwood, A Single Man 
(London: Vintage, 2010 [1964]), 52-4.
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political Weltanschauung; but it is also notable, of course, that Huxley’s body 
also suffered the trauma of blindness in his early years, leading to his a sig-
nificant loss of his eyesight. 191 
As I have argued in chapters 1 and 3, fatherhood and paternity serve as 
important correlates or synecdoches for otherness. Lévinas speaks of pater-
nity, for instance, as a “relationship” in which “the father discovers himself 
not only in the gestures of the son, but in substance and unicity.” 192 Just as 
one of Philip K. Dick’s most alarming and possibly critical ‘breaks’ arose 
when he perceived his father’s face in the sky (a recurrence or hallucination 
of a memory of his father from his childhood that I will address in chapter 
7 193), it is possible to identify in Huxley’s writing the traces of traumatic epi-
sodes with his father and grandfather. 
Moreover, much of the material I have discussed in this chapter, includ-
ing what I have lastly illustrated to have been Huxley’s attitude towards 
sexual identity—namely, his by turns liberal, pro-feminist attitude towards 
women and his at other times deeply regressive sexism—had also no doubt 
been the product of his relations with other men—not least his own father, 
his brothers, and grandfather. And it is toward the effect on Huxley of pre-
cisely these patrilineal relations, then, that the following chapters 5 will now 
turn its attention.
191 I attend to Huxley’s partial blindness in detail in the following chapter.
192 Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, 268; also see Ronell, 
Loser Sons, 104.
193 See my discussion of Dick’s apprehension of this face in chapter 7.
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Chapter Five
Reforging “The Law of the 
Father”: Huxley’s  
Expurgation and Extrospection
The Statu(t)e of TH Huxley;  
or, The Law of the “Grandpater”
it is customary for Aldous Huxley’s biographers to underscore the great in-
fluence that Huxley’s paternal grandfather, Thomas Henry Huxley, had on 
Huxley as a young man. A well-known biologist, TH was widely regarded as 
the foremost proselytiser and populariser of natural selection, and common-
ly described as “Darwin’s Bulldog.” 1 A lesser-analysed anecdote, however, 
involves the scene in which the Huxleys awaited the unveiling by the Prince 
of Wales of a monument erected in honour of TH. As a nervous-looking six-
year-old child, Huxley became ill during the ceremony, prompting his broth-
er Julian to offer him his Eton top-hat, a makeshift receptacle into which 
Aldous promptly vomited. 
At the same time as TH was cast in stone (see figure 5.1, below), a monu-
ment to John Tyndall was also erected, only a few feet away. To see these two 
men as a pair was, as Ronald Clark confirms, to bear witness to the ceremo-
nious preservation of a particularly masculine greatness: the twinned stat-
ues stood testament to their particularly masculine prestige and authority, a 
consecration “like that to Goethe and Schiller at Weimar.” 2 On a later occa-
1 See Adrian Desmond, Huxley: Evolution’s High Priest, vol. 2, (London: Michael Joseph, 
1999), passim; Keith Johnson, “Darwin’s Bulldog and Huxley’s Ape,” Twentieth Cen-
tury Literature 55, no. 4 (2009): 572-96, 585. As Murray notes, Juliette Huxley, in her 
interview with David Dunaway of 1985, emphasises “the ‘burden’ that was imposed 
on Huxleys to succeed at all costs” to be worthy of TH. As she exclaimed, “Worthy of 
Gran-Pater—right! You must be worthy of grand-pater.” See Nicholas Murray, Aldous 
Huxley: An English Intellectual (London: Little Brown, 2002), 18; Huntington Library 
Oral History Transcripts, Interview between Juliette Huxley and David King Dunaway, 
5 July 1985; David King Dunaway, Aldous Huxley Recollected: An Oral History (London: 
SAGE, 1999), 9-10.
2 On Aldous’s vomiting, see Murray, Aldous Huxley, 17; on the general ceremony of the 
monument, see Clark, The Huxleys, 121-24.
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sion, Huxley would remark that one of his early recollections was of “being 
taken to church in Godalming and disgracing [himself] by vomiting during 
the sermon—a precocious expression, no doubt, of anti-clericalism.” 3 Abject 
instances of vomiting and regurgitation, as well as abstinences from eating, 
thus become important underlying tropes in Huxley’s satires through the 
1920s. Just as Huxley wrote of vomiting humorously as a kind of ideological 
or anti-clerical expression, so does his fiction adumbrate vomiting as illus-
trations of “reactions” to political and spiritual ideologies. 4
This chapter interposes the “biological” and the “biographical” in rela-
tion to Huxley by focusing on instances of the kind just described: events in 
3 Murray, Aldous Huxley, 16.
4 Vomiting is treated in many of Huxley’s other works: see, for instance, After Many A 
Summer Dies The Swan (London: Chatto & Windus, 1959), 237; Island (London: Vintage, 
2005), 72; The Devils of Loudon (London: Vintage, 2005), 262, 294; and Grey Eminence 
(London: Vintage, 2005), 275.
Figure 5.1 The statute of Thomas Henry Huxley in the London Natural His-
tory Museum London. Photography by CherryX (published under Wikimedia 
commons Licence), http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NHM_London,_
Thomas-Henry-Huxley-Statue.jpg
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Huxley’s life, or incidents in his fiction, that prompt in him or his characters 
what may be described as a biological or embodied reaction. Huxley’s pre-
occupation with vomiting and the sense in which he might have felt that 
a certain pleasure or political cathexis could be accorded to the act, may 
have led to his unusual employment of the term “vomitorium” in Antic Hay. 
Seemingly using the term to denote a “place designed by the Ancient Ro-
mans in which they could purge themselves between feasts,” Huxley’s usage 
is what some dictionarians have described as the first erroneous usage of 
the term in history. 5 Citing Tobias Smollett’s Travels Through France and Italy 
as evidence, the OED notes, for instance, that the word originally denoted a 
place “entered by avenues, at the end of which were gates, called vomitoriae.” 6 
These were the gates out of which those who had attended a show in an am-
phitheatre would “spew forth” at its denouement. As William Nericcio notes, 
however, the OED, in offering both definitions, “allows herself to have it both 
ways,” since it defines the “vomitorium as theatre portal and erron, a Roman 
space of post-feat purging—a theatre and a toilet.” 7 Elsewhere in his travel 
book, Smollett describes the Romans’s
delicate custom of taking vomits at each other’s houses, when they were invit-
ed to dinner, or supper, that they might prepare their stomachs for gorman-
dizing; a beastly proof of their nastiness as well as gluttony. 8 
Smollett’s travel note suggests the rashness of dismissing Huxley’s usage of 
“vomitoroium” as altogether erroneous. Like many of the ludic and playful 
usages in Huxley’s novels, it may easily be read as a paronomasia or as what 
Derrida once described as “paleonymy”: the repurposing of what may be a 
term of derogation for a new, politically empowered function. 9 Often seek-
ing to produce biological images that had been otherwise repressed, Huxley 
refers to vomit in “vomitorium” precisely to denote and denude what has 
always already been an example of biological repression in language and in 
thought.
5 As the OED states, the erroneous conceives of the word to mean “a room in which An-
cient Romans are alleged to have vomited deliberately during feasts.” Oxford English 
Dictionary, s.v. “vomitorium” accessed December 10, 2013, http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/224638?redirectedFrom=vomitorium&.
6 Tobias Smollett, Travels Through France and Italy (New York: Tauris Parke, 2010 [1776]), 
312.
7 William Nerricio, Tex[t]-Mex: Seductive Hallucinations of the “Mexican” in America (Tex-
as: University of Texas Press, 2007), 154.
8 Smollett, Travels Through France and Italy, 255.
9 See Derrida, Positions, tr. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 
71.
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Understood as a colloquialism, “vomitorium” also reflects what Smollett 
called the “dirty creatures” within Rome’s filthy streets. This is particularly 
appropriate in the context of its utterance in Antic Hay, where the character 
to whom the word is attributed, Lypiatt, the artist-Goth, represents the hag-
gardness of an unclean public:
The door of his sacred boudoir was thrown rudely open, and there strode in, 
like a Goth into the elegant marble vomitorium of Petronius Arbiter, a hag-
gard and disheveled person whom Mr Mercaptan recognized, with a certain 
sense of discomfort, as Casimir Lypiatt (AH, 197). 
A word that aptly describes both Huxley and Lypiatt (and, in effect, Smollett 
as well), Grant Overton alludes to its usage as a metonym for the sickness 
that comes with the accumulation of travel knowledge:
he has been everywhere and seen everything... He will show them their prece-
dents and quote for them their texts—which they may ponder before passing 
out to the vomitorium. 10 
In Overton’s allusion, an overinvestment in writing, as in logophilia—or, in 
Lypiatt’s case, a compulsion to practice artmaking—is capable of producing 
in the subject an implacable physical reaction: exhaustion and sickness from 
overconsumption. 11 When Lypiatt visits Mercaptan in his offices (recalling 
the way in which Melville’s Bartleby attends his employer, the attorney’s, of-
fice), his response to Mercaptan’s published criticism of his work in Weekly 
World causes him to lose his temper, and to “shake” Mercaptan, threatening 
to strike him (AH, 198). 
Here Mercaptan’s outrage remorphologises that which has already been 
Lypiatt’s abrupt entrance: it constitutes an enraged “spewing forth” of anger, 
and an expulsion of feeling that is reified by Huxley’s proleptic reference to 
vomit in “vomitorium.” Further, the fact that Lypiatt has strode into a door 
that has been “thrown rudely open” suggests Huxley’s awareness of the orig-
inal meaning of “vomitorium.” It underscores, then, what is in Huxley’s im-
agistic program a condensation of the Goth-artist, vomit, and performance. 
Enacting a queasy performativity, Lypiatt induces in his audience (which is 
to say both the reader and Mercaptan) the negative transfiguration of the 
“visionary experience” that Huxley so valorised in Heaven and Hell. Now a 
10 Grant Overton, “The Twentieth Century Gothic of Aldous Huxley” in Cargoes for Cru-
soes (New York: Appleton, 1924) (84-97), excerpted in Donald Watt, ed. Aldous Huxley: 
The Critical Heritage (New York: Routledge, 1975), 98-113, 99. 
11 I will address logophilia (and logophobia) in detail in chapter 6.
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metonym for expurgation, Lypiatt brings into sharp relief the “horror of in-
finity” (HAH, 49-50) represented by the Goetheian or gothic sublime.
In After The Fireworks (1930), protagonist Miles Fanning reflects on the 
connection between Christian ritual and vomiting; he considers the extent 
to which, after drinking excessively, one may come to feel more pious in 
having purged. “Christians,” he thinks, paraphrasing Pascal, “ought to live 
like sick men; conversely, sick men can hardly escape being Christians” (ATF, 
444). Subtly elevated as a figure for “redemption through expurgation,” vom-
iting is also understood as capable of virtualisation; since in inducing oneself 
to vomit through biological manipulations (such as by drinking excessively), 
Christians might be guided to live in a better way: illness begins to prescribe 
how one “ought to live.” This chiastic description of the biological and theo-
logical leads Fanning to cynically ponder the manner in which vomiting and 
love are interwoven:
And he remembered sentiments-centimetres that French pun about love, so 
appallingly cynical, so humiliatingly true. “But only humiliating,” he assured 
himself, “because we choose to think it so, arbitrarily, only cynical because 
Beatrice in suso ed io in lei guardava; only appalling because we’re creatures 
who sometimes vomit bile and because, even without vomiting, we sometimes 
feel ourselves naturally Christians (ATF, 444). 12
Exemplifying one among many of Huxley’s chiastic clauses, Fanning’s re-
marks also suggest—in the paronomastic “sentiments-centimeters”—that 
“Christians” reside in a state of limbo between sickness and piety as a con-
dition of their biology. 13 The phrase functions, sonically at least, as a kind 
12 Huxley, After the Fireworks in Charles Rolo, ed. The World of Aldous Huxley: An Omni-
bus of his Fiction and Non-Fiction Over Three Decades (New York: Grosset’s Universal 
Library, 1971), 367-458, esp. 444. It is interesting to think of the chiasmic relation be-
tween “sentiments-centimetres” in itself, where two near-homonyms are parallelised 
in a meditative phrase. “Sentiments-centimetres” also resembles a phrase deployed 
by Bruno Latour in his analysis of actants in The Pasteurization of France. There La-
tour says of actants that associate with “others”: “Who speaks? Them [the others] or 
it [the actant]? Traditore-traduttore [Translator-traitor]. One equals several. It cannot 
be determined.” Like Huxley’s centimetres-sentiments, Latour’s “translator-traitor” 
syntagm functions as a chiasm between opposing forces that, to the cynic-scientist, 
amount to one and the same operation or agent. See Latour, The Pasteurization of 
France, tr. Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 
160.
13 Huxley will redeploy this pun twice in Brave New World: firstly, when the Assistant Pre-
destinator will cite a “piece of homely hypnopædic wisdom” by noting that “One cubic 
centimeter cures ten gloomy sentiments” (BNW, 46); and, secondly, when Lenina will 
remind Bernard not to lose his temper, reminding him of the sentiment-centimeter 
wisdom, reinforcing the efficacy of the drug Soma by uttering its slogan: “a gramme is 
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of micro-chiasmus. While “sentiments” becomes a metonym for what is an 
interiorised sense of illness—a “naturally” apprehended sense of theolog-
ical virtue—“centimetres” denotes the exteriorised and material world in 
response to which the physical-instinctive responses seem almost mechani-
cally to function. These are the measurable changes in biology that, such as 
in the case of vomiting, might take place when one meets the eyes of another 
(here “Beatrice”). 
The overall effect of this succession of images is to generate a mise en 
abyme of impulsivity. As with most biological impulses, to proceed through 
these images is to be affected by the nowness and suchness (“isness” or 
“Itsigkeit”) of the events they describe. These are allusions to eternal or 
“timeless moments”: constituted as metanoic instants, these are the kinds 
of durations expressed in such visionary phrases as Dante’s “suso ed io in lei 
guardava” (“she looked upward, and I at her”). 14 While these images are also 
reappropriated and universal, they represent Huxley’s attempt to reconfig-
ure them in such a way as to allow them to be experienced by his reader; as 
he remarks in Jesting Pilate, “proverbs are always platitudes until you have 
personally experienced the truth of them” (JP, 324). Prompts to excite the 
“physical-instinctive biological forces,” these images are, then, as Goethe’s 
translation of Dante’s phrase (appearing in Faust) suggests, also allusions to 
the sexual and libidinal triebs; they suggest, that is, how “the eternal-wom-
anly draws us upward.” 15 Akin to what Freud will observe as a “displacement 
from below”—or what Huxley would later describe as “upward self transcen-
dence” (DL, 375)—what is emphasised here is the incorrigible procession of 
biological phenomena and its influence on subjectivity. 16 
Eyeless in Gaza’s protagonist Anthony Beavis will be advised by his doc-
tor that the displacement of his physical drives and ailments, such as the 
always better than a damn” (BNW, 77).
14 Dante Aligheri, The Divine Comedy of Dante Aligheri, tr. Charles Norton (London: Wil-
liam Benton, 1952), Canto II (Paradise), line 22, 108. On “timeless moments”: as well 
as marking the “intersection” of “England and Nowhere” in T.S. Eliot’s Little Gidding, 
the phrase “Timeless Moment,” is, of course, also the title of Laura Huxley’s biography 
of Aldous: see T.S. Eliot, “Little Gidding,” in Four Quartets (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and Company, 1943), 32; Laura Archer Huxley, This Timeless Moment: A Personal View 
of Aldous Huxley (London: Chatto & Windus, 1969).
15 See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust, tr. Albert G. Latham (London: J.M. Dent 
and Sons, 1908), 342 (“Here the Ineffable/Wrought is with love./The Eternal-Woman-
ly/Draws us above.”), qtd. in Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a 
Philosophy of the Future, tr. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 126n21 and 126n22.
16 See Hull, Aldous Huxley: Representative Man, 63, 245, 528. 
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displacement of toxicity by vomiting, is not always enough to ameliorate ill-
ness. A breakthrough or a metanoia should also occur, the doctor suggests, 
that can trump the material world: “When you pray in the ordinary way,” the 
doctor remarks,
you’re merely rubbing yourself into yourself, if you see what I mean. Whereas 
what we’re all looking for is some way of getting beyond our own vomit!” (EG, 
553) 
Imagining a means of “getting beyond” his own bile, Beavis then reflects on 
how he himself might attempt to transcend those objects that so appeal to 
his biological senses; he wonders how he might move
beyond the books, beyond the perfumed and resilient flesh of women, beyond 
fear and sloth, beyond the painful but secretly flattering vision of the world as 
menagerie and asylum (EG, 553). 
In short, Beavis yearns to move beyond a “physical-instinctive” vision of the 
world—constituted as it is by the animality of sex and drives—and beyond a 
maniacally self-interested Weltanschauung—constituted by a kind of prayer 
that is only inward-looking. Resisting dualism, the doctor advises Beavis to 
“think like a Buddhist” (EG, 555-6)—as well as to eat like one: his diet should 
comprise only the dependable ingredients of “Vegetables and water,” for “we 
think as we eat” (EG, 555). In Eyeless in Gaza, as in elsewhere in Huxley’s 
fiction oeuvre, the body’s actions always represent the expurgation of what 
is false or inspires hate in society, including that which comes in the form of 
zealous religiosity. 
But if, as the doctor advises Beavis, the “greatest enemy of Christianity 
to-day” is “Frozen meat,” then it is all the more disturbing that such a threat 
is so widely available: for now “Even the poor can afford to poison themselves 
into complete scepticism and despair” (EG, 555). While once “only members 
of the upper classes were thoroughly sceptical, despairing, negative... be-
cause they were the only people who could afford to eat too much meat,” now 
the malaise of scepticism affects all classes in society (EG, 556). Amusingly 
expressed in the “clinical” vision of the authoritative doctor, Huxley’s biolog-
ical determinism now transforms into an elaborate genealogy of ideology 
and belief. Where religion and socio-economics have conditioned a people’s 
diet, so does it shape those people’s minds. To rupture this deterministic 
worldline is to vomit; and, in so materially renouncing the prosperity of 
Victorianism, the baneful oppression of religion, one also reconfigures the 
epistemological boundaries that underlie both constructions.
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 In Island, vomiting similarly signifies the overconsumption of idealistic 
zealotry. Employing religion as a means to deceive Dipa’s criminal inten-
tions, Mr Bahu is an ally of Colonel Dipa, the ruthless industrialist ruler of 
Rendang, Pala’s companion island. Described by Ranga in a list of “indict-
ments,” Mr Bahu is known for going
about giving lectures about the need for religious revival. He’s even published 
a book about it. Complete with preface by someone at the Harvard Divinity 
School. It’s all part of the campaign against Palanese independence. God is 
Dipa’s alibi. Why can’t criminals be frank about what they’re up to? All this 
disgusting idealistic hogwash—it makes one vomit (IsLAND, 72). 17
Signalling the overconsumption of a psychic or epistemological toxin 
(whether it be religious, political, or intellectual), vomiting carries the res-
idue of Huxley’s original reaction to the unveiling of TH’s statue. Much as 
Huxley and his brother Julian loved their grandfather, the former’s reaction 
to TH’s veneration serves as a prolepsis for the way in which vomiting would 
symbolise, throughout Huxley’s fiction, the torment and expurgation of his 
grandfather’s scepticism and society’s religiosity. 18 
TH Huxley and the Masculinities of Science
the influence of th on Huxley and his brothers, however, constituted more 
than simply a benign reverence commingled with a feeling of intimidation. 
It was a feeling that might occasion, especially in Huxley, a physical, and 
an almost certainly fearful response. TH’s scientific mind, for instance, had 
been passed on to all the Huxleys; but it was the young Aldous’s thoughts, as 
Overton remarks, that often seemed 
17 My emphasis.
18 On vomiting in Huxley also see, for instance, Peter Bowering, Aldous Huxley: A Study of 
the Major Novels (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013 [1968]), 124. Richard Crouse 
also discusses filmmaker Ken Russell’s attention to Huxley’s detailed treatment of 
vomit in Devils of Loudun, where, misquoting the novel, Russell notes how the narrator 
describes how the incompetent inquisitors, Ibert, Adam, and Barre, inspect the bile of 
Sister Jeanne. In his misremembered analysis, Crouse remarks on the narrative: “They 
analyzed her vomit.” Of this line, Russell, notes that “It’s in the book but people don’t 
believe it or can’t visualize it.” This precise line in fact does not appear in The Devils 
of Loudun, however, the novel does describe how the exorcists sought to examine the 
vomit of the nuns whom they thought were possessed by the devil (or a black bile). 
See Richard Crouse, Raising Hell: Ken Russell and the Unmaking of The Devils (Toronto: 
ECW Press, 2012), 50; Aldous Huxley, The Devils of Loudun (London: Vintage, 2010), 
166-8.
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lighted through stained glass, glass that singularly resembles the coloured 
microscopic slides with which Grandfather Huxley was intently preoccupied. 19 
When TH had engaged in discussion with Bishop Samuel Wilberforce in 
June 1860 at the Oxford University Museum, about seven months following 
the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of the Species, it became, as Keith 
Thompson notes, “a part of science’s mythology.” 20 Following his prosleyti-
sation of Darwinism, TH would come to represent in the history of scientific 
thought not simply “a man of science,” but a model for what it means to 
be politically predisposed to—as well as qualified for—the empiricist’s voca-
tion: a “gentleman of science.” 21 (Precisely as much had been confirmed in 
TH’s memorialisation and reification as a statue.) But TH was also politically 
motivated, and was capable of indicating his aversion to the “entrenched 
privileges of aristocracy” within what was, as Paul White notes,
19 Grant Overton, “The Twentieth Century Gothic of Aldous Huxley,” in Watt, The Critical 
Heritage, 99.
20 That there is considerable uncertainty about whether the so-called “Huxley-Wilber-
force debate” ever took place indicates that it probably did not. Jonathan Smith argues 
that “[t]here was no such thing as the Huxley-Wilberforce debate,” and instead that 
“historians have shown” that the debate “occurred more than twenty years after the 
event, in the 1880s and 90s.” The debate, he continues, is a “construction, almost ex-
clusively, of the Darwinians and their allies.” Notably, Smith asserts, it was construct-
ed particularly through “the work of Darwin’s son, Francis [... ] himself a botanist, and 
Huxley’s son, Leonard, in their respective Life and Letters volumes of their fathers... ” 
See Jonathan Smith, “The Huxley-Wilberforce ‘Debate’ on Evolution,” Branch, avail-
able at: http://www.branchcollective.org/?ps_articles=jonathan-smith-the-huxley-wil-
berforce-debate-on-evolution-30-june-1860. Also see Keith Stewart, “Huxley, Wilber-
force and the Oxford Museum,” American Scientist 88, no. 3 (May-June, 2000): 210-3; 
and William Irvine, Apes, Angels and Victorians: The Story of Darwin, Huxley and Evolu-
tion (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955), 5-8. Contemporaneous reports from 1960, howev-
er, record that a discussion involving Huxley and Wilberforce took place on that date. 
See, for instance, Letter from “Harpocrates,” The Morning Chronicle, 9 July 1860.
21 On scientific vocations in the first half of the nineteenth century, see Robert Kargon, 
Science in Victorian Manchester: Enterprise and Expertise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977); Morris Berman, Social Change and Scientific Organization: The 
Royal Institution, 1799-1844 (London: Heinemann Education, 1978); Susan Cannon, 
Science in Culture: The Early Victorian Period (New York: Science History Publications, 
1978); Jack Morrell and Arnold Thackray, Gentlemen of Science: Early Years of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); 
and Ian Inkster and Jack Morrell (eds.), Metropolis and Province: Science in British Cul-
ture, 1780-1850 (London: Hutchinson, 1983). On the mid- and late-Victorian period, 
see T.W. Heyck, The Transformation of Intellectual Life in Victorian England (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1982), James A. Secord, Controversy in Victorian Geology: The Cam-
brian-Silurian Dispute (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); and Paul White, 
Thomas Huxley: Making the “Man of Science” (London: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 7.
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a high-culture tradition whose bearers possessed inherent and lofty powers 
that raised them above other commercial and professional men. 22 
While the task of political advocacy had proved difficult for TH as a young 
man, his resourcefulness and ambition enabled him, when he married 
Henrietta, to model his “genius” in what White highlights as a startlingly 
literary manner. Calling upon the Romantic philosophy of a century earlier, 
TH would assert and develop what would become a particularly Huxleyan 
style of positivism or empiricism. 23 
Having methodically copied lines from Thomas Carlyle’s essay “Char-
acteristics” in his diary while working as a medical apprentice in 1842, TH 
would later adopt Carlyle’s belief that genius was a divine essence. Like 
nobility, he thought, genius was innate; and yet it was also—surprisingly 
enough—to be discovered more commonly in those of humble origins than 
in elites. 24 Associated with a range of attributes that had been “feminised” by 
the Victorians, TH felt that to be an ingenious man of science was to adopt a 
particular mode of masculinity—and even to be demasculinised. This meant 
that one should avoid the mercantilism of public life and develop a private, 
domestic setting for one’s work. 25 
Inheriting much from Coleridge and the Romantic poets, TH adum-
brated a post-Enlightenment, non-Cartesian, and post-mechanistic model 
of the mind. He felt, just as Coleridge had felt, that the potential for the 
human to know him- or herself depended on their ability to discern differ-
ences between modes of sensibility and sensuality. 26 But TH also departs 
22 As White notes, a number of TH’s contemporaries regarded him as a “narrow special-
ist, lacking the breadth required of the general critic or educational reformer.” See 
White, Thomas Huxley, 68.
23 TH was not able to perform the dissection work that he had sought to perform when 
he joined the navy and went on a survey voyage, for instance. See White, Thomas Hux-
ley, 67-8.
24 Ibid., 7. See Thomas Carlyle, “Characteristics,” The Edinburgh Review LIV (December, 
1831); T.H. Huxley Papers, Imperial College of Science, Technology, and Medicine Ar-
chives, London: 31.169, “Thoughts and Doings,” journal entry for April 1842, cited in 
White, Thomas Huxley, 7n4.
25 For more on the demasculinisation of science in the early eighteenth century, see Re-
becca Stott, “Masculinities in Nineteenth Century Science: Huxley, Darwin, Kingsley 
and The Evolution of the Scientist,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and 
Biomedical Science 35 (2004): 199-207; John Tosh, A Man’s Place: Masculinity and The 
Middle-Class Home in Victorian England (Yale: Yale University Press, 1999); Andrew 
Dowling, Manliness and the Male Novelist in Victorian Literature (London: Ashgate, 
2001).
26 See Alan Richardson, British Romanticism and The Science of the Mind (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2001), 40. As Levere notes of Coleridge, the poet’s view of the 
“consonance of mind with nature, of the role of imagination in science as in poetry... 
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from the Romantic tendency to accord human attributes to nature, such as 
when—even as he opens his lecture, “On Animal Individuality” (1852), with 
a passage from Coleridge’s “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” (1798)—TH 
disputes Coleridge’s imputation that the “delicate and peaceful inhabitants 
of the ocean” were capable of “evil.” 27 
However, many modern biologists, putatively challenging the view of 
“developmental individuality” that TH develops in this lecture, have argued 
that it is possible for animals to be individuals. Unlike what TH claims, ani-
mals can be individuated because, as I have already myself asserted in chap-
ter 1, animals’s bodies need not be seen as exclusively their own:
Animals cannot be considered individuals by anatomical or physiological cri-
teria because a diversity of symbionts are both present and functional in com-
pleting metabolic pathways and serving other physiological functions. 28
The “symbotic view of life”—as with Huxley’s chiastic view of life—which 
involves wandering between two worlds or states (between human and non-
human, heaven and hell, ape and essence), remains at least partly consonant 
with TH’s view of animal individuality. For TH, the “individual animal is 
the sum of the phenomena presented by a single life... it is all those animal 
forms which proceed from a single egg, taken together.” 29 While contempo-
rary biologists, then, and even Julian Huxley, argue that TH is “wrong” to fix 
the “fertilization of the egg” as the beginning of the life cycle, it is actually 
the forceful principle that “individuality” exists in “dynamic, not merely in 
static terms” that forms the gravamen of TH’s position. 30 
are the keys to his critical perception.” Trevor H. Levere, “Coleridge, Davy, Science 
and Poetry,” in John Christie and Sally Shuttleworth, eds., Nature Transfigured: Science 
and Literature, 1700-1900 (New York: Manchester University Press, 1989), 97. Also see 
Irving Massey, “Review: British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind,” Criticism 
44, no. 1 (2002): 78. 
27 See Thomas Henry Huxley, “Upon Animal Individuality,” Edinburgh New Philosophical 
Journal 53 (1852): 172-77. On this lecture see notably John Vernon Jenson, Thomas Hen-
ry Huxley: Communicating for Science (London: Associated University Presses, 1991), 
56-7; Eveleen Richards, “The Romantic Gestation of Nature,” in Romanticism and the 
Sciences, ed. Andrew Cunningham and Nicholas Jardine (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1990) 139-40.
28 Scott F. Gilbert, Jan Sapp and Alfred I. Tauber, “The Symbiotic Way of Life: We Have 
Never Been Individuals,” The Quarterly Review of Biology 87, no. 4 (2012): 325-41, esp. 
328.
29 T.H. Huxley, “Upon Animal Individuality,” Proceedings of the Royal Institution 1 (1851-
54): 184-9, esp. 187.
30 Quoted in Jenson, Thomas Henry Huxley, 57; see also Alan Boyden, Perspectives in Zool-
ogy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1973), 51.
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While TH had made his views relatively public in his lectures and ad-
dresses, he also had maintained a certain moral and incarnate drive to tran-
scend the economic “base reality” of an increasingly commercial society. TH 
expressed this in his exemplary style of domesticated living: he sought to 
domiciliate and familiarise the pursuit of the sciences as much as to orator-
ically “perform” and proselytise them. And while for TH the newly domes-
ticated “man of science” should be cleaved from the public domain of com-
merce, he would be unfazed that sexism remained normalised in science’s 
institutions, where biologists and anthropologists continued to identify the 
“location of inferiority in women’s bodies [and] minds.” 31 
As I have suggested in chapter 4, Henrietta Heathorn was an important 
figure in this history—and in contouring TH’s masculinity. Her poems and 
reminiscences—as well the symbolically “ordered” nature of the Huxleys’s 
Victorian home (“ruled by sympathy and affection”)—doubtlessly influenced 
and enabled TH’ s career to progress and fructify. 32 Through Heathorn, TH 
recognised that to be a man of science was to be capable of experiencing the 
world sensually. Preparation for the fine discriminations that the sciences 
increasingly required a practitioner to make were developed in the home, 
where sensual refinement was first nurtured and engendered; these domes-
tic sensibilites, TH felt, were the most useful—both at the theoretical and 
experimental levels—for those who wished to conduct scientific enquiry. 33
The “sensual,” literary, and romantic origins of TH’s scientism would 
transform as he grew older, and as he began ever more seriously to imagine 
himself as a man of letters. As White notes, literary sensibility had always 
been among TH’s first intellectual instincts—however much it had been 
unrecognised in his lifetime. 34 In his 1932 memorial lecture for his grand-
father, a piece titled “T. H. Huxley as a Literary Man,” Huxley contends that 
it is “as evident as a proposition of Euclid” that TH was “much more a lit-
erary than a scientific man.” 35 Yet, it was less for poesy’s than for veracity’s 
31 White, Thomas Huxley, 30n75; on the subordination of women through scientific dis-
course and practices throughout this period, see Evelleen Richards, “Darwin and the 
Descent of Woman,” in David Oldroyd and Ian Langham, eds., The Wider Domain of 
Evolutionary Thought (Boston: Hingham, 1983), 57-111 ; Cynthia Russett, Sexual Sci-
ence: The Victorian Construction of Womanhood (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989).
32 On TH’s domestic life, see White’s chapter “Improvement by Domestication” in White, 
Thomas Huxley, 19-22, 28-31. 
33 Ibid., 29-30. 
34 White, Thomas Huxley, 68.
35 Aldous Huxley, “T.H Huxley as a Literary Man,” in The Olive Tree (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1973), 46-62, esp. 47.
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sake that TH railed against certain abuses of language, since, as Huxley 
explained the attitude of his grandfather,
for all those rhetorical devices by means of which the sophist and the poli-
tician seek to make the worse appear the better cause Huxley felt an almost 
passionate disapproval. 36
For his biographers, TH represents the very making of the “profession of 
science”: as Desmond writes, “[w]ith him the ‘scientist was born.’” 37 But if 
TH emblematises the first scientist, then this scientist must also be a literary 
man for, as Huxley propounds, if science “were only investigation, it would 
be without fruit, and useless.” Since science is “also, and no less communi-
cation,” and because “all communication is literature,” science is truly, for 
Huxley, also “a branch of literature.” 38 
When he tangled with a contiguous distinction—that between religion 
and science—TH implored his listeners to abandon the former as though 
he were a political revolutionary. Petitioning for the liberation of history’s 
victimised “seekers after truth,” TH condemned the influence of religion on 
science, railing before an audience at the Royal Institution in 1860:
In this nineteenth century, as at the dawn of modern physical science, the cos-
mogony of the semi-barbarous Hebrew is the incubus of the philosopher and 
the opprobrium of the orthodox. Who shall number the patient and earnest 
seekers after truth, from the days of Galileo until now, whose lives have been 
embittered and their good name blasted by the mistaken zeal of Bibliolaters?
Praising TH’s engaging speech, Blinderman notes the repetition of the “b” 
sounds here—such as “in ‘incubus,’ ‘opprobrium,’ ‘embittered,’ ‘blasted,’ 
and ‘Bibliolaters,’” where the harshness of the diction emphasises TH’s vo-
ciferous rectitude. Later reaching a “crescendo in the disdainful ‘old bot-
tles’s of Judaism,’” Blinderman also underscores TH’s apparently earnest de-
sire for intellectual transformation, as well as what may also be considered 
36 Ibid.
37 See also Adrian Desmond, From the Devil’s Disciple to Evolution’s Priest (London: Pen-
guin, 1998), xviii; qtd. in Rebecca Stott, “Masculinities in Nineteenth Century Science: 
Huxley, Darwin, Kingsley and the Evolution of the Scientist,” Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Science 35 (2004): 199-207, esp. 203-4. Notably, 
TH was also a social organiser. In the the 1860s, he formed the “X Club”: a group of 
nine prominent thinkers who met on the first Thursday of every month, enabling “the 
elite of Victorian science to exchange personal pleasantries.” See Clark, The Huxleys, 
65. Notably, the X Club also affords another example of the Huxleyan chiasmus. 
38 Huxley, “T.H Huxley as a Literary Man,” 54-5. 
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an example of antisemitism. 39 While TH often seeks to evangelise science 
through the political reiteration and reinscription of classificatory rules—or 
else by overbearing his audiences and opponents through the cool applica-
tion of rationalistic argumentation, he also remains rhetorically dexterous, 
presenting historical and philosophical knowledge in the refined language 
of a master orator. As Blinderman confirms, TH’s deployment of “rhetorical 
questions, rhythm, parallelism, and antithesis,” enabled him to persuade 
his audiences; his voice contributed a great deal to the “potency” of scientific 
argumentation. 40
Stemming largely from his intellect, TH’s success as a champion of 
science also derives from his combative interdiction of many of the “rules 
of gentlemanliness and conduct” that abided in the scientific circles of the 
mid-nineteenth century. 41 If discriminatory rules excluded women and the 
poor from the sciences, these rules were also “central to the formation of the 
idea of the man of science in these decades.” 42 In his controversial disputes 
with Richard Owen throughout the 1850s and ‘60s on the subject of what 
distinguishes the “Man of Logic” from the “Man of Insight,” TH offers ample 
evidence of his tendency to interdiction. 43 Almost anticipating Huxley’s sat-
ires of the 1920s, TH makes clear that he eschews the tradition of patronage, 
and the graceful gestures of deference, that Owen’s method of “scientific 
gentlemanliness” epitomised. 
Whether by design or just effect, TH’s advocacy would allow for a tran-
sition to occur in the closing decades of the nineteenth century; his unique 
exhibition of a tough and upright masculinity allowed for a more “democrat-
ic” scientific class. No longer an elite explorer entitled to his genius by noble 
birth, the scientist of the future will be less constituted by their status than 
their sheer ability to explain themselves. Ever aware, like Huxley, of the effect 
of politics on science, TH “tried to shape the meaning of Darwin’s memo-
rial in the cathedral of London’s Natural History Museum as a monument 
to scientific character;” it should not be, he felt, a political monument that 
celebrated the “triumph of Darwinian doctrines.” 44 For Huxley, Darwin rep-
39 Charles Blinderman, “Semantic Aspects of T.H. Huxley’s Literary Style,” The Journal of 
Communication 12, no. 3 (1962): 171-8. 
40 Ibid., 176-7.
41 White, Thomas Huxley, 94.
42 Rebecca Stott, “Masculinities in Nineteenth Century Science: Huxley, Darwin, King-
sley and the evolution of the Scientist,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological 
and Biomedical Science 35 (2004): 199-207, esp. 205.
43 White, Thomas Huxley, 94, 57.
44 Ibid., 58, my emphasis.
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resented a figure much opposed to Owen’s ideas: Darwin possessed, he felt, 
“a certain intense and almost passionate honesty by which all his thoughts 
and actions were irradiated.” 45 Irrespective of what offence may be caused, 
to express “passionate honesty,” TH felt, was to grasp the indicium of science 
itself. 
Advocating for the preeminence of laboratory study over field studies, 
TH sought to supplant the “traditional allegiances to texts, personalities 
and social superiors” that affected science’s neutrality; he wanted to im-
bue its praxes with an unmediated and impartial relationship to nature. 46 
Combatively steering social convention in the direction of a particular kind 
of humanist objectivism, TH rebuked the socio-political divisiveness that 
had been engendered by the conduct of such men as Owen as he sought to 
install a different relation between men. Combined with his preference for 
the domestic and laboratorial spheres, TH’s domestication of science antic-
ipates what Eve Kosovsky Sedgwick identifies as the “homosocial” relations 
between men; over time, the process democratised science among men as it 
also began to invite the “active contributions of women.” 47
What is most crucial in Huxley’s epistemological vision of science, how-
ever, is his belief that those who classified and organised knowledge should 
be open to experiment and serendipity. While TH’s addresses exhibit a range 
of embellished literary utterances, his rhetoric does not merely operate to 
improve the reception of his work. Nor does it seek only to valorise the work 
of the scientists to whom it refers, as if his own scientific work was some-
how without its own merits. After all, TH was a competent, albeit largely 
45 Thomas Henry Huxley, “Charles Darwin,” Nature 25 (27 April, 1882): 597.
46 Stott, “Masculinities in Nineteenth Century Science,” 205.
47 White, Thomas Huxley, 8n9. The term “homosocial” was coined and defined by Jean 
Lipman-Blumen in 1976 in the context of her examination of segregation of women in 
social institutions (of which scientific academies are certainly one). As Lipman-Blu-
men defined it, homosociality is “the seeking, enjoyment, and/or preference for the 
company of the same sex. It is distinguished from ‘homosexual’ in that it does not 
necessarily involve (although it may under certain circumstances) an explicitly erotic 
sexual interaction between members of the same sex.” See Jean Lipman-Blumen, “To-
ward a Homosocial Theory of Sex-Roles: An Explanation of Sex Segregation of Social 
Institutions,” Signs 1, no. 3 (1976): 15-31, esp. 16. In developing the term, and extending 
its use to gender, literary, and cultural studies, Eve Kosovsky Sedgwick employs the 
expression “male homosocial desire” to describe a passage of English culture through 
the “mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century” constituted by the “emerging pattern 
of male friendship, mentorship, entitlement, rivalry, and hetero- and homosexuality 
[that] was in an intimate and shifting relation to class.” See Eve Kosovsky Sedgwick, 
“Between Men,” in Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, eds., Literary Theory: An Anthology 
(Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1998), 697-712. 
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undervalued scientist whose work may well have spoken for itself. 48 But TH’s 
motivation for remaining, at least in his own view, a scientist and a “man 
of letters” arose out of the zeal with which he had been persuaded of his 
own classificatory schemas—as well as those of Darwin, his close friend 
and colleague. Such was the openness of Huxley’s experimental imagina-
tion that he often seemed to be open to amplifying and applying almost any 
idea. There should be no fixed means of interrogating questions of natural 
classification, TH would often argue. Rather, as Blinderman comments, TH 
subscribed to a view well expressed in Ernst Cassirer’s proposition of radical 
openness: “There is no rigid and pre-established scheme according to which 
our divisions and subdivisions might for all be made.” 49 
In his criticism of the same “mathematical abstractions” that Huxley 
would himself disparage in The Doors of Perception, TH exhibits an aware-
ness that it is almost a kind of madness or divine theia of its own: a belief that 
the scientist courts nature rather than solves it. In 1884, in a response letter 
to his friend, philosopher Lady Welby, TH wrote that “Most of us are idola-
tors” since we “ascribe divine powers to the abstractions ‘Force,’ ‘Gravity,’ 
and ‘Vitality,’ which our brains have created.” 50 Conscious of the importance 
of labeling and naming, TH confessed to Welby that 
as you get deeper into scientific questions you will find that “Name ist Schall 
und Rauch” even more emphatically than Faust says it is in Theology. 51 
Just as this forecasts Huxley’s own disavowal of institutionalised religion, 
TH’s ludic allusion to theology also anticipates Huxley’s invention of a mys-
tical science in his The Perennial Philosophy. And if Huxley’s philosophy is— 
much like TH’s science—shot through with poetic “smoke and sound,” it 
also shares in TH’s affinity for naturalism, privileging the biological above 
all else. Putting into practice his theory that naming was instinctual and 
sometimes arbitrary, TH would take it upon himself to revise Linnaeus’s 
classification system; man, for Huxley, was now a primate among three 
48 Blinderman, “T.H. Huxley’s Literary Style,” 172. Also see Edward Clodd, Thomas Hen-
ry Huxley, 1940-1930 (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1902), 65-6. Clodd ad-
umbrates the many ways in which Huxley’s work has been neglected, and, quoting 
Chalmers Mitchell, he notes that his work has been “incorporated into the very body 
of science.” See Peter Chalmers Mitchell, Thomas Henry Huxley: A Sketch of His Life and 
Work (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1900), 34-5.
49 Blinderman, “T.H. Huxley’s Literary Style,” 172.
50 Ibid., 173.
51 Thomas Henry Huxley, “Letter to Lady Welby,” in Leonard Huxley, The Life and Letters 
of Thomas Huxley, 3 vols. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1900), 2: 67-8. Also see Blinder-
man, “T.H. Huxley’s Literary Style,” 173.
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groups of mammals. Disavowing Plato “by delving to extensional levels,” 52 
His classificatory system exhibited how, as Blinderman thoughtfully notes, 
TH “functioned as semanticist as well as scientist.” He was, from our mod-
ern perspective, clearly cognisant of the semiotic network that underlaid all 
scientific “communication.” 53 
Reclassifying these classical schemata, TH also practises what Elizabeth 
Grosz identifies as one of “the most complex and underdiscussed elements 
of Darwinism.” If this work is partly semiological, she suggests, it also marks 
“the point where Darwin’s own account uncannily anticipates Derridean dif-
férance.” 54 As soon as TH turns his mind to Linnaeus’s system, he begins 
discovering “meaning only in differences, in interstices,” and, far in advance 
of Derrida’s différance and sociologist Bruno Latour’s actor-network theo-
ry, similarities between “living bodies” and “whirlpools.” Like actors in a 
network, the bodies maintain their “individuality... in the constant mainte-
nance of a characteristic form, not in the preservation of material identity.” 55 
And, much like critics have developed a proto-semiological portrait of 
Darwin—such as one adumbrated by Jonathan Greenberg in his literary 
study of the evolutionist—TH abandons the search for originary essences 
as he comes to describe “epiphenomenalism,” and as such anticipates epi-
genetics. 56 Diverging both from Plato’s originary forms and Descartes’s du-
alistic (non-biological) model of the mind, TH proposes the mind’s epiphe-
nomenal nature. Just as the bell of a clock plays no role in keeping time, he 
argues, so the mind exercises no will, no real volition. If we do experience a 
will, TH argues, then it represents no more than a signification of something 
already having begun—a becoming-conscious of an embodied action that 
has already, elsewhere, emerged. 57 
52 See Thomas Henry Huxley, Evidence As To Man’s Place in Nature (New York: D. Appleton 
and Company, 1863), 22; Christopher Ernest Cosans, Owen’s Ape and Darwin’s Bulldog: 
Beyond Darwinism and Creationism (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2009), 111-16; 
Edward Clodd, Thomas Henry Huxley (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1902), 113.
53 Blinderman, “T.H. Huxley’s Literary Style,” 172; Aldous Huxley, “T.H. Huxley as a Liter-
ary Man,” 55.
54 Grosz, The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2004), 21. I note that Grosz misnames T.H. Huxley “T.E. Huxley,” 98.
55 Thomas Huxley, “Letter to Lady Welby,” in Huxley, Life and Letters of Thomas Huxley, 2: 
68.
56 Greenberg, “Darwin and Literary Studies,” Twentieth-Century Literature 54, no. 4 
(2009): 429.
57 There is no evidence to suggest that Huxley, however, coined the term “epiphenome-
nalism.” As John Greenwood writes, 
Epiphenomenalism is historically associated with Thomas Huxley, who promoted 
a version of the doctrine in his August 24 address to the 1874 meeting of the British 
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If Grosz is right in asserting that “Darwin seems to produce a quite pe-
culiar, and thoroughly postmodern, account of origin,” 58 then TH shares 
with Darwin this new scientific sensibility, a new vision in which work is 
begun to reform normalised conceptions of public and private—and even to 
apprehend the pluralisation of gender roles. A symptom of the larger episte-
mological shift promulgated by both these naturalists, Darwin’s work takes 
the form of a new taxonomical systematisation of nature that identifies not 
only “natural” observations in discrete identities, but relations between ob-
jects within a system. And while TH focuses on the ovum or fertilization 
of a being in describing its genus, his and Darwin’s studies also both take 
account, as Greenberg notes, “of flux rather than stability.” They both seek, 
in other words, to define a being not on “positive terms” but in terms of its 
“meaningful differences within a system.” 59 
If Huxley and Darwin anticipate post-structural understandings of lan-
guage, then, they may also be seen as important precursors to what is now 
described as “speculative materialism,” for often they offer early ripostes to 
correlationism. 60 In this way, TH should be understood as an organiser of 
Association for the Advancement of Science [BAAS] in Belfast, entitled “On the Hy-
potheses That Animals Are Automata, and Its History. [But the] term “epiphenome-
nal” comes from medicine, where it was originally employed to describe symptoms 
of a disease that have no causal influence on the development of the disease, with-
out supposing that these symptoms have no physical (or medical) effects.” 
 Greenwood, “Whistles, Bells and Cogs in Machines: Thomas Huxley and Epiphenome-
nalism,” Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences 46, no. 3 (2010): 276-99, 277-8. 
Also see W. Whately Carington, Matter, Mind, and Meaning (London: Metheun and Co, 
1949). Carington notes that he believes is “T.H. Huxley” this “blessed word,” 231n2. 
Cf. William Robinson, who notes that it is unusual that no trace of this word is found 
in Huxley’s writings. Robinson proposes that this omission was probably because 
Huxley preferred the term “automata,” and may have uttered “epiphenomenal” or a 
variant in his lectures: Robinson, “Epiphenomenalism,” The Stanford Encyclopaedia 
of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/ sum2012/entries/epiphenomenalism/, accessed 20 July, 2011. Also see Hux-
ley’s original essay, published prior to the 1874 meeting of BAAS: “On the Hypothesis 
that Animals are Automata, and its History,” Nature (September, 1871): 362-6; and Neil 
Campbell, “What was Huxley’s Epiphenomenalism?” Biology and Philosophy 16 (2001): 
357-75, esp. 357-8.
58 Grosz, The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely, 21 and 22; cf. Greenberg, 
“Darwin and Literary Studies,” 429.
59 As Greenberg argues, “Darwin can be conceived of as a proto-postmodernist.” Green-
berg, “Darwin and Literary Studies,” 429-30.
60 See Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How To Follow Scientists and Engineers Through 
Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 84-86. For an excellent collection 
of essays by the so-called “continental materialists” or “speculative realists,” see Levi 
Bryant, et al. eds., The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism (Mel-
bourne: re-press, 2011). While thinkers such as Quentin Meillassoux critique correla-
tionism as “the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation 
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knowledge, for he recognised more than anything else that the work of any 
scholar of nature could only ever amount to a work of organisation. This work 
could then be disseminated in communications between humans, where its 
systems of information transfer would secure its veracity, and usefulness, 
as an organising model. Huxley had known this about his grandfather, and 
had himself emphasised the extent to which even “mathematicians are men 
of letters—men of algebraic letters, no doubt.” And while some of these let-
ters are more “aesthetically good or bad” than others, they can also, Huxley 
wrote, be “litterae humaniores or inhuman letters.” 61 
But no matter how well organised, the dialectical frisson between signifi-
er and signified, science and nature, human and nonhuman, it may never be 
fixed, frozen, or stabilised. It remains enlivened by the reader who encounter 
this frisson in action: in the words themselves and their correlates in reality. 
But what is important, Huxley notes—prefiguring Marshall McLuhan’s anal-
ysis of the media—is that “some kinds of literature are more widely accessi-
ble than others.” 62 To argue that the communication of such popular or “uni-
versal” experiences as “love” may be more “accessible” than “observations 
on, say, deep-sea fish”, TH argues, would be to presuppose that an audience 
cannot be “moved by their subject.” But then again, it matters less what the 
subject of discussion is, TH argued, than whether the speaker’s own relation 
to and treatment of the subject is constructive and edifying:
It has been laid down as a sound rule for rhetorician and poet, that those who 
desire to stir the minds of others should be themselves moved by their sub-
ject; and the maxim has no less force for the man of science who desires to 
bring before an audience, unskilled in any special department, the leading 
facts and results of investigations into that department. 63
between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the oth-
er,” it is arguable—in terms of the sensuousness that I have identified that contours 
TH’s intuition and belief in scientific conduct and masculinity—that TH’s philosophy 
actually begins to depart from correlationism in placing a post-Kantian emphasis on 
the Romantic sensuality of language and of thought. See Quentin Meillassoux, After 
Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency (London: Continuum, 2008), 5.
61 Huxley, “T.H. Huxley as a Man of Letters,” 56.
62 Ibid., 57. On McLuhan’s landmark work in media studies and his description of the 
“communication sciences” after Descartes, see McLuhan, Understanding Media: The 
Extensions of Man (Ca. Massachusetts: MIT University Press, 1994 [1964]), 161.
63 Quoted in Blinderman, “T.H. Huxley’s Literary Style,” 174. Blinderman notes that this 
quotation is derived “From The Huxley Papers, Vol. 221 (of my catalogue), a collection 
of mostly unpublished letters, lecture notes, essays, in the Haldane Library of The Im-
perial College of Science and Technology, University of London. Quotations from this 
collection are made with the permission of the Governors,” 174n1.
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Communication and knowledge are thus enmeshed in a semiological chi-
asm, a coiled, codependent relation in which one cannot advance without 
the other. And it is in and as this configuration, in fact, that science would 
be introduced to Huxley at the earliest stages of his life. 64 
During Huxley’s enculturation, TH’s epiphenomenalism functions as 
a kind of chiasm in its own right: it is a “form of neutral parallelism that 
holds that there is,” as Greenwood observes, “a neurophysiological state or 
process corresponding to every mental state or process (or every conscious 
mental state or process).” 65 From out of these presages of post-structural-
ism then arise Huxley’s own scientific instincts. These instincts gestate in 
him what is an indisputably more Bergsonian than Einsteinian philosophy 
of nature. And evidence of this appears not only in Huxley’s model of the 
mind as a reducing valve, but in his heterodox—and no less Bergsonian (or 
Heisenbergian)—understanding of Einsteinian relativity. 66 It is also from out 
of this philosophical crucible that Huxley’s metaphysical view of time will 
flow, leading him to claim—in a paraphrastic allusion to Eliot’s Little Gid-
dings—that “Men achieve their Final End in a timeless moment of conscious 
experience.” 67
As I have suggested in the previous chapter, when Huxley begins to 
experiment with mescaline, his “rhetorical symptoms” express what is an 
ageometrical ontology. While this pattern of thought had always already 
been incipient in Huxley’s linguistic utterances—and especially in his early 
poetry—it is while on mescaline that Huxley finally “maps out” this ontology 
proper. It now becomes, as Doyle notes, “the gem, the fold, and above all the 
flower,” all of which “help” to “make sensory the articulation of [an] ecodelic 
experience.” 68 But it is not simply this chiasmatic arrangement of knowledge 
that is of interest to a consideration of Huxley’s “thought processes.” This 
64 Although I should note that TH Huxley only survived Aldous’s birth by “a short year”; 
he died before Aldous was one year old. The influence was thus through the expecta-
tions of Leonard and Julia, rather than from TH directly: see Sybille Bedford, Aldous 
Huxley, 1: 2.
65 Greenwood, “Whistles, Bells and Cogs in Machines: Thomas Huxley and Epipheno-
manalism,” 278.
66 On Bergson’s differences with Einstein, see Jimena Canales, “Einstein, Bergson, and 
the Experiment that Failed: Intellectual Cooperation at the League of Nations,” Mod-
ern Language Notes 120 (2005): 1168-91; Milič Čapek, “What is Living and What is Dead 
in the Bergsonian Critique of Relativity,” in The New Aspects of Time, ed. Robert S. Co-
hen (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991). 
67 Quoted in Douglas Wood, Men Against Time: Nicolas Berdyaev, T. S. Eliot, Aldous Hux-
ley, & C. G. Jung (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1982), 115.
68 Richard Doyle, Darwin’s Pharmacy: Sex, Plants and the Evolution of the Noösphere (Lon-
don: University of Washington Press, 2011), 58, emphasis mine.
Reforging the Law 245
structure, as I have argued in chapter 4, appears time and again in Hux-
ley’s biographical chronology as a chiasmus. Quadrants and triangulations, 
rather than dyads, will obtain variously between father and mother figures, 
Freudianism and anti-Freudianism—and later, Eastern and Western reli-
gion, all of them made all the more quadrangular because Huxley’s works 
of fiction and non-fiction are themselves interwoven in a chiastic manner. 
But critics have been loath to equate Huxley’s life with his writing, let alone 
to suggest its importance in the development of his intellect or ontology. In 
1963, Harold Watts wrote that 
the survey one can make of Huxley’s life does not suggest that it will ever be 
very profitable to use the events and patterns of the writer’s life as keys that 
unlock the man’s great mass of writing... [the] most one can predict is that 
some of the keys would be quite useful; others not at all. 69 
Watts’s theory is worth testing, though—if only to identify those keys that 
might be “useful” among the many that are “not at all.” But what can “use-
ful” mean here? And how is any kind of “unlocking” to be achieved? 
While Barthes’s postulations about the death of the author, which I have 
addressed in chapter 2, may seem to vitiate any critical method in which 
conclusions are to be drawn from studying an author’s life, Nicholas Rombes 
suggests that it may now be time to declare the author’s rebirth (“the rebirth 
of the author”). If to “unlock” an author has been difficult to achieve in previ-
ous decades, that is, it may have since become less problematic. As much as 
we are all authors now, writes Rombes, we are also each of us
[s]tripped of aura, of mystery, of distance... Surveilled, recorded, and marked, 
we are becoming the function of our components—our decoded genes, the 
number of hits (hourly, daily, monthly) on our websites, our on-line purchas-
ing histories. It is perhaps ironic that it is in the very forms of authorship that 
post-humanist critics strove to erase that we find our best chance of theoriz-
ing—and resisting our own disappearance. 70
Inviting all manner of digital-historical scholarship, our post-internet mo-
ment means that carefully attending to Huxley’s life might have become 
not simply an operation to which we are better accustomed as increasingly 
expert surveillance operatives. Nor does it mean simply that we perform our 
scholarly tasks with less reason to heed Barthes’s attempt to erase the author 
69 Harold H. Watts, Aldous Huxley (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1969), 17.
70 Nicholas Rombes, “The Rebirth of the Author,” 1000 Days of Theory (June, 2005, edited 
by Arthur and Marilouise Kroker), at http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=480.
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as “passé” (although we do that as well). 71 This moment also reenlivens the 
intimately personal model of literary biography, which involves what is per-
haps a strange brew of speculative and forensic examination, one that seeks 
to do more than is possible with an author’s letters alone. 
Attempting to understand or unlock a body of work now requires us to 
describe what Jean Baudrillard names its “poetic singularity”; we must seek, 
that is, not simply to develop historical readings, but also metaphysical, 
mathematical, and diagrammatic accounts of its emergence.  72 And while 
New Historicists as much as Rezeptionstheorists may, as Bernard Knox ob-
serves, insist on situating works of literature in their own historical time and 
place, the timeless particularities of Huxley’s works—not simply becuase he 
is a canonic literary figure but also a “public intellectual”—seem to invite 
us, as Raymond E. Legg Jr. suggests, to examine his life in an even more 
comprehensive manner than this. 73 Our examination, in other words, needs 
to be more than historical—and even metahistorical.
Extrospective Aldous:  
An Epiphenomenal Man
in many ways, huxley’s life and career bear the character of having been pre-
determined. When historicised, or examined through a prism of historical 
events and circumstances, Huxley may appear as much an unwilling prod-
uct of his circumstances as an opportunist who turned his gifts and privileg-
es to his best advantage. As with the lives of Shakespeare’s Hamlet or King 
Macbeth, Huxley’s life “often seems,” as Legg notes, “driven by the forces of 
family, ambition, temperament, and the supernatural, all of which were be-
yond his control.” 74 All this indicates Huxley’s singular and exemplary status 
as a model for psychobiography, and even as a model for the “epiphenome-
nalism” that TH implicitly propounded—even if not by that name. 
In view of his biological and biographical traumas, it seems that few 
authors could have felt as biologically predetermined as Huxley. And yet, 
71 See Craig Saper, “Artificial Auteurism and the Political Economy of the Allen Smithee 
Case,” in Directed by Allen Smithee, Jeremy Braddock and Stephen Hock, eds. (Minneap-
olis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 33.
72 See Jean Baudrillard, The Perfect Crime, tr. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 1996), 103.
73 See Bernard Knox, “Author, Author,” Philosophy and Literature 20, no. 1 (1996): 76-88, 
81; Raymond E. Legg Jr., “The Son of His Fathers” (Chapter 1) in “The Intellectual 
Tourist: A Study of Aldous Huxley’s Spirituality,” DA diss., Middle Tennessee State 
University, 1996, 1-4.
74 Legg, “The Intellectual Tourist,” 1.
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as Holmes among many others suggest, it remains difficult to apprehend 
Huxley’s nature. 75 Despite a wealth of letters, including many in which rev-
elations of previously unknown facts have emerged—such as in the range 
of previously private letters published in Sexton’s Selected Letters in 2007— 
Huxley wrote a paucity of personal journal entries, and even fewer personal 
poems. 76 
As I have already suggested, TH’s influence on Huxley is legible in what 
Huxley wrote encomiastically about his grandfather. Huxley defends TH, 
for instance, against G.K. Chesterton’s claim that TH was “more a literary 
than a scientific man,” asserting the “strange paradox” by which “the older 
scientists survive mainly as great artists.” 77 But if Huxley also accepts that 
TH might be regarded as a “literary man” in a twentieth-century context, 
this also indicates Huxley’s understanding of the elasticity of these catego-
ries—and that TH, among many others, may have been seen as a “man of 
science” in the nineteenth century. 78 Notwithstanding Huxley’s veneration 
of his grandfather, there is much to indicate Huxley’s lesser reverence for 
his father Leonard. (I will examine their relationship in detail in chapter 
6). Huxley’s cousin, Laurence Collier, recalls how Huxley as a boy remained 
“aloof and secretly critical” when he was in Leonard’s company. When Leon-
ard “held forth, as he was apt to, on the joys of mountaineering,” Huxley 
would become frustrated. And when Leonard uttered “Per ardua ad astra” 
(“through adversity to the stars”), Huxley
said nothing, but looked at something else or gazed abstractedly into the dis-
tance with a fixed, enigmatic smile, and I began to think that he liked neither 
Switzerland nor his father. 79 
If TH’s different relationship with various men, such as Darwin and Owen, 
may be explained psychologically—or even in terms of a dynamic of chang-
ing homosocial gender relations, as I have suggested—then Huxley’s relation 
to his father may offer even more to such a psychoanalytic reading. It may 
75 Holmes point out the scarcity of personal materials kept by Huxley, and the imper-
sonal nature of his poems: “He left no journals as frank as Gide’s, few poems so obvi-
ously personal as Yeats.” Charles Holmes, Aldous Huxley and The Reality (Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1970), 4. Of course, as many critics lament, much of Huxley’s per-
sonal archive perished in the fire that ravaged their house on 12 May, 1961. See Laura 
Huxley, This Timeless Moment, 69-73; Dunaway, Huxley in Hollywood, 358-9.
76 See James Sexton, Aldous Huxley: Selected Letters (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2007).
77 Huxley, “T.H Huxley as a Literary Man,” 48-50.
78 Ibid.
79 George Woodcock, Dawn and the Darkest Hour: A Study of Aldous Huxley (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1972), 37; also see Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 10.
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highlight, for instance, the role of masculinity and intellectual authoritari-
anism across three generations of men, and across two centuries.
Charles Holmes characterises Huxley as “anguished,” which is to say 
burdened by a schism even more violent than that felt by the Romantics: 80 
More than anyone seems to have suspected... [Huxley] projected, addressed, 
and debated within himself... much of his work shows him plagued by inner 
conflict, struggling to explore his identity... he was inwardly split for most of 
his life even more than Keats or Byron or Coleridge. 81
Perhaps as with all psychological conflicts, Huxley’s “inner conflict” had its 
origin in a range of idiopathic aetiologies. But many of Huxley’s biographers, 
including Woodcock, emphasise the role that grief must have played in Hux-
ley’s anguished life: 
Three times before he assumed his vocation as a writer [the] realization [of 
suffering and death] beat upon Aldous Huxley’s mind: when his mother Julia 
died in 1908; when his eyesight failed him less than three years later; when his 
favourite brother Trevenen committed suicide in 1914. 82 
But when Huxley begins writing as a young man, it will be—despite or be-
cause of these tragedies—in the satirical mode of the cynic; he will become 
the one who parodies the very nature of the split-personality, even as he him-
self possesses it. 
Apparently familiar with the plight of the schizoidal or divided self that 
Arnold Pick had characterised only as recently as the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century as dementia praecox, Huxley makes light of the affective 
position of the schizophrenic, lambasting the mental state on which Emile 
80 As Adam Sidaway argues, each of these words might serve to “adequately represent 
the [different] periods” of Huxley’s life. For my own purposes, it suffices to note that 
Sidaway understands Huxley’s “trauma ridden childhood” to be “constantly threat-
ened by madness.” Sidaway’s argument is here suggestive of the ways in which Huxley 
is for psychoanalytic—and, to focus on his possible “madness”—even psychopatho-
logical readings, an exemplary model or candidate, both in his life and fiction. See 
Adam Sidaway, “Madness, Badness, Sadness: Aldous Huxley and the Shifting Shadow 
of Psychoanalysis,” MPhil diss., University of Birmingham, 2011, 5, available online 
at http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/1639/1/Sidaway11MPhil.pdf, last accessed 20 September 
2013. Sidaway’s thesis title quotes Huxley’s 1956 essay see Aldous Huxley, “Madness, 
Badness, Sadness.” See Aldous Huxley: Complete Essays, eds. Robert S. Baker and James 
Sexton, 6 vols. (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), 6:179-187.
81 Holmes, Aldous Huxley and the Way to Reality, 4, 8, also qtd. in Legg, “The Intellectual 
Tourist,” 1.
82 Woodcock, Dawn and the Darkest Hour, 37.
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Kraepelin and Eugene Bleuler had already elaborated during the late-1800s. 83 
Portraying the paradox of splitness (schizotypy) as a nosological category in 
its own right, Huxley
satirizes his characters not only for being divided from one another, but for 
being split within themselves. His painters, poets and scientists... comprise 
so many dichotomies of mind against the body. 84 
These satirical “split-men” on their “quests for wholeness” range from Rich-
ard Greenow in “The Farcical History of Richard Greenow,” to Young Calamy 
in Those Barren Leaves, to Hugh Ledwidge in Eyeless in Gaza. Each of these 
split-men serve to reveal the difficulty, as Meckier notes, of Huxley’s malad-
justment to a world increasingly confounded by new empirical truths—ones 
that could only ever be “perfectly provisional and temporary” (TBL, 34-5). 85 
The characters’s presences in these texts also underscore the restrictive-
ness of the “simple faith in nineteenth-century materialism” that had led 
to the problem of certainty and uncertainty—which is to say to this psychic 
schism—in the first place. What had been a rift between Cartesians and epi-
phenomenalists in TH’s day is now transmogrified into an agon between 
productivity and pathology. No longer a philosophical debate, Descartes’s 
dualism now divides again; if it were once two, it now is four and, so redupli-
cated, presents not just a differently structured debate, but a newly complex 
structural problem—a chiasm—in the mind itself. 
As Huxley often suggests, causation and origin can themselves be myths: 
for every cold, materialist, or univocal explanation of the world that he faced, 
Huxley had prepared (or extemporaneously would prepare) a relatively more 
complex and multifaceted theory. Often he would articulate what may be 
described as his motto—a pithy phrase that expressed his view that nature 
accumulated rather than reduced in its causative models: “not only, but al-
so.” 86 And when Huxley’s 1920s satire ridicules men who, at the thought 
83 See Eugen Bleuler, “Die Prognose der Dementia Praecox—Schizophreniegruppe,” All-
gemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie 65 (1908): 436–64. Interestingly, Thomas Huxley had 
himself been interested in the hereditary aspects of nervous and mental diseases, 
and in 1860, a lecture was given in his name on the subject; see W. Mott, “(The Huxley 
Lecture) On Hereditary Aspects of Nervous and Mental Diseases,” The British Medical 
Journal (October 8, 1910): 1013-20. Mott quotes TH at the beginning of his review: 1013.
84 Jerome Meckier, Aldous Huxley: Satire and Structure (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1971), 
26.
85 Ibid., 26-7.
86 In a recorded luncheon with Aldous Huxley of 31 March 1961 in Toronto, Huxley ar-
gued that “it is most unfortunate [that] human beings always have this tendency to 
say ‘either/or,’ ‘either/or,’ well, why [not] ‘not only, but also’?” See Sexton, ed., “Intro-
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of chaos, fall into panic, Huxley also begins to mock, at least privately—in 
his letters—those who engaged in complex introspection, and who thereby 
fruitlessly sought the truth of their own subjectivity. 87 
In 1929, at thirty-five years of age, Huxley would write a letter to his long-
time American correspondent, Mrs Flora Strousse—a woman who wrote 
to Huxley under the pseudonym “Floyd Starkey.” In his letter, Huxley rails 
against what he sees as a tendency toward self-introspection. Confessing 
that he is disinclined to have ideas about himself, Huxley could scarcely 
make his principled sense of extrospection clearer: 
I have almost no ideas about myself and don’t like having them—avoid hav-
ing them—on principle even—and only improvise them, when somebody like 
you asks to know them. For “know thyself” was probably one of the stupidest 
pieces of advice ever given—that is to say, if it meant turning the self inside 
out by introspection. If one spent one’s time knowing oneself in that way, one 
wouldn’t have any self to know—for the self only exists in circumstances out-
side itself and introspection which distracts one from the outside world is a 
kind of suicide. 88
Huxley’s denouncement of introspection as a “kind of suicide” seems all 
the more freighted with gravity and trauma when read as the residue of his 
brother Trevenen’s suicide—a tragedy that had taken place some fifteen 
years earlier. Typical of Huxley’s enduring belief in the “wisdom of the 
body,” his remarks also betray an aversion to paranoiac encounters with 
the self; they anticipate his later work on the “negatively transfigured” vi-
duction to the Toronto Luncheon Colloquy 1961,” 193. This is comparable with what 
Huxley writes in “Meditation on the Moon”: ‘“Nothing but’ is mean as well as stupid [... 
] Enough of ‘Nothing but.’ It is time to say again, with primitive common sense (but for 
better reasons, ‘not only, but also.’” Aldous Huxley: Complete Essays III: 1930-35, eds. 
Robert S. Baker and James Sexton (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), 110. Furthermore, as 
Bedford notes in the first chapter of her biography: Aldous was “Different; at the same 
time a young child. “Not only, but also,” as the later Aldous would have said.” Bedford, 
Aldous Huxley, 1: 3. 
87 As Meckier argues, Huxley knew that
In a disintegrated society, the artists, who should see life as steadily and whole, are, 
Huxley complains, almost incurably split inasmuch as each is either Houyhnhnm 
or Yahoo, all intellect or all genitals.
 Meckier, Satire and Structure, 26. Of course, while this position appears syntonic with 
Freudianism, it is, in Meckier’s analysis, and evidently throughout Huxley’s fiction, a 
different kind of reduction. 
88 Huxley to Flora Strausse, 7 January 1929 (Letter 284) in Smith, Letters, 306. For a sim-
ilar sentiment expressed elsewhere see “The Education of an Amphibian,” 21. Here 
Huxley discusses Descartes’s affirmation Cogito ergo sum [I think therefore I am], re-
placing it with Cogitor ergo sum [I am being thought, therefore I am].
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sionary experience (HAH, 48-9), and they indicate his preference to study the 
construction of meaning in the “outside world” rather than in terms of the 
inner world of the mind. As an “intellectual with a mistrust of the mind and 
language,”Huxley studied the fact that one exists, rather than the question 
of what or how one exists. 
This is a metaphysical preference confirmed by Huxley’s earlier remarks 
in his letter: 89
Jehovah’s attitude towards psycho-analysis has always seemed to me entire-
ly satisfying. “I am that I am”—what could be truer? What more profoundly 
wise? 90
Huxley would later articulate a similar conception of reality while on mesca-
line, describing the “is-ness,” the “Istigkeit, the Allness and Infinity,” 91 and 
the “archetypal Suchness” of the “flowers or chair or flannels ‘out there’” in 
the world (DOP, 18). Here Huxley would conceive of himself as but one actant 
within a network of affiliated objects. Each of those other objects, he would 
think, is external to him, just as he is merely a perceiver who had opened 
perception’s doors. But as much as Huxley sought to avoid introspection 
while in his thirties, a decade or so later he would also marvel at the “set of 
symbols” that constituted his “inscape,” remarking that this vista possessed 
89 Meckier’s full description of Huxley’s character is as incisive as instructive, although it 
is so wide-ranging that only parts of it will be relevant in this thesis. As Meckier writes, 
An intellectual with a mistrust of mind and language, an artist who prefers un-
popular truth to artistic effect and whose search in art for standards to live by is 
accompanied by a mistrust of art, a life-worshipper who feels the physical will al-
ways let you down, Huxley is an alleged mystic who is always clear and rational, and 
a knowledgeable scientist who has written century’s severest critiques of science. 
He supports individuality but opposes egotistic individualism and eccentricity; he 
advocates centricity but is careful to distinguish this from regimentation.
 Meckier, Satire and Structure, 7; also see Janet Goodrich, “Bringing Order Out of Cha-
os: Huxley’s Time Must Have a Stop and Vedanta,” in Bloom, ed., Aldous Huxley, 79-87, 
esp. 86.
90 Huxley to Flora Strausse, 7 January 1929 (Letter 284) in Smith, Letters, 306.
91 Huxley’s uses terms “Istigkeit,” “Suchness,” and other forms of “verbal recklessness,” 
as Robert Baker names them, as they constituted for him “a form of “linguistic pu-
rification” that he “associated with Rimbaud and Mallarmé.” As Baker additionally 
notes, Huxley 
refused to define more narrowly what might constitute such an avant-garde deploy-
ment of language, but he linked it to an emphasis on the unique particular and the 
ramifying images of a highly metaphoric style, and to an idiom of shifting percep-
tive.
 Aldous Huxley: Complete Essays: Volume VI: 1956-63, eds. Robert S. Baker and James 
Sexton (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), xvii.
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the artificial or virtual attributes of a play-toy: the “suffocating interior of a 
dime-store ship” (DOP, 18, 26). 92 
These were the kinds of symbols that Huxley had so vociferously de-
nounced in his “Hocus Pocus” essay on Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams, 
which he had written some twenty years earlier. But even as Huxley now gaz-
es upon the very symbols whose significance he had previously spurned, he 
remained unimpressed. Little more than epiphenomena, Huxley’s visions 
serve only as another confirmation of his long-held belief in biological de-
terminism. 93
92 As the ship now becomes a psychotrope for Huxley’s displeasure, having witnessed 
those interior images produced by his mind, it also becomes a figure for madness in 
Foucault’s History of Madness. But what is interesting about this is the way in which 
the so-called ship of fools, a mythical trope or psychotrope for madness, had at least 
in Foucault’s work become the subject of some controversy. HCE Midelfort makes the 
crucial point that the image of the “stultifera navis,” or the historical “Ship of Fools” 
(from which name Foucault takes the title of his opening chapter in Histoire de la 
folie) represents little more than a fanciful rhapsody—a product of Foucault’s “sym-
bol-searching.” There is, Midelfort argues, no evidence that such a ship existed. Nor is 
there, as Colin Gordon adds, evidence for the practice of “riverborne deportation”: the 
medieval treatment of the insane. But numerous mistakes appear Midelfort’s reading, 
and, by and large, in both Huxley’s and Foucault’s divergent appeals to this psycho-
trope the apocryphal ship becomes an ideal symbol for madness: denoting isolation, 
the impossibility of escape, and a sense of physical envelopment or “suffocation.” 
What makes Huxley’s ship even more interesting—and what tethers it to Philip K. 
Dick’s psychotropic imaginary, is its scale and its “cheapness.” One experiences mes-
caline 
as though one were below decks in a ship... A five-and-ten-cent ship... [whose] gim-
crack mobiles of tin and plastic were [his] personal contributions to the universe” 
(DOP, 26). 
 Organised into colour blocks, this is a visual mode echoed in Dick’s novels The Three 
Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch and A Scanner Darkly, both of which I address in chapter 8. 
Also see “Madness and Civilization in Early Modern Europe: A Reappraisal of Michel 
Foucault,” in After the Reformation: Essays in Honour of J.H.Hexter, ed. B.C. Malament 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), 247–65; Colin Gordon, “Histoire de la 
folie: An Unknown Book by Michel Foucault,” in Arthur Still and Irving Velody (eds.), 
Rewriting the History of Madness: Studies in Foucault’s Histoire de la folie’ (London: 
Routledge, 1992), 32. John Rittmeister compares the hallucinations of lone travellers 
at sea to Descartes’s hallucinations: John Rittmeister, “Die Mystiche Krise des Jungen 
Descartes,” Zeitschrift fur Psychosomatische Medizin 15 (1969): 204-44, qtd. in Laurence 
Rickels, “Politics and Psychosis,” The Germanic Review 83, no. 1 (2008): 25-41.
93 Yet Huxley does suggest the potential for a positive interior symbolic of the self (an 
“inscape”):
Mescalin had endowed me temporarily with the power to see things with my eyes 
shut vision; but it could not, or at least on this occasion did not, reveal an inscape 
remotely comparable to my flowers or chair or flannels “out there” (DOP, 26). 
 While Huxley’s account records no positive account of these interiorised mental im-
ages, he leaves the “door” open, as it were, for such a positive experience to arise. His 
reluctance to examine to study his interiorised mental images while on mescaline, or 
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When Huxley expresses his resistance to paranoid introspection in gen-
eral, he anticipates what Paul Ricoeur would later call the “hermeneutic of 
suspicion.” Ricoeur named it such in a book on Freud published nearly two 
decades after Huxley’s The Doors of Perception. As with Ricoeur’s criticism of 
the suspiciousness espoused by Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx, Huxley senses 
Freud’s desire to create or invent a “superb complex” out of a range of “as-
sumptions.” But for Huxley, Freud relies less on evidence—for “no proofs” 
are “adduced” (OCHP, 319)—than on a speculative suspicion and scepticism. 
Putatively bringing into relief the invisible “culprit” of psychological disease, 
Freud professes both to expose the “truth” about, and provide a “cure” for 
the “evil wishes pullulating in the den of the Unconscious,” as well as to haul 
the “underworld of the mind” into “the light” (OCHP, 318-19). 
For Ricoeur, the hermeneutical method that we see at work in Freud’s 
psychoanalytic writing belongs to a “school of suspicion.” Regarding the 
“whole of consciousness primarily as ‘false’ consciousness,” this school de-
velops their own formations of consciousness to stand in place of the origi-
nary lacuna that reflects only a dissimulated falsehood. 94 But where the sus-
picious hermeneutic, as well as all other “philosophical investigations cut 
across one another,” becoming harmonised, is in the “area” of language. 95 
For Ricoeur as for Huxley, then, language lies at the core of scientific knowl-
edge, for neither the production of a science, nor its expression in language, 
more important than the other:
True, facts and theories can be communicated in terms that give the reader 
no aesthetic satisfaction. So can the passions, But neither passion, nor facts 
and theories can be communicated rapidly and persuasively in such terms... 
We have a certain difficulty in taking in anything that is not intrinsically el-
egant; a certain eagerness to accept anything that moves us aesthetically. 96
to entertain the notion that positive mental images might be seen by others, perhaps 
reflects Huxley’s own disposition (what Leary would call one’s “set”) at the time of his 
mescaline session. 
94 See Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, tr. Denis Savage 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 32-3; Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Paranoid 
Reading and Reparative Reading; or, You’re So Paranoid, You Probably Think This In-
troduction Is about You,” in Novel Gazing: Queer Readings in Fiction, ed. Eve Kosovsky 
Sedgwick (London: Duke University Press, 1997), 5. Also see Brian Leiter, “The Herme-
neutics of Suspicion: Recovering Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud,” in Leiter, ed. The Future 
for Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 74-105. 
95 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, 3.
96 Huxley, “T.H. Huxley as a Literary Man,” 54. 
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Ultimately, Huxley feels that if any science is inelegant—and if it cannot be 
expressed in a way that is aesthetically moving—then it is ineffective. 
Remaining averse to the excesses of paranoid calculation, such as those 
engendered by such suspicious acts as introspection, Huxley valorises the 
power of “suggestion” and intuition. For Huxley, hypnotism is a corollary to 
the excessive calculation of introspection. It induces relief in the absence of 
systematic analysis. Any “cure” for neurasthenia, Huxley writes, 
would probably have been effected much more expeditiously if straightfor-
ward suggestion and hypnotism had been employed from the first. Nor, if any 
other methods had been employed, would the patient have gone away with 
his mind full of the fantastic and, for anyone with a tendency to neurasthe-
nia, dangerous and disgusting mythology of the psychoanalytic theory (OCHP, 
320).
While Freud’s “dangerous and disgusting mythology” is mocked throughout 
Brave New World, the novel also offers an epistemological critique of that un-
derlying suspiciousness that, as Ricoeur suggests, drives Freud, Marx, and 
Nietzsche to invent new phrases for and constructions of the mind. 97 And 
despite Huxley’s partial blindness as a child, he himself never seems to have 
held any suspicion about the body’s strength or potential. Rather, he had al-
ways maintained, as Kimberly Hewitt describes, “a firm faith in the wisdom 
of the body, which many scholars have overlooked... ” 98 
At one point of Brave New World, Bernard Marx discusses with his col-
league Helmholtz Watson whether it might be possible to discover “some 
sort of extra power” in words that may transcend the manipulative “hyp-
nopædic” writing that Watson teaches at the College of Emotional Engineer-
ing. This is the “piercingly” phrased discourse that—while it penetrates the 
mind just as “X-rays” penetrate the body—ultimately amounts only to a lot of 
“something about nothing” (BNW, 60). Confounded by the meaninglessness 
of his hypnopædic prose, Watson ponders the “queer feeling” he now has 
that his words might be put to a better use than their present one:
I’ve got something important to say and the power to say it—only I don’t know 
what it is, and I can’t make any use of the power. If there was some different way 
97 For a detailed analysis of some of these satirical elements, see Meckier, “Our Ford, 
Our Freud and the Behaviorist Conspiracy of Brave New World,” Tahlia 1 (1978): 35-9; 
Buchanan, “Oedipus in Dystopia,” 103-4; Peter Firchow, The End of Utopia: A Study of 
Huxley’s Brave New World (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1984), 55.
98 Kimberley Allyn Hewitt, “Psychedelics and Psychosis: LSD and Changing Ideas of 
Mental Illness, 1943-1966,” PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2002, 100. 
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of writing. Or else something else to write about.” He was silent; then, “You see,” 
he went on at last, “I’m pretty good at inventing phrases, you know, the sort of 
words that suddenly make you jump, almost as though you’d sat on a pin, they 
seem so new and exciting even though they’re about something hypnopædical-
ly obvious. But that doesn’t seem enough. It’s not enough for the phrases to be 
good; what you make with them ought to be good too” (BNW, 59-60).
That these inchoate ideas are ineffable, unavailable to consciousness yet 
somehow also perceptible, generates in Watson his uncanny and “queer 
feeling.” But it is what this ponderousness engenders in Huxley’s narrative 
that is even more curious. Interrupting Watson’s contemplation, Marx an-
nounces that “there’s somebody at the door.” But when the doubtful Watson 
rises to check, he is unsurprised to discover that “of course” nobody is there. 
Returning to his meditation on language, Marx then begins to explain his 
suspiciousness in an “uprush of self-pity,” suggesting that the source of his 
paranoia is in fact Watson’s speculations on hypnopædia: “When people are 
suspicious with you, you start being suspicious with them” (BNW, 60).
Signifying how rapidly and perniciously such contagions of paranoia can 
progress, Marx’s explanation—a rhetorical chiasmus of its own—commu-
nicates the extent to which he is just as helpless as he is defiant. But if Wat-
son’s self-questioning should generate such feelings of suspicion in Marx—a 
man who Watson feels has “things on his nerves,” and about whom he feels 
“ashamed”—then perhaps, Watson thinks, his friend ought to feel more se-
cure in his own thoughts. If only he “would show a little more pride”—Wat-
son notes to himself—then he might feel less paranoid (BNW, 59). But Marx’s 
apparently hallucinated mishearing of “somebody at the door” is a delusion 
that cannot be controlled. A form of neurasthenia, it is specifically triggered 
by the contagion of suspicion that Watson himself begins. As innocuous as 
this introspection appears, it is enough to induce in Marx a nervous mental 
destablisation. Forming an implicit allegory for the dangers of introspection, 
identified elsewhere by Huxley, the scene is among a range of episodes in 
Brave New World that express Huxley’s objection to the “hermeneutic of sus-
picion,” a psychopathological dysfunction that Ricoeur attributes to Freud. 
As this episode also suggests, however, it is only with the imprimatur 
of an authorised heuristic—be it Freud’s psychoanalysis, Marx’s dialectical 
materialism, or what Henry Staten calls Nietzsche’s “psychodialectic”—that 
one should initiate a self-analytics. 99 That Watson instigates such an intro-
spective process is, for Bernard Marx, a problem. But the fact that Watson 
99 See Henry Staten, Nietzsche’s Voice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 6-7.
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does so on his own terms, against hypnopædia, amounts to something far 
worse: a kind of apostasy. 100 But Watson’s desire to create a new language 
derives not simply from his suspicion that the hypnopædist’s words inade-
quately express the mind’s tropes; the problem is, rather, that this language 
is also clearly “obvious,” uttered for reasons that are essentially not “good” 
(BNW, 59). Like the language of psychoanalysis, Watson’s hypnopædic utter-
ances convert every analytical thought into a “suspicious” idea. 
Knowing this, Watson seeks a materialist construction of reality; but 
he knows neither where to begin, nor why, nor how his native language is 
inadequate. While there is for Watson no imaginable alternative to the ma-
levolence he vaguely imputes to the hypnopædic voice, then, he is yet also 
ashamed of Marx’s paranoia, which functions as an expression of Watson’s 
transferred guilt. Aroused by a fear of being surveilled or overheard, what 
Marx feels is a reflection of Watson’s heterodox impulse to disavow the lan-
guage of the state, and to defy the sovereign himself.
Arising because Marx shows too little “pride” in himself, Watson’s shame 
functions as an inversion of Huxley’s dismissal of the suspicious analysis of 
the mind. It is arguable that at the root of Huxley’s aversion to paranoiac 
meditation lies his dismissal of his father: that is, it is a syndrome that fun-
damentally reacts to his father’s lack of pride. To show little faith in the po-
tential of the “psycho-physical” organism is, for Huxley, as fatal as excessive 
introspection itself. It is a pathology as anathematic to an artist as it is to any 
other individual. Huxley elaborates this idea in his letter to Strousse:
An artist is bound in any case to detach himself from actual life in favour of 
the fictitious existence of his creations—is bound to, unless he happens to 
possess, which I don’t, the exuberant vitality and power which suffices for two 
simultaneous lives: he is therefore the last person who can afford to go about 
cultivating ideas of himself. 101
Having less than enough power to live out “two simultaneous lives,” Huxley 
yearns for a unifying synthesis of the “actual” and the “fictional” in what 
must always remain an ironically double-sided or chiasmic structuration. 
This is a synthesis whose misbegotten origin as the cultivation of a suturing 
100 I describe this performance as a kind of apostasy in view of Huxley’s subtle suggestion 
that Freudianism functions as a religion for many of its followers. Testament to this is 
Huxley’s oft-noted custom of satirically making the sign of the cross at the mention of 
Freud’s name. Huxley was seen to do this while at conferences, and when in casual or 
formal conversation. See Buchanan, “Oedipus in Dystopia,” 118n3.
101 Huxley to Flora Strausse, in Smith, Letters, 306. 
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of fiction and actuality is inerasable. For Huxley, it will always be possible to 
trace the artist’s originary dehiscences—to detect the breaks and metanoias 
whose first ruptures now echo and ramify in each of their “fictional” expres-
sions—since they reverberate as so many strategies to displace or conceal 
their sources. 
The figure of the chiasmus thus appears in Huxley’s thought again, 
although in this case Huxley seeks to disconfirm it. Claiming that he, as 
an artist, cannot live at once in the fictitious and the actual planes, Huxley 
etiolates his own subjectivity, describing himself as detached, and shorn 
of vitality. But if Huxley devalues actuality only to elevate the fictional, it is 
not because through fiction he might thereby escape reality. It is because 
the artist, a noble agent who feels such shame, must transcode and remor-
phologise actuality, refabricating it in a highly ritualised manner. A mode of 
self-effacement—and even a ritual suicide or seppuku—the artist’s process 
involves repudiating the presumption that they, as an artist or author, feel an 
“egotistic assumption” about themselves. 
For Huxley, this involves disconfirming whatever notion a reader may 
have that he thinks himself the “triumphant product of biological evolu-
tion.” 102 The creator of a form of consumable decoration derived from his very 
own “entrails,” Huxley produces what Meckier describes as an “anti-physical 
satire.” No more or less than this physical offering should be expected, Hux-
ley writes, of an artist:
And anyhow when one’s profession is to commit hara-kari every publishing 
season and wreathe one’s entrails in elegant festoons—le style c’est l’hom-
me—all over the bookstalls... well, really in those circumstances having ideas 
about oneself in letters or conversation becomes, it seems to me, rather a work 
of supererogation. 103
For Huxley, no artist, and especially no epistelophobic artist, should be ex-
pected to have “ideas about” him- or herself. 104 The artist’s primary responsi-
bility, rather, it to maintain an objective distance from their own thoughts so 
that each event they encounter may be seen “with a multiplicity of eyes and 
from different viewpoints.” 105 As an elaboration on TH’s epiphenomenalistic 
102 Meckier, Satire and Structure, 39.
103 Smith, Letters, no. 284, 306.
104 Ibid. Compare “epistelophobia” with my brief discussion of Foucault’s identification 
of “logophobia,” and the way in which I argue that the latter is emblematised in Lady 
Ottoline Morrell’s reaction to Huxley’s Crome Yellow in the following chapter.
105 Meckier, Aldous Huxley: From Poet to Mystic, 45; cf. Meckier, Satire and Structure, 155.
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view of the mind, Huxley’s self-detachment echoes his grandfather’s positiv-
ist dispassion (“passionate honesty”). This resistance to close reflection on 
the mind is also an adaption of TH’s epiphenomenalism for Huxley’s (and 
his fiction’s) apparently different purposes. To overcome the self-circularity 
of narcissism, Huxley shifts focus from the self in order to redirect it to cre-
ation—towards, that is, a “free and wild creation” of literary concepts.
Fashioning his artistic materials less from the mind than from “actuali-
ty,” Huxley generates a carnivalesque and dyspeptic “marionette theatre” out 
of all that orbits him. But in this act the “artist” also commits a kind of ritu-
alised suicide. Seeking less to bury himself beneath his fiction than, as Sean 
Latham suggests, to exact a kind of revenge on the modern world, Huxley 
becomes “caught between the demands of art and the demands of profit.” 106 
A lamentation on the “commercialization of aesthetics,” Those Barren Leaves 
(1925) thus presents, as Latham observes, a scathing “critique of the cultural 
marketplace,” offering a piquant illustration of mass culture’s effects on the 
literary spirit. In the novel, the move away from an artistic to a commer-
cial literary culture is emblematised by the success of Mary Thriplow, the 
best-selling novelist; but the obverse is represented by the contrapuntal fail-
ure of Francis Chelifer, a melancholic poet who is now consigned, in relative 
poverty, to editing The Rabbit Fancier Gazette. 107 
But like Crome Yellow, Those Barren Leaves also presents a thinly-veiled 
critique of Huxley’s own relationship to Lady Ottoline Morrell. Represent-
ed in the figure of Mrs Aldwinkle, Huxley’s novel lampoons Morrell as the 
self-deluded “giver of literary parties, and agapes of lions” (TBL, 85). And yet, 
it is Adwinkle who is even more consumed by the preservation of art than 
Chelifer, the latter of whom represents Huxley. Adwinkle cannot reconcile 
herself to the belief that an increasingly cynical Chelifer is not an “art- for-ar-
ter,” and that he could, when Chelifer mocks his own status as an artist, so 
recklessly “blaspheme like that against [his] own talent” (TBL, 86). 
Implicit in Huxley’s allusion to his own “hara-kari” in his letter to 
Strausse is Huxley’s tendency to self-effacement. This attitude functions not 
simply as a disavowal of his own “talents,” however, but as a refutation of 
the sovereign master or patron whose reputation demands that he produce 
a pure, automatised work, one that remains free of any reference to the 
author’s actuality, whether commercial or social. As Latham affirms, “pa-
106 Sean Latham, “The Coterie as Commodity: Huxley, Lawrence, Rhys, and the Business 
of Revenge,” in The Art of Scandal: Modernism, Libel Law, and the Roman à Clef (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 140.
107 Ibid., 138-9.
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tronage offers no refuge from the mass market”—neither for Huxley or for 
Chelifer. Rather, it “implicates Huxley, his reader, and his critics,” at least as 
much as his characters, “in a tangled web of capital exchanges” in what is 
another rearticulation of the scrivener’s disempowerment. 108 
Thinking the Interstitial Self
the idea of occupying two worlds, the fictional and the actual, would return 
to Huxley in 1942. In a letter to Sybille Bedford and in a phrase borrowed 
from Matthew Arnold, Huxley expresses his mood after having now spent 
five years in California: 109
I was born wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to 
be born, and have made, in a curious way, the worst of both. For each requires 
that one should be whole-heartedly there, at the moment—with Micawber, as 
he is and for his own sake, while he is drinking his punch: with the Clear 
Light of the Void as it is and for its own sake, in an analogous way. Whereas I 
have always tended to be somewhere else, in a world of analysis, unfavourable 
equally to Micawberish living, Tolstoyan art and contemplative spirituality. 
The title of my first book of stories, Limbo, was, I now see, oddly prophetic! 110
Whether one interprets this configuration of “worlds” as a distinction be-
tween the “fictional” and the “actual” or, as in Descartes’s terms, a dichot-
omy between mind and body, subject and organism, it remains crucial that 
Huxley characterises himself as “always” having felt in between two states, 
unanchored and all at sea. Few lines express so clearly Huxley’s perception 
that he had been placed at the centre of a chiasmus as those above; it is clear 
that he stood in limbo, between two worlds or points. For clarity’s sake, the 
particular coordinates of Huxley’s description may be mapped in a diagram, 
as in figure 5.2, below. 111
108 Ibid., 140.
109 As Smith points out, “Wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless 
to be born” is here quoted. from Matthew Arnold’s “Stanzas from the Grand Char-
treuse.” See Matthew Arnold, The Poems of Matthew Arnold, ed. Kenneth Allot (Lon-
don: Barnes and Noble, 1965), 285-94; Smith, Letters, 476n460.
110 Huxley to Sybille Bedford, 10 February, 1942 (Letter 460), in Smith, Letters, 476.
111 In relation to the Cartesian subject and psychoanalysis, Justin Clemens offers a 
thoughtful reading of Lacan and Cartesianism that is relevant here. Lacan finds him-
self, in both Clemens’s and Gilbert Chaitlin’s view, countenancing transference (qua 
“love” in Clemens’s reading) as an insurmountable paradox for psychoanalysis. For 
Lacan, Clemens notes, “the paradox of love is central to whatever he could be said to 
offer to [the philosophical tradition of] ontology.” See Justin Clemens, Psychoanaly-
sis is an Antiphilosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 56-57. Also see 
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Marked as “x,” Huxley may be understood not simply to express his feel-
ings of alienation from the fictional world (“world one”), or his displace-
ment from the actual world (“world two”), between which he was “born 
wandering.” Rather, Huxley also characterises his interstitiality as a prod-
uct of his having been stuck in a “world of analysis” that was “somewhere 
else.” 112 Trapped in this purgatory, Huxley is unable to become “whole-heart-
edly there” in the world. 113 And while he offers no further clarification in this 
letter about what he imagines are the natures of these words, that Huxley 
associated the “fictional world” with a land of the “dead” is at least partial-
ly confirmed with his references to the artist’s “hara-kari” in his letter to 
Strousse. It is also apparent, however, that this “fictional world” does not 
coextend with “actual life,” since, remaining “powerless to be born,” it can 
never be brought into the universe of material reality. And yet “actual life” 
is also connected with death: Huxley’s life is itself “powerless to be born:” it 
merely wanders (it is “born wandering”) into a world that remains not here, 
but “somewhere else.” 
In Island, Huxley begins to advance his own method of placating what 
had been his lifelong drive to resolve this feeling of major conflict, a split-sub-
G.D. Chaitin, Rhetoric and Culture in Lacan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 151; cf. Samo Tomšič, “The Invention of New Love in Psychoanalysis,” Filozofski 
Vestnik 31, no. 2 (2010): 189-204. On Huxley being “in love” with Mary Hutchinson, see 
Sexton, Selected Letters, 5, 6, 120-21.
112 Huxley to Sybille Bedford, in Smith, Letters, 476.
113 Ibid.
Figure 5.2 A diagrammatic representation (a chiasmus) of
Huxley’s self-conceptualisation.
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jectivity that had resonated in all his writing. Dr. Andrew MacPhail will seek 
to overcome the “enormous folly of trying to make a marriage between hell 
and heaven,” (IsLAND, 156) in his effort to establish what Gorman Beau-
champ calls a “psychedelic utopia.” 114 At one point, the Scottish Dr MacPhail, 
a trained physician, joins in with the spiritualist Raja (the Palanese King), to 
make the best of “all worlds”:
If the king and the doctor were now teaching one another to make the best of 
both worlds—the Oriental and the European, the ancient and the modern—it 
was in order to help the whole nation to do the same. To make the best of both 
worlds—what am I saying? To make the best of all the worlds—the worlds al-
ready realized within the various cultures and, beyond them, the worlds of 
still unrealized potentialities. It was an enormous ambition, an ambition to-
tally impossible of fulfillment; but at least it had the merit of spurring them 
on, of making them rush in where angels feared to tread— with results that 
sometimes proved, to everybody’s astonishment, that they had not been quite 
such fools as they looked. They never succeeded, of course, in making the best 
of all the worlds; but by dint of boldly trying they made the best of many more 
worlds than any merely prudent or sensible person would have dreamed of be-
ing able to reconcile and combine (IsLAND, 129).
Later defending his ambition to convoke these worlds, MacPhail will claim 
that “there was nothing in that best-of-both-worlds program to offend the 
susceptibilities of even the touchiest and most ardent of religious patriots” 
(IsLAND, 221). Later still, Dr. Robert MacPhail—Andrew MacPhail’s grandson 
and a surrogate for Huxley himself—will instruct those who take the mok-
sha-medicine to watch as “Shiva-Nataraja dances the dance of endless be-
coming and passing away” (IsLAND, 167). Dancing “in all the worlds at once,” 
Shiva-Nataraja attains a state of “infinite and eternal bliss” where “play is an 
end in itself, everlastingly purposeless” (IsLAND, 167-68). 
If Huxley envisions a way to overcome the burdensome feeling that he 
is equally as split as the “split-men” of his satires, then one way of repairing 
this dehiscence is through what he will call “A Psychophysical Education” 
(1962). In his essay of that name, Huxley emphasises—as he had also em-
phasised the “realization of a state of ‘no-mind’” (TPP, 86)—the importance 
of mental and physical “non-attachment.” 115 This non-attachment may be 
114 See Gorman Beauchamp, “Island: Aldous Huxley’s Psychedelic Utopia,” Utopian Stud-
ies 1, no. 1 (1990): 59-72.
115 Aldous Huxley, “A Psychophysical Education,” in More Talk of Alexander, ed. Wilfred 
Barlow (London: Gollancz, 1978), 1. I note that Barlow confirms that Huxley’s essay 
(chapter 5) is reprinted from the Alexander Journal, of which he is the editor. However, 
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distinguished from the “detachment” that Huxley had, earlier in his life, pro-
pounded through his satires, such as through Beavis’s aloofness in Eyeless 
in Gaza. 116 Non-attachment requires more than an attitude of indifference: 
bodily “modification” must be employed too; and this will ameliorate the 
problems of a “maladjusted” physique, restoring it to its potential as “the 
instrument used to establish contact with the outside world.” 117
It was in the late 1930s, and perhaps by the time that Huxley had finished 
writing Ends and Means (1937), that he, as Woodcock notes, began to feel that 
his earlier philosophy of cynical or satirical detachment was insufficient. 
“Words,” Huxley would insist in Literature and Science, are only ever so pow-
erful, limited in number and configurable in only so many “conventionally 
fixed ways” (LAs, 99). But even before 1963’s Literature and Science, in The 
Perennial Philosophy (1945), Huxley would criticise what he, in Woodcock’s 
view, regards
as a cardinal omission on his great-grandfather’s part; the ancestral Thomas, 
in laying a typically Arnoldian stress on the need for all-round moral develop-
ment, has neglected what for the adherent of the Perennial Philosophy must 
be the essential consideration—that any form of self-will prevents “recollect-
edness and non-attachment” and so closes the heart to “the enlightening and 
liberating knowledge of Reality. 118
A repudiation of the will, Huxley’s transition from “detachment” to “non-at-
tachment” also describes his conversion from Western metaphysics to East-
ern philosophy or the philosophia perennis—a transformation that takes 
place about five years before he begins experimenting with mescaline. After 
his mescaline experiences, Huxley seems to allow for the usefulness of intro-
spection in a way that he had not done earlier.  119
Huxley’s essay does not appear in the contents pages listed in the Alexander Journal’s 
online database (see http://www.mouritz.co.uk/131alexanderjournal.php). It thus re-
mains unclear on which year this essay was written or first published. However, the es-
say is likely to have been written in the immediate years before Huxley’s 1963 death—
probably around 1962—and perhaps at the same approximate time as his similar 
essay, “Education on the Nonverbal Level.” See Huxley, “Education on the Nonverbal 
Level,” Daedulus 91, no 2 (1962): 279-93. The latter essay also appears in Aldous Huxley, 
Complete Essays, Volume VI: 1956-63, ed. Robert S. Baker and James Sexton (Chicago: 
Ivan R. Dee, 2002), 303-20. 
116 Woodcock, Dawn and the Darkest Hour, 136.
117 Huxley, “A Psychophysical Education,” 1.
118 Woodcock, Dawn and the Darkest Hour, 34.
119 For an excellent essay from an Eastern perspective written by an Indian scholar on 
The Perennial Philosophy, The Doors of Perception, and Island, see “The Philosophia Pe-
rennis, Synthetic Divine Conciousness and the Buddhist Pala,” in B.L. Chakoo, Aldous 
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Earlier in his life, in 1925, Huxley had addressed the subject of com-
parative psychology in a letter to John Murry by reference to his essay “Our 
Contemporary Hocus-Pocus. 120 Containing one of Huxley’s most direct and 
forceful critiques of Freud, the letter condemns psychoanalysis as one of 
“the finest specimens” of “pseudo-science” to have been “designed by the 
mind of man.” 121 Of course it is true, argues Huxley, that the “individual left 
to himself, with nothing to support him” may soon be drawn to reflect on his 
own shortcomings. But in a prolepsis of Derrida’s theorisation of différance, 
as well as of the notion of espacement in language, Huxley underscores the 
destructiveness of analysis; it a process whereby even arriving at a positive 
meaning is likely to prompt the analyst to consider its merits as against its 
negative corollary. 
As deconstruction emphasises the extent to which the presence of lan-
guage always differs from, and serves only to momentarily defer a consid-
eration of, what is absent, so does self-analysis, for Huxley, elicit only the 
negative valency, signaling what is absent: 122
Habituated to the practice of self analysis on a scale never before attempted—
self analysis, which always has the terrible effect of making the analyser con-
scious of the evil opposite of everything good that he analyses. Analysing love 
for his fellow being, he discovers hatred; analysing purity, he discovers impu-
rity. That is the penalty we pay for excessive self-consciousness. 123 
Anathematic to the self-world relationship, Huxley again dismisses having 
“thoughts about oneself.” Introspection now amounts less to an instance of 
suicide or self-harm than an act that produces hatred where it should exude 
love. But Huxley’s impersonal detachment from the “he” who allows himself 
to feel “excessive self-consciousness” only betrays his very personal struggle 
to cease feeling so self-consciously about himself. It is a repercussion of his 
disposition “between two worlds”; and Huxley’s resistance to self analysis 
serves to ameliorate or desublimate what may well have been, as Blinderman 
suggests, his own serious neurosis. 124 In Freud’s own terms, Huxley’s attempt 
Huxley and Eastern Wisdom (Delhi: Atma Ram & Sons, 1981), 213-58.
120 Huxley, “Hocus-Pocus,” 313-20.
121 Ibid., 315.
122 See Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, 82-3.
123 Huxley to John Middleton Murry, 5 March, 1925 (Letter 225) in Smith, Letters, 243-4. 
Bentley theorises that Huxley’s dichotimisation of love and hate operates here to ex-
press his “Manichean consciousness.” See Bentley, “Anatomical Vision,” 96.
124 That Huxley’s fiction might have served to so desublimate is the gravamen of Bentley’s 
argument in “Anatomical Vision,” 171-84.
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to fortify his mind against self-consciousness—one that is often achieved by 
his reinvention of himself as the fictional characters of his novels—func-
tions as a kind of transference or displacement that allows for his neurotic 
thoughts to be indirectly expressed, allegorised, and circulated.
Focusing on the similarity between Huxley’s descriptions of mescaline 
intoxication and the affective experiences of those with depersonalisation 
disorders, philosophers of psychiatry affirm that Huxley’s commentary is 
a “compelling” example among those in which subjects have attempted to 
“make sense of their feelings of ‘mind emptiness’ and hollowness.” 125 Yet 
it also possible to conceive of the decades during which Huxley appears to 
have evaded the process of self-conscious reflection—namely, the 1920s and 
‘30s—as producing in him those “feelings of separateness from oneself and 
one’s actions” that are characteristic of depersonalisation. 126 
Of course, the theory of depersonalisation suggests that the afflicted 
subject is essentially divorced from their “psychic core.” As more detailed 
assessments of the impact of the World Wars appear, generating historicistic 
accounts of mental illness in the twentieth century, it seems increasingly 
“possible,” as François Villa notes, “that our idea of the unchangeable psy-
chic core is in reality, too, only a belief, an illusion made possible by an op-
eration of splitting.” 127 To subscribe to the idea that a “psychic core” exists 
would be to accept, then, that
the constitutive elements of psychic life constitute an indestructible and im-
mutable core able to resist both the passing of time and the events of human 
life, [and] that these elements are invariable, atemporal, and ahistorical. 128
When Huxley airs his political views about war before the middle decades of 
the twentieth century, he indicates the extent to which the specter of war might 
have played a role in shaping his feelings of alienation and depersonalisation. 129 
125 See Daphne Simeon and Jeffrey Abugel’s discussion of Heaven and Hell’s illustration of 
depersonalisation in their chapter “Depersonalization in Philosophy and Literature” 
in Feeling Unreal: Depersonalization Disorder and The Loss of the Self (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 145-50.
126 See Laurent S. Lehmann, “Depersonalization,” American Journal of Psychiatry 131, no. 
11 (1974): 1221. 
127 François Villa, “The Psychoanalytical Method and the Disaster of Totalitarianism: 
Borderline States as the Psychical Equivalent of the Discontent in Civilization?” Criti-
cal Inquiry 40, no. 2 (2014): 267-87, esp. 267.
128 Ibid.
129 See Laurence Rickels’s series, Nazi Psychoanalysis, especially in volume 3 (“Psy Fi”), 
in which Rickels briefly writes on Huxley’s Brave New World, and in which, as Bennet 
notes in the volume’s foreword, Rickels “moves at the end from “sci” to “psy” [to give 
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At the same time as he begins writing his pacifistic novel Eyeless in Gaza 
and a series of essays on society in Ends and Means, one of which, “War,” 
is a thorough refutation of war’s defensibility, Huxley would also zealously 
expresses his pacifism in political pamphlets such as What Are You Going To 
Do About It? The Case for Constructive Peace (1936) and An Encyclopaedia of 
Pacifism (1937). 130 
Repudiated and denigrated, the former pamphlet elicited a harsh re-
sponse from critic C. Day Lewis, who penned his own screed titled We’re 
Not Going To Do Nothing (1936). Huxley will then reconfigure this situation 
in Eyeless in Gaza, where Beavis characterises “negative pacifism” and “scep-
ticism about existing institutions” as so many “holes in the mind,” and an 
“emptiness waiting to be filled” (EIG, 425). 131 
As conduits for excessive self-consciousness, Huxley’s “holes in the mind” 
resemble the “reducing valves” to which the author would later advert in The 
Doors of Perception. These are the ducts or valves through which paranoiac 
introspection might enter; once in the brain it infects an individual, plant-
ing and programming a suspicious mind with whatever “positive content” 
may serve as its “fillers” (EIG, 425). Transcoding actuality into fiction, Eyeless 
in Gaza and other of Huxley’s romans à clef also function as the author’s per-
sonal “fillers” for those parts of his own mind—and for those of his readers’s 
minds—that might otherwise be filled with a deceptive if not “alluring posi-
tive doctrine—however criminal or crazy its positiveness may be” (EIG, 425). 
And while “pumping full” the “negative void” of the mind with this “positive 
pacifism” is precisely what Eyeless in Gaza’s Beavis seeks to do, his ability 
to effectively propagandise is increasingly as uncertain as the potential of 
Huxley’s pamphlets to persuade: even if we assume that we have “the time,” 
Beavis asks, “have we the ability?” (EIG, 425). 
While Huxley’s pamphleteering reflects his negative opinion of the First 
World War, Huxley’s increasingly disillusioned view about his political influ-
ence heavily impacts on him as he realises his limitations as an “artist.” 132 
the volume its title, “Psy Fi”] by a neat transition that uses Huxley’s “Ford/Freud” in 
Brave New World”: Laurence A. Rickels, Nazi Psychoanalysis, Volume Three: Psy Fi (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press), xiii, 215-21. 
130 See Aldous Huxley, What Are You Going To Do About It? The Case for Constructive Peace 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1936); Huxley, An Encyclopaedia of Pacifism (London: Chat-
to & Windus,1937).
131 See Anna Deters, “Eyeless in Gaza: Mystical Means and Socio-Political Ends,” Aldous 
Huxley Annual 5 (2005): 151-66, esp. 155-6; Valentine Cunningham, British Writers of 
the Thirties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 70; C. Day-Lewis, We’re Not Going 
To Do Nothing (London: The Left Review, 1936).
132 As Cunningham writes, Huxley’s Case for Constructive Peace was “one of the ‘30s’s 
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When “faced with the ineluctable fact of World War II,” Huxley will outgrow 
his desire to produce “propaganda”; he realised, as Anna Deters notes, “the 
naivety of the claim that changes in the individual alone can alter the course 
of society.” 133 Now turning his back on the question of pacifism and toward a 
mystical-spiritual outlook, Huxley’s transition also marks a point of return. 
Here, once again, Huxley will repress and resist those feelings of paranoid 
introspection and self-attachment, rebranding them as mystical “non-at-
tachment.” 134
In her essay “On Mental Health,” Melanie Klein describes “a well-inte-
grated personality” as “the foundation for mental health.” But integration 
also relies, she writes,
on an interplay between the fundamental sources of mental life—the impuls-
es of love and hate—an interplay in which the capacity for love is predomi-
nant. 135 
Despite his negative self-feelings, Huxley’s great capacity for love is illustrat-
ed throughout the many letters that pass between him and his father, as well 
as between he and his brother Julian. But Huxley’s belief in love is also evi-
dent in what is known about his long marriage to Maria Nys, which begins 
in 1919 when Huxley is only 25, and which would last until Maria’s tragic 
death in 1955—in spite of what may have been a number of challenges. 136 A 
most persistently denigrated texts.” Cunningham, British Writers of the Thirties, 70.
133 Deters, “Eyeless in Gaza: Mystical Means and Socio-Political Ends,” 156.
134 Ibid.
135 Melanie Klein, “On Mental Health,” in Melanie Klein, Envy and Gratitude and Other 
Works 1946-1963, ed. M. Masud R. Khan (London: The Hogarth Press, 1984), 271.
136 Unfortunately, correspondence between Maria and Huxley (they wrote to each other 
every day in the years leading to their marriage) remains lost, despite the relatively 
recent discovery that five letters were preserved by a private collector. It is assumed 
destroyed, having probably burnt alongside almost all of Huxley’s papers in a house-
fire in his and Laura Huxley’s Hollywood home on 12 May 1961. See Sexton, Selected 
Letters, 4n1; Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 84. Nevertheless, the story of Maria and Hux-
ley’s love affair is mostly known. In a letter written in 1952 to Matthew Huxley (son of 
Aldous and Maria), Maria asks why she had ever allowed Huxley to approach her, per-
mitting herself to become exposed to the “intellectual strain” of a life (at Garsington) 
for which she was ill-prepared. Huxley had known, she writes, “that he could never 
teach me to write poetry or remember what I read in a book, or spel [sic] or anything he 
did set value on.” (Bedford, 1: 94-5). Murray describes her as possibly suffering anorex-
ia nervosa and speaks of her suicide attempt in 1915, about which D.H. Lawrence had 
been outraged. (Lawrence had written a chiding letter concerning this topic to Lady 
Ottoline Morrell in 1915): Murray, Aldous Huxley, 69; Bedford, Huxley, 1: 80. Ottoline 
had restored Garsington Manor, near Oxford, and had turned it into an aristocratic 
refuge for leftists and artists. Maria and Huxley had lived there for a time, and, as I 
have already addressed, it inspired Huxley to write Crome Yellow, in which Lady Otto-
Reforging the Law 267
Belgian refugee, Maria does not appear to have objected to their pair’s open 
relationship, and it is possible, as I have suggest of her attraction to women 
in the previous chapter, that Maria herself had even proposed it. Of course, 
the precise details of Maria’s sexuality, and the nature of her marriage to 
Huxley, remain only approximately understood. 137 
Nevertheless, one assertion—that D.H. Lawrence had been Huxley’s “ho-
mosexual lover”—a claim made in book of political history that also claims 
Huxley’s central role in Britain’s alleged “Opium War” against the U.S., ap-
pears inflammatory and unsubstantiated; especially as it is offset by what 
Huxley’s friend Don Bachardy, in an interview with David Dunaway, says of 
Huxley’s sexuality: “I don’t think Aldous had a queer bone in his body.” 138 
line is represented as Priscilla Wimbush, and Dora Carrington as Mary Bracegirdle. 
137 Here I refer to Maria’s bisexuality. Murray notes that although her sisters knew of it, 
Maria’s bisexuality had remained unacknowledged by the Huxleys until recently. As 
Murray points out, however, Matthew, son of Aldous and Mary, expressed “bafflement” 
upon hearing the suggestion. Laura Huxley, Aldous’s second wife (whom he remarried 
after Maria’s death), said that she did not know of it: Murray, Aldous Huxley, 72. Ma-
ria’s bisexuality is also discussed by David King Dunaway in his Huxley in Hollywood 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1989), but it is more recently given context in Dunaway’s 
more recent book, Aldous Huxley Recollected: An Oral History (London: SAGE, 1999). It 
is here that Ellen Hovde, Aldous and Maria’s daughter-in-law (and Matthew Huxley’s 
wife) writes that 
Maria, goodness knows, was a bisexual. She was not offended by Aldous’s interest 
in other women. She didn’t want to anything to get hot enough to break them up, 
but they were interested in exploring what everything was all about. I think by the 
time I knew them that had cooled out and they were interested in exploring psychic 
phenomena. (92). 
 See also: Stan Lauryssens, Mijn Heerlijke Nieuwe Wereld: Leven en Liefdes van Maria Nys 
Huxley (Leuven: Uitgeverij Van Halewyck, 2001); Chris Hastings, “Huxley’s marriage 
‘no sham’: family: Bisexual wife bedded Garbo, Dietrich, new book claims,” The Otta-
wa Citizen [Ottawa, Ontario], 8 May 2000: A16; Chris Hastings, “Huxley Family Balks 
at Sex Claims,” The Vancouver Sun [Vancouver, B.C.], 9 May, 2000: C6. James Sexton dis-
cusses Maria’s relationship with Mary Hutchinson, who Sexton described as “another 
fashionable Bloomsbury hostess and wife of a prominent barrister.” Sexton notes that 
a “three-sided relationship between the Huxleys and Mary... reached its peak in 1925.” 
See Sexton, ed., Selected Letters, 5.
138 See Konstandinos Kalimtgis, David Goldman, and Jeffrey Steinberg, Dope Inc.: Brit-
ain’s War Against The U.S. (New York: New Benjamin Franklin Publishing House, 1978). 
In this sensationalist book, the authors make a range of bold, unsubstantiated claims 
about Huxley, including that D.H. Lawrence was Huxley’s “homosexual lover” (366), 
citing Clark’s The Huxleys, but giving no page reference. There is nothing in Clark’s bi-
ography of the Huxley family to suggest that Huxley had been a homosexual or bisex-
ual; in fact, Clark notes that Lawrence’s feelings for Huxley were nothing more than 
“mixed.” (See Clark, The Huxleys, 231). The authors of Dope Inc. also claim that the 
“case officer” for Britain’s Opium War was Aldous Huxley,” citing Bedford’s biography 
as evidence, but again giving no page reference. Finally, the authors also assert that 
Huxley was instrumental in founding a nest of Isis cults in Southern California 
and in a San Francisco suburb called Ojai—which consisted of several hundred de-
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While Bachardy stresses that his claim is only on “instinct” and relies on “no 
evidence,” Bachardy’s speculations conform to the testimony of others. For 
Huxley was, as Dunaway writes,
one of those men—there are quite a few of them—who actually find lesbian 
women attractive or masculine: women who have lesbian tendencies are more 
attractive to them than just ordinary heterosexual women. 139 
In any case, it is arguable that, following Klein, Huxley’s capacities to love 
and to fully accept the reality of humans’s biological impulses, including 
perhaps his own sexual drives and those of his first wife Maria, contributed 
to his ideas about the body as much as they permitted him to cope during 
his difficult youth. When Huxley faced what Clark describes as “the blud-
geonings” of “his mother’s death, blindness [and] Trev’s suicide,” his capaci-
ty for love allowed him to remain mindful of what he would later identify as 
the virtue in “accepting the horror of life and saying to oneself that in spite 
of everything, the universe is good.” 140 
“One never loves enough,” is also the “theme song” that Laura, Huxley’s 
second wife, attributes to him. This was a song that “increased in intensity” 
ranged worshippers of Isis and other Gods (367).
 What the authors refer to here is unclear, although it is notable that Huxley founded 
a private coeducational school in Ojai called the Happy Valley School with Annie Be-
sant and J. Krishnamurti, among others. See http://www.besanthill.org/about/history/
founders/index.html, accessed 20 January, 2014. The authors also claim that Humphry 
Osmond was the “Huxleys’ private physician” (368). These claims are not supported by 
the works the authors cite, which include the biographies mentioned above, nor are 
these claims confirmed by Nicholas Murray’s biography or Dunaway’s books, which 
the authors do not cite. As Firchow argues, “Huxley’s partial responsibility for the 
spread of knowledge about psychedelics is undeniable; but that he was the “Daddy 
of LSD” is not true.” Firchow then quotes from a letter written to Osmond of July 22, 
1956, in which Huxley writes
I think the matter [of these drugs] should be discussed, and the investigations de-
scribed, in the relative privacy of learned journals, the decent obscurity of mod-
erately high-brow books and articles. Whatever one says on the air is bound to be 
misunderstood...
 See Peter Firchow, Aldous Huxley: Satirist and Novelist (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press 1972); Huxley to Osmond, 22 July 1956 (Letter 751), in Smith, Letters, 802-
3. Critics of Huxley have quoted his lines about heroin to discredit him, often not real-
ising that heroin was, at the time of Huxley’s words, a legal drug, often used for colds 
as well as pain relief during child-birth. In Antic Hay, Gumbril Junior will ask: “Who 
lives longer? the man who takes heroin for two years and dies, or a man who lives on 
roast beef, water and potatoes ‘till ninety-five? One passes his twenty-four months in 
eternity. All the years of the beefeater are lived only in time” (AH, 227).
139 Dunaway, Aldous Huxley Recollected, 89.
140 Clark, The Huxleys, 350. 
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after 1955—the year in which Maria died and, not long after, when Laura first 
used mescaline with Huxley. 141 In an address before a “prodigious group of 
people, all doctors, PhDs, [and] probably Nobel Prize winners,” Laura writes, 
Huxley could only advise his audience to “Try to be a little kinder to each oth-
er.” That Huxley was, according to Laura, embarrassed that “after forty-five 
years of research and study” this was “the best advice” he could “give to peo-
ple,” is a fact that reflects not Huxley’s intellectual failure but the silliness he 
felt in realising the greater importance of this piece of wisdom than all else 
that he had learned. 142 As I have already intimated, Huxley’s reluctance to 
engage in excessive introspection also serves as an exemplary counterpoint 
to certain diagnostic descriptions of psychotic mental disorders, such as the 
following description of schizophrenia advanced by Louis Sass: 
In many cases of schizophrenia, it does make sense to interpret the loss of 
self as involving an exigent introspection [where] the suspicious scrutinizing 
seems to break beyond the realm of philosophical speculation or aesthetic ex-
perience to supplant the ordinary modes of everyday life. 143 
If exigent introspection operates as the radical counterpoint to good men-
tal health, it might also function as the antinomy to the “profession” that 
demands the “artist” commit what Huxley—as in his letter to Strousse—felt 
was a ritual suicide. This is the sacrificial rite that Huxley felt was required of 
him by his readership. 144 While the inflection of Huxley’s reference to suicide 
had been overlain by a satirical somberness—just as much of Huxley’s 1920s 
writing had been—his allusion to the honourable, voluntary death ritual 
remains instructive. Here the death of the Japanese samurai displaces the 
141 Laura Huxley, This Timeless Moment, 117.
142 Ibid. Also see Ganga White June, “Interview with Laura Huxley” (1998), available at 
http://www.whitelotus.org/interviews/with_laura.html, accessed 21 March 2014; Hus-
ton Smith, “Aldous Huxley—A Tribute,” The Psychedelic Review 1 no. 3 (1964), repr. in 
Huxley, Moksha, 290-1.
143 Louis A. Sass, “Introspection, Schizophrenia and the Fragmentation of Self,” Repre-
sentations 19 (1987): 1-34, esp. 15.
144 On the subjects of love and suicide, I simply note that, following Justin Clemens, that 
when discussing love, Lacan went so far as to suggest in response to Jean Hyppolite 
that “love is a form of suicide.” See Clemens, “Love as Ontology; or Psychoanalysis 
Against Philosophy,” in Psychoanalysis is an Antiphilosophy, 58n38. Also see Jacques 
Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book 1: Freud’s Papers on Technique 1953-1954, 
ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, tr. John Forrestor (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 149. On love 
and the “two-world” crossing of caritas (charity) and cupiditas (desire), which is analo-
gous in my analysis with the chiasmus (and with what might be called the neurosis and 
psychosis of love), see Beatrice Marovich, “Thing Called Love: That Old Substantive 
Relation,” Speculations 3 (2012): 43-68.
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Christological “sacrifice” narrative of Jesus’s crucifixion; and it prefigures 
Huxley’s theological turn to Eastern theology some twenty years later—an 
interest that nonetheless began in his undergraduate years at Oxford’s Bal-
liol college. 145 An allusion that is all the more significant in the aftermath of 
Huxley’s brother Trevenen’s suicide (an act that took place “while” ‘Trev’ had 
been, according to the coroner, “temporarily insane”), this reference also 
registers as a kind of complaint; it signifies Huxley’s deep-seated yearning to 
be the author of his own destiny, and to resist losing control. 146 
An essay that is illustrative of Huxley’s desire to maintain mental control 
is his “The History of Tension” of 1956. Exhibiting Huxley’s optimism for the 
capability of drugs to generate synthetic or enhanced modes of self-control, 
Huxley argues for the ways in which one must “release tension.” And later, in 
his related essay, “Drugs that Shape Men’s Minds” (1958), Huxley will quote 
Bergson in proposing that drugs bring into effect a “psychic disposition” 
that, while always “there, potentially” lies dormant until it receives “a signal 
to express itself in action” (DsMM, 155). 147 By resisting self-introspection, the 
individual may release tension and enhance control through “autocondition-
ing” (HOT, 126). This serves to counteract any force that might generate what 
Louis Sass describes as “the passivization or other fundamental distortions 
of the normal self-world relationship.” It might also allow for the kinds of 
psychological alterations that, through “thoughts, actions, feelings, or per-
ceptions,” may have been previously “imposed” on the individual: fashioned, 
as Sass notes, “under the control of some external being or force.” 148 
At the frontier between psychoanalysis and psychiatry, Huxley navigates 
the distinction between private control and the fallible history of medicine. 
Confirming the non-existence of a range of imaginary disorders, such as 
145 See Clark, The Huxleys, 168; Huxley to Dilip Kumar Roy (date unknown), in Sisirkumar 
Ghose, Aldous Huxley: A Cynical Salvationist (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), 
187. Also see A.A. Mutalki Desay, “India and Aldous Huxley: A Symbiotic Relationship,” 
in Sumita Roy, Annie Pothen, K.S. Sunita, eds., Aldous Huxley and Indian Thought (New 
Delhi: Sterling, 2003), 26-36, esp. 29.
146 Clark, The Huxleys, 164.
147 See Aldous Huxley, “History of Tension,” in Moksha, 121-28; Henri Bergson, Two Sourc-
es of Religion and Morality, tr. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton (London: Mac-
millan and Co., 1935), 186.
148 Sass offers a helpful discussion of German psychiatrist Kurt Schneider’s list of “First 
Rank Symptoms” for schizophrenia: “Introspection,” 4. As Huxley notes, he borrows 
the term “autoconditioning” from Duke University sociology professor Hornell Hart: 
see Hart, Autoconditioning: The New Way To a Successful Life (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
1956). 
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“a medieval stomach-ache,” Huxley highlights the very personal and embod-
ied nature of disease:
no such thing as a specifically Neolithic focal infection, a characteristically 
Victorian neuralgia, or a New Deal epilepsy. So far as the patient is concerned, 
the symptoms of his illness are a complete personal experience, an experi-
ence to which the public life of nations... or events... discussed in scientific 
journals and literary reviews are totally irrelevant (HOT, 117).
Each an immaterial force its own right, every single disease is idiopathic 
or sui generis. And if none is translatable it is precisely because it “tends 
to narrow the patient’s awareness until, in extreme cases, he is conscious 
of nothing but himself” (HOT, 118). For this reason the history of illness is 
also incapable of being understood “as experience,” and must instead be 
understood only “as medicine.” A universal phenomenology of disease is 
impossible, Huxley argues, just as medicine can be nothing more than the 
“history of theories about the nature of diseases and of the recipes employed 
at different times for their treatment” (HOT, 118). 
But if in refuting the proposition that mental disorders are generalisa-
bile Huxley repudiates the possibility of a phenomenological medicine, this 
appears to be an inadvertent consequence of his observations. For Huxley 
himself valorises William James’s descriptions of alcohol and even religion 
as keys to the “transcendent to the world of everyday experience” (HOT, 121). 
Arguing that the treatment for “tension” and other “psychosomatic disor-
der[s]” might involve the education system’s incorporation of “a few simple 
courses in the art of controlling the autonomic nervous system and the sub-
conscious mind,” Huxley proposes that students “carry [their own] resolu-
tions into practice” (HOT, 126). But students should also be made vigilant, 
Huxley argues, against “herd poison,” having already been exposed to “the 
absurd and discreditable secrets of propaganda” (HOT, 126). And finally, Hux-
ley recommends that young students must embrace the “pharmacological 
revolution” that will occur, he writes, “whether we like it or not,” and which 
will allow for the discovery of “scores of new methods for changing the qual-
ity of consciousness” (HOT, 127). 
Much like his brother Julian and his colleague and close friend, the bio-
chemical psychiatrist Humphrey Osmond, Huxley imagines “breaking” the 
“dominance of psychoanalytic theory in (American) psychiatry.” Conceiving 
of disease “on the animal level,” and as “exclusively biological,” Huxley notes 
that “the disease of tension” for instance, 
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seems to have arisen under all cultural conditions—in shame cultures as in 
guilt cultures, in primitive cultures no less than developed cultures... (HOT, 
118). 149 
However, Huxley also accepts that biological distress, such as that caused by 
a traumatic event, could also affect biology, producing even further mental 
distress. In The Doors of Perception, he rhetorically asks the following: “Is the 
mental disorder due to a chemical disorder? And is the chemical disorder 
due, in its turn, to psychological stress affecting the adrenals?” (DOP, 3) 
Meditating on the relation of psychology and biology, Huxley thus resists 
dualistic explanations of the subject-object relation and increasingly consid-
ers the human as an “amphibian,” that is, as a being who resides between 
the aquatic and non-aquatic, and the biological and psychological worlds 
(EOA, 9). For all his resistance to self-analysis, then, what else dominates in 
Huxley’s thought is his recurrent belief in the human as a biologically deter-
mined animal. 
This chapter has shown how much of this view of the world had been 
“gifted” to Huxley by his grandfather. However, Huxley arguably went fur-
ther than his grandfather in expressing and developing this view, nurturing 
an interest in the metaphysical imagery of the East in his later years—in 
addition to the scientific and evolutionary classification schemata he had 
learned from Western science in his young adulthood. And it is to this limb 
of Huxley’s epistemology that the following chapter shall now turn.
149 I have already cited the paper that Julian Huxley and Humphry Osmond (et. al) pub-
lished in Nature in 1964. It is De Bont, “Schizophrenia, Evolution and the Borders of 
Biology,” 144-59. For more recent work on the psychobiological basis of schizophre-
nia, see Takeshi Sakurai, et. al., “Schizophrenia Research in 2013: Are we Making 
Progress?” Neurobiology of Disease 53 (2103): 1-2. On the relatively new atractin, pan-
tonate-kinase2, oxytocin, and arginine-vasopressin hypothesis (linked with what was 
formerly known as Hallervorden Spatz Syndrome), see Omri Teltsh, et. al., “Oxytocin 
and Vasopressin genes are significantly associated with schizophrenia in a large Ar-
ab-Israeli pedigree,” International Journal of Neuropsychopharmacology 15 (2012): 309-
19. Also see Katherine E. Burdick, Benjamin Glicksberg, and Gary Donohue, “Genetic 
Influences on Cognition on Schizophrenia,” (chapter 10) in Cognitive Impairment in 
Schizophrenia: Characteristics, Assessment and Treatment, Phillip D. Harvey, ed. (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge, 2013), 161-75, esp. 166-9.
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Chapter Six
An “Amphibical”  
Anthropology 1
in the 1950s, during what was perhaps the apotheosis of his biological deter-
minism, Aldous Huxley came to adopt a view of humans as amphibians. To 
apprehend the human simply as an animal, however, would be to dismiss, 
he thought, our capacity for language—and to conceive of this diacritical 
distinction between human and nonhuman simply as anomalous: as an 
evolutionary nicety. And yet for Huxley, to think of the human as an am-
phibian is to treat consciousness with jesting indifference. As with Balzac’s 
Comédie Humaine, Huxley’s “amphibical” writing suggests that what we 
understand as special about humans is the same force that produces what 
is, for him, the grand comedy of biological life. Replete with predictable 
and oftentimes apparently automatic gestures, human bodies illustrate in 
their histrionic vitality the very proof of what TH had argued for all his life: 
epiphenomenalism. 2 
In the early twentieth century, when William James discovered that 
laughing gas could produce in humans what Marcus Boon calls an “anes-
thetic revelation”—enabling him to collapse Hegelian distinctions into the 
1 I borrow this title from a chapter title in Peter Sloterdijk’s Neither Sun Nor Death, tr. 
Steve Corcoran (New York: Semiotext(e), 2011), 303.
2 It is perhaps worth noting here that Huxley made continued reference to Balzac’s 
Comédie Humaine throughout his life and, in “Hocus-Pocus,” Huxley observes that 
it was Balzac’s “serious” interest in the science of “Lavater, Gall and Mesmer,” that 
led Balzac to offer “pseudo-scientific expositions of the theory of bumps and phizes 
and magnetic fluids” (OCHP, 313). Further, Lilian McNair’s analysis of Huxley’s en-
gagement with Balzac is instructive—and not only in terms of the general adoption in 
Point Counter Point of Balzac’s methods and philosophy a “materialistic philosophy.” 
McNair’s essay lends weight to my proposition that Huxley’s writing is overlain with 
structuring figure of the chiasmus, underscoring Huxley’s tendency to employ coun-
terpoint. “Instead of using complete novels as themes for his work [as Balzac was able 
to do],” McNair asserts, “Huxley, restricted by the limitations of a single book, de-
veloped a more concentrated counterpoint, and secured an effect similar to Balzac’s 
by astute and sensitive combinations of chapters, paragraphs, even phrases.” Such 
combinations develop a “construction” of “the Comédie Humaine... but in miniature.” 
See McNair, “Balzac and Huxley: A Short Study of the Comédie Humaine on Point Coun-
terpoint [sic],” The French Review 12, no. 6 (1993): 476-9, esp. 477.
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“genus of which the conflicting terms were opposite species”—he also re-
alised that the nitrous oxide could be used as a perceptual instrument. It 
could, he realised, reveal how it is precisely “the mechanical nature of human 
activity,” apparently “guided by transcendental forces, that is the source of 
laughing gas’s laughter.” 3 Only two years later, Henri Bergson would make 
a similar observation when, in an essay on comedy, he would write that the 
“mechanical interpretation” of human behaviour “ought to be one of the 
favourite devices of parody.” But while Bergson and James had “reached this 
result through deduction,” it would also seem, wrote Bergson, that “clowns 
have long had an intuition of the fact.” 4
These anecdotes form two suitable analogues for the revelation that 
Huxley purports to expose in his satirical fiction: the one by which humans 
are made suddenly visible through a zoological lens, and shown to be guided 
by transparent social forces. 5 Joseph Bentley describes this optic as Huxley’s 
“anatomical vision” of human life. To produce his images, Huxley often 
takes the unrefined or animalistic elements of humans and—through a 
process of “semantic gravitation” and “satiric reduction”—produces a pan-
tomime show in which the human becomes a mind ineluctably and comed-
ically embedded in an unruly or even overruling body. 6 If anything impedes 
Huxley’s strategy, it appears in the literary mechanics: for, if humans are 
simply animal organisms, which is to say the expressions of bodily drives, 
then how might we transcend that very fact when we read Huxley’s fiction? 
And how has just such a simple animal—Huxley the—artist, produced these 
omniscient words, these zoological observations? 
One crucial explanation is that Huxley’s sardonic cynicism typifies what 
Herbert Marcuse identifies as the “Great Refusal in the language of litera-
ture.” Exemplifications of the “rationality of negation,” Huxley’s satires of 
the 1920s, as with his essays of the 1950s, function like all art in “advanced 
positions,” which is to say they “protest against that which is.” Among vari-
ous literary expressions, the
modes in which man and things are made to appear, to sing and sound and 
speak, are modes of refuting, breaking, and recreating their factual existence. 
3 See William James, “On Some Hegelisms,” in The Will To Believe: Essays in Popular 
Philosophy (London: Longmans Green and Co, 1912), 263-98, esp. 296-7, my emphasis; 
Marcus Boon, The Road of Excess, 121.
4 Bentley, “The Anatomical Vision,” 158-176; and Bentley, “Semantic Gravitation: An Es-
say on Satiric Reduction,” Modern Language Quarterly 30 (1969): 3-19.
5 See Marcus Boon, The Road of Excess, 121.
6 Bentley, “The Anatomical Vision,” 158.
An Amphibical Anthropology 275
But these modes of negation pay tribute to the antagonistic society to which 
they are linked. 7 
Using language to refute his society and its epistemologies, Huxley also 
deploys what Derrida describes as writing’s “arche-violence,” or what Fou-
cault similarly describes as language’s “implicit” violence. 8 And while for 
Derrida language is violent only when it is “logocentric”—when the text 
that this language constitutes is “supposed to correspond to reality”—Fou-
cault regards all language as violent, embracing—or rather acknowledg-
ing—“linguistic violence as a necessity.” It is imperative that there is, Fou-
cault argues, “a conceptual order.” But this is a violent intervention from 
which Foucault does not resile: “so we will make one, only we will not shy 
away from it.” 9 
Syntonic with what seems to propel Huxley’s satirical mode is what 
leads Foucault to defend this “necessity” of violence in language. As Mark 
Kelly argues, Foucault’s postulations about the establishment of a new 
order indicate his view that the only “thing to do in response to the objec-
tionable aspects of existing discourse is to establish a new violence, a new 
way of ordering things, albeit one which understands itself as violent.” 10 
But Foucault also identifies the trace of “a certain fear” that “hides behind 
this apparent supremacy accorded, this apparent logophilia” in language. 
This fear, which I addressed in the previous chapter, is a form of suspicion, 
one that is aimed at mastering and controlling the speaker or writer. It 
affects, as Foucault writes, 
7 Marcuse rails against the increasingly “one-dimensional” nature of the human, and 
argues that art, “whether ritualized or not,” proceeds by means of “the rationality 
of negation.” Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (London: Routledge, and Kegan Paul, 
2007), 66. 
8 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, tr. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 
1972), 228-9.
9 Mark Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault (London: Routledge, 2009), 24. 
Kelly goes on to assert that Derrida is aligned with Nietzsche in a way that Foucault, 
and in my reading Huxley, is not. Arguing that while for Derrida there is “nothing but 
signs”—that is, “no outside of signification”—Kelly says that for Foucault, contrasting-
ly, there is such an outside: “it is the antagonism inherent in nature that is the basis 
for the discontinuity of language with previously-existing reality.” For the purposes 
of my argument, it is this discontinuity of language that Huxley seeks to exploit in 
his early satirical fiction; although, rather than simply the case that “nature” at large 
is the source of discontinuity, it is for Huxley the human in its totality that is discon-
tinuous, paradoxical, and chiasmic. As Bentley puts it, Huxley sees the human as “a 
total, or unselective image of an object [that] would include all the known facts about 
it—high facts as well as low facts... ” Bentley, “The Anatomical Vision,” 169. 
10 Ibid., 25.
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the great proliferation of discourse, in such a way as to relieve its richness of 
its most dangerous elements; to organise its disorder so as to skate round its 
most uncontrollable aspects. 11
Just as Huxley’s desire to control his own body is evident in his adoption of 
the Bates Method and the Alexander Technique—about both of which he 
writes in The Art of Seeing—Huxley’s desire for psychophysical control will 
also prompt his drug experimentation in the 1950s. It is precisely to control, 
through language, the bodies of others—perhaps even as a substitution for a 
lack of control over his own body—that Huxley produces what Bentley calls 
his “art of satiric reduction.” In the “tradition of Aristophanes, Rabelais, and 
Swift,” Bentley writes, Huxley “often evokes the image of man as a totally 
physiological being, as a grotesque animal, preposterously convinced of his 
spirituality and refinement.” 12 
Reducing humans to their excretory and other biological functions, 
Huxley gives us his “most obvious self-projection” in the personage of Philip 
Quarles in Point Counter Point. Quarles is what Norman Carlin describes as 
a “cosmobiological” novelist; he combines his research on the reproductive 
processes of animals (in the case of the novel, rare fish) with his observations 
on the cosmopolitan and “amorous intrigues of the Bloomsbury sophisti-
cates.” 13 In a series of paronomastic references to fish, Molly d’Exergillod 
calls Philip “The Zoologist of Fiction,” for he is both “learnedly elfish,” and 
“a scientific Puck” (PCP, 114). At a later point, Philip himself will decide to 
make the fictional novelist who appears in his novel a biologist, generating 
a triadic mise en abyme of Huxley, Quarles, and Quarles’s novelist character:
Since reading Alverdes and Wheeler I have quite decided that my novelist 
must be an amateur zoologist. Or, better still, a professional zoologist who is 
writing a novel in his spare time. His approach will be strictly biological, He 
will be constantly passing from the termitary to the drawing-room and the 
factory, and back again. He will illustrate human vices by those of ants, which 
neglect their young for the sake of intoxicating liquor exuded by the parasites 
that invade their nests (PCP, 414).
11 See Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 227.
12 Bentley, “Semantic Gravitation,” 3. As Bentley notes, Huxley condemns Swift for his 
intolerance toward such matters as human defecation: 177.
13 See the description of Quarles as “cosmobiological” in “The Ant in Literature” in Nor-
man Carlin, et al., eds., Notes From The Underground: A Myrmecological Newsletter, 
Museum of Comparative Zoological Studies (Cambridge: Harvard, 1990), 2, available at 
http://www.notesfromunderground.org/nfu5.pdf, last accessed December, 2013. Bent-
ley, “Semantic Gravitation,” 6. Incidentally, Bentley quizzically attributes the inven-
tion of the title “The Zoologist of Fiction” to Quarles himself, 53.
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If the structure that assembles Huxley and these characters into a novel is 
chiastic or symbiotic, it is so because this assemblage represents another 
instance in which Huxley’s “mixed up starting points” promote psychobi-
ographical investigation, and lead us back to that essential shape or psycho-
trope, which I introduced in chapter 4 and 5. Thus, having read Alverdes and 
Wheeler, Quarles will begin to write like them. But does this repetition and 
imitation—this mimicry—not also suggest that Huxley will have himself 
previously read Alverdes and Wheeler, and that he has also begun to write 
like them too? 14 But Huxley’s decenterings and mix ups are not restricted to 
substitutions among fictional and non-fictional humans. What is indicated 
in the novel’s observations about its characters is Huxley’s view of them as 
animals: Quarles, for Molly, is a fish; and later, Beatrice Gilray will become 
“ant-like” in her industriousness (PCP, 225).
If these zoological and animal metonyms in Huxley’s 1920s fiction per-
sist in his essays of the 1950s, they are in these later works less comedic than 
directly philosophical. In the declarative opening of his 1956 essay “The 
Education of an Amphibian,” for instance, Huxley describes the human in 
unambiguously direct language, not very different that which TH had once 
deployed:
Every human being is an amphibian—or, to be more accurate, every human 
being is five or six amphibians rolled into one. Simultaneously or alternately, 
we inhabit many different and even incommensurable universes (EOA, 9). 15
Dividing these “incommensurable universes” by means of his figuration of 
“amphibiousness,” Huxley’s essay illustrates how in moving between the 
“world of experience and the world of notions” humans also move between 
the “world of direct apprehension of Nature, God, and ourselves, and the 
world of abstract, verbalized knowledge about these primary facts” (EOA, 7). 
Huxley had expressed his view of humans as amphibians for the first 
time two years earlier in his foreword to Jiddu Krishnamurti’s The First and 
Last Freedom. In a way that reads as resolute and newly vociferous, Huxley 
crystallises what had been, throughout his life, his chiastic ontology: 
14 See Jerome Meckier, “Quarles Among the Monkeys: Huxley’s Zoological Novels,” in 
Aldous Huxley, Bloom’s Critical Views: New Edition, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: In-
fobase, 2010), 59-78, 77n13.
15 Also see Peter Firchow, “Aldous and Julian: Men of Letters, Men of Science,” Aldous 
Huxley Annual 4 (2004): 205-25, esp. 205.
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Man is an amphibian who lives simultaneously in two worlds—the given and 
the homemade, the world of matter, life and consciousness and the world of 
symbols (FLF, 9). 16 
While Huxley’s formulation highlights the adaptability of those who can 
live between two worlds, it also evinces a certain pessimism; it expresses a 
kind of bathos about the potential of human thought, and thinks morosely 
of epistemology. Despite the talents of “logicians and semanticists,” Huxley 
argues, none has reached any answer to the “fundamental problem of the 
relationship of man in his psycho-physical totality, on the one hand, and his 
two worlds, of data and symbols, on the other” (FLF, 11). 
For Huxley, this fundamental problem can only be addressed in terms of 
the entire “psycho-physical instrument” of the human and its environment 
(EOA, 12). For if ever since Galen it has been the task of medicine to locate 
the “cause which produces damage” and to identify the “localization of a 
disease” in the case of any affliction, then Huxley similarly conceives of the 
human’s split-subjectivity as a medical problem; he seeks, therefore, a princi-
pal cause (an aitia proegoumene) for human illness. Seemingly in agreement 
with such philosophers of medicine and psychiatry as Georges Canguilhem, 
Huxley approaches the problem of the twentieth-century human not as a 
range of discrete problems, but as a singular and uniform condition. 17 It is 
an approach that Canguilhem describes in detail:
The problem of pathological structures and behaviors in man is enormous. A 
congenital clubfoot, a sexual inversion, a diabetic, a schizophrenic, pose in-
numerable questions which, in the end, refer to the whole anatomical, embry-
ological, physiological and psychological research. It is nevertheless our opin-
ion that this problem must not be broken up and that chances for clarifying it 
are greater if it is considered en bloc than if it is broken down into questions 
of detail. 18
16 Huxley would also write in this foreword that “It is through self-knowledge, not 
through belief in somebody else’s symbols, that a man comes to the eternal reality, in 
which his being is grounded” (12). For an insightful discussion of the satirical way in 
which Huxley viciously portrays Krishnamurti as “the obnoxious Murugan, future rul-
er of Pala,” see Jerome Meckier, “Enemies of Utopia: Young Krishnamurti and Madam 
Blavatsky in Aldous Huxley’s Island,” Aldous Huxley Annual 10/11 (2010/11): 299-316. 
17 I rely here on Luis Peset’s historical overview of medicine’s development. See “On The 
History of Medical Causality,” in Corinna Delkeskamp-Hayes and Mary Ann Gardell 
Cutter, eds. Science, Technology, and the Art of Medicine: European-American Dialogues 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), 57-74..
18 Georges Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 
33.
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Huxley’s discovery that human afflictions are integral or unitary, rather than 
discrete “unicities” (as in nineteenth-century psychiatry), anticipates the 
emergence of holistic or integrative medicine in the years after his death. 
Precisely this kind of whole-person approach to health is given lucid ex-
pression in the “pragmatic holism” practised by the Palanese institutions 
in Island, for instance (IsLAnd, 78). Imagining a method of “schooling” or 
“training” in which, as Huxley writes in his “Amphibian” essay, the “de-
bauched kinaesthetic sense may be restored to its pristine integrity” (EOA, 
13), Huxley mourns the specialisation of medicine at the same time as he 
commiserates education’s specialised efficiencies (see IsLAnd, 210). 19 “In all 
the activities of life,” Huxley writes,
from the most trivial to the most important, the secret of proficiency lies in an 
ability to combine two seemingly incompatible states—a state of maximum 
activity and a state of maximum relaxation. The fact that these incompatibles 
can actually coexist is due, of course, to the amphibious nature of the human 
being. That which must be relaxed is the ego and the personal subconscious, 
that which must be active is the vegetative soul and the not-selves which lie 
beyond it. The physiological and spiritual not-selves with which we are asso-
ciated cannot do their work effectively until the go and the personal subcon-
scious learn to let go (EOA, 20).
Huxley’s image of the human as an amphibian relies on a complex “sev-
en-fold” division of the mind, including a “schematic” account “of man’s dou-
ble life as a self and associated with a group of not-selves” (EOA, 11-12). 20 But 
the “amphibious nature” of the human being had already been expressed as 
an important psychotrope by a range of evolutionary scientists in the nine-
teenth century. It was not until Darwin had taken seriously the power of the 
amphibian as an important explanation for evolution and metamorphosis 
in his A Naturalist’s Voyage Around The World, for example, that he could be-
gin to contemplate those more complex evolutionary theories that enabled 
him to finish On The Origin of the Species. Permitting Darwin to conceive of 
such evolutionary notions as “development heterochronies” and “evolving 
convergences,” the amphibian is what lies at the basis, as Jean-Sébastien St-
eyer notes, of Darwin’s theory of natural selection. 21 
19 On “holism” in Island, see William Curtis, “Rorty’s Liberal Utopia and Huxley’s Is-
land,” Philosophy and Literature 35 (2011): 91-103, 97-8. 
20 For a thoroughgoing analysis of Huxley’s man-as-amphibian argument, see Hull, Ald-
ous Huxley: Representative Man, 484-6.
21 See Steyer, “Darwin, the Amphibians, and Natural Selection,” Evolutionary History of 
Life 8 (April 2009): 233-41, esp. 239; and Darwin, A Naturalist’s Voyage Around The World 
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But the example of the amphibian also provides Darwin a means by which 
distinguish his own evolutionary arguments from those of Jean-Baptiste La-
marck. Calling on Aesop’s fable “The Ox and The Frog”—a story in which 
a frog is shown “to blow itself up from vanity and envy until it burst[s]”— 
Darwin notes how these amphibious creatures “enlarge themselves when 
alarmed or angry by inhaling air.” 22 Darwin’s observation underscores not 
only the relationship between affective or mental stress and physiognomy 
that Huxley would describe in The Doors of Perception; it also instantiates a 
productive collision of literary description and scientific discovery.
Huxley had asked the following of butterflies in “Spinoza’s Worm”: Can 
they “transform themselves at will into butterflies? Is the miracle within 
their powers? (sW, 62-3). But now the amphibian, not the butterfly, becomes 
the exemplary figure—the special creature through which Huxley will even 
more seriously explore the possibility of biological transformation and 
metamorphosis. 23 
In 1955, only one year before the publication of Huxley’s “Education of 
the Amphibian,” it had been Julian Huxley who coined the term “genetic 
morphism,” a term he had invented in an attempt to describe the non-mu-
tational genetic anomalies that, as he now discovered, co-existed, in equi-
librium, with any one organism’s genetic norms. 24 But where Julian focuses 
on the anomalies of the body, Huxley attends to aberrant thoughts—the 
anomalies of the mind. Axiomatic in “Education” is the crucial notion that 
laguage—while it is “the greatest of all our gifts” (EOA, 11)—cannot prevent 
certain “bad habits” arising in the mind. Disconnected from the body, lan-
guage produces only a
world of light and air [that] is also a world where the winds of doctrine howl 
destructively; where delusive mock-suns keep popping up over the horizon; 
where all kinds of poison come pouring out of the propaganda factories and 
tripe mills. Living amphibiously, half in fact and half in words, half in imme-
(London: John Murray, 1913), and especially those paragraphs related to the frog’s 
bladder as “necessary for its existence” (408).
22 Charles Darwin, The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (London: John Murray, 
1872). Also see Laura Gibbs, ed., Aesop’s Fables (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
166.
23 Notably, the thyroid hormone, rich in tadpoles and frogs, was as Donald Brown ob-
serves, “the first developmental morphogen ever discovered.” Brown also notes that 
the discovery of this morphogen “stimulated the research of generations of anato-
mists, endocrinologists, physiologists, and biochemists.” Donald Brown, “Amphibian 
Metamorphosis,” Developmental Biology 306, no. 1 (2007): 20-33.
24 See Raf De Bont, “Schizophrenia, Evolution and the Borders of Biology,” History of 
Psychiatry 21, no. 2 (2010): 144-59, esp. 145 and 145n1.
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diate experience and half in abstract notions, we contrive most of the time to 
make the worst of both worlds (EOA, 11).
Here Huxley is as critical of language as Plato is critical of it in his Phaedrus; 
but where the Egyptian King Theuth identifies language as a pharmakon, 
Huxley proposes that, not only is language toxic, but it is also a poison that 
is increasingly produced and consumed en masse. 25 
And while language can infect and dissolve the body and mind in ways 
that are detrimental to the whole organism, it can also, as Huxley attests, be 
used to ameliorate and to heal. In his “Hocus Pocus” essay, Huxley’s criticism 
of Freud dovetails with his concession that psychoanalysis may in fact assist 
its subjects through its inadvertent deployment of the power of “suggestion,” 
a power that is always incipient in language:
The possibility that psycho-analytic cures are really due to suggestion must be 
considered. Psycho-analysts, of course, indignantly repudiate the notion and 
declare that suggestion is entirely foreign to their system and is, as a matter 
of fact, never practised by them (OCHP, 319). 26
What is paradoxical about Huxley’s observation here—a recognition that 
linguistic suggestion can influence one’s mental health—is that Huxley 
had also disavowed language’s potency when he had used it to satirise his 
acquaintances in his early fiction. While critics such as James Sexton dis-
pute Huxley’s claim that he was not unaware that his romans à clef might 
have offended, Huxley does appear to have been—perhaps incredulously 
to those in his circle—at least partially naïve as to the full effects of lan-
guage’s violence. 27 
Yet, when Huxley describes Crome Yellow as his “Peacockian novel,” he 
indicates not only the work’s ostentation and bravura but its imitation of 
Thomas Love Peacock’s poetic satires. 28 Despite this, when Lady Morrell was 
offended by Crome Yellow, the result was a breach that, as Bedford narrates,
25 See Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, tr. Barbara Johnson (New York: Continuum, 1981 
[1972]), 95-116, esp. 112.
26 Justin Clemens’s comments about the “paradoxical situation that renders the psycho-
analytic cure very fraught” are relevant here See Clemens, Psychoanalysis is an Antiphi-
losophy, 53.
27 Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 122-3.
28 Peacock’s satirical ballad Sir Proeteus, appeared under the pseudonym P.M. O’Don-
ovan, Esq. See Howard Mills, Peacock: His Circle and his Age (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969), 48.
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ensued that lasted many years. Aldous and Maria were distressed, and Aldous 
genuinely surprised. If the setting of the novel, the country house party, was very 
much based on Garsington, was this not a rather elegant house to its hosts? 29
As Bedford continues, if anyone had been offended by the archetypal char-
acters of the text, 
surely then people must see that all these were conceived in a spirit of 
light-hearted comedy and that their absurdities did not belong to life and 
dreary Realismus, but to a summer’s masque? 30 
Lasting a period of about six years (from 1921 until 1927), the social breach 
between Huxley and Morrell may be understood to have been a symptom of 
what Foucault describes as a Manichean struggle between “logophilia” and 
“logophobia” in his essay “The Discourse on Language.” 31 
Behind the aggrandisement of discourse in Western civilisation—or 
what Foucault calls “this apparent logophilia”—there lies a “certain fear” of 
the “irruption” of language’s most “dangerous elements” and “uncontrolla-
ble aspects.” These may and will explode, Foucault notes, “into the activity 
of our thoughts and language.” 32 Moreover, this “profound logophobia” con-
stitutes nothing less than the
dumb fear of these events, of this mass of spoken things, of everything that 
could possibly be violent, discontinuous, querulous, disordered even and per-
ilous in it, of the incessant disorderly, buzzing of discourse. 33
Offering a number of radical postulates, Foucault names the “three decisions 
that our current thinking rather tends to resist”: namely, the “will to truth,” 
the will to “restore the discourse its character as an event,” and the will “to 
abolish the sovereignty of the signifier.” 34 
Consonant with Huxley’s view of language as a device that is often no 
more than the ventilated “winds of doctrine,” Foucault’s proposal indicates 
a willingness to dissolve the extent to which individuals may have personal 
responsibility for their words. Proposing “a principle of reversal,” Foucault 
seeks to devalue the privileged position accorded to “the author discipline,” 
29 Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 123.
30 Ibid.
31 Foucault, “The Discourse on Language,” in Archaeology of Knowledge, 215-237. Sexton, 
Selected Letters, 5.
32 Ibid., 228-9.
33 Ibid., 229.
34 Ibid.
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a position that, “according to tradition,” allows us to apprehend the “source 
of discourse [and] the principles behind its flourishing and creative action.” 
But this allowance is a dissimulation and, as Foucault then argues, “we must 
rather recognise the negative activity of the cutting-out and rarefaction of 
discourse.” 35 Focusing less on individual authors than on those institutional 
forces giving rise to discourse as an “event” (see chapter 2), Foucault’s crit-
icism may be superimposed or transplanted onto Huxley’s own mode of 
“speaking truth to power.” In Huxley’s satirisation of Morrell, his patron, 
and of those others he parodied in the Garsington Manor, it might be said 
that Huxley most directly critiques the rarefaction of language; he does not, 
that is, focus on parodying these individuals, so much as the language they 
use. Nevertheless, it is also possible that Huxley chose his battles poorly: as 
Quentin Bell suggests, it remains highly questionable why Huxley, like Gil-
bert Cannan and D.H. Lawrence, might have “set out to deliberately wound” 
Morrell and her friends. 36 
That the six-year-long “breach” between Huxley and Morrell had been 
violent and traumatic is evidenced by the fact that it could not be remedied— 
not even by the “tactful” and heartfelt letter that Huxley’s wife Maria had 
written to the Garsington host in 1923. This was a letter, Sexton notes, in 
which Maria would herself acknowledge her own “logophobia,” casting hers 
as the more neutral and dispassionate voice between the logophilic violence 
of Huxley’s tongue and the rarefaction of Morrell’s even more public vocal-
isations. Writing pleadingly to the host, Maria refers favourably to Huxley’s 
new book, Antic Hay, which had only just been published that year:
I hope you will like Aldous’ latest book... it is very good, and also much bet-
ter—you know what I mean by this unpleasantly clumsy way of expressing my 
thoughts.” 37
While Maria’s subtle, self-conscious remarks betray the degree to which 
Morrell had been invested in Huxley’s work, other passages—such as those 
that appear in a series of letters exchanged between Huxley and Morrell, 
published for the first time in 2007—even more clearly divulge the traces 
of Morrell’s disapproval of Crome Yellow. Repeatedly sharing his intimate 
and personal troubles with Morrell, Huxley’s letters to the Garsington host 
from 1916 to 1920 reveal the two principal issues that preoccupied him at 
35 Ibid.
36 Quentin Bell, Bloomsbury Recalled (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 163-4.
37 Sexton, Selected Letters, 5.
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this time: first, the availability of money; and second, his being “absurdly 
miserable” for having not received a letter from his then girlfriend, Maria. 38 
But these letters also indicate Huxley’s propensity to develop his witty 
and satirical observations about others, and about the situations in which he 
found himself. One of these amusing narratives within these letters detail 
Huxley’s observations of Alix Strachey, for instance, the “sadly red-nosed and 
wind-pinched” woman whose features “spoilt her statuesque appearance.” 
One of these stories also tell of the time that Huxley visited the “strangely 
Conradesque” lodgings he had intended on adopting as his home. In what 
became a “most amusing experience,” Huxley—apprehending the sight of 
the room and its occupants as a scene “pregnant with nightmares”—is led 
to promptly “decline in haste” and “take care not to be done in.” 39 That there 
have appeared no extant copies of Morrell’s original letters to Huxley, howev-
er—including no copy of the specific letter in which Morrell expresses her an-
guish to Huxley over Crome Yellow—is a fact that makes it difficult to analyse 
the full extent of Morrell’s feelings of betrayal. As much as Morrell’s unhappi-
ness may be gleaned from the apology and response that Huxley writes to her, 
it is likely that even Huxley had understated his wrongs, and that Morrell had 
been far more offended than even Huxley’s letters even make out. 40 
Huxley’s surprise and bewilderment that Morrell “could suppose that 
this little marionette performance... was the picture of a real milieu” offers 
to him only “another proof” that “we are all parallel straight lines destined 
to meet only at infinity.” Demonstrating that “real understanding” between 
humans is in fact “an impossibility,” Huxley remains firmly of his view that 
humans are unable, or simply unwilling, to distinguish between “the two 
worlds” that are constituted by, on the one hand, “real living people” and 
on the other, “puppets, devoid of all emotion, devoid indeed of most of the 
attributes of living humanity.” 41 It is evident from Huxley’s defence of his 
novel—a defence mounted in the face of Morrell’s disdain—that he had been 
accused by her of treating his “friends with contempt.” 42 Denying this and, 
in Sexton’s view, “feign[ing] shock at Lady Ottoline’s outrage,” Huxley asserts 
that Crome Yellow merely imbues “perfectly fantastic marionettes with gen-
eralized qualities and a capacity for talking.” 43 
38 Maria Huxley to Ottoline Morrell, 1 March 1917 in ibid., 48.
39 Ibid., 48 and 56, Huxley to Morrell, c. July 1917, in Selected Letters, ed. Sexton, 56.
40 Huxley to Morrell, 3 December 1921, in ibid., 107.
41 Ibid., 108.
42 Ibid., 107-8.
43 Ibid., 5, 108.
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And while, in the strict terms of Huxley’s apologia, his fantastic work of 
fiction constitutes only a ludic “puppet-comedy of ideas,” it is also true that 
Crome Yellow had satirised not simply elements of Morrell’s persona— in 
the character of astrology enthusiast and patroness Priscilla Wimbush— 
nor even simply the folly of other members of Bloomsbury. 44 Rather, Crome 
Yellow paints a satirical portrait of Huxley himself in the character of Mr 
Barbecue-Smith, even as Huxley asserts that he “deliberately and studiedly” 
avoided making this character like “any whole or complete human being.” 45 
In the meditative title of his book Pipe-Lines to the Infinite, Barbecue-Smith 
offers a tantalising augury of the Bergsonian “Mind-at-Large” that Huxley 
would incorporate into his 1940s studies of the mind. Intimating Huxley’s 
crumbling belief in the possibility of the “faithful representation of a general 
logos,” Huxley’s philosophical defence of Crome Yellow suggests its success 
not only as a “comedy of ideas” but as a comedy of the precarity and volatility 
of language. 46 
Just as Foucault’s comes to visualise Western thought as a kind of “per-
manent anthropologism,” which is to say a succession of modulated episte-
mes that are nevertheless always already inadequate, so Huxley now comes 
to view language as the hopeless expression of what is ultimately, in the 
words of Claire Colebrook, an “anthropological sleep.” As adumbrated in 
Crome Yellow, Huxley understands the ephemerality of the logos as its fatal 
element; it is precisely his own authorial specificity—his own experience 
at Garsington—that, as it turns out, is untranslatable. In a letter to Morell, 
Huxley underscores the limits of linguistic morphology: “I write something 
which seems to me immediately and obviously comprehensible for what it 
is.” 47 But in a way that is antithetical to Foucault’s understanding of the lo-
gophilic—in which the writer no longer distinguishes between words and 
the world—Huxley is logophobic: he understands that literature is a kind of 
writing that is “separated... from all other language with a deep scission,” 
and “can never” represent the same thing as “that which must be thought” 
by the writer. 48 
44 Ibid., 108.
45 Ibid.
46 See Foucault, Archaeology, 229. Cf. Claire Colebrook, “Foucault: Anti-Representational-
ism and Logophobia,” in Philosophy and Post-structuralist Theory: From Kant to Deleuze 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995), 162-201, esp. 172 and 191.
47 Sexton, Selected Letters, 108.
48 Foucault, Archaeology, 43-4.
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In Bentley’s view, Huxley’s satirical romans à clef enable him to “desub-
limate” his psychotic feelings, ventilating and dissipating them through an 
act of “unrepression.” Writing becomes a remedy for the range of events that 
Brian Aldiss has described as Huxley’s “fatal breaks.” 49 Thus, if body and 
mind are related, then their relation parallels that which distinguishes, for 
Freud, the psychotic and the neurotic. As Bentley argues, the crucial differ-
ence between these syndromes is that while the neurotic does “not deny the 
existence of reality,” the psychotic “denies it and tries to substitute some-
thing for it,” bringing about a kind of wilful blindness or “até.” 50 Constitutive 
of the subject’s “wilful ignorance of certain low valued components,” this 
substitution then allows the psychotic to express their “dissatisfaction with 
some aspects of reality.” 51 In both tragedy and satire, Bentley asserts, “the 
work of repression” is reversed; what has already been repressed in a “dis-
placement from below upwards”—a move to which I referred in chapter 5—is 
now brought back to its origin, which is to say it is “buried below.” Taking aim 
at “all culture and all highly valued or superorganic elements of experience,” 
Huxley’s satires reveal these rarefied moments as “either displacements of 
organic functions or alembications of physiological motives.” 52 
49 Bentley, “Anatomical Vision,” 172. Aldiss notes that “the fatal break is the sign of a 
writer who has suffered a severe discontinuity in his or her private life, and generally 
early on, in the formative years, The discontinuity in life is echoed in their fiction.” See 
Brian Aldiss, “Fatal Breaks,” in Michele Langford (ed.), Contours of the Fantastic: Se-
lected Essays from the Eighth International Conference on the Fantastic in the Arts (West-
port: Greenwood Press, 1990), 4-5. Of course, mescaline and LSD would later serve to 
generate a similar “break” for Huxley, acting like a salve and showing him “in the old 
Zen way of a kick in the ass or a blow on the head... what he didn’t know before.” Hull, 
Aldous Huxley: Representative Man, 505n11.
50 Bentley, “Anatomical Vision,” 172.
51 Sigmund Freud, Collected Papers, J. Strachey, ed., vol. 2 (Basic Books, New York, 1959), 
279-80, qtd. in Bentley, “Anatomical Vision,” 172-4.
52 Bentley, “Anatomical Vision,” 174. Also see Sandor Ferenczi, Further Contributions 
to the Theory and Technique of Psycho-Analysis (London: Karnac, 2002), 85; Monique 
Cournut-Janin, “Dora: Fragment of an Analysis of Hysteria,” in Freud: A Modern Read-
er, ed. Rosine Perelberg (London: Whurr Publishers Ltd, 2005), 47-60, esp. 57. While 
Bentley and others attribute this displacement mechanism to Freud, the psychoana-
lyst’s words are relatively indirect. The notion of this mechanism appears in his case 
study of Dora, where Freud describes how the fourteen-year-old girl “[who] coughed a 
great deal” was asked about her symptoms. In response, 
all the girl could think of was that her grandmother, who was said to have catarrh, 
coughed like that. Then it was clear that she too had “catarrh”, and did not want to 
have any witness to her careful cleansing of herself in the evening. The discharge 
of mucus, thus shifted from lower to higher in the body by the use of the word catarrh, 
was even of unusual intensity. 
 Emphasis mine. Freud, A Case of Hysteria (Dora), tr. Anthea Bell (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2013), 70n1. In addition to Bentley, it is notable that in a discussion of Oe-
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As with Bentley’s analysis, Peter Sloterdijk’s detailed description of Dio-
genes’s vaunted revolution in Ancient Greece aptly describes the tradition in 
whose shadow Huxley strides:
Whereas “high theory” from Plato on irrevocably cuts off the threads to ma-
terial embodiment in order instead to draw the threads of argumentation all 
the more tightly into a logical fabric, there emerges a subversive variant of low 
theory that pantomimically and grotesquely carries practical embodiment to 
an extreme. The process of truth splits into a discursive phalanx of grand the-
ory and satirical-literary troupe of skirmishers. 53
If Crome Yellow is a “puppet-show” of satirical figures and their skirmishes, 
it is itself supplemented by a brutal cynicism that, as Julian Huxley writes in 
Memories, is likely to have been triggered or catalysed by the grief Huxley felt 
after his mother died. Throwing light on Huxley’s tendency to mock those 
around him, Julian laments that it was this “meaningless catastrophe”—a 
tragedy that befell Julia Huxley when she was only forty-six years old—that 
“was the main cause of the protective cynical skin in which [Huxley] clothed 
himself and his novels in the twenties.” 54 
Simply to understand Huxley’s cynical phase as a reverberation of this 
trauma, however, would be to discount Huxley’s own admission that, in 
writing the novel, he had desired to amuse not only himself but also those 
“first rate people” who inhabited the “best circles.” Huxley would have been 
among only a few who “dared to laugh at”—and knew how to make fun 
of—those bourgeois estates, filled as they were with wealthy and educated 
people, “especially in Bloomsbury.” 55 And while Huxley’s mother’s death 
dipalism and self-enucleation—the stabbing of the eyes—the authors note the preva-
lence since Freud of “The theory” in which “self-enucleation was an expression of the 
patient’s wish to punish themselves by castration, after ‘upward projection’ from the 
testicles to the eyes.” See Matthew Large and Olav Nielssen, “Self-enucleation: Forget 
Freud and Oedipus, it’s all about untreated psychosis,” British Journal of Opthalmology 
96 (2012): 1056-7.
53 Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason (Minneapolis: Minnesota Press, 1988), 102.
54 Sunday [London] Times Weekly Review, 12 April, 1970, 25, quoted in Birnbaum, Aldous 
Huxley’s Quest for Values, 131; also see Dunaway, Aldous Huxley Recollected, 6n8.
55 Robert Kirsch, in Lawrence Powell, et al., Aldous Huxley, 1894-1963: Addresses at a Me-
morial Meeting Held in the School of the Library Service, February 27, 1964 (Los Angeles, 
1964), 4, qtd. in Birnbaum, Aldous Huxley’s Quest for Values, 5. Also see the relation 
that Eli Zaretsky describes as between the Bloomsbury set and psychoanalysis in the 
1930s: as Zaretsky asserts, 
The integration of psychoanalysis into the welfare state began in England during 
the 1930s, and culminated during World War II. At the centre of analytic thought 
during this period was the idea of ruptured connection. Along with the emphasis 
on the mother, British analysis developed a new view of “the ego,” as ethically re-
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doubtless had a significant impact on Huxley, the origin of his cynical drives 
are as diverse and as general as those that had also driven the ancient cynics. 
As with the Greek practitioners of Cynicism, of whom Diogenes is emblem-
atic, Huxley cast a sceptical eye over the world only to affirm the view that, 
as David Mazella notes, “human conduct is directed... wholly by self-inter-
est or self-indulgence, and that appearances to the contrary are superficial 
and untrustworthy.” 56 Inasmuch as Huxley’s cynicism is of a political kind, 
then—and precisely as much is amply confirmed in Brave New World—it also 
derives from his philosophical meditation on the possibility of a “mental 
mechanism” that seeks to make, as Bentley argues, “high values descend... 
toward concomitant low values.” 
Huxley sensed the modernist paradox in which low and high values 
would be forever engaged in a play of appearances. What Quentin Bell de-
scribes as the contradiction between Morrell’s “stupendous dramatic pos-
sibilities,” and her reality—the one in which she was “decidedly dull”—is a 
contradiction that Huxley seeks to reverse in his novels. And this an impulse 
driven by a desire to reveal to his readers the way in which the “unfavourable 
aspects of the image” of reality “are suppressed or filtered out,” bringing the 
“previously excluded reality back into the picture.” 57 
As I have already noted, Bentley calls on Freud to propose that Huxley’s 
“satire is a desublimation.” Analysing an exemplary scene in Crome Yellow, 
Bentley observes how Denis Stone, a young man, narrates how his amorous 
relation to the word “carminative”—a word he has long associated with such 
features as warmth, passion, and spirit—leads only to a tragically embodied 
bathos. Stone’s high regard for the word, he relates, is what has prompted 
him to compose a poem upon it: a work he entitles “And passion carminative 
sponsible, i.e., not reflecting upon universal considerations, but rather involved in 
concrete obligations to others. This ethic expressed a new attitude towards person-
al life and represented, in effect, a “feminine” alternative to Freud—an ethic of care 
instead of an ethic of justice. 
 Notwithstanding Huxley’s cynical attitude toward the Bloomsbury set and toward 
Freud, is it not precisely this kind of relation to the mother and to new “feminine 
Freudianism” that Huxley enacts, both in his fiction, and, later, through the 1940s 
and ‘50s, in his works on pacification? See Eli Zarestsky, “Melanie Klein and the Emer-
gence of Modern Personal Life,” in Lyndsey Stonebridge and Joan Phillips (eds.), Read-
ing Melanie Klein (New York: Routledge, 1998), 34.
56 David Mazella, “Cynicism and Dandyism,” in The Making of Modern Cynicism (Char-
lottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007), 176. I note that Mazella’s description is 
taken from a 1913 dictionary definition of cynicism.
57 Bell, Bloomsbury Recalled, 162; Bentley, “Aldous Huxley and the Anatomical Vision,” 
175.
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as wine... ” 58 As Stone explains the word to his companion, Mr. Scogan—an 
older man, and a cynic himself—“carminative” is
A word I’ve treasured from my earliest infancy [... ] treasured and loved. They 
used to give me cinnamon when I had a cold—quite useless, but not disagree-
able. One poured it drop by drop out of narrow bottles, a golden liquor, fierce 
and fiery. On the label was a list of its virtues, and among other things it was 
described as being in the highest degree carminative. I adored the word. “Isn’t 
it carminative?” I used to say to myself when I’d taken my dose. It seemed so 
wonderfully to describe that sensation of internal warmth, that glow, that—
what shall I call its—physical self-satisfaction which followed the drinking of 
cinnamon. Later, when I discovered alcohol, “carminative” described for me 
that similar, but noble, more spiritual glow which wine evokes not only in the 
body but in the soul as well (CY, 221).
Praising the power of what we shall soon discover is an entirely misused 
word, Stone’s description of how defective usages of words can yet produce 
such a feeling of “self-satisfaction” allegorises the similarly misapprehending 
or defective vision of reality that Huxley imputes to Crome Yellow’s personae.
Inhabiting the “ripe and rich” manor named “Crome,” the characters live 
in this eponymous house, which is daily “basked in full sunlight” (CY, 6). 
Much like Stone and his friends at Crome, Morrell and the others with whom 
Huxley had been acquainted at Garsington also misapprehend their world. 
For Huxley, these elites’s misreadings and failures are typified in their inap-
propriate turns of phrase or—if we are to read Stone’s narrative at its most 
extreme: as an allegory for misconduct—in their outbursts of flatulence. 
In any case, if Huxley was intent on humiliating someone, then what best 
would allows him to achieve this goal, he thought, was an exposure of these 
characters’s underlying biologies; for behind each manicured appearance, 
felt Huxley, lay an embarrassing, vulgar, and mundane body, forever exceed-
ing its owner’s control. 
While Huxley’s satire tirelessly alludes to the unworthiness of those in 
high social and political positions, it is the scatological humour evoked in 
Stone’s misappropriation of the word “carminative” that most forcefully sug-
gests the power and nature of Huxley’s cynical mode. When Stone explains 
his recent “realization” to Mr. Scogan, the explanation becomes a kind of 
metanoic moment: a clarification of the point that language’s aural sensu-
ousness is an embodied sensuousness. The episode also intimates what may 
58 Bentley seems to misquote the poem, giving it the title “And Love Carminative as 
Wine!” See Bentley, “Aldous Huxley and the Anatomical Vision,” 175.
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be an aetiology for logophilia; with a libidinal and even coprophilic instinct 
for words, the logophile’s pleasure precedes and defies any and all intellec-
tual rationalisations. “It was the first time I had ever committed the word to 
writing,” Stone says, 
and all at once I felt I would like lexicographical authority for it. A small En-
glish-German dictionary was all I had at hand. I turned up C, ca, car, carm. 
There it was: “Carminative: windtreibend.” “Windtreibend!” he repeated. Mr. 
Scogan laughed. Denis shook his head. “Ah,” he said, “for me it was no laugh-
ing matter. For me it marked the end of a chapter, the death of something 
young and precious, There were the years—years of childhood and innocence 
–when I had believed that carminative meant—well, carminative. And now, 
before me lies the rest of a life—a day, perhaps, ten years, half a century, when 
I shall know that carminative means windtreibend.
 “Plus ne suis ce que j’ai été. 
 Et plus ne saurai jamais l’être.”
It is a realization that makes one rather melancholy (CY, 223-24).
If a word so pleasurably expressive and “admirable” as “carminative” can 
also denote a strange biochemical compound, one that is “capable of induc-
ing gas”—and liable to make the speaker, as Stone suggests, quoting Clé-
ment Marot, “more than he was”—then how are these sensual associations 
of morphemes to be explained? 59 And when, if ever, should such solecisms be 
purposefully or even pleasurably employed? 
Huxley considers exactly these questions when he denounces the utter-
ance that “Swift thought so much of” in his satirical poem “The Lady’s Dress-
ing Room.” This is an utterance in which the poet confirms that the beau-
tiful young woman, Celia, does in fact defecate—just like all other humans: 
“Celia... shits!” Contemplating the kinds of readers and writers who might, 
like Swift, take pleasure in such “unclean and unsavoury” intimations of the 
body’s waste systems (sWIFT, 25-6), Huxley can only think of “certain idiots” 
or “blunted or hardened... insensitives”: those who delight in the “pursuit 
of horrors and disgustfulness long after the majority of their fellows have 
begun to shrink from a pleasure” (sWIFT, 25-6). 60 
And yet, despite Huxley’s apparent disapproval of this kind of biological 
humour, there is also a mystical coterie, he writes, which even includes mem-
59 See Clément Marot, “De soy-même,” in Œuvres de Clement Marot: Revûes sur plusieurs 
manuscrits, vol. 1 (La Haye : P. Gosse et J. Neaulne, 1731), 71.
60 See Bentley, “Anatomical Vision,” 177.
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bers as august as “the mystical Mme. Guyon... [and] St. Francis of Assisi.” 
This group, Huxley notes, seeks the “glow of satisfaction which follows the 
accomplishment of some act in the teeth of an instinctive resistance” (sWIFT, 
25-6). If Swift’s “hatred of bowels” may be read as the “rationalization of an 
intense disgust,” Huxley wonders, then why would Swift “pore so lingeringly 
over what revolted him?” (sWIFT, 26) To answer this question, Huxley then 
assembles in a few clauses a string of axiomatics that are characteristic of 
his ontological perspective on art. And, in his conclusion, he charts his view 
of the Derridean arche-violence of language, invoking a familiar geometrical 
analogy:
Swift’s greatness lies in the intensity, the almost insane violence of that “ha-
tred of bowels” which is the essence of his misanthropy and which underlies 
the whole of his work... Like Shelley’s apocalyptic philanthropy, it is a protest 
against reality, childish (for it is only the child whose refuses to accept the or-
der of things), like all such protests, from the fairy story to the socialist’s Uto-
pia. Regarded as a political pamphlet or the expression of a worldview [these 
stories] are preposterous... Regarded as works of art, as independent univers-
es of discourse existing on their own authority, like geometries harmonious-
ly developed from a set of arbitrarily chosen axioms, they are almost equally 
admirable (sWIFT, 27).
At play in Swift’s misanthropic relation to the external world is a puerile and 
childish playfulness against which Huxley ostensibly militates. But Huxley 
also mounts many of his own “childish” protests against reality; these ap-
pear in so many variations of childish and sincere humour in his fiction, 
essay works and, of course, his own “political pamphlets.” Neither a sim-
plistic “insensitive” nor a complex mystic himself, Huxley nurtures what is 
ultimately A cynicism about the human’s relation to their own biology. And, 
however much Huxley’s own fictions constitute a kind of Swiftian grotesque-
ry, they also function as a fanciful mistake. Like Denis Stone’s inadvertent 
allusion to those organic functions produced by a “carminative,” Huxley’s 
fiction constitutes only a “puppet-comedy of ideas.” 61
But if Huxley or Swift are childish, then their immaturity need not have 
anything to do with a stymied or stunted sexual or even intellectual devel-
opment. Dismissing Freud’s “assumption” that “young children have sexual 
feelings and desires,” Huxley mercilessly repudiates the notion that an in-
fant’s mind might be capable of complex thought. His “Hocus-Pocus” essay, 
61 Huxley to Morrell, 3 December 1921, in Selected Letters, ed. Sexton, 107.
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for instance, produces a comical image of the infant theologian or child 
epistemologist precisely to reveal it as an incredulous one:
Infants at the breast, Freud assures us, experience a genuine sexual pleasure; 
and to prove this, he bids us look at their faces which wear, while sucking, 
that perfectly contented expression which, in adult life, only follows the ac-
complishment of the sexual act. We might as well say that the expression of 
profound wisdom and rapt contemplation which we often see on the faces of 
babies lying contentedly in their cradles is a proof that they are great philos-
ophers and are thinking about the problems of free will and predestination 
and the theory of knowledge (OCHP, 318).
But if the existence of an infant philosopher is to be “gravely doubted,” it is 
only because the epithet “childish” functions as a pejorative in Huxley’s lexi-
con. 62 After all, Huxley would playfully imagine just such an image in his essay 
“The Critic in the Crib” in 1929. While ostensibly mocking Freud’s perception 
of infants as intelligent, Huxley rejects what has since become a mainstream 
psychological view of children: that they are so much more “thoughtful” and 
“philosophical” than adults are even capable of understanding. 63 
Nevertheless, Huxley’s remarks bring into relief one of the most per-
sistent problems in the Freudian oeuvre: the impasse that divides and 
extricates the infant from adult. This is what is, in Lacan’s terminology, a 
distinction between the fragmented, presubjective self—the one to whom 
the “total form of the body” appears only ever as “Gestalt,” unable to uttered 
in language—and the fully constituted subject for whom the body provides 
“the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial form” and 
to whom language “restores” their “function as a subject.” 64 
62 Notably, however, Huxley, in “The Critic in the Crib,” writes of the “profoundly phil-
osophical eyes of the child.” See Baker and Sexton, eds., Huxley: Complete Essays III, 
10-14, esp. 14.
63 See, for instance, Alison Gupnik, The Philosophical Baby (London: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2009); Alison Gopnik and Joshua B. Tenenbaum, “Bayesian Networks, Bayes-
ian Learning and Cognitive Development,” Developmental Science 10, no. 3 (2007): 
281-7; Susan Carey, Conceptual Change in Childhood (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985); 
Alison Gopnik, Andrew Meltzoff and Patricia Kuhl, How Babies Think: The Science of 
Childhood (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999); Henry Wellman and Susan Gelman, 
“Knowledge Acquisition in Foundational Domains,” in Handbook of Child Psychology, 
Volume 2: Cognition, Perception and Language, ed. William Damon (Hoboken, NJ: Wi-
ley, 1998), 523-573. For a broader discussion of children in British Literature, see Adri-
enne E. Gavin, ed., The Child in British Literature: Literary Constructions of Childhood, 
Medieval to Contemporary (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), esp. 205-6, in which 
reference is made to Huxley’s Point Counter Point in a discussion of child deaths and 
the inaccessibility of children’s minds.
64 Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function,” in Écrits: A Selection, tr. 
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As Meckier observes, Antic Hay and other of Huxley’s novels continually 
reinforce the extrication of adult and child, generating “perverse contrasts 
between childishness and maturity.” These juxtapositions everywhere “tes-
tify to Huxley’s interest in the theme of age.” Persisting even in Island, Hux-
ley’s interest in mixing up ages also explains “the bildungsroman element in 
many of his novels.”  65 But what is most perverse in these contrasts is perhaps 
their tendency to reverse upon and fold into themselves, so that each collaps-
es as many category distinctions as it reaffirms or reinforces. In Time Must 
Have A Stop (1944), for instance, grown men are imagined as Oedipal babies: 
Eustace Barnack gorges with his “unweaned” lips at the “wet brown teat” 
of the cigar that is “incarnate where he sucks”; meanwhile, Sebastian be-
comes the “gigolo-baby” of Mrs. Ockham (TMHAs, 51, 214). But what Huxley 
no doubt intends here as a satirisation of Freud also becomes a denigration 
of men as children; and if this “juvenilisation” denigrates Freud’s concep-
tualisation of children as having “profound wisdom,” it also reaffirms the 
obverse: that adults can be childish, lacking the wisdom enough to even 
mature beyond their infancy. 
What is undoubtedly Huxley’s low estimation of the abilities and matu-
rity of grown adults, however, is a theme playfully radicalised in Huxley’s 
depiction of children in Brave New World; here the children become animals, 
“made to scream at the sight of a rose” within the dark corners of the state’s 
“Neo-Pavlovian Conditioning Rooms” (BnW, 15, 18). Not every adult is prone 
to childishness, however—just as not every child is vulnerable to behavioural 
conditioning. And if Huxley remains disinclined to undertake introspection, 
he also remains unlikely to feel egotistical about his position as a “visionary” 
in the 1950s. That is, he remains indifferent to his position as an artist; for 
instance, he is never prepared to think excessively about his status as the 
“marionette” puppet-master in his letters to Morrell. And yet Huxley’s feel-
ings about himself as a kind of authority or singular exception among the 
swarthy masses also seems to be channelled—as well as emblematised—in 
Brave New World through the character of John the Savage. 
It is notable that a range of critics have interpreted the Savage’s obses-
sive consumption of Shakespeare as an indication of Huxley’s “cultural ar-
rogance”—a situation that has even led some to suggest, as Nicolas Brown 
observes, that Brave New World is “insufferably elitist.” To these critics, 
the novel proposes no less than a proposal that “the savages” (BnW, 33, 90) 
Bruce Fink (London: W.W. Norton and Co., 2002), 4. 
65 Meckier, Satire and Structure, 32.
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should be so liberated as to experience the “free play of the imagination,” 
only when so induced by the authority of the European literary canon. 66 It is 
difficult, however, to reconcile these claims with the narratological bathos 
that is constituted by the tragic death of John the Savage when he hangs 
himself at the end of the novel. 
It is just as easy to assert, moreover, that such a denouement expresses, 
at least tacitly, Huxley’s pessimism toward that which Bobby Newman char-
acterises as the “corrupting culture” devised by the behaviourists. And it is 
perhaps no less reflective of Huxley’s concession that such an act—suicide, 
that is—might be completely necessary if one wishes to sustain the illusion 
of a “pure existence.” 67 
The Savage’s suicide also echoes that incident of seventeen years earlier in 
which Huxley’s brother, “Trev,” had hanged himself—the outcome, in Hux-
ley’s words, of his sad inability to act consistently with the “ideals” he had 
“the courage” with which to “face life.” In this way the Savage’s story func-
tions as a counterpoint to those “thousands” of humans to whom Huxley 
had adverted immediately after Trev’s death, himself no doubt among them: 
“who shelter their weakness from the same fate by a cynical, unidealistic 
outlook on life.” 68
The Tempest and other of Shakespeare’s plays, however, are not the only 
literary works on which John the Savage focuses his efforts and autodidacti-
cism. When he is given a book by his mother, Linda, the Savage attempts as 
a child to comprehend embryonic engineering, poring over the many pages 
of a book titled The Chemical and Bacteriological Conditioning of The Embryo: 
Practical Instructions for Beta Embryo-Store Workers. But John’s initial enthu-
siasm for the task soon disappears, and almost as quickly as it had arisen: 
it is a “beastly, beastly book,” he laments, one whose “title alone” had taken 
him “a quarter of an hour to read” (BnW, 112). 
One part L’enfant terrible, another part the all-too-candid child, John thus 
represents the childish and defiant spirit that is everywhere disavowed and 
66 Brown, Aldous Huxley, 259.
67 Bobby Newman, “Brave New World Revisited Revisited: Huxley’s Evolving View of Be-
haviorism,” The Behavior Analyst 15, no. 1 (1991): 61-9, esp. 63.
68 Huxley to Gervas Huxley, late August, 1914 in Letters, ed. Smith, 61-2. As Woodcock 
notes, 
The third and arguably most thunderous blow to the young Huxley, in 1914, was 
the suicide of his closest brother “Trev,” whose presence and devotion enabled his 
younger brother, still half sightless and walking with the deliberate lifting tread of 
the near-blind, to find his place in the unfamiliar world of Oxford.
  Woodcock, Dawn and the Darkest Hour, 46, 146.
An Amphibical Anthropology 295
erased by the novel’s biopolitical economy. In one scene, when the Director 
of Conditioning and Hatcheries castigates Bernard Marx, dismissing him 
from “the Bloomsbury Centre” (BnW, 127), the Director characterises Marx’s 
defiance as the psychopathological residue of a poor and disobedient child-
hood. Now a persona non grata—and an enemy of the state—Marx’s public 
shaming highlights his troublesome infancy:
“... even as a little infant,” (here the Director made the sign of the T), “he has 
proved himself an enemy of Society, a subverter, ladies and gentlemen, of all 
Order and Stability, a conspirator against Civilization itself” (BnW, 129). 
As a critique of the biopolitical implications of Freudianism, behaviourism, 
and the bureaucratisation of all the sciences, Huxley’s novel adumbrates an 
epistemology in which industrial science, medicine and health remain as 
fiercely disempowering as they are ameliorative. Thus, if Brave New World 
gives literary expression to what Hull describes as the “intellectual atmo-
sphere of the time,” then this is an atmosphere that still persists—whether 
in spite or because of Huxley’s prescient vision of a technologised Gehenna. 69 
The works produced in Huxley’s time and milieu—including such Amer-
ican contributions as Harold Lasswell’s classic Psychopathology and Politics 
(1930)—were nonetheless representative of the birth of critical science stud-
ies, a discipline typified at this time by the works of Max Weber, H.G. Wells 
and Bertrand Russell. Of course, Huxley and Russell had met at Garsington, 
and it is notable that the latter’s The Scientific Outlook (1931) was published 
in the same year as Brave New World. 70 But unlike Weber’s and Russell’s tem-
pered projections, Huxley’s image of science’s new world encounters the ma-
levolent nature of the moralistic and humanistic experiments that arose as 
science advanced in the context of modernist shock. Proud to have produced 
a series of scenarios in which “biological inventions” would ensure the “ab-
olition of the family,” Huxley wrote in a letter to his father Leonard of Brave 
New World’s imaginary scope: it captured the “appalingness... of [a] Utopia” 
in which the wrong means were used to erase “all the Freudian ‘complexes’ 
for which family relationships are responsible.” 71
69 See Hull, Aldous Huxley: Representative Man, 227.
70 Ibid., Also see Newman, “Brave New World Revisited Revisited,” 63; Robert Baker, “Sci-
ence and Utopia: Bertrand Russell, Max Weber, and Huxley’s Technocratic Dystopia,” 
in Brave New World: History Science and Dystopia (Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 
1990); Bertrand Russell, The Scientific Outlook (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1931); Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1930).
71 Huxley to Leonard Huxley, 24 August, 1931, in Letters, ed. Smith 351-2.
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One such scenario arises in the novel when it is revealed that John the 
Savage is in fact the “delicious creature,” which is to say the son, of the hatch-
ery Director. Upon learning that John is indeed his son, the Director makes 
a scene before all of London’s “upper-caste,” resigning “immediately” and 
swearing “never [to] set foot inside the Centre again” (BnW, 133). Meckier 
identifies the way in which this “terrifying” episode may be distinguished 
from the “Swiftian ironies and Dickensian zaniness” that typify much of 
the novel’s action. Confirming the sincerity of Huxley’s disapprobation of 
state-sanctioned social engineering, he argues for the novel’s dreadful illus-
tration of a dystopian future riven by familial discord. 
But this scene is also a singularly sincere derision of the biopolitical con-
trol, a regulation whose vicious social critique is now all the more sugges-
tively amplified by the gravitas of its articulation as an Oedipal, father-son 
conflict. Anticipating what would be taken up by Foucault in his lectures 
on biopolitics some forty years later (in 1973-4), Huxley’s novel thus lays the 
groundwork for what Foucault will explicitly theorise as the torqued dialec-
tic between the administration by the state of psychological and psychiatric 
apparatuses, and the role or institution of marriage or the family. 72 
More than simply a history of diagnosis and institutionalisation, howev-
er, Foucault’s lectures identify, much like Brave New World, what is the less 
apparent, but more insidious function of psychiatric power. Naming this 
function the “Psy function,” Foucault characterises psychiatry as a disci-
pline that will occupy any and all of those interstices of power left unfilled 
and open by the family: 
What I will call the Psy function, that is to say, the psychiatric, psychopatho-
logical, psycho sociological, psycho-criminological, and psychoanalytic func-
tion, makes its appearance in this organization of disciplinary substitutes for 
the family with a familial reference. And when I say “function,” I mean not 
only the discourse, but the institution, and the psychological individual him-
self. And I think this really is the function of these psychologists, psychother-
apists, criminologists, psychoanalysts, and the rest. What is their function if 
not to be agents of the organization of a disciplinary apparatus that will plug 
in, rush in, where an opening gapes in familial sovereignty? 73
If Huxley’s attention to the importance of infanthood puts both his Brave 
New World and anti-Freud essay into dialogue with psychoanalysis and be-
72 Meckier, Satire and Structure, 7.
73 Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power, Lectures at the College De France 1973-73, ed. J. Ar-
nold Davidson and tr. Graham Burchell (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 85.
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havourism, it also allows him to envision that which he apprehends as the vi-
olence of the Psy function at its most extreme. Rendering what is a proto-Fou-
cauldian vision of the family as “criminological,” Huxley’s “Hocus-Pocus” 
essay detects the amusing image of the infant philosopher, only to lambast 
the Freudian baby—the quizzical figure who is now vulnerable but radically 
perceptive. 
Despite this, the prodgious infant will also be the heuristic through 
which Huxley will envision the potential of political subversion in Brave New 
World. Substituting the personage of John the Savage for Freud’s baby, the 
novel envisions a sanguine image of the child “genius”—albeit that in Hux-
ley’s work, genius appears only in rare cases, such as in this case of John 
the Savage. At the same time as Huxley mocks the idea that a baby’s face 
might reflect an underlying wisdom, he also leaves ambiguous the question 
of what constitutes the infant John’s exasperation with the “beastly” embry-
ology textbook: Is it is his illiteracy or his disagreement with the book’s mor-
al tenets that dissuades him from reading it? That Huxley himself is often 
characterised in terms that reflect his precocity as an infant (D. H. Lawrence 
described Huxley, even as an adult, as a “talented adolescent”) helps to ac-
count for what appears to be his personal reluctance to altogether disavow 
the possibility of infant precocity—even as he mocks the idea as it arise in 
Freud’s work. 74
When in his considerations of Freudianism Huxley is led to contemplate 
the infant philosopher, he elucidates a number of questions, many of which 
remain among those that are most intractable in psychoanalytic theorisa-
tions of childhood trauma and repression (OCHP, 318). The dubiety of the 
procedure in which a psychoanalyst can attribute wisdom to a child based 
on their expression, for instance, is no more, Huxley argues, than a panto-
mimed version of the ordinary psychoanalytic procedure, the one in which 
values are “read” and “accorded” to individuals based on their expressions 
and verbalisations. 
That is, where the analyst imputes to the analysand any among the skein 
of dubious traumas, affects, and experiences that they do, such imputations 
are based solely on symptoms that are detected in just as arbitrary a manner, 
as those which are imputed to “child”. For psychoanalysts can provide no 
74 See, for instance, the narrative in which a four-year-old Huxley is asked what he is 
thinking about while sitting at a window, to which he replies “Skin.” Julian Huxley, 
Aldous Huxley: A Memorial Volume, 21. Also see descriptions of Huxley’s huge head and 
often pensive expression in Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 1; D.H. Lawrence, The Letters of 
D.H. Lawrence, ed. Aldous Huxley (New York: Viking, 1932), 765.
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better “proofs” than those that are subjectively observed or in other discred-
itable ways “adduced” by lay persons (OCHP, 319). 
From Huxley’s perspective, Freud’s inability to provide evidence of a 
nexus between affect and past trauma is axiomatic. It brings into view not 
only the question of the existence of the analysand’s symptoms, but also the 
question of the importance of the trauma to which the putatively symptom-
atic affect is attributed. Nonetheless, it is difficult to take Huxley’s rejection 
of Freudianism completely seriously; for Huxley’s attention to Freud’s writ-
ing appears, at best, cursory and scant. Even among the few quotations and 
summations of Freud advanced by Huxley in his “Hocus Pocus” essay, none 
appears to be anything more than a random, scattershot line from the air; it 
is as though Huxley has read the neurologist at second hand. 
And while Huxley is certainly justified in detecting that it was under the 
influence of “Charcot’s view of the traumatic origins of hysteria” that Freud 
had initially considered “aetiologically significant the statements of patients 
in which they ascribed their symptoms to passive sexual experiences,” Hux-
ley makes nothing of the fact that Freud soon abandoned an attendant no-
tion: that the aetiological origin of a patient’s complexes could lie in any 
particular physical or biological trauma. 75 
For when Freud realised that, as M. Guy Thompson notes, “children are 
capable of repressing virtually anything that is too painful to bear,” Freud 
moderated his theory to permit this very discovery. “Fictionalisations” of 
trauma, Freud argued, could also engender neurosis. He thus accepted that 
the precipitation of negative affect or the emergence of a negative syndrome 
could no more reflect the violence of a particular physical event than the im-
pact of an imaginary one. And around this time, Freud also proposed that 
fictionalisations of trauma might substitute for, and aid in the repression of, 
an actually-experienced traumatic event; through a kind of self-deception, 
then, one might be enabled to overcome the neurosis. 76
What Lacan would later call a “méconnaissance,” then, is first proposed 
by Freud. For Freud now realises that patients are prone to misconstrue, 
misidentify, or displace the origin of their own traumas, to trace “their 
symptoms to traumas that are fictitious . . .” If this be true, Freud speculated, 
75 Sigmund Freud, “The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement,” in James Strachey, 
ed., The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 24 vol-
umes (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-1974), 14: 3-66, 17.
76 See M. Guy Thompson, “Deception, Mystification, Trauma: Laing and Freud,” The Psy-
choanalytic Review 83 (1996): 827-47, esp. 828-9.
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then the new fact which emerges is precisely that they create such scenes in 
phantasy, and this psychical reality has to be taken into account alongside 
practical reality. 77
Having undergone an almost incomparable triad of impactful traumas as an 
adolescent, Huxley ostensibly represents, as Philip Thody forcefully argues, a 
peerless candidate for psychoanalytic examination. 78 But if Huxley expresses 
a wild aversion to Freud’s method, he seems only to become so much the 
more vulnerable to this analysis, leading to the claim that—just as had been 
the case for Vladimir Nabokov’s disdain for Freud—Huxley’s anti-Freudian-
ism functions as a smokescreen, as a protest against the very method that 
might most reliably betray or denude the subject’s own neuroses. 
Regarded in this way, Huxley’s derision might be seen as little more than 
the narcissistic dismissal of one writer by another—or of one man by an-
other. Huxley’s spiteful attitude towards Freud is thus visible as a kind of 
homosocial agon, one of the kind that Freud had well encapsulated himself 
when he, after Ernest Crawley, called it the “narcissism of minor differences” 
(der Narzißmus der kleinen Differenzen), or the “taboo of personal isolation.” 79 
Naming an anxiety that “situates envy as the decisive element” in any ac-
tion, and focusing on this syndrome as it appears “in issues that involve nar-
cissistic image,” Freud identifies what is—if not the only provocation to Hux-
ley’s spite—then one of the primary forces that leads Huxley to fight against 
any and all “feelings of fellowship” with the psychoanalyst. But all of this is 
also a strategy—or a “smokescreen,” as I have argued—that inoculates Hux-
ley from Freud’s form of analysis. It functions as a “self-protective bombard-
ment of critics and criticism,” one that tends to forestall (just as it may have 
worked for Nabokov) the torrent of Freudian criticism that may otherwise 
have swamped Huxley’s novels. 80 At the same time as Huxley satirises Freud, 
however, his literary fiction—much like many of Nabokov’s novels—offers 
what may be seen either as a straightforward reproduction of psychoanalytic 
themes, or an alternative model of human experience, one which differs from 
Freud’s model only in its minor particulars: in degree rather than in kind. 81 
77 Ibid., 17-18; Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, 5-6; also see notably Leni Marshall, “Through 
(with) the Looking Glass: Revisiting Lacan and Woodward in “Méconnaissance,” The 
Mirror Stage, and Old Age,” Feminist Formations 24, no. 2 (2012): 52-76, 54n2.
78 Philip Thody, Aldous Huxley: A Biographical Introduction (London: Studio Vista, 1973), 
16-7.
79 Sigmund Freud, “The Taboo of Virginity,” Standard Edition, vol. 11 (London: Hogarth 
Press, 1953), 191-208.
80 Ibid.
81 This claim seems to have affinity with a variety of the “reversality” conjectures of Sla-
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Distinguishing Huxley from Freud, Bentley suggests that Huxley tends to 
embark less on a systematic study of individual cases of trauma or psycho-
pathology than examine the means by which images of “high values” may be 
denigrated, may be made “low” by the act of writing. Like a medieval guil-
lare, Huxley sets out to reveal the extent to which certain “cultural objects 
have been overvalued” in the past. 82 Describing this method as a process 
that moves by force of “semantic gravity,” Bentley illustrates how in Huxley’s 
work “low images are inserted into a cluster, a configuration, of high imag-
es,” such as when Denis Stone’s rarefied utterances of “carminative” descend 
into his gormless embarrassment, his humiliation at having even used as 
base a word as this. 83
But if Huxley’s diminution or devaluation of high images distinguishes 
his mode of affronting human sensibility from psychoanalysis’s attempt to 
explain it, this is not because Huxley lacks interest in specific nodal symp-
toms. Nor is it because Huxley renounces the importance of particular trau-
matic incidents. Rather, Huxley does these things for the same reason that I 
indicated earlier: Huxley is less persuaded that specific ailments are curable 
at the micro-level than he is interested in the entire “Gestalt” that consti-
tutes the original image. Thus by drawing this larger image to our attention, 
in defiling and “lowering” it in so many biological banalities, Huxley pro-
vides a more plausible theory of the curative amelioration of pain than any 
specialist can do. Bentley explains Huxley’s procedure in this way:
Previously excluded facts with pejorative overtones cause the Gestaltqualität 
of a perceptual image to decline in value. We may know these excluded facts, 
but for some psychic reason they do not generally appear in the pattern of our 
perception. 84 
Huxley thus applies what Bentley calls an “inbred frame of mind” to express 
his “rejection” of what is socially or even linguistically excluded from the 
socio-cultural imaginary. Influenced by Wolfgang Köhler, Bentley’s analysis 
characterises Huxley’s “dancing attitude” of “rejection” as a kind of Gestalt 
voj Žižek: for instance, that it is “precisely” because one wants not to suffer the con-
sequences of utilising or imbibing a particular product (coffee), that one then drinks 
the decaffeinated product. With Huxley’s writing, it seems that the author sometimes 
offers us “Freudian material without the Freudianism.” See, for instance, Žižek, Wel-
come to The Desert of the Real! Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates (London: 
Verso, 2002), 10-11.
82 Bentley, “Aldous Huxley’s Anatomical Vision,” 176.
83 Ibid.,95.
84 Ibid., 167.
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in its own right: “the given fact, [and] the mathematical constant in the 
equation of his artistic personality.” 85 
But Bentley also attributes to Huxley a particular perspicacity, a vision-
ary ability through which, as he argues, Huxley can see important elements 
where we, as readers, cannot. If Huxley sees neither the minutiae nor even 
the omissions of our lived experiences, then he perceives the more general 
“Gestalten of reality,” but he denigrates this Gestalten in his fiction in the 
same instant in which he reveals it. 86 When the romantic Mr Staithes takes 
Mary’s hand in Eyeless in Gaza, for instance, this image—this “Gestalt of 
refined female eroticism”—is reduced to the “excrement of polecats,” for this 
is what Staithes suddenly detects in Mary’s perfume (EIG, 182). 87 Similarly 
in Point Counter Point, Lord Edward Tantamount devalues the “Mozartian 
Gestalt” by illustrating to his listeners the way in which “musicians” can be 
seen, at least in evolutionary terms, as no more valuable than the “hind legs” 
of “sheep” (PCP, 34). 88
While Bentley does not address it, Huxley would come to see Gestalt 
therapists as the revivers of “procedures which were current in various 
systems of Oriental philosophy and psychology one or two thousand years 
ago.” 89 As the adopters of theories that had languished largely in obscurity 
for centuries, Gestalt psychologists were, Huxley observes, the first to see the 
potential in this wisdom, which had been “allowed to remain as some sort 
of vague Oriental superstition which we haven’t bothered about.” 90 In The 
Doors of Perception, Huxley laments that teachers had not already embraced 
Gestalt psychology:
Gestalt psychologists, such as Samuel Renshaw, have devised methods iden-
tifying the range and increasing the acuity of human perceptions. But do our 
educators apply them? The answer is, No. (dOP, 47)
And while Renshaw’s methods for enhancing vision had been part of the 
institutional program in the American Army during the Second World War, 
they had not been employed much since that time. Then, navy sailors had 
been given “tachistoscopic training” based on Renshaw’s principles, and 
85 Ibid., 183.
86 Ibid., 168.
87 Ibid., 152.
88 Ibid., 121-22.
89 Aldous Huxley, “Latent Human Potentialities” in The Human Situation: Lectures at San-
ta Barbara, 1959, ed. Piero Ferrucci (London: Harper and Row, 1977), 247.  
90 Ibid.
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this had enabled them to identify airplanes at a rapid speed and from great 
distances, enhancing their military skills. 91 Huxley, of course, as an avid re-
searcher into methods of improving eyesight, is familiar with this history; 
and it is in these Gestalt methods that Huxley sees potential to improve the 
psychophysical human. 
And yet ironically, it is this same optimistic attitude toward reforming 
and improving the body that motivates Huxley to displace and devalue what 
is already valorised in society as civilisation’s Gestalt imagery. If Huxley is 
justified to propose that, “in our urban-industrial civilization,” the “kin-
aesthetic sense” and the “autonomic nervous system” are prone to become 
“debauched,” the problem must relate to what this society prioritises above 
these senses, to what this socio-political milieu prizes more than them. 
Compelled by these Gestalts, the “individual develops a habit of using his 
psycho-physical instrument improperly,” Huxley writes; the human thus 
“loses his sense of what we may call muscular morality, his basic standard of 
physical right and wrong” (EOA, 19-20). 
It is a problem for the whole body that, “insofar as physical events condi-
tion mental events,” also precipitates a situation in which “everything [can] 
go wrong... in the mind” as well as in the body (EOA, 19-20). Irreducible to 
discrete symptoms, the kinaesthetic degradation that Huxley describes is 
aptly described by the contemporary psychiatric definition of Gestalt: 
A Gestalt is a salient unity or organization of phenomenal aspects [that] 
emerges from the relations between component features (part-part-whole) re-
lations, but cannot be reduced to their simple aggregate (whole is more than 
sum of its parts). The Gestalt’s elements are interdependent in a mutually con-
stitutive and implicative manner and the whole of the Gestalt codetermines 
the nature and specificity of its particular aspects while, at the same time, the 
whole receives from the single aspects its concrete clinical rootedness. 92 
Just as Huxley laments the increasing debauchery of the “kinaesthetic sense,” 
so Parnas mourns the fact that “clinicians are not taught and therefore not 
aware of the characteristic Gestalt of schizophrenia, of its ‘whatness.’” 93 Par-
91 Sailors would be exposed to images in a tachistoscope so that the rate at which their 
visual perceptions were grasped by them increased. See Edwin G. Boring, ed. Psychol-
ogy for the Armed Services (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1945), 297-8.
92 Parnas, “A Disappearing Heritage,” 6. On this definition, also see Sass and Parnas, 
“Explaining Schizophrenia: The Relevance of Phenomenology,” in Man Cheung, Bill 
Fulford and George Graham, eds., Reconceiving Schizophrenia (London: Oxford Univer-
sity press, 2006), 63-95. 
93 See, for example, the range of articles in Cheung, Fulford and Graham, eds. Reconceiv-
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nas’s view is representative of one that many contemporary philosophers of 
psychiatry hold; they have, like him, discovered that it is precisely the defi-
cient Gestalt “prototype”—a signifier “especially salient in hebephrenic”— 
that “eludes the diagnostic radar.” 94 Eschewing what Alfred Kraus decribes 
as the “symptomatological-criteriological” markers of physical and mental 
disorder, Parnas employs the term “whatness” as a deixis for what Huxley 
had already described in The Doors of Perception as the “suchness” or “Is-
ness” of objects (dOP, 7). 
Huxley’s interest in the denigration and valorisation of Gestalts is a 
growth from his interest in William Bates’s method for improving eyesight, 
and from his adoption of the muscle-improvement techniques espoused by 
F. M. Alexander (and featured throughout Eyeless in Gaza). It is also an inter-
est that reflects Huxley’s more general aversion to specificity, his tendency to 
holism, repudiation of dualism, and ambition to engender a totalising vision 
of reality, which is rooted in the human organism. 95 But if Huxley’s biologi-
cal determinism arose, as I argued in chapter 5, through the influence of his 
grandfather, TH, then it is a view just as crucially shaped by Huxley’s rela-
tionship with his father, Leonard. In the following sections of this chapter, 
then, I will address the impact that Leonard’s ideas had on Huxley. And, as I 
will propose, this may be seen as a history inextricably linked with Huxley’s 
problematic eyesight.
ing Schizophrenia, or in K. W. M Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard Gipps, George Gra-
ham, John Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini, and Tim Thornton, eds., The Oxford Hand-
book of Philosophy and Psychiatry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
94 Parnas, “A Disappearing Heritage,” 8.
95 On Huxley’s incorporation of F.M. Alexander’s methods into Eyeless in Gaza, see A. 
Guin Nance, “Psyche and Soma: Huxley and the Mind-Body Connection,” in The Peren-
nial Satirist: Essays in Honour of Bernfried Nugel (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2005), 278-90.
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The Enucleating Family:  
Aldous as Oedipus
The whole of philosophy is based on two things 
alone: a curious mind and bad eyesight.
—de Fontenelle 96
In order to understand the history of modern humanity and its technical constitution, 
it is necessary to go through a sort of death by exposure. It is necessary to look from 
the absolute outside into the inner world, with eyes of death or schizo-eyes...
—Peter Sloterdijk 97
in 1911, during the “Easter Half at Eton,” Huxley awoke with swollen and red 
eyes. 98 Apparently the inflammation had been the result of a contamination 
of his eyes by airborne dust or allergens; and shortly thereafter, a stye mate-
rialised in Huxley’s right eye. It had appeared after Huxley, a member of the 
Officer Training Corps, had stood guard at Edward VII’s funeral procession 
to Windsor. Writing in a 1911 letter of how he had struggled to keep “the 
rabble back with the butt end of [his] rifle,” Huxley details an unfortunate in-
cident that recalls the misfortune of those earlier episodes—at the ceremony 
honouring TH, or on his first visit to a Church—in which the young Huxley 
had also been biologically injured or affected. 99 
96 This is how the line is translated in the Henry Hargreaves’s translation of 1990: 
Bernard le Boiver de Fontenelle, Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds, tr. H.A. 
Hargreaves (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 11. In an older translation, 
it is written thus: 
Madam, says I, all philosophy is founded upon these two propositions, I. “That our 
minds are ‘curious;’” and, 2. “That our eyes are bad;” for if our eyes were better than 
they are, we could not discover whether the stars were suns that enlighten other 
worlds, or note; and if, on the other hand, we were less curious, we should not care 
whether it were so or otherwise; which, I think, is much to the same purpose.
 See M. De Fontenelle, Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds, tr. unknown (Dublin: 
Peter Wilson, 1761), 6, available at http://archive.org/details/conversationson00font/, 
last accessed 28 August 2013.
97 Sloterdijk, Neither Sun Nor Death, 216.
98 Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 33.
99 As summarised at the beginning of chapter 6, Huxley had also experienced a bio-
logically-affecting incident when he first visited a Church. Ironically, in this letter to 
Gervas, Aldous blames Gervas’s eyes for his “unintelligible” letter: “I could only read 
about half of it. Damn your bloody eyes.” Huxley to Gervas Huxley, 24 May 1910 (Let-
ter 18), in Letters, ed. Smith, 36. It is perhaps also remotely possible, assuming that 
Ernest Clarke’s diagnosis of staphylococcus aureaus was correct, that the infection had 
been contagiously or infectiously passed between Gervas and Huxley. It is most coin-
cidental that Gervas’s eyes should have been agitated at the same time that Huxley’s 
had been. As Huxley wrote in an earlier letter to Gervas, “I’m sorry your optics have 
purpureated [sic]. It must be rotten in the sun now.” Huxley to Gervas, 29 June, 1908 
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Huxley, to be sure, was a vulnerable child. While no one had been partic-
ularly anxious about Huxley’s eye, which had been diagnosed by a medically 
naïve Matron as conjunctivitis or “pink eye,” the persistence of the injury, 
and the increasingly severe inflammation of Huxley’s cornea, led Dr Henry 
Huxley and others, some time later, to attempt to treat it. 100 Unsuccessful, 
the Huxleys then consulted Ernest Clarke, the leading eye surgeon in Lon-
don, who diagnosed the condition in that year as staphylococcus aureus. Per-
sisting long after this diagnosis, however, the infection was rediagnosed no 
less than two years later as keratitis punctate: a condition characterised by 
alterations in the corneal tissues—such as the appearance of diffuse ede-
mae: plaques that which make the cornea more opaque. 101 
The greasy, white-coloured deposit that appeared on Huxley’s right eye, 
visible in almost any picture of him, would become an important feature of 
the writer’s personality. Throughout his life, it was a feature that was high-
lighted in myriad portraits of the young man, including in the photographs 
produced by Cecil Beaton, which portray Huxley as a figure of obscurement 
and occlusion, a man who was ever peering through a veil (see figures 6.2, 
6.3 and 6.4, below). The extremely painful inflammation would leave Huxley 
virtually blind for eighteen months, permanently impairing his vision. 102 Ir-
reparably weakened, Huxley presented as a tragic child on whom great
damage had been done and there he was. The boy with the immense curiosity 
about the world, the boy who wanted to read all the books, was nearly blind... 
He could not read. 103 
Far from forlorn and self-sympathising, however—Huxley when struck with 
his affliction—began to teach himself Braille. When he peered, as Joan Buz-
(Letter 10) in Letters, ed. Smith, 28; also see Murray, Aldous Huxley, 30. Pathogenesis 
of certain keratitis strains, notably, has often been considered “infectious in origin, 
specially viral, although not proven so.” Savitri Sharma, “Keratatis,” Bioscience Reports 
21, no. 4. (2001): 422.
100 Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 33.
101 As Phillips Thygeson notes in his 1950 article, 
The term superficial punctate keratitis was introduced by Fuchs in 1889 to describe 
superficial keratitis secondary to acute conjunctivitis. This disease is not generally 
known under the more descriptive name of epidemic keratoconjunctivitis.
 Whether this diagnosis was accurate in Aldous’s case remains indeterminable. See 
Phillips Thygeson, “Superficial Punctate Keratitis,” Journal of the American Medical As-
sociation 144, no. 18 (1950): 1544; Ernst Fuchs, “Keratitis punctate superficialis,” Wie-
ner klinische Wochenschrift [The Central European Journal of Medicine] 2 (1889): 837.
102 Thody, Aldous Huxley, 7.
103 Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 33.
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Figure 6.1 A portrait of Huxley, by Cecil Beaton, reproduced from Cecil Bea-
ton’s Scrapbook (London: B.T. Batsford, 1937), 130. In this portrait, Huxley tears 
“aside the veil of bourgeois respectability.” Opening a part in a sheet that has 
been torn through its middle, Huxley reveals himself to the viewer. The visu-
al metaphor in which Huxley ‘tears the veil’ also indicates Huxley’s potential 
acuity: while partially blind, Huxley yet sees more than others. The image also 
infantalises Huxley, who appears to be peer through the maternal genital tract. 
See Murray, Aldous Huxley, 246-7.
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zard observes, “at his eyes with interest in the looking-glass,” it might have 
been a particularly difficult stade du miroir through which to pass. As much 
as blindness may have forced Huxley to mature, then, it had also made a 
deep and enduring impact on his self-image. 104
To look deeply into one’s own eyes is, as Sloterdijk suggests, to incite a 
monumental catalysis, and to provoke philosophical speculation. Inviting 
consideration about the body’s organic processes and their relation to the 
experience of subjectivity, the practice prompts a process of examination 
that is as personal as it is medical. As the “organic prototype of philosophy,” 
then, the eyes’s 
enigma is not only that they can see but are also able to see themselves see-
ing. This gives them a prominence among the body’s cognitive organs. A good 
part of philosophical thinking is actually only eye reflex, eye dialectic, see-
ing-oneself-see. 105
To simply look at oneself as a human-being-seeing-a-human-being, however, 
is not enough to engender a philosophical disposition. Rather, reading, as 
Sloterdijk affirms, is of equal importance. (This is of course relevant to the 
young Huxley, who would initially have great difficulty reading after the in-
fection.) But if reading psychosomatically enables philosophical thought, it 
also leaves its own biological traces on the reader:
With intellectuals, an astounding dullness in the eyes is often evident that 
comes not least from the continual violence done to the eyes by having read 
things the eyes would not accept if they had their own way. They must serve 
merely as tools for reading; and it is no wonder when the perspective of such 
people, being used to black lines, glides right off from reality. Master cynical 
knowledge, as it collects in intellectual heads, betrays itself through the rigid 
eye blinkers and a cloudiness and coldness of the gaze... The cynical gaze lets 
things know that they do not exist as real objects for it, but only as phenome-
na and information. 106
Blindness, then—while it presents a compelling evidentiary basis for what 
would become Huxley’s biological-deterministic outlook (as well as, if we ac-
cept Sloterdijk’s line of argument, Huxley’s cynicism as a young man)—also 
presented an arduous challenge for Huxley. It called on the young man to 
overcome an impediment not faced by his peers. 
104  Hull, Representative Man, 7; Buzzard is quoted in Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 32, 32n2.
105 Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 146.
106 Ibid., 146-7.
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Figure 6.2 Portrait of Huxley in 1934 by Howard Coster, from the archives 
of Time magazine, and subsequently donated to the National Portrait Gallery. 
Source: © The National Portrait Gallery, London. Source: Terence Pepper and 
Arthur Strong, Howard Coster’s Celebrity Portraits (London: Dover Publica-
tions, 1985), 10.
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Huxley’s cousin and close childhood companion, Gervas, put the dis-
turbing situation clearly:
We were all appalled. The shock of it. I was shattered, but not Aldous. He faced 
it with fantastic courage; and a complete absence of self-pity. 107 
If Huxley’s drive to overcome the obstacle of sightlessness engendered in 
him his tendency toward satirical cynicism—or, as Bentley puts it, toward 
his Gestalt of “rejection”—then Huxley’s experience of blindness also shook 
his epistemological infrastructure. Anticipating that he would have great 
trouble visualising and examining materials through a microscope, Hux-
ley jettisoned his plan to study biology and medicine after school (subjects 
which he had already begun studying at Eton), and took up the cause of writ-
ing literature. 108 Having already expressed his desire to study the sciences in 
a letter to Julian—one that was written on the very “eve of his blindness”— 
Huxley’s change of course represents less his “endogenous” inclination to-
ward cynical philosophy than the pragmatic adoption of a new, albeit less 
optimistic perspective on the world.
Visual dysfunction and blindness has long been of intense critical inter-
est to an array of French thinkers throughout the twentieth century, includ-
ing Bergson, Bataille, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and Derrida. 109 At issue for 
all of these philosophers is, as Kate E. Tunstall argues, the primacy of visual 
metaphors in the pre-modern history of Western thought. 110 Seeking to re-
107 Quoted in Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 33.
108 Huxley to Julian Huxley, 11 December 1910 (Letter 22) in Letters, ed. Smith, 38 and 
38n22. Of course, TH’s influence did not simply have ramifications for Aldous among 
the Huxley family. Julian, a preeminent evolutionary biologist and eugenicist, was 
perhaps even more directly influenced by TH than Huxley, especially in relation to 
his views on evolution. See, for instance, Julian Huxley, “Natural Selection and Evolu-
tionary Progress,” Report of The British Association for the Advancement of Science 106 
(1936): 81-100; Julian Huxley, Evolution: The Modern Synthesis (London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1942); “Eugenics and Society,” Eugenics Review 28 (1936): 11-31; “Eugenics in 
Evolutionary Perspective,” Eugenics Review 54 (1962): 123-41.
109  Kate E. Tunstall, Blindness and Enlightenment: An Essay (New York: Continuum, 2011), 
13. My particular interest in Huxley’s blindness, is unlike, for example, the question 
asked by Christopher Isherwood (and quoted by Nicolas Murray), which seems to 
be a variation of the “purely biological” question: “How much did he actually see and 
how much did he cognize, by some kind of built-in radar?” My own question might 
be phrased thus: How did Huxley’s partial blindness enhance his philosophical vi-
sion, and in what philosophies or philosophical histories, if any, is such a vision-de-
spite-blindness featured or even valorised? See Julian Huxley, ed., Aldous Huxley: A 
Memorial Volume, 156 (emphasis in original).
110  See Kate E. Tunstall, Blindness and Enlightenment, 13 (on which much of my argument 
and historical view here is based). 
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Figure 6.3 Aldous Huxley in 1956. Portrait by Richard Avedon, New York. 
© Richard Avedon. Source: Collection of The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 
Accession no. 2002.379.55, see http://www.metmuseum.org/collection/
the-collection-online/search/284313.
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pudiate the hegemony of vision, the appearance of many of these French 
scholars’s works of philosophy coincides with the development of construc-
tionist sociologies of illness and madness—many of which similarly propose 
a challenge to the functionality of the biological mechanisms alone. 
In Levin’s words, these works seek to “challenge the hegemony of vision 
[and] the ocularcentrism of our culture” so that we may finally “see” and 
grasp the primacy so accorded to vision. This allows us, he argues, to in-
tuit how automatically we understand “ourselves as visionary beings.” But 
among these French philosophers of ocular ontology, Merleau-Ponty in par-
ticular calls attention to the “total way” in which the eyes allow us to sense 
an object “with [our] whole being.” 111 Reassessing what Martin Jay describes 
as the “ancien scopic régime”—and thus approaching afresh the pre-modern 
development in Western thought of scepticism—ocular readings of episte-
mology demonstrate how a cynical distrustfulness arose at this time, one 
that was motivated by a suspicion of knowledge that itself had been devel-
oped “on the basis of the evidence of the senses.” 112 
By dint of what may be understood as the unhappy coincidence of his 
sightlessness and intellect, Huxley’s writing anticipates and intersects with 
the philosophical concerns of these ocular epistemologists. For Sloterdijk, 
the proposition that so much of our “thinking structure” is “located in the 
eyes” is evidenced by his observation that “those who are born cross-eyed 
appear to be somatically predisposed toward a double vision of things, of 
essence and illusion, of the concealed and the naked.” So essential is the 
organic nature of vision, Sloterdijk argues, that “the organ dialectic of their 
eyes drives them on in this.” It leads these cross-eyed individuals, he writes, 
to emphasise “the dialectic of right and left, of the masculine and the fem-
inine, of the straight and the crooked.” 113 If this is true, then the chiasmic 
ontology that I have attributed to Huxley in chapters 5 and 6—as well as in 
the present chapter—may be explained quite simply, following Sloterdijk, by 
Huxley’s own particular “damaged” eyes. 114 
111  David Michael Levin, ed. Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision (California: University 
of California Press, 1993), 205; Merleau-Ponty, “The Film and the new Psychology,” 
in Sense and Non-Sense (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 48. Also see 
Juhani Palassmaa, The Eyes of the Skin: Architecture of the Senses (West Sussex: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2012), 18-9.
112  Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French 
Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 149-435; also see William Paul-
son, Enlightenment, Romanticism and the Blind in France (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1987); Tunstall, Blindness and Enlightenment, 14.
113 Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 146.
114 “Damage” is the name of Murray chapter on Huxley’s blinding accident: see Murray, 
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Nonetheless, it is important that Huxley’s impairment had also been 
foregrounded by an important family scenario. If Huxley developed his 
scepticism only after his experience of blindness, then Huxley had also been 
predisposed to this sceptical attitude before he was blinded. It was TH, for 
instance, who had maintained, and promoted to Huxley, a strong “skepti-
cism for anything that smacked of religious faith” throughout his life. 115 The 
impact of Huxley’s blindness perhaps only triggered what had always already 
been instinctive and incipient in him as a “sceptical” outlook. Perhaps it was 
a result of this perspective that Huxley refused to take his father Leonard “au 
sérieux,” admiring nothing about his father except, if anything, his literary 
endeavours—and even then only those that recalled “grandpater.” 116 
But in keeping with the general “erosion of European patriarchal struc-
tures,” which Blackwell notes had “accelerated through the late nineteenth 
century,” Huxley resisted his father’s humorous charms. 117 One of a number 
of “sons of literary families who had seen their fathers and uncles living out 
those values in ignoble domesticity,” Huxley became, as Martin Green notes, 
resentful of his apparently impassive father. And while, as Green argued, 
“fathers of these [literary] men were articulate, humorous, kindly men of cul-
ture,” there remained a significant and implacable “gap, and... hostility be-
tween them and their sons.” 118 Including Huxley in this coterie of resentful 
literary sons—a group that includes Evelyn Waugh, H. G. Wells, and Lytton 
Strachey—Green posits that “in all these cases there was an older child, who 
in significant ways stood between father and son.” 
Green draws attention to the importance of the presences of Julian and 
Trev in the Huxley family’s configuration, highlighting Huxley’s position 
as the youngest among three perceptive young boys. 119 Bedford’s biography 
Aldous Huxley, 25-40. Cf. Bedford’s chapters on Huxley mother’s death, and Huxley’s 
blindness, respectively titled “First Damage” and “Second Impairment.” Bedford, Al-
dous Huxley, 1: 24-27, 32-6.
115  Legg, “The Intellectual Tourist,” 3.
116  Sybille Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 124. The Leonard Huxley who is Aldous Huxley’s fa-
ther should not be confused with his relative and namesake Professor Leonard George 
Holden Huxley, the Australian physicist (the latter is a second-cousin once removed 
from Thomas Huxley, Leonard’s father and Aldous Grandfather). This is not to dis-
count the fact that some of Aldous’s earliest comments in respect of his father were 
exultant and as acknowledging of his paternal figure’s notable achievements in liter-
ature: “Have you read Life and Letters by my father?” asked Huxley in his adolescent 
years. “It’s a good book.” See Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 124.
117 Marilyn Blackwell, “Strindberg’s early Dramas and Lacan’s ‘Law of the Father’,” Scan-
dinavian Studies 71, no. 3 (1999): 311-24, esp. 311.
118 Martin Green, Children of the Sun, 87-8.
119 Ibid.
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adds to this portrait by illumining the peculiar competitiveness that ran be-
tween Huxley and his father, a contest that appears to derive from Huxley’s 
advanced maturity, or his self-image of serious maturity—even in his adoles-
cent years. Later, Julian would observe that Huxley maintained an “innate 
superiority, which called for respect even in the nursery jungle.” 120 
When Leonard invented and named words that were not in the dictionary 
during the family’s regular games of charades, Huxley issued correctives to 
his father, excoriating Leonard as “silly” and accusing him of wrongdoing: 
“Father—cheating again?” 121 While “invariably kind” and loving, Leonard, 
Gervas confirms, was not exactly “the kind of father that one looked up to; 
or went to when one was in trouble.” He remained, at least from the per-
spectives of Gervas and Huxley, aloof and unaware that “grown-ups were 
supposed to act like grown-ups and not like fellow school-boys.” 122 
It was in the face of Leonard’s avuncular wordplay and jocular moods 
that Huxley became increasingly obsessed by the “hard facts of scientific 
discovery and the new clarity of understanding which they provided.” In-
creasingly at this time, he also began to dismiss his apparently inexacting fa-
ther as immature. As Gervas notes, “it was this lack of respect that troubled 
Aldous and marred his relationship with his father.” 123
Serving as a model for Huxley’s novelistic representations of father-son 
dyads, Huxley’s relationship with Leonard had a significant impact on his 
fiction. 124 For Sidaway, Huxley’s relations with his parents exhibit a “great 
deal in common with [another] famous blind man from antiquity; Oedipus, 
the tragic victim of fate, to whom it dealt the worst possible hand.” 125 Iden-
tifying the extent to which “the blind, disgusted Oedipus is rampant” in 
Huxley’s debut short story “The Farcical History of Richard Greenow” (1920), 
Sidaway also observes how it is in a character developed slightly later than 
Greenow—the figure of Mr Wimbush from Crome Yellow—that we encounter 
the “pseudo-father for whom utopia” is a life lived “entirely secure from any 
human intrusion.” 126
120 Quoted in Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 3.
121 Gervas Huxley, quoted in Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 14 (emphasis in original).
122 Ibid.
123 Julian Huxley, Aldous Huxley: A Memorial Volume, 21; Gervas Huxley, quoted in Bed-
ford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 14.
124  In fact in Huxley’s fiction, we see the development of a variety of homosocial pairings 
arise between father and son, such as between the Gumbrils in Antic Hay, which are 
then just as rapidly destroyed. 
125  Sidaway, “Madness, Badness, Sadness,” 9-14.
126 Ibid., 10; see also Aldous Huxley, “The Farcical History of Richard Greenow,” in Limbo 
(London: Chatto & Windus), 1-115.
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But as much as these father-son dyads are instructive, it is in Antic Hay 
that the patrilineal vector will most vehemently explode into a simulacrum 
of Huxley and Leonard’s relationship. Defending himself against the accu-
sation of laziness leveled at him by his father, Gumbril Junior will admonish 
his father, Gumbril Senior:
“What else was there for me to do?” Asked Gumbril Junior [... ] “You gave me 
a pedagogue’s education and washed your hands of me. No opportunities, 
no openings. I had no alternative. And now you reproach me.”
Mr Gumbril made an impatient gesture. “You’re talking nonsense,” he said. 
“The only point of the kind of education you had is this, it gives a young 
man leisure to find out what he’s interested in. You apparently weren’t suf-
ficiently interested in anything—”
“I am interested in everything,” interrupted Gumbril Junior. 
“Which comes to the same thing,” said his father parenthetically, “as being 
interested in nothing” (AH, 17).
While the tense hostility between the Gumbril men already alludes to the 
novel’s imbrication with the myth of Oedipus, it is also true, as Deborah Mod-
delmog suggests, that readers of Sophocles’s myth may be tempted to identify 
traces of the narrative in almost all literary depictions of father and son. 127 
Yet, it is nonetheless apparent that it is in the agon between the Gum-
brils—an implicit tournament for the hand of Myra Viveash—that the Oe-
dipal configuration more explicitly appears. Modelled on Nancy Cunard, a 
woman with whom Huxley had himself been intimate, Viveash is the “ar-
chetype of the promiscuous post-war flapper.” 128 Breaking Gumbril Junior’s 
heart, Viveash prompts the son to attempt to improve his prowess in his 
“conquest of the fair sex” (AH, 95). 
Inspired by his Lothario friend Coleman, whose recently grown “beard” 
enables him to seduce any number women, Gumbril Junior buys a false or 
artificial beard, one that, at least in his mind, makes him appear not only 
more virile, but presumably older too—as though he were, in fact, his fa-
127 On the identification of the Oedipal myth in a wide range of literature, see Deborah 
Moddelmog, Readers and Mythic Signs: The Oedipal Myth in Twentieth Century Litera-
ture (Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993), xii-xiii.
128 See Murray, Aldous Huxley, 146. Murray’s descriptions of Cunard are particularly in-
sightful in terms of Huxley’s portrait of Myra Viveash. As Murray attests, Cunard “was 
strong-willed, certain of herself...the Giaconda of the Age.” Green notes that “Huxley 
had an affair with her [Cunard] in 1922 and was very badly treated, so in his portraits 
she is quite viciously cruel”: Martin Green, Children of The Sun, 290.
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ther. 129 While the Oedipal triangle between Gumbril Senior, Gumbril Junior, 
and Viveash partly betrays Huxley’s own contest with Leonard, it also sati-
rises the very notion of competition between father and son, providing what 
Meckier describes as the “most amusing episode of Antic Hay.” 130 
Deeply symbolic, Gumbril Junior’s beard becomes a “mournful append-
age” and an “amorous arm,” one that enables its wearer to transform from 
“The Mild and Melancholy Man” who has “suffered all too frequently,” into 
the “Complete Man” (AH, 95). This transformed man is now imbued with the 
confidence of a patriarch such as Gumbril Senior, who himself clutches at his 
beard when angered or ponderous (AH, 19, 27). In this transposition of son 
and father, the two Gumbrils are condensed into one being; the son becomes 
that “complete and Rabelasian man” who, when faced with the right “oppor-
tunities... could know how to take them” (AH, 94). The transposition of the 
beard from father to son is also an implicit affront to—or deauthorisation 
of—Gumbril Senior, one that metonymises a parricidal event, instantiating 
the paternal equivalent to what Kristeva calls a “psychical matricide.” 131
Paraphrasing Kenneth Burke, Bentley notes that satirists like Huxley ap-
pear to overcome and exceed paternal authority by acting out their desire 
to resist, mute, transmute, or to otherwise overpower the progenitor’s law. 
They seek to “demolish,” he writes, “the gods held sacred by the satirist’s fa-
ther.” 132 Gumbril Junior’s transposition or erasure of his father’s authority is 
enacted in more than simply this way, however. As Ronald Sion observes, the 
129  Bentley characterises this character as a kind of living-dead woman: “Myra Viveash 
(does [her] name mean “living death”?) seems always to be speaking from a death bed, 
expiringly and with a perpetual death-rattle in her pronunciation.” While Viveash is 
generally at odds with descriptions of Huxley’s mother, the sense of death that follows 
her in the novel refracts Huxley’s mourning for his own dead mother. In this way, 
Gumbril Senior and Junior compete for the affections of a “living-dead” woman, the 
ghost of Huxley’s mother, Leonard’s wife. Bentley, “Aldous Huxley and the Anatomical 
Vision,” 61-2.
130  Meckier, Structure and Satire, 35. As Murray attests, Nancy Cunard had lost her lover, 
Peter Broughton-Adderley, in the War and, as such, it is possible that Huxley may also 
be expressing here, through Gumbril Junior, something like his sense of disaffiliation 
from the figure of the grieving woman. This figure expresses her devotion to anoth-
er man, and in this way becomes consubstantial, symbolically, with the maternal or 
mother figure. See Murray, Aldous Huxley, 146.
131 As Kristeva declares, ‘‘[f]or man and for woman the loss of the mother is a biological 
and psychic necessity, the first step on the way to autonomy. Matricide is our vital ne-
cessity, the sine qua non of our individuation.’’ Julia Kristeva, Depression and Melancho-
lia, tr. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 38, qtd. in Alison 
Stone, “Against Matricide: Rethinking Subjectivity and the Maternal Body,” Hypatia 
27, no. 1 (2012): 118.
132  Bentley, “Aldous Huxley and The Anatomical Vision,” 182.
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many “aimless conversations” between the two Gumbrils—not to mention 
their matching names—soon becomes “so undifferentiated that it is difficult 
for the reader to identify who is speaking” at various points thoughout the 
novel. 133 Univocal and identically embearded, the Gumbrils’s assimilation 
into one another mirrors the imbrication and intertwining of Huxley’s and 
Leonard’s writing careers, an occurrence attested to by Huxley’s 1920s let-
ters to his father. 134 
The rumblings of tension between Huxley and Leonard were detectable 
even before Huxley wrote these 1920s novels, however. At an early age, Don-
ald Watts notes, Huxley had “dropped the second name, which, it might 
be noted, was his father’s name.” 135 And when Huxley’s “proportionately 
enormous” head had been compared to his father’s head—leading Julian 
to exclaim “We put father’s hat on him and it fitted!”—the condensation or 
homogenisation of Huxley and his adult father became intrinsic in the fam-
ily’s imaginary. 136 In 1916, prior to the publication of Huxley’s first book, The 
Burning Wheel (1916), three of Huxley’s poems were published in The Nation, 
erroneously under Leonard’s name. Ludically rebarbative in response to this 
misattribution, Huxley condemned the “folly” and “criminal silliness of The 
Nation,” which he said sarcastically, had “been good enough to sign them 
with my father’s name.” 
Huxley later went on to suggest the fraudulence of his father’s literary 
career, explaining that in the first time he had
heard of their publication was [in] a letter from A. C. Benson to my father congrat-
ulating him on the extreme beauty of the verses and quoting Coleridge, aptly and 
with charm, to prove the fact. And now wherever my father goes, showers of felic-
itations fall upon him and he live haloed with a reputation entirely fictitious. 137
Originally seeking to work in the law and read for the bar, Leonard found 
only moderate success in his writing career; he published his biography on 
TH in 1900 before joining the publishing firm Smith, Elder & Co. There Leon-
ard found some success as a reader; and he went on to become assistant 
editor of a literary journal titled Cornhill in 1901. 138 But it was less Leonard’s 
133  Ronald T. Sion, Aldous Huxley and The Search for Meaning: A Study of The Eleven Novels 
(London: McFarland and Company, 2010), 35.
134 See Smith, Letters, passim.
135 Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 2.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid., 1: 66; and Huxley to Frances Peterson, 23 August 1916 (Letter 98) in Letters, ed. 
Smith, 110.
138 Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 4. 
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lack of talent than his humility, as his assistant John Murray writes, that “de-
nied him the public recognition” he deserved. For “so firm was his basis of 
literary scholarship that he could afford to be gentle and humble in dealing 
with authors of every age or degree of experience or conceit.” Leonard’s kind-
liness as a critic was so unusual, in fact, that it had once led one contributor 
to remark that they “preferred a letter of rejection from Leonard Huxley to 
one of acceptance from any other editor.” 139 
Equivalents of these courteous letters of rejection were exchanged be-
tween Huxley and his father throughout the course of their lives. When Leon-
ard announced that he would be remarrying in February 1912, becoming 
the husband of Rosalind Bruce, Huxley would write what Bedford describes, 
referring primarily to its brevity, as a “pathetic” letter to Leonard. If it is 
evidence of Huxley’s implicit disavowal of his father’s second marriage, the 
letter is also testament to Huxley’s difficulty in writing at this time, when his 
eyes remained severely impaired: 140
Dearest Father
Many thanks for your letter, which, I regret to say was rather too small for 
me to read with any comfort. In fact I was only able to take the cream off 
each sentence by picking out one word in every four or so. Typewriter would 
be all right but a lot would be rather trying, I think. 141
Taking only “the cream off” his father’s words by “picking out” only a quar-
ter of them, Huxley’s letter narrates an exercise in selective reading as it also 
functions as a synecdoche for Oedipus’s self-enucleation in Oedipus The King. 
Stabbing himself in the eyes with the aid of his mother Jocasta’s “beaten 
golden brooches,” Oedipus would become similarly impaired, the trauma of 
his desires too great to bear. 142 
By not acknowledging his father’s news of his second marriage in the 
wake of his mother Julia’s death, Huxley remains as “blind” to this event 
as he is unseeing of Leonard’s other clauses—or spouses. A psychoanalytic 
reading of the short letter might detect in it Huxley’s own drive to self-enu-
cleation: it may be seen, that is, as an expression of Huxley’s “wish to punish 
[himself],” or even his father, “by castration, after ‘upward projection’ from 
139 Ibid., 125.
140  Aldous had by this time been diagnosed as partially blind: more on this later.
141  Quoted in Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 37; Smith, Letters, 41-2.
142  See Sophocles, Oedipus The King, li. 1268 in Ruth Fainlight and Robert J. Littman, 
eds. and trs., Sophocles: The Theban Plays (Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2009), 55.
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the testicles to the eyes.” 143 And of course while Huxley’s blindness cannot 
itself be understood as self-inflicted or as “Oedipal” in any causative sense, 
the confluence of these oedipal coordinates in Huxley’s early life would seem 
remarkable for their resemblance to the myth—if these elements were not 
also so woefully tragic. 
Huxley’s Oedipal perspective is not lost on Philip Thody, for one, who 
writes on Huxley’s letters to his father with as much acuity as any other critic 
of the writer:
There may also, of course, have been subconscious motives at work in deter-
mining the hostility which Huxley reveals, throughout his fiction, towards the 
man he always addressed in his letters as “Dearest father.” To a Freudian, it 
would be quite obvious that Huxley’s adoration of his mother implied feelings 
of intense jealousy for his father, and that these were translated into the sub-
conscious notion that Leonard Huxley was at least partly guilty for his wife’s 
death. 144
The situation in which Huxley mourned for his mother was not helped by 
the fact that, as Bedford observes, “the ground seems not to have been well 
enough prepared” for Leonard’s announcement of his second marriage. This 
is a point confirmed by George Clark’s observation that the marriage had 
been only very “casually announced to the boys.” 145 
In the following years, Huxley would recall that the announcement had 
been impersonal, suggesting that he carried the imprint of the event at least 
until the 1920s. As Peter Firchow notes, while Huxley writes Point Count-
er Point, he “seems not to have forgiven [Leonard’s] marriage to the much 
younger Rosalind Bruce not long after his mother Julia’s death”
If the portraits of the older Quarles in Point Counter Point or the older Beavis 
in Eyeless in Gaza are anything at all like Huxley’s own father (and the latter 
definitely resembles him, at least in part) then it’s clear that Huxley consid-
ered his father to be something of a pompous ass and a pious hypocrite. 146 
143  Large, “Self-enucleation,” 1056. Also see Karl Meninger, “A Scientific Study of Self-Mu-
tilations,” Psychoanalytic Quarterly 4 (1935): 408-66; Lowell Edmunds, “The Body of 
Oedipus,” Psychoanalytic Review 75, no. 1 (1988): 51-56; Lowell Edmunds, Oedipus: The 
Ancient Legend and Its Later Analogues (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1985), esp. 50-2.
144 Philip Thody, Aldous Huxley: A Biographical Introduction (London: Studio Vista, 1973), 
16-7.
145 Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 37-8.
146 Peter Firchow, “Aldous and Julian: Men of Letters, Men of Science,” 207.
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Formality, nevertheless, may have partially disguised Huxley’s feelings of 
anger, or had at least kept the relationship between he and Leonard osten-
sibly civil. But no formality could displace the longstanding unease. Thus 
while Huxley persists in signing off at “the end of his letters to his father 
with the phrase “your loving son,” his attitude,” Firchow remarks, “is usually 
not loving but distant and even aloof.” 147 
Since Leonard had been employed as a critical reader, it is perhaps un-
surprising that he was critical of Huxley’s Antic Hay. But Leonard’s criticism 
of that book had deeply affected Huxley’s spirits, prompting him to write 
an uncharacteristically emotive letter to his father in November 1923. De-
fending the novel, Huxley here expresses great sorrow that his father had so 
brutally characterised the book as “distasteful.” 148 
In a defensive apologia that recalls the letter in which, two years earlier, 
Huxley had attempted to explain his intentions in writing Crome Yellow to 
Ottoline Morrell, Huxley now insists that, while Antic Hay’s “unfamiliar char-
acter makes it appear at first sight rather repulsive,” it is nonetheless, and 
“without fatuity, a good book.” 149 Conceived as Huxley’s “serious” attempt at 
“novelty,” the novel, Huxley argues, had sought to unify “all the ordinarily 
separated categories—tragic, comic, fantastic, realistic,” combining them 
“so to say chemically into a single entity.” 150 
Expressing his unwillingness to quarrel with his father, Huxley, in a show 
of paternalistic omniscience, conveys his foreknowledge of the fact that 
Leonard would be as disinclined to argue as he had been: “Like you,” Hux-
ley writes, “I have no desire to enter into an argument about it: argument, 
indeed, would be useless, as we should start from completely different prem-
ises.” 151 But the matter most in contention for this intergenerational pair was 
not what Leonard thought of Antic Hay’s most “repulsive” elements—such as 
its fabrication of a pastiche or bricolage of genres, which detracted, Leonard 
felt, from the novel’s literary merit. Nor was it the particular disappointing 
for Leonard that the novel had come under public scrutiny, having “acquired 
an undeserved reputation for ‘obscenity’” among London’s critics and book-
sellers, leading “several of the more respectable libraries” to refuse “to stock 
147 Ibid., 207.
148 While it is unclear whether Leonard offered his disapprobation in person or in a letter, 
the latter seems more likely based on the fact that Huxley and his father had often 
communicated at this time by letter. See Huxley to Leonard Huxley, 26 November 1923 
(Letter 210), in Letters, ed. Smith, 224.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151  Ibid.
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it.” 152 More crucial than these elements for Leonard’s and Huxley’s dispute 
was Antic Hay’s representation of the protagonist Gumbril Junior’s mother’s 
death. This is what had, apparently, invoked Leonard’s fulmination. 
In Antic Hay, Gumbril Junior’s mother—who is Gumbril Senior’s wife—
dies of “malignant diseases,” suffering “creeping and devouring pain” while 
Gumbril Junior is “still a boy” (AH, 3). The scene is unequivocally a transpo-
sition of the early circumstances in which Julia Huxley, Aldous’s mother and 
Leonard’s wife had died. The scene even echoes what had been Julia’s tortu-
ous cries while on her deathbed: “Why do I have to die, and die so young?” 
she had asked. 153 When the distraught Gumbril Junior bawls, “crying, still 
crying” at his mother’s bedside (AH, 3), he reaches a deeply inspiring cathexis 
of the kind that Huxley—who had “stood ‘in stony misery,’” at his mother’s 
funeral—had perhaps himself never realised. 154 
Huxley’s unquestionable “adoration” of his mother, to use Thody’s words, 
underlay his having been astonished at his father’s imputation that he hadm 
in the novel, appropriated his mother’s death merely for the purposes of his 
fictional experiment. Admitting that he did not expect his father to “enjoy 
the book,” but only that he hoped and imagined his “contemporaries would,” 
Huxley abruptly ended the disagreement:
And there, I think, I had better leave it, only pausing long enough to express 
my surprise that you should accuse me, when I speak of a young man’s tender 
recollections of his dead mother, of botanizing my mother’s grave. 155
That Huxley deploys the odd expression “botanizing” here seems crucial, 
especially when it is placed in the context of this word’s prior utterances. 
Not having Leonard’s letter as evidence, however, makes it impossible to 
know whether the adjective had first been employed by Leonard—and mere-
ly rearticulated by Huxley—or had been employed by Huxley only. But the 
word ineluctably invokes the early years of Huxley’s early education in Surrey 
152  Joceyln Brooke, Aldous Huxley: Supplements to British Book News on ‘Writers and Their 
Work’ 55 (London: Longmans, 1954), 15. Also see Watt’s summary of the range of crit-
icisms levelled at the novel, including a report that “two American readers” who had 
reportedly “burnt the book,” and another New York critic who regarded the novel as 
“highly immoral.” Watt, Aldous Huxley: The Critical Heritage, 9. Furthermore, David 
Bradshaw writes that Antic Hay was so blasphemous that it had been “burned in Cai-
ro.” See Bradshaw, “Aldous Huxley (1894-1963),” in Brave New World (London: Vintage 
Books, 2007), xxxi.
153 Julian Huxley, Memories, 1: 64.
154 Huxley had, however, initially sobbed in the wake of his mother’s death. See Wood-
cock, Dawn and the Darkest Hour, 37; Murray, Aldous Huxley, 26.
155 Huxley to Leonard Huxley in Smith, Letters, 224.
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where, alongside Julian and Trevenen, Huxley had collected flowers to study 
in Leonard’s botany laboratory. There Huxley had sought to identify partic-
ular species of birds and to study plants, and so for Huxley to “botanize” an 
object is to connote this image of Huxley as a child, and to revitalise this 
moment long before his mother’s death, and before the Huxleys had moved 
from those hills. 156 
Of course, forms of botanising also appear in Brave New World, such 
as when Huxley satirises the apparent dangerousness of raising a child on 
merely “books and botany” (BnW, 16-17). When in the “Infant Nurseries” the 
Director begins to “rub in the lesson with a mild electric shock,” guarantee-
ing “what the psychologists used to call an “instinctive” hatred of books and 
flowers,” he ensures that they would “be safe from books and botany all their 
lives” (BnW, 17). Associated with childhood throughout Huxley’s oeuvre, the 
word “botanize” thus marks a site of trauma; it indicates—and even more so 
if it is one of Leonard’s words—precisely that which may have been Huxley’s 
apparently aloof and scientific response to his mother’s death. 
And it is, of course, a word whose offensive meaning is only now exacer-
bated, at least in Leonard’s eyes, by its literary reappropriation by his son. 
Expressing yet another of Huxley’s “mixed up starting points,” the term also 
names the agon into which Huxley imaginatively placed his mother and father, 
pitting them one against the other. While Leonard the patriarch encouraged 
Huxley to work with botanical specimens, Julia is the woman who uttered, 
as Gumbril Junior narrates, a “few words only,” but with “all the wisdom he 
needed to live by” (AH, 3). 157 Inscribed on a letter that Julia had given the young 
Huxley while on her deathbed, her kind words would echo in Huxley’s ears for 
the rest of his life, inspiring him to “Judge not too much and love more.” 158
If Leonard cannot reconcile himself to what are clearly Antic Hay’s thin-
ly-veiled autobiographical or clef elements, then it is perhaps because the 
novel is such a “farce.” It operates, as James Mulvihill writes, “along the lines 
of one of the ‘painful jokes’” that Huxley had already attributed to Ben Jon-
son’s plays in an essay of 1920. “There is,” Huxley had written on Jonson’s 
plays, three years before writing Antic Hay, 
156  For a detailed discussion of these early “naturalizing expeditions” see Woodcock, 
Dawn and the Darkest Hour, 37.
157 Ibid. Bedford notes that it was Leonard who took Aldous, Gervas, Julian, and Trev-
enan on mountain climbs, such as on their climb of Saddleback mountain in Bla-
senthwaite, near Keswick, in 1905. See Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 14. 
158 Quoted by Sybille Bedford addressing the P.E.N. meeting “In Honour of Aldous Hux-
ley,” 15 November 1978. Tape in National Sound Archive, cited in Murray, Aldous Hux-
ley, 27n9.
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a certain hardness and brutality about them all—due, of course, ultimately 
to the fact that the characters are not human, but rather marionettes of wood 
and metal that collide and belabour one another, like the ferocious puppets 
of the Punch and Judy show, without feeling the painfulness of the proceed-
ing. 159
Far from the “orgies of quaint pathos and sentimental comedy”—which 
Huxley eschewed—Jonson’s plays remind their audiences of the “enormous, 
painful jokes which fate sometimes plays on humanity.” 160 But this painful 
mode—the one in which Huxley had already brought into clear view so many 
of the humiliating and tragic traits he perceived in Morrell and other of the 
Bloomsbury sophisticates in Crome Yellow—is a mode that is revitalised in 
Antic Hay, where Huxley uses the same optic in relation to the Gumbrils, as 
father and son.
In Huxley’s own rendering of a “painful joke” of fate, Gumbril Senior 
is not simply a clownish archetype but, “beneath his absurd appearance,” 
as Mulvihill notes, a “pathetic” and helpless creature. 161 An unsentimental 
symbol for the impotence of all paternal figures, Gumbril Senior enables 
Antic Hay’s “diatribe against fathers” to become, as Sidaway asserts, “fully 
mobilised.” 162 It is thus as much Huxley’s pathological response to Leonard 
as his small rebellion against all fathers of Leonard’s generation that charac-
terises Gumbril Senior, who may now be read as a direct parody of Huxley’s 
father, one that features saliently within the novel’s unforgiving portrait of 
Huxley’s London milieu: 
In the 1920s London of the novel, stewing in its disillusionment and cynicism, 
is the prevailing legacy of an older, more specifically Victorian generation that 
has clearly failed to come to terms with the trauma of war. Huxley depicts a 
younger generation so disillusioned as if to be terminally ill. 163
A representative of London’s “younger generation,” Gumbril Junior is left to 
tend to the cooking and domestic duties around the house while his father 
159  The essay was first published in The London Mercury in 1920. See J.C. Squire, ed. The 
London Mercury 1, nos. 1-6 (November 1919-April 1920), published as an eBook in 2014, 
184-191, available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/45116/45116-h/45116-h.htm, ac-
cessed 30 June 2014. Also published in Aldous Huxley, “Ben Jonson,” On The Margin 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1923), 202; and Baker and Sexton, eds. Aldous Huxley: Com-
plete Essays I: 1920-25, 119-126. Also see James Dalton Mulvihill, “Antic Hay: A Study in 
Post-war Disillusionment” MA diss., McMaster University, 1978, 16.
160  Ibid. Also see Mulvihill, “Antic Hay,” 16.
161 Ibid., 4.
162  Sidaway, “Madness, Badness, Sadness,” 2.
163  Ibid., 2.
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indulges in “suspended” philosophical speculation about the possibility of 
telepathy. It is a ruse seemingly designed to charm Myra Viveash, the object 
of Gumbril Senior’s attention. Telepathy, Gumbril Senior excitedly proclaims, 
would enable humans to “go to sleep at once, wake at once, say the same 
thing at once... Without a leader, without a command, they do everything 
together, in complete unison” (AH, 284-5). 
A subtle parody of the disconnection between son and father, the con-
versation that then follows leads Gumbril Junior to inadvertently embarrass 
his father in front of the seductive Viveash. Suggesting that his father should 
exhibit the architectural model that Gumbril Senior had recently built for 
one his clients, Gumbril Junior exposes the fact that Gumbril Senior had in 
fact already sold the work (AH, 286). But, astonished to learn that his father 
has sold the model, Gumbril Junior is led to wonder why he sold it—espe-
cially since his father seems to cherish such things even more than him, his 
own son:
He knew with what a paternal affection—no, more than paternal; for he was 
sure that his father was more whole-heartedly attached to his models than his 
son—with what pride he regarded these children of his spirit (AH, 287).
But Gumbril Junior’s seemingly unconcerned and indifferent description 
of his father’s inattention—one that remains undergirded by his sensitivity 
to and envy about these nonhuman “children of his spirit,” about Gumbril 
Senior’s cherished models—depicts the father as a man who both underesti-
mates and scorns his son’s diligence and thoughtfulness. 
Then ironising his father’s speculation about his having the capacity to 
use telepathy, Gumbril Junior highlights the way in which his father fails 
to detect precisely the thoughts of those around him—those whose minds 
he would profess to read. While Viveash and son have become bored by the 
father’s abstract musings, Gumbril Senior himself unknowingly laments his 
own impotence, describing those few telepaths whose talents prevent them 
from communicating in the normal way, those “few, no doubt, who could 
never communicate directly” (AH, 245). 164 Articulating what has already be-
come sorely clear, Gumbril Senior thus describes his ability to communicate 
164 As Nicholas Murray notes, Huxley travelled to India in 1925, only two years after Antic 
Hay’s publication. There Huxley noted the uniquely provident conditions under which 
philosophical activity of this kind was available to the upper-classes: “Born an Indian 
or brought up in the slums of London,” he writes, “I should hardly be able to achieve so 
philosophical a suspense of judgement” (JP, 137); also qtd. in Murray, Aldous Huxley, 
13.
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with other humans as though he were the first to be endowed with such a ca-
pacity: “I let my telepathic faculty lie idle,” he comments, “preferring to em-
ploy an elaborate and cumbrous arrangement of symbols in order to make 
my thoughts known to you through your senses” (AH, 244). This description 
of his capacities functions as an excuse for the failure of the capacity that he 
had earlier adverted to: his ability to telepathically communicate. 
Initially positing that his reluctance to develop telepathic skills is simply 
a matter of preference, Gumbril Senior soon reveals his foolishness when—
indulging in a “fancy”—he tests his presentiment that his “faculty” of telep-
athy could be as sharp as that of those “well-developed” mind-readers who, 
“by the twenty-first century,” will be capable of “direct communication with 
other minds, whether they want to or not” (AH, 244-5). Predicting that the 
birds will “wake-up and begin their half-minute of chatter in the dark” at the 
very instant in which he ceases to speak, Gumbril Senior, now having fin-
ished his speech, commands Viveash to “Wait! And “Hush,” before placing 
“his hand over his mouth, as though by commanding silence on himself he 
could command it on the whole world” (AH, 245). 
After a full minute of silence has passed, Gumbril Junior, realising now 
that no chirping will occur, narrates how “the old gentleman burst out hap-
pily laughing” in an echo of the “fit of esoteric laughter” into which the fa-
ther had erupted at an earlier point of the novel (AH, 53). 
In these scenes, the father becomes what Gumbril Junior had earlier de-
scribed as the “non compos [and] not entirely there” figure of the “clown”—a 
figure into which Gumbril Junior had feared he himself would transform 
while in the presence of Myra Viveash (AH, 183-84). But it is now Gumbril 
Senior who is exposed to Viveash as an impotent and unsuccessful seducer; 
it is the father, that is, who is revealed to be the alienated, lonely man among 
the two, the one whose most “affectionately cherished friends” have depart-
ed so rapidly (AH, 18-19). 
But this father lacks not only human company; or rather, his quickly 
disappearing companions are not only human: now they also take the form 
of those starlings that, when Gumbril Senior searches for them, cause him 
continually to be “gazing up, round-spectacled and rapt” (AH, 19). Cauteris-
ing the figure of the lonely, stargazing father who looks for answers in the 
sky—only to be refused them—Huxley’s novel is an unforgiving depiction of 
the erring father, a searing portrait of paternal impotence (AH, 19).
If these allusions to Leonard’s impotence are too obscure, then the more 
explicit allusions to Huxley’s father that appear at an earlier stage of the Antic 
Hay confirms its biographical verisimilitude. As he begins to work on his 
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history homework, Gumbril Junior undertakes a formal consideration of his 
own psychobiography:
“Give a brief account of the character and career of Pope Pius IX, with dates 
wherever possible.” Gumbril leaned back in his chair and thought of his own 
character, with dates. 1896: the first serious and conscious and deliberate lie. 
Did you break that vase, Theodore? No, mother. It lay on his conscience for 
nearly a month, eating deeper and deeper. Then he had confessed the truth. 
Or rather he had not confessed; that was too difficult. He led the conversation, 
very subtly, as he thought, round through the non-malleability of glass, through 
breakages in general, to this particular broken vase; he practically forced his 
mother to repeat her question. And then, with a burst of tears, he had answered, 
yes. It had always been difficult for him to say things directly, point-blank. His 
mother had told him, when she was dying... No, no; not that (AH, 9).
This oblique adumbration not only implies the indirect manner in which 
Huxley could not himself “say things directly.” It also exemplifies the mode 
of provocation that constitutes both Gumbril Junior’s and Huxley’s meth-
ods. In other words, this is a “conversation” that “very subtly” addresses a 
number of related or orthogonal subjects until, as with Huxley’s allusions 
to Leonard Huxley or Ottoline Morrell, the reader is “practically forced” to 
recognise the narrative’s true meaning, its real-world imputation. And, while 
this provocative method appears programmatic, it also recalls the instinc-
tive and ambulative manner in which Huxley—as I argued in chapters 4 and 
5—tends to illustrate and deduce particular ideas. 
Denis Stone’s misuse of the word “carminative,” for instance, in a scene 
in which Stone and Mr. Scogan serve as surrogate father and son, is an apt 
illustration of the way in which words’s meaning can be ambiguous—equal-
ly as much for the speaker as for the listener. Allusions that are sensitive or 
proscribed are equally as likely to be misspoken accidentally as prone are 
likely to be uttered strategically and provocatively. 
But irrespective of whether Huxley’s illustrations are intentionally allu-
sive or merely the product of his subconcious, they lead only and ultimately 
to Huxley’s melancholia. And even if he is not disappointed that Leonard 
and Morrell dislike his narratives, he certainly feels “melancholy” when he 
discovers that his words, such as the word “carminative,” mean something 
other than he had originally thought; for Huxley’s misspoken allusions, such 
as they are seem to, signal the “death of something young and precious” (CY, 
223-24).
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Thus, when read at its most radical, Derrida’s claim that “the origin of 
logos is its father” allows us to identify Denis Stone, the surrogate son to 
Mr. Scogan, as a metonym for the Stone’s dual misapprehension. That is, 
Stone does not only misconstrue the meaning of “carminative,” but he also 
misattributes the sympathetic qualities of the father to an indifferent and 
non-filial elder man. And just as what initially appears a rich and noble word 
is later revealed as only an ignoble and unpleasant one, so is the man who 
initially appears fatherly exposed only as an aloof and distant stranger—“not 
a literary mind” but a man who might in fact require, as Denis concludes, a 
“mental carminative” (CY, 224). 
Huxley’s fiction, in short, produces a configuration of paternal symbols 
and linguistic associations that is just as subtly imbricated as that which 
Derrida unpacks (or “deconstructs”) in his essay on language:
One could say anachronously that the “speaking subject” is the father of his 
speech. And one would quickly realise that this is no metaphor, at least not in 
the sense of any common, conventional effect of rhetoric. Logos is a son, then, 
a son that would be destroyed in his very presence without the present atten-
dance of his father. His father who answers. His father who speaks for him 
and answers for him. Without his father, he would be nothing but, in fact, 
writing without his father, he would be nothing but, in fact, writing. At least 
that is what is said by the one who says: it is the father’s thesis. The specificity 
of writing would thus be intimately bound to the absence of the father... The 
reader will have noticed Socrates’ insistence on misery, whether pitiful or ar-
rogant, of a logos committed to writing: “... It always needs its father to attend 
to it, being quite unable to defend itself or attend its own needs.” 165
It is out of just such a “pitiless and arrogant” misery that Huxley’s fatherless 
cynicism, and his “agonistic” satires, as Bentley suggests, seem to arise. 166 
Confronted with the chiasmic relation of the father and son, the son-cynic 
luxuriates in the spoils of his father’s authority while he furtively disguises 
his implacable dependence on him; he also hides the fact that the value of 
his words is determined by the qualifying imprimatur of the father: that is, 
by that fatherly procedure in which value is accorded to the son’s words, and 
authority transferred to the son’s speech. 
This procedure is often given vital expression in Huxley’s life and work; 
in almost all allusions to the father-son dyad, for instance, Huxley denies 
Leonard the opportunity to bear witness to his own means of endowing his 
165 Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 82.
166 Bentley, “Anatomical Vision,” 182.
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son with such authority. Accepting none of Leonard’s utterances, Huxley 
evacuates them of their power, mystifying their “own safe transmission and 
the establishment of a worthy legacy.” Breaking the patrilineal transmission 
of the word, then, Huxley prevents the scene in which, as Seán Burke de-
scribes it, the father endows his son with the “signature” of his own speech. 
In a typical scenario, Burke notes, the signature is written on the son, as a 
genealogical inscription. But this “signature,” Burke continues, 
may then erase itself, [and] the master may depart, in the assurance of auton-
omous truth; a truth which will carry the signature forward in itself, in its 
sons and brothers, who bear the name and the name’s genius under names 
of their own. 167
Like Diogenes’s “kynical mode”—an apparently privileged speaking position 
that Hegel called “a rude product of luxury”—Huxley’s cynicism expresses 
his distaste for his countrymen—the Victorians—just as it does for its leg-
atees, which is to say, for the generation of men to which Huxley’s father 
belonged. 168 
But Huxley’s Oedipal resistance to his father also reflects the discomfort 
Huxley would have felt, begrudging Leonard as he did while also apparently 
unable to explicitly express these hostilities. Huxley appears to have pre-
ferred—ironically in a fashion like that of the Victorians he deplored—to 
deny or defer these matters rather than to address them directly. As Thody 
suggests, it is tempting to explain Huxley’s evasion of such matters as a frail 
man’s denial of the truth:
A thorough-going Freudian would also see the hostility which Huxley always 
shows for Freud’s ideas as an indication of the fear which he had that such a 
diagnosis might be true, and the fact that almost all fathers in Huxley’s fiction 
are caricatures would lend weight to this view. 169
But if Huxley’s fiction can provide any trace of an answer for his position—
any way to explain his repressed hostility—then his historical writing is at 
least equally as instructive as his fiction. 
167 Seán Burke, The Ethics of Writing: Authorship and Legacy in Plato and Nietzsche (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 120.
168 Quoted in Andreas Huyssen, “Foreword: The Return of Diogenes as Postmodern In-
tellectual,” Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason (Minneapolis: Minnesota Press, 
1988), ix. For an alternative translation, see G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of 
Right, ed. Allen Wood, tr. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
see section 195, 231.
169  Philip Thody, Aldous Huxley, 17.
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An exemplary instance of transference, for instance, occurs in Grey Emi-
nence, Huxley’s 1941 biography of François Leclerc du Tremblay. Recounting 
the death of du Tremblay’s father—a tragedy that occurred when François 
was only ten years old—Huxley observes how the young man had “loved his 
father with all the repressed violence of which his inward-turning nature 
was capable” (GE, 22). In these lines Huxley expresses the inexorable fading 
away of human happiness that, as a range of interpretations have noted, 
the loss of Huxley’s own mother had produced in him. 170 Reflecting on his 
predicament, the young François realises, in Huxley’s psychobiographical 
study, that
There remained with him, latent at ordinary times but always ready to come 
to the surface, a haunting sense of the vanity, the transience, the hopeless pre-
cariousness of all merely human happiness (GE, 22).
More than what has been simply understood as an instance of chiastic in-
version—as Huxley’s transference of his own feelings onto the French monk 
who has now lost his father—it is also possible to see this passage as Hux-
ley’s commission of the symbolic parricide to which he had, some twenty 
years earlier, only ever coyly alluded. 
Now this malaise is all the more defensible, albeit invisible: here, in a 
non-fiction work, one written nearly ten years after Leonard’s death, and 
published on the cusp of Huxley’s mystical turn, the artist finally comes 
to grips with his history of “repressed violence.” Executing the symbolic 
parricide that he had for so long deferred, Huxley now composes a work 
of truth, confessing, through the figure of François, the “love” that had 
always been deeply resident in him—even despite his own “inward-turning 
nature” (GE, 22).
This chapter began by examining the way in which Huxley, in much of 
his post-1940s fiction and essays, represents the human as an amphibian. 
It then went on to scrutinise Huxley’s depictions of sons and fathers in his 
wider oeuvre. Just as chapters 4 and 5 before this concluded that Huxley’s 
complex psychological profile is representable—even soluble—as a kind of 
structure that I have nominated as the chiasmus in this and previous chap-
ters, this chapter will now conclude by reinforcing the notion. Huxley, torn 
between love and hate, anxiety and affection, expressed a complex mixture 
of feelings towards his father. This was a chiastic combination of affects that 
170 Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 25. Also see Hewitt, “Psychedelics and Psychosis,” 2; Brian 
Aldiss, “Fatal Breaks,” 4-5; Murray, Aldous Huxley, 27n6. 
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is as much a testament to his uniquely self-propelled intellectual develop-
ment as it is emblematic of his melancholic, and sometimes loveless sense of 
alienation. In the final chapter of this thesis—in chapter 7, the chapter that 
follows—I will turn to a very different author to Huxley: Philip K. Dick. But if 
Huxley’s psychobiography is difficulty to disentangle, as I have argued, then 
Dick is equally as enigmatic. 
Much like Huxley, Dick sought to enable his readers to see the world 
of technology and biological enhancement in a new way. However, where-
as Huxley often self-consciously parodies the increasing paranoia of his 
characters in these dystopian milieux, Dick adopts the role of one of these 
characters himself. Dick, as I will argue, shows us not simply that the hu-
man is biologically determined, then, but that the human’s control of their 
own bodies—as well as their brains—is predetermined too, making largely 
redundant—and shockingly helpless—the question or character of one’s bi-
ological choices. More than this, though, Dick shows us that one can wildly 
misread one’s brain, making for a range of less stable, and altogether more 
unreliable worlds, than anything Huxley had imagined.
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Chapter Seven
“The Shock of Dysrecognition”: 
The Disorienting Biopolitical 
Visions of Philip K. Dick 1
that philip k. dick’s reputation has been expressed in such phrasal epithets 
as “drug-addled nut,” “acid-crazed visionary,” and his work described as 
“stimulant literature,” indicates the way in which Dick is often promoted 
as a hyper-accelerated author—the composer of an ontologically weird and 
transcendental fiction. For many critics and readers, Dick is a fiendish hop-
head from whose shaking hands spills a range of intractable gnostic images 
and narratives. 2 Such an image, however, has become all too familiar within 
circles of Dick’s readership; it is a stereotype so popular in fact that, in adopt-
ing this view, Dick’s readers risk not only uncritically accepting a flase image 
of the writer, but automatically and even “fashionably” rearticulating it. If 
there is a reason that Dick is still described in this way, though, it is perhaps 
because in so attributing to any author the quality of an automatic mad-
ness—or, what I have previously described in this thesis as their “automati-
sation”—we, whether as nonspecialist readers or critics, can affirm just how 
impressively such beings resemble kinds of machines or calculators. These 
authors, we think, are strange machines—beings in the order of a Deleu-
zoguattarian “schizo” or, as I have alternatively called this kind of figure, a 
model of the “psychoactive scrivener.” 
In addition to the “schizo,” however, Deleuze and Guattari also envis-
age another kind of author: an agent they name an “organ-machine.” This 
is that being who inexorably materialises in the late twentieth century, the 
predictable result of the “production, distribution, consumption” model of 
1 This chapter is a revised and extended version of my “‘The Shock of Dysrecognition’: 
Biopolitical Subjects and Drugs in Dick’s Science Fiction,” in The World According to 
Philip K. Dick, ed. Alexander Dunst and Stephen Schlensag (London: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2015), 30-47.
2 Lawrence Sutin, Divine Invasions: A Life of Philip K. Dick (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005 
[1989]), 9; Andrew M. Butler, “LSD, Lying Ink, and Lies, Inc.,” Science Fiction Studies 32, 
no. 2 (2005): 265-80, esp. 265; and Marcus Boon, The Road of Excess, 189.
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capitalism’s “formal developed structures.” However, this figure—as with 
the figure of Huxley in the 1920s—is also often inclined to criticise this very 
structure’s alienating effects: namely, the estrangement or “entfremdung” 
of which Karl Marx had once written. 3 Diagnosing the “late capitalist ano-
mie” that was the natural consequence of the “post production” regime of 
consumer capitalism, Dick—as Andrew P. Hobernek suggests—becomes not 
simply a machine, but a professional working author; he is “driven, like any 
technician or executive or secretary or salesperson, to sell his mental labor 
to the highest bidder.” 4 
Throughout the 1960s, Dick would function as an exceptionally produc-
tive writer—notwithstanding his increasingly frenetic life, one that had been 
marked by the emotional trauma of three divorces in less than two decades. 
Dick’s implacable drive to produce written material was so great, in fact, that 
even he sometimes seems incredulous: “In five years,” he once remarked, 
“I wrote sixteen novels, which is incredible. I mean, nobody, I don’t think 
anybody’s done that before.” 5 As Dick suggests, it is this kind of superhuman 
productivity that might have enabled him to produce what may well be a 
record of a kind in the history of literary production. 
But if Dick is the model of a productive writer, he is also, as I have al-
ready indicated, a model of the “schizo”: this is the figure who, as Deleuze 
and Guattari argue, constitutes both the “conclusion” and “exterior limit” 
of capitalism. The “schizo,” they argue, expresses in their every action the 
“deepest tendency” of a system that compels the subject to perform a range 
of repetitive, intermittent functions. 6 Moving in fits and starts—in “hiatuses 
and failure, breakdowns and ruptures”—the schizo is also a “desiring-ma-
chine,” one who works only to “withdraw a part of the whole, to detach, to 
3 See Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, tr. Martin Milligan, (New 
York: Prometheus Books, 1988), 10.
4 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 4.
5 Uwe Anton and Werner Fuchs, “So I don’t write about Heroes: An Interview with Philip 
K. Dick,” SF Eye 14 (1996): 37-46. Accessed 12 February 2014, http://2010philipkdick-
fans.philipkdickfans.com/frank/anton.html, transcribed by Frank Bertrand.
6 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti Oedipus, 246. Dick divorced from his first wife, Jeanette 
Marlin in 1949, from his second wife, Kleo Apostolides, in 1959, and then from his 
third wife, Anne Rubenstein, in 1964. Dick would marry twice more: firstly, to Nancy 
Hackett in 1966, and then finally, to Leslie “Tessa” Busby, in 1973. See “Chronology,” 
in Philip K. Dick, Philip K. Dick: Valis and the Later Novels, ed. Jonathan Lethem (Unit-
ed States: The Library of America, 2007), 823-38. Also see Jonah Peretti, “Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia: Contemporary Visual Culture and the Acceleration of Identity For-
mation/Dissolution,” Negations (Winter 1996), accessed at http://www.datawranglers.
com/negations/issues/96w/96w_peretti.html.
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‘have something left over,’ [and] to produce.” 7 Constituting “not the identi-
ty of capitalism, but, on the contrary its difference, its divergence, and its 
death,” the schizo is a rogue whose “real operations of desire in the material 
world” constitute only so much as the outgrowth or expression of their far 
more particular and intensive desires.
The schizo is a far cry from Freud’s Oedipal subject who—as for the 
portrait I have sketched of Huxley in chapters 4 to 6—remains blinded to 
reality’s contours. Where Freud’s subject is conditioned by a polymorophous 
perversity that is endlessly and statically repeated, the desiring-machine ap-
prehends their “libidinal assemblage” with a much different—and in fact an 
unassailable—acuity. Giving themselves over to the pulses of the ego and 
the schizzes of desire, the desiring-machine becomes a new kind of human, 
one who is fully integrated into and consubstantial with their every psycho-
biological pulse, their every embodied stratagem, and their every calculat-
ed machination. 8 Constituted less (if at all) by infantile sexualisation (like 
the psychotic or neurotic)—and less still by some ground of an “originary” 
syndrome—the schizo is a dynamic, decentering knot in which the “desire 
and the social” efficiently and seamlessly thrust, torque, and tangle. And, in 
view of these procedures, schizos are also exemplary operators within their 
fields; they are masters, that is, within the very same context that Huxley had 
mournfully anticipated in his critique of “total efficiency” (UD, 209). 
But if for the schizo “There is,” as Deleuze and Guattari write in Anti-Oe-
dipus, “only desire and the social, and nothing else,” then this reality can 
only ever be reimagined or reconfigured in or as other equivalents of this 
principal binary. Schizos are thus reduced always to an inside and outside; 
they are constituted by a social matrix whose values, codes, and norms ap-
pear only incidental to—or perhaps even invisible within—the autonomous 
and “automatising” field of desire that propels and accelerates their social 
existence. They are always, then, outside of the social, exiled and alienated. 
So excluded, the desiring-machine or schizo must peregrinate—which is to 
say ambulate or itinerate—even as they do no fit, do not work, within the 
socius. And while they remain near this locus—or nearby it—they remain 
there only in the spirit of realising or satiating their own desire’s needs. And 
7 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 41-2 (my emphasis). On what Jeery Aline Flieger 
argues is probably a much more facile distinction than Deleuze and Guattari’s them-
selves suggest, between their own model of the subject and Freud’s model, see Jer-
ry Aline Flieger, “Overdetermined Oedipus: Mommy, Daddy and Me as Desiring Ma-
chine,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 96, no. 3 (1997): 599-620, esp. 605-6.
8 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 37, 38.
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mournfully, these are inexorably social needs—even if they themsleves are 
not social beings. Thus, in Deleuze and Guattari’s “broad outlines of the par-
allelism [or chiasmus] between social production and desiring production,” 
the former is always subordinate to the latter: the social, that is, determines 
the individual. The “truth of the matter,” they argue, is that the social is 
only another, if not the primary, expression of desire, expressed as it is in its 
particular and “determinate conditions.” 9 
As the producer of so many confounding alternative worlds (including 
romans à clef whose marionette-show qualities at times resemble the fea-
tures of Huxley’s satirical novels), Dick may be understood to produce or 
generate an exemplary instance of the kind of “residue” that, as Jerry Aline 
Fleiger suggests, is to be expected of an exemplary desiring-machine. 10 But if 
Dick’s narratives offer images of the final and inevitable “death” of capitalist 
power, producing what have become—in science fiction’s history as much as 
literary fiction’s history—the most singular and matchless examples of capi-
talism’s most radically augmented, reduplicated, and totalising alternatives, 
then his fiction is also an imagining of capitalism’s most intoxicating, and 
most intoxicated, apotheosis. 
These are the futures, for instance, in which those technologies that 
undergird desire, production, and consumption have become as deliriously 
alienating as they are defrauding of one’s identity and beliefs. And, in the 
varied milieux in which the social systems regulating these adjuvants ap-
pear, these technologies—often drugs—are treated at once as medicines, in-
toxicants, foods and—as I will elaborate in this chapter—even as substitute 
for thought itself; they are thus metaphysical potions, talismans of unimag-
inable power and destructiveness.
To propose that Dick’s tendency to produce these fictions is simply an 
artifact of his own drug use, however—and not, for instance, also Dick’s re-
sponse to that parallelism of social forms and desire so thrillingly described 
by Deleuze and Guattari—would be far too reductive. Indeed, such an ap-
proach can offer only the most flimsy of footholds amid the many question 
marks engendered by Dick’s tumultuous personal biography. 11 To ascribe 
these frenzied stories to their author’s drug use, in other words, is simply 
to recapitulate to the difficulty that obtains in any work of historical and 
authorial biography. And yet it is an approach that seems all the more tempt-
9 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 29-30.
10 Jerry Aline Flieger, “Overdetermined Oedipus,” 6.
11 Also see Phillip Purser-Hallard, “The Drugs Did Work,” The Guardian (London, UK), 12 
August 2006, 8.
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ing here; for Dick’s mental state—described in so many instances as patho-
logical—seems so much more difficult to comprehend than that of other 
authors. 
But then again, to attribute Dick’s ideas and fiction to drugs is wrong-
headed for other reasons. It would be to leave unacknowledged, for instance, 
the way in which the rapid popularisation of Dick—himself now a kind of 
recognisable brand name or franchise—has also led to a crucial literary-crit-
ical situation in which his work has become all the more enigmatic. It is 
increasingly decentered and unwieldy for theoretical or historical criticism 
not only because of its strange perspicacity, but also because of the strange-
ness of its many companion texts—its many “intertexts.” Straddling the 
intractable threshold between art and consumer product, the range of re-
appropriations of Dick’s fiction, for instance—or the repeatedly appearing 
reconfiguration of Dickian worlds in the science fiction literature and media 
that has appeared after his death—may represent, as Francis Mason notes, 
an instance, of the very “deadening of consciousness” about which Dick’s 
books themselves forewarn. 12 
And yet, if one looks to the number of textual simulations and simulacra 
of Dick’s works, one sees nothing if not a diverse, or polymorphous response 
to Dick’s variable oeuvre; it is a moveable feast, and testament to Dick’s own 
habitually mottled, and capricious conceptualisations of reality. Beginning 
with as admirable a cinematic adaptation as Ridley Scott’s 1982 film Blade 
Runner (an adaptation of Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?), Dick’s cine-
matic afterlife has nonetheless led to a range of less admirable films, such as 
Paul Verhoeven’s 1990 Total Recall or Lee Tamahori’s 2007 Next. 
Of course, myriad artistic homages to Dick’s ideas have appeared out-
side of cinema too. A particularly notable example is the video installation 
exhibited in 2011 at the Art Gallery of NSW by collaborative duo Ms&Mr (see 
figures 7.1 – 7.3, below). Remixing Dick’s 1977 address to the Metz Science Fic-
tion Convention (an event that took place in Metz, France), the installation 
intersperses slow-moving images of Dick’s convention speech with images 
of the author’s fifth wife, Tessa. 13 Indeed, such appropriations and reverber-
ations of Dick’s novels and biography appear so regularly in the cinema and 
art worlds that the difference between what is a “genuine” Philip K. Dick 
12 Francis Mason, “Nostalgia for the Future: The End of History and Postmodern “Pop” 
T.V.” Journal of Popular Culture 29, no. 4 (1996): 27-40, esp. 28.
13 Thus putting Phil and Tessa into dialogue, the work fabricates what the artists de-
scribe as an “implausible exchange” across time and space. Also see the artist’s press 
release: http://www.novamilne.net/news.php?news=20111214215601. 
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Figures 7.1-7.3 Stills from the video installation work entitled XEROX MIS-
SIVE 1977/2011 by Mr&Mrs. Notably, this work’s title makes reference to what 
Dick, in the Exegesis, describes as the “Xerox missive”: a letter he claims to 
have received from the FBI, seeking his cooperation in reporting communist 
sympathisers to them. In a letter of 2 September 1974, Dick, adhering to these 
orders, wrote a letter to the FBI warning them of science fiction (and literary) 
critic Darko Suvin as well as “three other Marxists”: Frederic Jameson, and 
Petter Fitting. See Dick, The Exegesis, 900n80; Philip K. Dick, The Selected 
Letters of Philip K. Dick, 1974, ed. Paul Williams (California: Underwood-Miller, 
1991), 235-6.
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narrative and only a “Dickian” narrative has often seemed an arbitrary and 
confusing distinction. 14 
Thus, whether because of or in spite of this profusion of paratexts, Dick’s 
fiction has become difficult to particularise, to examine or apprehend di-
rectly; its totality is all too readily reducible in the popular idiom to the 
imaginative scrivenings of a “drug-addled nut.” And if Dick’s writing now 
seems difficult to apprehend in other ways, it is perhaps because contempo-
rary admirers of Dick’s fiction encounter his works almost always through 
their cinematic paratexts. Many new readers in particular are familiar with 
Dick’s works only through what are in effect poor substitutes for them—and 
by this I mean not only the cinematic adaptations of his novels and short 
stories. Rather, the increasing number of articles that seek to confirm Dick’s 
oft-vaunted “prescience”—which is to say the accuracy of his social and ma-
terial prognostications and his “prophecy” 15—are also often of critical inter-
est to erstwhile readers of his fiction. 
It is precisely this state of affairs that perhaps led Jonathan Lethem, ed-
itor of Dick’s 2009 Library of America editions and co-editor of Dick’s Exe-
gesis, to title his 2002 article in Bookforum “You Don’t Know Dick.” 16 While 
Lethem’s acerbic title suggestively foregrounds his yearning to “get on pa-
per” what “that special condition known as Dickheadedness meant in the 
14 There have been a significant number of direct adaptations of Dick’s fiction, and per-
haps more than any other science fiction writer’s work. These include, in order of re-
lease: Hampton Fancher, et al., Blade Runner, dir. Ridley Scott (California: The Ladd 
Company, 1982); Nikos Nikolaidis, Morning Patrol, dir. Nikos Nikolaidis (Greek Film 
Center, 1987); Ronald Shushett, et al., Total Recall, dir. Paul Verhoeven (United States: 
Carolco Pictures, 1990); Jacques Audiard, et al., Confessions d’un Barjo, dir. Jérôme 
Boivin (Levallois-Perret: Alicéléo, 1992); Dan O’Bannon, et al., Screamers, dir. Chris-
tian Duguay (Los Angeles: Columbia, 1995); Caroline Case, et al., Impostor, dir. Gary 
Fleder (New York: Dimension Films, 2001); Richard Linklater, A Scanner Darkly, dir. 
Richard Linklater (Burbank, California: Warner Independent Pictures, 2001); Scott 
Frank and Jon Cohen, Minority Report, dir. Steven Spielberg (California: Amblin Enter-
tainment, 2002); Gary Goldman, et al., Next, dir. Lee Tamahori (California: Paramount 
Pictures, 2007); John Alan Simon, Radio Free Albermuth, dir. John Alan Simon (2008, 
independent release); George Nolfi, The Adjustment Bureau, dir. George Nolfi (Califor-
nia: Universal Pictures, 2011); and Kurt Wimmer, et al., Total Recall, dir. Len Wiseman 
(California: Columbia Pictures, 2012).
15 As an example of the kinds of articles that regularly appear promoting Dick’s prescience 
or prophesy, see Brent Staples, “Philip K. Dick: A Sage of the Future Whose Time has 
Finally Come,” New York Times, 8 June 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/08/opin-
ion/08fri4.html?_r=0. Also see the documentary The Prophetic Vision of Philip K. Dick, 
directed by Mark Steensland and Andy Massagli (New York: First Run/Icarus Films, 
2000), VHS; and Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, “The Apocalyptic Vision of Philip K. 
Dick,” Cultural Studies <-> Critical Methodologies 3, no. 2 (2003): 186, 202n6.
16 Jonathan Lethem, “You Don’t Know Dick,” Bookforum 9, no. 2 (2002): 22-3.
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lost years after [the author’s] death and before his recent and ongoing can-
onization,” it also uses the kind of language that signifies Lethem’s hybrid 
identity: equal part fan and archivist. Such a hybrid position is common in 
“Dickhead” circles; fans qua specialist independent researchers such as Per-
ry Kinman, for instance, have begun extremely small-runs of newsletters on 
Dick, documenting in them such obscure facts as how many real and fiction-
al drug references appear in each of his novels (see figures 7.4 and 7.5, below). 
The censorious side-effect of Lethem’s title, of course, is that it emphasises 
the extent to which Dick’s authorial status—whether he is understood as an 
“acid-crazed visionary,” an exemplar for Deleuze and Guattari’s model of the 
“schizo,” or as a preeminent critic and theorist of late-capitalism—remains 
now, as in those “lost years,” unresolved—especially in relation to what 
might now be understood as the “postmodern literary canon.” 17
Even during his lifetime, however, Dick had been primed to anticipate 
the likelihood of his canonisation as a drug user—although he had also 
already contested the extent to which his works should be considered the 
direct products of his drug use. Dick felt that his experimentation with d-ly-
sergic acid diethylamide (LSD) in particular—a drug that he had ingested 
on fewer occasions than Aldous Huxley had used it—had been overplayed, 
especially in the promotional tactics and ploys designed to popularise cer-
tain of his novels. Such a motivation prompted the publication of a German 
version of Dick’s 1965 novel The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch under the 
new and radically different title LSD-Astronauten, that is, LSD-Astronauts (see 
figure 7.6, below). 18 According to Dick, in an interview given during his vis-
it to Metz, France in 1977, it was the literary critic Franz Rottensteiner, an 
agent of science fiction writer Stanislaw Lem, who had been responsible for 
17 An example of Dick’s characterisation as a drug-dependent author appears in Philip 
Purser-Hallard’s article “The Drugs Did Work,” The Guardian (London, UK), 12 August 
2006, 8.
18 Dick used LSD on at least three occasions, but probably, at most, only on as many as 
a handful of times between 1963 and 1967. On Dick’s use of LSD throughout this peri-
od, see Lawrence Sutin, Divine Invasions: A Life of Philip K. Dick (New York: Carroll and 
Graf, 2005), 127, 141-2; Gregg Rickman, To The High Castle: Philip K. Dick: A Life 1928-
1962 (Long Beach: Fragments West/Valentine Press, 1989), 138; and also see Dick’s 
claim that he “took LSD only two or three times” in Gregg Rickman, Philip K. Dick: In 
His Own Words (Long Beach: Fragments West/Valentine Press, 1988), 5. Also see Perry 
Kinman’s obscure fanzine Rouzleweave, which provides an exhaustive list of the drugs 
Dick used according to various biographies between 1933 until 1980: see Kinman, 
ed. Rouzleweave 5 (unpublished), 2008. Two relevant pages from this fanzine are re-
produced in figures 7.5 and 7.5. I reproduce the cover of LSD-Astronauten (Frankfurt: 
Insel, 1971) in figure 7.6.
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the title—a title of which Dick apparently disapproved. 19 Following the Ger-
man publication of LSD-Astronauten, Dick would also specify Rottensteiner’s 
name among those who he identified as the “dedicated outlets in a chain of 
command from Stanislaw Lem in Krakow, Poland.” 20
When Dick wrote a letter to William C. Sullivan, then head of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, he described Rottensteiner as one among a collec-
19 This is what Dick reports in his interview with Anton and Werner, “So I don’t write 
about Heroes: An Interview with Philip K. Dick.” 
20 See Philip K. Dick, The Selected Letters of Philip K. Dick, 1974, ed. Paul Williams (Cali-
fornia: Underwood-Miller, 1991), 235-6. I note that William C. Sullivan is, in this ed-
ited collection of letters, misnamed William A. Sullivan; also see Philip K. Dick, The 
Exegesis of Philip K. Dick, ed. Pamela Jackson and Jonathan Lethem (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt, 2011), 908n80.
Figure 7.4 A page from Perry Kinman’s obscure fanzine Rouzle-
weave. This page provides an exhaustive list of the drugs that Dick is 
known to have used between 1933 until 1980 by reference to various 
biographies: see Kinman, ed. Rouzleweave 5 (Tokyo: self-published), 
2008. 
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tive of American literary critics including Darko Suvin, Fredric Jameson, and 
Peter Fitting who were operatives of the “Iron Curtain Party group.” Identify-
ing Stanislaw Lem as the “total [communist] Party functionary” and the man 
behind the publication of a “great deal of Party-controlled science fiction,” 
Dick expressed a great suspicion for those in his science fiction circle. 21 While 
Rottensteiner went on to exhibit a special interest in visionary and drug-re-
lated fantasy literature—or what may be called “psychotropic literature”—it 
was perhaps the influence of Harlan Ellison’s Dangerous Visions collection, 
first published in 1967, that led Rottensteiner to retitle Dick’s 1964 novel. 22 
21 Ibid.
22 Rottensteiner is notably one of a paucity of scholars to have investigated the literary 
works of Leo Perutz, the author who wrote what appears to be a prediction of LSD’s 
1937 (or, as psychoactive, 1943) discovery in his 1933 novel Saint Peter’s Snow, tr. Eric 
Figure 7.5 The front cover of Issue 5 of Perry Kinman’s obscure 
fanzine Rouzleweave. Kinman, ed. Rouzleweave 5 (Tokyo: self-pub-
lished), 2008. 
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When Ellison had asked Dick to write a story about or “under the in-
fluence of (if possible) LSD,” it was perhaps less to elicit an interesting sto-
ry than to allow him to write a marketable introduction to “The Faith of 
Our Fathers”—the short story that Dick ultimately contributed to Ellison’s 
collection. As Ellison would write, both this story and The Three Stigmata 
of Palmer Eldritch (henceforth “Stigmata”) had been the product of an LSD 
Mosbacher (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1990). On Rottensteiner’s commentary on 
Perutz’s work, see The Fantasy Book: The Ghostly, The Gothic, The Imaginary, The Unreal 
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1978), 144. On recent scholarship on Perutz’s novel, 
see my “Making Madness Before America: Saint Peter’s Snow, Psychotomimetics, and 
the German Experimental Imaginary” (2012), available at http://www.rudge.tv/blog/
psychoactivesubstances/; and Alan Piper, “Leo Perutz and the Mystery of Saint Peter’s 
Snow,” Time and Mind 6, no. 2 (2013): 175-98. 
Figure 7.6 The German publication of The Three Stigmata of Palm-
er Eldritch, published as LSD-Astronauten (LSD-Astronauts) in 1971 
(Frankfurt: Insel, 1971).
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trip—“the result of just such a hallucinogenic journey.” 23 Despite Dick’s “Af-
terword” to the short story—the work of a few pages in which Dick, echoing 
Huxley, wonders whether “through psychedelic drugs, the religious experi-
ence” could become “commonplace in the life of intellectuals”—Dick gener-
ally downplays the extent of his experience with visionary experience, both 
in general terms and concerning any such experience as it may have been 
engendered by means of LSD or its analogues. In “my own experiences with 
psychedelic drugs,” he writes, “I have had previous tiny illumination com-
pared with [John Scotus] Erigena.” 24 
Causing a “furor” between Dick and Ellison, a pair who had maintained 
a healthy friendship since the mid-1950s, the incident emblematises Dick’s 
defensiveness about being characterised as an author who writes under the 
influence of drugs. In fact, so intense and continuous was Dick’s “fury” over 
Ellison’s introduction that it would, as Sutin suggests, later prompt him to 
withdraw his promise to contribute to a forthcoming issue of Fantasy and 
Science Fiction—an honorary issue dedicated to Ellison himself. 25 In view of 
these and many other of the presages of Dick’s soon-to-be-pervasive reputa-
tion as a drug-inspired author, many of which were visible at this time, it is 
no surprise that he often ironised this kind of pigeonholing avant la lettre. 
Dick predicted in a 1980 letter, for instance, his future critical reception; 
writing just before the publication of VALIS, Dick articulated his own eulogy 
in a deadpan bathos typical of his fiction: “took drugs. Saw God. BFD.” 26 
Here Dick’s biloquistic dismissal of his own work—articulated only 
two years before his untimely death—belies his far from resolute attitude 
toward, and relationship with, licit and illicit drugs. And if these paratactic 
phrases obscure Dick’s earnest and complex critical views on drugs, they 
also wrongly suggest his ignorance about the orbiting fields of psychiatry 
and psychosis—and hence the irony. Thus, to accept the overdetermined and 
reductive formulation in which Dick is simply a “writer on drugs,” and to do 
so without examining the conditions of his drug use, is to neglect evidenc 
of the complexity of this relationship, evidence which appears perhaps most 
revealingly, however fugitively, in both Dick’s fiction and personal letters. 
23  Harlan Ellison, “Introduction to ‘Faith of Our Fathers,’” in Dangerous Visions 2 (Lon-
don: Sphere Books, 1974), 31. 
24 Ibid., 68-9.
25  Sutin, Divine Invasions, 161, 236.
26 Philip K. Dick, The Selected Letters of Philip K. Dick, 1980-82, ed. Don Heron (Novato: 
Underwood Miller, 2010), 27; also see Umberto Rossi, The Twisted Worlds of Philip K. 
Dick: A Reading of Twenty Ontologically Uncertain Novels (London: McFarland & Com-
pany, 2011), 288n12.
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While it is true that Dick experimented with and wrote about a variety 
of drugs throughout his life—amphetamines, psychedelics, anti-psychotics 
and “heroic dosages” of orthomolecular vitamins, to name only a few—to 
propose that Dick understood these kinds of drugs as tools that offered only, 
or even offered any, strictly positive benefits to himself or others, would be 
to miss the point. It would also be to ignore the gloomy, even alarmist tenor 
of most of his writing on the subject. 27 
The roles that drugs play in Dick’s fiction are as so many tropes and psy-
chotropes; they are variously symbols of terror, malevolence, disillusionment, 
and shrewd parody. And Dick’s readiness to accept a variety of medical expla-
nations for drugs’s actions and inactions—even despite the fact that his own 
experiential accounts contradicted this evidence—suggests Dick’s pointed 
distrust for the predictability and value of biochemical alteration in general. 
Ever apprehensive of the economic structures that scaffold drug-controlled 
societies, Dick’s fiction and biography signal his materialist suspicion of the 
political, economic and cultural structures through which both legal and 
illegal drugs are developed, regulated, prescribed, proscribed, and sold.
In this chapter, I want to elaborate on Dick as a writer on drugs. I will 
consider his fiction as an example of what Sadie Plant calls “writing on 
drugs,” and examine the relation of the historical questions of Dick’s drug 
use contemporaneous developments in medical and economic psychiatry. 
But why should it be important for literary scholars to examine Dick’s per-
sonal drug use in this way, and not simply the representations of drugs in 
his works? 28 Building on the initial concerns of this thesis with the status 
of authorship in part 1—and conceiving of a writer’s drug use as part of a 
larger pursuit in literary studies to develop novel images or models of what 
Huxley calls the “psychophysical organism”—this chapter proposes that 
the material circumstances of textual production, including those related 
to the author’s biography, are always in some way available to the analyst. 
27 On Dick’s use of LSD and psychedelics see Sutin, Divine Invasions, 127, 141-2; on am-
phetamines, including “speed” and the methamphetamine compound Semoxydrine, 
see Sutin, Divine Invasions, 107, 123, 164-5, 169-70, and Rickman, To The High Castle, 
49-52; on the anti-psychotic Stelazine, see Sutin, Divine Invasions, 124, and Anne R. 
Dick, The Search for Philip K. Dick,188-89; and on Dick’s drug use generally, see Kinman 
Rouzlewave, (unpublished, 2008). Also see David Lenson, On Drugs (Minneapolis: Min-
nesota University Press, 2002); Boon, The Road of Excess, 189.
28 That this might constitute a scholarly-critical transgression is indicated by the re-
marks of critics such as Andrew M. Butler. In his 2005 essay, Butler argues that we 
should “try to keep his life and his work separate and not overplay Dick’s use of drugs.” 
Butler, “LSD, Lying Ink, and Lies, Inc.,” Science Fiction Studies 32, no. 2 (2005): 265-80, 
esp. 265.
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I argue that these extratextual details, moreover, should always be critical-
ly welcomed in literary scholarship. As I suggested in earlier chapters (and 
in particular chapters 2 and 6), if the emergence of new technologies—the 
printing press, the typewriter, the computer, and various other means by 
which a shift toward electric formats took place—can be understood as hav-
ing been essential in reshaping literary ideas throughout modern history (as 
much scholarship has postulated), then a historicisation of the modalities 
opened up by developments in psychopharmacology and drugs in the late 
twentieth century may also be—as David Boothroyd proposes—“readily ac-
knowledged as a matter of legitimate contention.” 29 
Yet, only a handful of excellent volumes have been dedicated to this sub-
ject, appearing sporadically throughout the last two decades. Of course, it is 
notable, too, that most of these works refer explicitly to Dick’s work. 30 One 
explanation for this is that there exists a growing interest in the history of 
drug use and its effects on literary production, albeit a nascent one. If this be 
so, then this development serves as a rallying call for the continuation of this 
work. The range of socio-legal changes that have occurred over the last two 
to three years—the legalisation of cannabis under two US state law regimes, 
for instance—speak further to the emergence of a new epistemic moment in 
which the development of a cultural studies of drugs and a corresponding 
“narcoliterary” studies of texts may be crucial to our understanding of the 
nature of authorship and textual production. 31
Almost singularly prodigious in his interlocution with the psychiatric 
developments of his time, Dick turns his acerbic, even Huxleyan, wit to the 
biopolitical and psychopolitical pressures of American life after the Second 
29 On the printing press, see Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution in Early 
Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Marshall McLuhan, 
The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1962), 4-6. On electronic and digital writing, see notably N. Katherine Hayles, 
Writing Machines (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002) and My Mother Was a Computer: 
Digital Subjects and Literary Texts (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
And see David Boothroyd, Culture on Drugs: Narco-Cultural Studies of High Modernity 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press), 9. 
30 I refer here to works I have previously cited including Boothroyd’s edited volume Cul-
ture on Drugs, Lenson’s On Drugs; Boon’s Road of Excess; as well as Avital Ronell’s Crack 
Wars: Literature, Addiction, Mania (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992); Sadie 
Plant’s Writing On Drugs (London: Faber and Faber, 1999), see 114 and 169; and Rich-
ard Doyle’s Darwin’s Pharmacy: Sex, Plants, and the Evolution of the Noösphere (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2011), 49.
31 For a summary of these changes, see for instance, D. Mark Anderson, et al., “The Le-
galization of Recreational Marijuana: How Likely is the Worst Case Scenario?” Journal 
of Policy Analysis and Management 33, no. 2 (2014): 221-31.
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World War. As Lethem observes of Dick’s 1964 novel Clans of the Alphane 
Moon, it is an “antic psychiatric farce, written as if cribbed from the DSM-
IV.” 32 Dick’s familiarity not only with psychiatric drugs, however, but the 
epistemology of psychiatric diagnosis and classification, is not only redo-
lent in his fiction but also central to a number of his prose essays, letters, 
transcribed interviews, book forewords and, of course, his own seemingly 
endless torrent of theoretical philosophy: The Exegesis. While this archive 
cannot be fully addressed in this chapter, the companion essays that Dick 
wrote on the subjects of drugs and schizophrenia during a time of unprec-
edented personal anxiety and prescription drug use were scrivened by him 
during the same period that forms this chapter’s focal point: the years 1963 
to ‘65. Dick’s concern particularly with the relation of hallucination, schizo-
phrenia, and drugs during this period indicates the significance of these 
years in Dick’s writing life, as well as their difficulty for him. 33 
Influenced by the philosophy of psychiatry expressed in Rollo May’s edit-
ed collection Existence, Dick’s theorisations on hallucinations and psychotic 
illnesses readily entangle themselves with a range of more detailed elabo-
rations on the politics of psychiatry, enunciated at this time by the likes of 
Thomas Szasz, Foucault, Laing, Franco Basaglia, and Guattari. 34 In his ear-
nest and scholarly engagement with the phenomenology of consciousness— 
and his implicit concern to locate the origin of what Foucault understood 
simply as “madness”—Dick distinguishes himself from other drug-oriented 
literary figures of the time. He is in many ways unlike those who formed “the 
Beats,” for example, for as a group they were less persistently concerned with 
“epistemologising” than with “experientialising” their interiorities. 35 
32 Lethem, “You Don’t Know Dick.”
33 Anne Dick’s history of her and Phil’s marriage in The Search For Philip K. Dick (Califor-
nia: Tachyon, 2010) details this tumultuous period of Dick’s life in the mid-1960s, cul-
minating in Dick’s perception of a face towering over him in the sky—what Sutin calls 
a “visage of perfect evil.” See Sutin, Divine Invasions, 126-7. Dick’s essays of this period 
are reproduced in Lawrence Sutin, ed. The Shifting Realities of Philip K. Dick (New York: 
Pantheon, 1995), 167-82. 
34 Anne Dick writes that Dick became “overly involved with the case histories” of those 
featured in Rollo May’s co-edited volume Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and 
Psychology (London: Basic Books, 1958); The Search, 79; and see Christopher Palmer, 
Philip K. Dick: Exhilaration and the Postmodern (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 
2003), 147; Rossi, Twisted Worlds, 111, 117, 281n15.
35 Of course, writers like Burroughs also penned essays on drugs, although these are 
characteristically less philosophical than Dick’s. See, for instance: “Points of Distinc-
tion Between Sedative and Consciousness-Expanding Drugs,” in David Solomon, ed. 
LSD: The Consciousness-Expanding Drug (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1964), 168-73.
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Descending from a lineage of literary figures that includes Huxley, Stan-
islaw Witkiewicz, and Antonin Artaud, then, Dick’s fictional drug narratives 
function not simply as fictions, nor even as political fictions, but as—like 
these other writers’s oeuvres—a corpus of writing that narrativises phil-
osophical problems. In other words, Dick belongs to that range of practi-
tioners whose role and status is ably articulated in an epithet that Dick once 
used to describe himself—they are “fictionalizing philosopher[s].” 36
While Dick’s fiction serves at once as philosophical satire and technop-
olitical critique, it also bears the influence of what had been a range of com-
monly held views about drugs throughout the 1960s and ‘70s. In particular, 
his novels Clans of the Alphane Moon and Stigmata respond to the political 
conditions in which psychiatry began to escalate in 1960s America; these 
novels thus map the rapid transformation of the pharmaceutical industry 
throughout this decade. 37 Later in this chapter, I will propose how Dick’s 
prose and fiction respond to the question of drug addiction (and even to the 
question of his own drug addiction). These reponses, I argue, reflect Dick’s 
increasingly self-assured perspective on the uncertainty of the human body 
(a perspective that is quite distinct from that which Huxley holds), and the 
untenability of positivistic conceptualisations of nature more generally. 
Dick’s fiction, then, reflects the manner in which psychiatric and bio-
chemical knowledge had itself drawn the author’s attention to the way in 
which bodies can suddenly and unpredictably respond to psychoactive and 
other substances. And, as the diegetic realities of his works become progres-
sively more unrecognisable, and his speculative views about the potential for 
the human body more wild, Dick’s views are increasingly typified by a belief 
in the notion that reality may invert, transform, and break down. This belief 
is especially well emblematised in such instances as when no biochemical 
aetiology or potentiality is to be found in respect of an embodied affect. 
And when an inert or non-psychoactive substance causes unpredicted and 
unpredictable effects, for instance, what does this mean? For Dick, such dis-
coveries offer nothing more than moments of truth; they are revelations of 
things that had before been, for one or another reason, occulted or hidden 
previously.
36 Philip K. Dick, The Exegesis of Philip K. Dick, ed. Pamela Jackson and Jonathan Lethem 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011), 693; also see Steve Erickson’s and Simon 
Critchley’s separate notes on this expression. 
37 On the massive increases in amphetamine production and sales in the United States 
between the late 1950s and 1970 see Richard DeGrandpre, The Cult Of Pharmacology 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 146-8.
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Following what is at least a very close encounter with mental illness in 
the mid-1960s, Dick, by the early ‘70s, had come to feel that drugs in fact 
could not be readily repurposed for any specific or reliable use in society. 
Having concluded as much, he redirected the focus of his science fiction 
to machines—and later, he would attend to immaterial forces like VALIS or 
UBIK. But if illicit drugs had made any impact on society, Dick mused, then 
they had been only a malignant pestilence; they punished, as Dick would 
write in the Afterword to A Scanner Darkly, those who “wanted to keep on 
having a good time forever” (SD, 276-78). But despite his changing views on 
“good time” drugs like hallucinogens and opiates, mind-changing substanc-
es of all kinds remain consistent tropological figures within Dick’s fiction; 
but at almost all times, these drugs are pernicious. They represent the colo-
nisation of desire—and they are the material form of that power, wielded by 
those who would seek to assert and enforce biopower, in contemporary and 
future societies.
Unworking the Socius: Drugs and Writing
as i have already discussed in previous chapters, the nexus of drugs and lit-
erature is perhaps most carefully scrutinised in Jacques Derrida’s reading 
of Plato’s Phaedrus. Here Derrida retells and analyses the story in which 
Sophocles, as I mentioned in chapter 6, compares Phaedrus’s written texts to 
a drug or pharmakon: to that which is “alternately or simultaneously... benef-
icent or maleficent.” 38 Emphasising the inherent instability of writing—and 
highlighting its unstable duality—Derrida conceives of inscription not only 
as originating as “logos” in, or as a kind of father, but also as a drug—as a 
compound that has its origins in nature. 39 
But Plato, Derrida argues, also does much more than this. He is “bent on 
presenting writing as an occult, and therefore suspect, power,” 40 and he re-
mains intent to ensure that all those prone to misprision—those malicious 
abusers of words—shall know that they will, like sorcerers and conjurers, be 
the first among those exiled from the polis for their misdeeds. After all, it is 
precisely this point that Plato would more explicitly confirm in his Laws. 41
38 Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 75.
39 Ibid., 82.
40 Ibid., 99.
41 See Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, tr. Ben Jowett, 4 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1871), 4: 92.
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Telling at once the history of writing’s invention and prohibition, here a 
chiasmus consisting of “doing drugs” and “doing texts”—be it through the 
reading or producing of them—is what propels writing’s potentiality, even 
at and from the very moment of its birth in Western history. And since both 
are now known to be dangerous powers, the acts of writing and drug use 
will equally be subject to interdiction by the father-king or ruling sovereign; 
doing one or the other, it seems, will lead to the perpetrator’s banishment 
or exclusion. 
In other books, this nexus of drugs and writing is configured different-
ly: it becomes a relation of social communion (drugs) and rhetoric in Dale 
Pendell’s Pharmako book series, and a relation of alterity (drugs), rhetoric, 
ecology in Richard Doyle’s Darwin’s Pharmacy. However, in all these texts, 
the nexus is not simply pernicious, but rather representative of the myriad 
ways in which communicating, remembering, and problem-solving involves 
many methods and materials, all of them deeply implicated in one another’s 
operations, and none of them simply reducible to writing or drugs alone. 42 
For instance, since, as Doyle notes, “psychedelic compounds have already 
been vectors of technoscientific change” throughout history—eliciting the 
kinds of insights apprehended by the likes of Nobel Prize winning biochem-
ist Kary Mullis, who discovered polymerase chain reaction or PCR—drugs 
are not simply atrophic agents of disorder, but sources of growth that aid to 
“increase the overall dissipation of energy in any given ecology.” 43 Others lit-
erary scholars—David Lenson, Sadie Plant, Marcus Boon, Avital Ronell, and 
David Boothroyd—focus on the relation of literature’s production and drug 
use. And meanwhile, Anthony Enns, Andrew M. Butler, and Paul Youngquist 
have variously contributed to the scholarly discourse specifically on the rela-
tion of Dick’s writing and drug use. 44 
But among these scholarly efforts, Ronell’s work is perhaps the most in-
structive—or at least the most evocative. Employing a rich terminology that 
ricochets off of what Deleuze and Guattari variously call “schizoanalysis” 
42 Each book in Dale Pendell’s ‘Pharmako’ series is published by North Atlantic Books, 
California: Pharmako/Poeia: Plant Powers, Poisons and Herbcraft (1995); Pharmako/Dy-
namis: Stimulating Plants, Potions and Herbcraft (2002), see esp. 151; and Pharmako/
Gnosis: Plant Teachers and the Poison Path (2005). Also see Doyle, Darwin’s Pharmacy, 
passim.
43 Doyle, Darwin’s Pharmacy, 33, 121.
44 See Youngquist, “Score, Scan, Schiz: Dick on Drugs,” Cultural Critique 44 (2000): 84-
110; Anthony Enns, “Media, Drugs and Schizophrenia in the Works of Philip K. Dick,” 
Science Fiction Studies 33, no. 1 (2006): 68-88; and Butler, “Lying Ink, and Lies, Inc.,” 
passim.
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and “pharmacoanalysis,” Ronell prepares the ground for a “narcoanalysis” 
of literature, enabling the act of writing now to become visible as a revelatory 
procedure, one that denudes this graphemic technic of political, juridical, 
and philosophical obfuscations. 45 While examples of “writing on drugs” 
may serve to promote certain political ends—such as to promote drug de-
criminalisation, regulation, or even to allow for these molecular compounds 
and their variously specific subjective effects to escape interdiction altogeth-
er—this mode of writing also enables a new kind of knowledge. This is an 
exceptional category of knowledge that permits drugs at once to be known 
as material objects, as well as to be seen as the ciphers of new syntagmati-
cally representable affects, ones that are pregiven to procedures of cognitive 
distortion and mimesis. 
That “literature,” Ronell argues, is in a sense always and ever “on drugs 
and about drugs,” can be seen in the history of its censorship—in the many 
proceedings in which literature has itself been “treated juridically as a drug” 
because its “menace... consists in its pointing to what is not there in any 
ordinary sense of ontological unveiling.” 46 Literature, in other words, can 
be understood as a technology for transcribing molecular and ontological 
possibility; it is a sieve through which thoughts ordinarily interdicted may 
become more easily grasped, and thus more readily thinkable. 
Just as drugs gesture at molecular difference, so does literature point 
to what is not ordinarily possible; but where the latter converts molecular 
operations into what is an apparently material form of comprehension and 
comprehensibility, the former only modify those originary differences. 
Thus, while literature is only a symbolic, or second-order technic in this con-
figuration, it is nonetheless an ally of the molecular real; it expresses and 
articulates these neuromolecular processes, even as it obscures them. Citing 
Philip K. Dick himself, Ronell’s study of drug literature detects the chiasmus 
that consists in the twin cultures of drugs and electronics:
If the literature of electronic culture can be located in the works of Philip K. 
Dick or William Gibson, in the imaginings of cyberpunk projection, or a re-
45 See Avital Ronell, “Toward a Narcoanalysis,” in Crack Wars, 47-64; Gilles Deleuze, A 
Thousand Plateaus, 248. See also Anna Powell, “Pharmacoanalysis” (ch. 2) in Deleuze, 
Altered States and Film (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 54-9; and John 
Fitzgerald, “Pharmacoanalysis: Discourses of Hidden Drug Use,” PhD diss., Monash 
University, Melbourne, 2001 [unpublished]. 
46 Strangely enough, in Michael Bishop’s science fiction book The Secret Ascension (New 
York: Tor Books, 1987) the “second printing” of Dick’s novel VALIS is censored by the 
censorship board: 33. Also see Ronell, Crack Wars, 50, 55-6.
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serve of virtual reality, then it is probable that electronic culture shares a cru-
cial project with drug culture. 47
If the “crucial project” in which electronic and drug cultures share is a lit-
erary one—and if it is discernible in both formal and material objects, such 
as those that lie outside Dick’s or Gibson’s identities or oeuvres—then this 
project is also an axiom around which each of their works orbits. This project 
is a tendency or drive to reproduce and redeploy material technics, but now 
in a syntagmatic or textual shape. Equally trussed to electrical forces as it is 
sutured to molecular operations, this literary project, moreover, arranges its 
modes of formal expression around the incidental or itinerant movements 
of a stimulus that is anterior to and yet propulsive of it. And given that drugs 
and electronic technologies routinely feature in Dick’s novels as what James-
on calls “adjuvants”—as adjuncts or aids to the protagonists’s mental lives— 
it is notable that these related cultures must also orbit around the practice of 
what was once called the tekhne iatrike: the mechanical arts. 
Where one adopts the outlook in which the medical and mechanical arts 
may be productively brought together, the techniques (tekhne) of physical 
medicine (iatros) begin to consist in those practices by which subjects var-
iously experiment with nothing less than the power to heal themselves. 48 
Remedying one’s ills—such as by satiating one’s desires, investing in the ma-
terial consumption of a substance, or performing an apparently therapeutic 
procedure by “self-medicating”—becomes a procedure that is presumed to 
further the subject’s own ends, no matter the net result. 
For its part, the text itself, at least in literary studies, serves to allow for 
a similar restorative and restitutional work; like a drug, or a drug-use proce-
dure, a book points to those lacunae that are, as Ronell suggests, “not there 
in any ordinary sense.” 49 In doing so, books—like drugs—allow us to access 
particular kinds of thoughts—or even “images of thoughts,” or “psychotro-
pes”—which are not easily accessed in other ways.
If drugs make legible a wider spectrum of ontological experience, 
though, they can also be used in another way: namely, in the way in which 
47 Ibid., 68.
48 Consider in Stigmata, for instance, the interrelation of the drug Can-D, the E Therapy 
that is used by Dr. Denkmal, and the computer psychiatrist, Dr. Smile. I employ the 
term tekhne iatrikes as it was used in ancient Greek to refer to medicine as a “mechan-
ical art.” On this, see Robert Araya’s essay “The outlook of the Tekhne Iatrike and the 
Medical Act to the Third Millennium,” Theoretical Medicine 17, no. 2 (1996): 163-73. 
49 See William S. Haubrich, Medical Meanings: A Glossary of Word Origins (New York: 
American College of Physicians, 2003), 115.
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they are deployed by the figures of Dick’s novels. Almost invariably, charac-
ters in Dick’s fiction use drugs to mitigate their human suffering—to vitiate 
what they have come to experience as a depressed or hyper-routinised (au-
tomatised) economic milieu. In other words, drugs, as I have already made 
clear in chapter 3, can allow for the “deautomatisation” of what might have 
become all too automatic or “automatised.” 
Almost all of Dick’s future worlds constitute outlines, for instance, of 
disturbing future conditions. They are dystopias, then, that invariably depict 
the mere fact of “being alive” as reason enough to imbibe something, or to 
make oneself subject to some invasive or otherwise subjugating intervention 
through some device or drug. These disturbing diegeses are thus Dick’s own 
visionary illustrations of the same state that Giorgio Agamben describes as 
“biological modernity”: the period characterised by the “politicisation of 
bare life as such.” 50 
It is also in Dick’s fictionalisations of future narcoeconomies and tech-
nopolises that we can identify the “unworking” that Ronell—calling on Jean-
Luc Nancy and Maurice Blanchot’s word, “désoeuvrement”—describes as the 
disoperationalisation of the cultural, political, and social forces that abide 
in a collective, governmental state. Representing such societies—dystopic 
as they are—is Dick’s own way of offering a digressive corrosion of the sov-
ereign; it is his means of adumbrating those forces “whose contours we can 
begin to read,” as Ronell notes, in the literature on drugs. 51 In Dick’s science 
fiction, moreover, such an unworking of these forces plays out within the 
very “reserve of virtual reality” that is itself opened up by the disorienting 
and heterogeneous psychoscape of the novel. These are those diegetic set-
tings—already characterised by chaos and an endlessly hallucinating drug 
culture—in which the apocalyptic vision is no longer monumental, but rather 
mundane and banal. It is a vision that is emblematised, for instance, by the 
“tract area of cheap but durable houses, long ago vacated by the straights” 
that appears in A Scanner Darkly (SD, 4). 
50  See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, tr. Daniel Hell-
er-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 4.
51 Ronell, Crack Wars, 68; Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, tr. Susan Hanson 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 424. Also see Jean-Luc Nancy, The 
Inoperative Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 156n40; 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Lit-
erature in German Romanticism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 57-8; 
Scott Shershow, The Work and The Gift (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 
165-83, 193-205.
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While this narrative strategy makes it possible to read Dick’s narra-
tives as critiques of the aftermath of biopolitical power—as illustrations of 
post-apocalyptic worlds that are hardly distinguishable from our present-day 
societies—it is the promise and experience of a crucial reorientation within 
these worlds that enables his novels to generate such striking psychotropes. 
And, since Dick’s fiction so often prompts its readers to recognise the ways in 
which this quotidian disorientation has become so pervasive—so normative 
that it ceases to be real, and thus must only be chimerical—it is a strategy 
that allows Dick to redouble the shockingness of the dystopia itself. No longer 
an obviously or explicitly degraded locus, the dystopian world, we discover, 
is just like our own. 
This is precisely what Dick defines as the purpose of his writing—but not 
only of his science fiction, but of science fiction (“sf”) more generally. In fact, 
he would make exactly this point when relaying his thoughts to the upcom-
ing sf author John Betancourt in a 1981 letter. In addition to explaining the 
less obvious typological distinction designated by his “value term” of “good 
science fiction,” 52 Dick’s letter seeks to remind Betancourt of the importance 
of conjoining the “fictitious world” with our own. Thus, while the world of sf 
might be essentially different or “orthogonal” to the author’s current one, it 
must also remain a world that is recognisable to the reader :
There must be a coherent idea involved in this dislocation; that is, the dislo-
cation must be a conceptual one, not merely a trivial or bizarre one—this is 
the essence of science fiction, the conceptual dislocation within the society so 
that as a result a new society is generated in the author’s mind, transferred to 
paper, and from paper it occurs as a convulsive shock in the reader’s mind, the 
shock of dysrecognition. 53
To create a society riven by drug use—or a society whose participants and 
subjects seem to have lost or acceded control in the face of a drug scourge—
thus constitutes a prototypical dislocation of the world for the purposes of 
Dick’s science fiction. The pervasiveness of drugs in many of Dick’s future 
societies represents an exemplary “deterritorialization of the socius,” as 
Deleuze and Guattari similarly describe the phenomenon that Dick aspires 
to bring about. 54 Enabling the author to generate the all-important “convul-
52 This letter is reproduced as the preface to Beyond Lies the Wub: The Collected Stories 
of Philip K. Dick, 6 vols. (London: Gollancz, 1988), 1: 9-10. This is from a letter to John 
Betancourt dated 14 May, 1981.
53 Dick, preface to Beyond Lies the Wub, 1: 9-10.
54 The word “socius” is Latin word for a kind of social gathering. I use it throughout this 
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sive shock” they seek to inflict on their readership, producing drug-depen-
dent societies also yields a new “ontological unveiling” that is connected 
to the real world. After all, at the time that most of Dick’s anti-psychiatry 
fiction was published—the mid-1960s—these narratives appeared relatively 
plausible. For it was at this time that drugs had secured a special purchase 
on America’s paranoiac imaginary. 
In the 1960s, a new fear had recently arisen: many felt that even those 
prescription drugs that had undergone rigorous clinical trials might beget 
fatal, and tragic, ends. There was thus a suspicion of biochemical science. It 
was a fear that had already been expressed in 1960, for instance, when news-
paper headlines across North America panicked readers by reporting the 
news that one over-the-counter medication, thalidomide—a sedative drug 
marketed as “remarkably safe” in the previous decade—had been discovered 
to cause severe birth defects and malformations in unborn children. 55 The 
thalidomide story called into question the expertise avowed by the medical 
authorities, the pharmaceutical industry, and the FDA—which regulated 
and oversaw the distribution of these drugs—and a pharmacological pan-
ic quickly arose that seemed to propel the republication of this and many 
other related stories. This panic served only to exacerbate what had already 
appeared as an incipient hysteria over the trialling and application of more 
experimental drugs; and it is precisely this panic that Dick elaborates on in 
his novels of the time. 
While the clinical trials and applications of these experimental drugs had 
remained only investigational before the 1960s, the fear that spread across 
the American populous at the time soon meant that drugs—and compounds 
like LSD—were to themselves face a ban in most US states. 56 But while this 
specter of drug fear ensured that the experimental use of psychopharma-
cological therapies waned, the general use and prescription of commercial 
psychopharmacological treatments—for a variety of illnesses, including de-
pression—dramatically rose in this period. As early as 1963, for instance, 
around 15 per cent of Americans—or some thirty million people— were us-
ing prescription drugs for psychiatric complaints. 57 An ardent consumer of 
chapter (and have done in previous chapters) in place of society (which Dick uses) in 
order to more fully denote what Deleuze and Guattari call a “social machine”: Anti-Oe-
dipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, tr. Robert Hurley, et al. (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1983), 33, 141.
55 Erika Dyck, Psychedelic Psychiatry: LSD from Clinic to Campus (Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 2008), 119.
56 Dyck, Psychedelic Psychiatry, 121.
57 See Rasmussen, On Speed, 163.
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prescription drugs himself at this time—as well as of illicit ones—Dick had 
been well aware of what was to become a new regime of psychopharmacolog-
ical treatment in the United States. 58 
Sf-ing the Acid Nightmare
it was within this early 1960s context—a period of pharmacological panic—
that  LSD and “homemade versions” of the drug known as “acid” (whose sale 
had begun on the black market) first emerged in high numbers. Inevitably, 
this appearance and popularisation of LSD generated, as Erika Dyck notes, 
a torrent of fear among the US public. But this was a fear that inaugurated 
not simply a feeling of anxiety among the general population—which was 
increasingly prone to associate the LSD with the revolutionaries of the coun-
terculture. Rather, this sense of panic and fear also affected some of the drug 
scene’s most credible and honest commentators. 59 
By 1964, for example, even Beat author William S. Burroughs—suspect-
ing that malevolent biopolitical forces may be at play in the distribution of 
hallucinogens—urged readers of his novel Nova Express to respond acrimo-
niously to their dealers’s latest offerings:
Throw back their ersatz Immortality... Flush their drug kicks down the drain—
They are poisoning and monopolizing the hallucinogenic drugs—learn to make 
it without any chemical corn—All that they offer is a screen to cover retreat 
from the colony they have so disgracefully mismanaged. To cover travel ar-
rangements so they will never have to pay constituents they have betrayed 
and sold out. 60
Published less than a year after the publication of Nova Express, Dick’s Stig-
mata proves a companion text to Burroughs’s cautionary tale regarding the 
newly drug-controlled society. For Dick as for Burroughs, the world had 
increasingly become a place at whose center of gravity laid the vision and 
promise of “ersatz Immortality.” It was a place that did little more than elab-
orate on the “acid nightmare” that had been dreamed up by, or had been 
visited upon, a mainstream media already predisposed to drug hysteria. 
58 Dick’s most notable prescription drugs were Semoxydrine, a prescription metham-
phetamine, and Stelazine, a prescription anti-psychotic.
59 Dyck, Psychedelic Psychiatry, 101.
60 William Burroughs, Nova Express (New York: Grove Press, 1992 [1964]) 6; also see Mar-
tin A. Lee and Bruce Shlain, Acid Dreams (New York: Grove Press, 1985), 82. 
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And while Stigmata follows a brief lineage of Dick’s anti-psychiatric nov-
els—one that begins with Martian Time-Slip (1964) and continues with Clans 
of the Alphane Moon (1964), published only months before Stigmata—this 
novel further refines this triad’s thematic preoccupation with psychiatric 
and molecular politics. Sigmata, that is, intersects with the fuzziness of 
the molar legal structures that, in Dick’s eyes, at one and the same time 
proscribe and tolerate a range of questionable biomedical and psychiatric 
practices. 61 Like so many of Dick’s novels, Stigmata also transcodes the vi-
olence of what might be called “neoliberal” or late-capitalist economic con-
structions—including the insidiousness of a “duopoly,” for instance—into 
memorable stories, thus bringing into relief a number of the ways in which 
the force that Foucault named bio-power had been redeployed through and 
by these economic regimes. 62
But, more than any force in Stigmata, it is the illegal drug “Can-D” that 
serves to most viciously structure the economic and biopolitical societies 
that the novel will describe. These societies include those on Earth, but also 
those on Mars. The drug, in fact, pervades the entirety of the known uni-
verse, and in so doing engenders a “shock of dysrecognition” both in the 
novel’s characters and in a contemporaneous American sf readership, one 
already experiencing the symptoms of an “acid panic,” increasingly familiar 
as they had become with the malignancy and ubiquity of LSD. 63 
As I have noted, the name of the malevolent drug in Stigmata is “Can-D”—
an aptronym whose meaning inheres in its homonymous relation to the word 
“candy.” This name, however, is also a brand name—one that connotes the 
manner in which the drug induces in its users a childish fantasy. It serves, 
at least putatively, to relieve and therapise those who have been deported to 
any one of the hundreds of dirt-farm colonies on Mars. Having now risen 
to dangerously high temperatures, the Earth’s climate has made most of its 
continental zones uninhabitable; and this climate has required its remaining 
inhabitants to travel in “thermsosealed interbuilding commute car[s]” (TSPE, 
10). And while Can-D is by no means an official medicament for those who 
live in Mars’s “hovels,” the drug ensures the continued exclusion of those 
who live there: those who were formerly Earthlings, and whose subsistence in 
their “bare lives” as dirt-farmers also enables those still on Earth to prosper. 
61 This thematic is also explored in The Simulacra (New York: Ace Books, 1964), where 
psychotherapy has been outlawed under pressures from A.G. Chemie, a Berlin based 
pharmaceutical company.
62 See notably Brett Levinson, “Biopolitics and Duopolies,” Diacritics 35, no. 2 (2005): 65-5.
63 Dyck, Psychedelic Psychiatry, 101-118. 
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In fact, those on Earth largely remain in professions associated with 
the production of Can-D and its related materials. All characters in the 
novel, for instance, work in jobs related to the manufacture of accessories 
and enhancements for the drug’s ritual use. Among the myriad accessories 
produced for the purposes of the Can-D “translation,” the most important 
include the doll known as “Perky Pat” and the so-called layout boards—man-
ufactured by P.P. Layouts—on which this doll lives out her imaginary life. 
But even the many other various “units of her miniature world” (TSPE, 10)—
objects of furniture, including vases, and all of which are named “mins,” as 
in “miniatures”—are critical to the ritualised procedure in which the Can-D 
experience is inaugurated, and through which its users enter, or “translate,” 
into this doll-house world. 
While “translation” is an apparently casual and self-directed practice, 
the Martian hovelists’s use of Can-D is nonetheless institutionalised, and 
virtually mandatory. In what is quite literally a drug “trip,” Can-D’s users 
share in a hallucinated consensus-reality. In the virtual world of the drug, 
that is, they return to Earth—and specifically to San Francisco—there be-
coming one of only two characters in what appears to be a kind of 1950s 
melodrama, or an idealised Hollywood romance film. Translating into the 
now-living physical form of either one of the figurine dolls of the layout 
boards—either Walt Essex or (“Perky”) Pat Christensen—the drugs’s users 
become ontologically consubstantial with the dolls’s bodies and minds. 
In this ersatz San-Francisco, they explore the virtual landscape, which to 
them appears to be a fully realised, if not an overtly cinematic, world. Users 
become “ghosts in the machine” in an operation comparable to—and we 
might say recently allegorised in—Spike Jonze’s Being John Malkovich (1999). 
In this film, the subject, by undertaking the right procedure, can enter into 
the body of John Malkovich for an apparently finite period of time, seeing 
the world through his eyes. But the “Perky Pat world” is even more totalising 
than the Malkovich one; in Dick’s virtualisation, characters seem to forget 
their original identities: men become women, and vice versa, such that nei-
ther gender—nor presumably any other aspect of their original identity—re-
mains important. 
When the layout boards and dolls are not in use, the husks of these fig-
ures—which is to say the very figures into whose bodies the Can-D partici-
pants enter—are strewn across the floor. There they lie, unmoving on these 
dormant and inactive boards, much like a child’s playset that has long gone 
unused. Among the various mins that might appear on the board, certain of 
the hovelists in the novel aim to own an actual “psychoanalyst” figurine; for 
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even in the Perky Pat world—and perhaps especially in this world as Dick’s 
novel suggests—a need or desire is felt for therapy, a psychological consulta-
tion of the kind that the users “had back on Earth” (TSPE, 37-8). 
Dick, of course, had been influenced by the materials and devices that 
appeared around him at various times in his various homes, which included 
his own children’s toys. As he reported in a 1975 interview in Rolling Stone 
with Paul Williams—an interview that would be widely read, escalating Dick 
to relative notoriety—Dick “got to where” he would “literally look up” while 
typing to generate his ideas for narrative action: “I was literally looking up, 
type type type and look up...” he noted. “With one character I deduced he 
had a child because I could see a tricycle in the driveway.” 64 
As with the invention of the man with a child—an idea engendered by a 
tricycle—the idea for Perky Pat arose when Dick had witnessed his daugh-
ters playing with their Barbie and Ken dolls. Dick rapidly became fascinated 
with these posthuman bodies—these strange figurines—which could not be 
real: “They couldn’t exist in the real world,” he remarked, “Their heads are 
much too small for their bodies.” 65 But Dick had also been fascinated by the 
ritual itself: How, if they could not exist in the real world, might one be led to 
bridge this schism between irreality and the real?
Deported and deterritorialised, those who live in the hovels of Mars find 
that while Can-D facilitates a subjective distantiation from their immediate 
world—offering them a brief respite from their miserable reality—the drug 
also ensures the continuation of their “gloomy quasi-life of involuntary ex-
patriation in an unnatural environment” (TSPE, 51). And that the malaise 
of these hovels is specifically biological is signaled by the viral inflection of 
the name given to its central Martian milieu: “Chicken Pox Prospects.” As 
a chewable elixir, Can-D is derived from a lichen fungus; and this fact tele-
graphs its relation to such similarly fungus-based drugs as the psychedelic 
mushrooms, psilocybe cubensis, as well as to LSD itself, which is crucially 
synthesised from a number of ergot fungi, and most commonly the Claviceps 
purpurea fungus. 66 
64 Paul Williams, “The True Stories of Philip K. Dick,” Rolling Stone (6 November 1975): 
47.
65 Quoted in Anne Dick, The Search for Philip K. Dick, 217. Also see Patricia S. Warrick, 
Mind in Motion: The Fiction of Philip K. Dick (Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1987), 95; Emmanuelle Carrère, I am Alive and You are Dead: A Journey into the 
Mind of Philip K. Dick, tr. Timothy Bent (New York: Picador, 1993), 105; Laurence A. 
Rickels, I Think I Am Philip K Dick (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 
425n1.
66 See Vladimír Křen, et al., ed., Ergot: The Genus Claviceps (Amsterdam: Harwood, 2005), 
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But Can-D, in its operations, simulates not only an experience of inter-
planetary travel; it also allows for travel through time. That is, its symbolic 
or virtualising operations allow users to achieve “an actual translation from 
Mars to Earth-as-it-was” (TSPE, 48). In their attempts to account for their 
seemingly unique experiences of “translation” (a belief that is largely false, 
since each users’s experience is much the same), Can-D users produce a se-
ries of spiritual theologies, dogmas, and anti-mythologies; with these, they 
seek to explain how it is that they have now accessed what they know is po-
litically interdicted. How, they ask, have we managed to “gain something... 
to which [we are] normally not entitled?” (TSPE, 49) 
But at every turn, the novel underscores the redundancy and delusion of 
these users’s theological explanations. For instance, when Dr. Denkmal—a 
glorified shock therapist, and a man who is clearly modeled on psychia-
trist-theologian Albert Schweitzer—dismisses the historical debates be-
tween Erasmus and Luther as so much time-wasting in the face of advanced 
technological devices like his E-Therapy, he dismisses theology in general. 
The subsumption of theological mystery into drugs and mind-expanding 
devices such as Denkmal’s E-Therapy machine now serves to allegorise and 
perpetuate the subjugation of these individual subjects within the biopoliti-
cal and economic logics of Stigmata’s new world—a place in which these de-
vices are built into the entrenched and implicitly legitimised drug market. 
Structuring their lives around the Can-D ritual, the Martian colonists 
subsist in what Foucault calls a “political double bind.” They live under a 
great disciplinary force, and even as they do so, they expedite and comply 
with the “simultaneous individualization and totalization” that allows the 
sovereign to sustain its biopower over them. 67 They are, in short, addicted 
to their own incarceration. But it is not enough that the colonists have been 
deported and must putter about “in a small land.” 68 
In Dick’s vision of an incarcerating biopolitical future, rather, intrinsic 
restrictions on freedom of movement also confirm the biopolitical regime 
94-104.
67 Foucault defines biopower as “the set of mechanisms through which the basic biologi-
cal features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general 
strategy of power”: Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, ed. Michael Senellart, tr. 
Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1. Cf. Foucault, “The Subject 
and Power,” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 785; Agamben, Homo Sacer, 9; cf. Hung-chi-
ung Li, “Out of the Biopolitical Double Bind: Universal Singularity, Singular Inversion, 
and Subtractive Unworking,” Concentric 37, no. 2 (2011): 111. 
68 Puttering About in a Small Land is the name of one of Dick’s non-science fiction novels; 
it was written in 1957, but not published until 1985, three years after Dick’s death: see 
Dick, Puttering About in a Small Land (Chicago: Academy Chicago Publishers, 1985).
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from which this citizenry cannot escape. While Can-D guarantees that the 
colonists will think they are generating uniquely bespoke and individual-
ized “trip reports” in their use of the drug—that they are becoming more 
intimately connected with themselves—what underscores the narrative more 
broadly is the extent to which the users striated and stratified accounts of 
the drug experience are increasingly characterised by anxiety. This is an anx-
iety that the users feel not simply about their situations, however, but about 
their own use and insight into Can-D. Does the drug, they begin to ask, have 
any real significance or meaning? 
Increasingly contending with one another, the various contentions of 
users about the drugs’s operations and metaphysical ramifications serve 
only to obscure what is their collective inculcation into a state of political 
disenfranchisement. The narrative functions as an allegory of Spinoza’s 
worm—the philosophical thought experiment reviewed by Huxley. In this 
experiment, which I addressed in chapter 5, Huxley compares the worm’s 
myopic, circumscribed view of their world to the “reality” of the substance 
that we, as humans, see and know as blood. Similarly, Dick portrays a contin-
gent of humans whose “bare lives” remain invisible to those who live them; 
only the reader, watching from afar, can identify that the substance to which 
they are so addicted has the pernicious and unworthy origins it does. 
Constituted by a subsistence exclusively on Can-D and its fantasies, users 
cannot see beyond their next translation; they thus remain oblivious to the 
regime of dependency and deportation that defines and sustains their en-
tire living environment. 69 The structure of this biopolitical economy is also 
obscured by the Burroughsian “screen” under which Leo Bulero—chairman 
of P. P. Layouts—disguises his geopolitical and international business in-
terests. Using a “hidden subsidiary” to cooperate with what Bulero calls a 
“dark-skinned [and] sneaky little unevolved politician” (TSPE, 19)—namely, 
the General Secretary of the UN Narcotics Bureau, Hepburn-Gilbert—Bule-
ro’s operation not only manufactures the accessories for Can-D’s ritualised 
“translations,” but also processes and distributes the drug itself. It has, in 
short, monopolised that which has now become a public health (or public 
illness) regime, one that crucially shapes the lives of an entire off-world pop-
ulation (TSPE, 17-18). 
69 On the increasing usefulness of internet trip reports to medicine, instance, Paul Dar-
gan, ed. et al., Novel Psychoactive Substances: Classification, Pharmacology, Toxicology 
(Oxford: Elsevier, 2013), 61. 
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Generating what Deleuze and Guattari identify as a “materialist psychi-
atry”—a psychiatric system that is responsible for introducing “desire into 
the mechanism, and introducing production into desire”—Stigmata thus 
illustrates the way in which “political techniques of power” can overlap with 
“technologies of the self.” In so doing, the novel offers a striking narrativi-
sation of what Agamben calls a “zone of irreducible indistinction.” Since the 
novel is written from a number of perspectives, and from two points of origin 
(Earth and Mars), readers can easily intuit what has been rendered invisible 
to the Martian hovelists: namely, the pernicious and degrading effects that 
unchecked sovereignty and biopower has on human life. 70
Despite Can-D’s disempowering effects, it is also possible to understand 
the hovelists’s responses to the drug as a reclamation of Leo Bulero’s bio-
power. By developing their liberal interpretation systems, for instance, the 
hovelists generate a collective rejoinder to Can-D, one that facilitates its own 
kind of “unworking.” In this way, the hovelists might be thought to reappro-
priate the very materials that the regime imposes on them, finding meaning 
in a place, or in an object, where none had been thought to exist. It is not only 
the collective exposure to Can-D’s alternative, and relatively depoliticised, 
ontological world, however—the world that is “psychoactivated” by Can-D’s 
biochemical operations—that leads the drug’s users to reconceptualise the 
political structures that disempower them. As much as their debates stymie 
the development of their knowledge of the regime that disempowers them 
from above, their various contentions also allow the hovelists to remain at 
least partially inoculated from Can-D’s neurochemical snare as well. For in 
their discrete theorisations of the Can-D experience—those that the users 
themselves, in their diversity, develop out of the biochemical experience—
many find a kind of truth or alethia that is otherwise inaccessible—even in 
a free society.
Allowing for the constitution of new subject positions—a possibility 
fortified by an instinctive and embodied knowledge of their dependence 
on Can-D—the act of “translation” thus enables the users to conceive of a 
“perennial philosophy,” a philosophy that at once recognises and authorises 
that mystical Truth underlying Can-D’s “miracle.” This philosophy, as with 
Huxley’s own perennial philosophy, is a psychophysical mysticism that rec-
ognises the unassailable nature of the human’s status as a being who is, 
ultimately, biologically-determined. Momentarily sidestepping the unjust 
70 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 22; Agamben, Homo Sacer, 12, 17; cf. Li, “Out of 
the Biopolitical Double Bind,” 111.
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and arbitrary malevolence of their socio-political context, users gain access 
to “the most solemn moment of which they [are] capable”—they arrive, that 
is, at a state of meditative peacefulness (TSPE, 43). 
But for all this, protagonist Sam Regan’s experience, as well as that of 
the other hovelists, is less the “miracle” he yearns for than a repudiation of 
the entire “translation” process. When Regan uses the drug, the effects of 
Can-D are revealed, in fact, to be irremediable; that is, they will never fade 
away or wear off. It is a narrative event that possibly reflects Dick’s own scep-
tical views about LSD and biochemical alteration—views that he espoused 
between 1963 and 1965 during what is possibly the most tumultuous period 
of his life. 71 So completely persuasive and irrefutable is the process of trans-
lation—and so totalising and unified is the route by which these users phys-
ically and mentally enter into the trip to become either Walt or Pat—that, 
ultimately, no subjective intervention is possible within the hovels. But nor is 
such an intervention even desired: characters such as Anne, for instance, ex-
press a desire to continue using the drug forever, even in the face of evidence 
that it is politically, socially, and in other ways disempowering. 
But the drug is not only inescapable because it is addictive; it is inescap-
able, rather, on a more technical level. When Sam Regan “translates” into the 
persona of Walt Essex, for instance, his attempt to remediate the totalising 
experience of the drug produces an unpromising and dispiriting outcome. 
Having translated into the body and mind of the handsome Walt Essex, Re-
gan finds a note—one that has clearly been written “in his own hand.” Faced 
with this “ocular proof,” Regan can only presume that he has penned the 
note, perhaps at some point prior to his translation. 
But the note is interesting: encouraging Regan to “make use of his time 
of translation,” and to enjoy what will be his shortlived respite from the 
colony, the note instructs Sam (not Walt) to call up his girlfriend while he 
still can: “Call up Pat pronto!” it urges (TSPE, 51). In Regan’s hapless plan to 
remediate the operations of Can-D—in his attempt, that is, to understand 
the origin of the note—he is prompted at the same time as he is prevented 
from doing what it asks of him. He is entirely prevented, in other words, from 
recognising the virtuality or fictionality of his present habitus in the “layout 
world”—and the way in which the novel illustrates this impasse means that 
71 Anne Dick asserts that in 1963 Phil has such a “bad trip he never tried LSD again.” See 
Dick, The Search, 124. In contrast, Sutin describes Dick’s 75 microgram acid trip two 
years later, in 1965: Sutin, Divine Invasions, 149. Of course, Dick’s initial castigation of 
hallucinogens is moderated in his introduction to “Faith of Our Fathers,” in Danger-
ous Visions, vol. 2, ed. Harlan Ellison (London: Sphere Books, 1974 [1969]), 68-9. 
The Shock of Dysrecognition 361
it may also be seen to offer a useful working study of Foucault’s conception 
of the “[bio]political double-bind.” 
As this scene suggests, it impossible (and perhaps for good reason) for 
Regan to “break through” and disrupt Can-D’s simulation simply by appre-
hending it as such. Even if he were to discover its irreality, he would be unable 
to renounce it merely as a simulated world of artificial “illusion,” or, as Dick 
once said, as a world that is “only apparently real.” 72 This is because Regan 
simply cannot see the other world, and because this world is actually to him, 
at least in this moment, real; he cannot suture the two worlds together con-
ceptually, nor in any other way. Not even the phantasmatic trace of Regan’s 
“own hand,” for example, offers proof enough to persuade or permit Regan 
to suspect or controvert the layout world. Rather, the only remediation imag-
inable in this context is that which is permitted by Regan’s awareness of the 
drug’s transience and irreality, signaled by the note. While he is somewhat 
aware of the fact that something is different, and that he may be on drugs, 
then, nothing more than this may be confirmed.
If Spinoza’s worm might, even for a fleeting moment, come to know the 
fictionality of its myopic perception of blood, this would not mean that the 
same worm could immediately then deny to itself his earlier experience of 
blood altogether. It could not, in other words, as a result of this realisation 
alone, transform into a higher species—into an enlightened creature that 
can access both the “worm world” and the higher world in which a worm 
knows its own previously ignorant perspective. To do as much would be to 
evolve—or to transmutate—from a worm to another species: for what had 
defined the worm was its ignorance of the blood as such. It is, then, a ques-
tion of evolutionary taxonomy, and the potential of the human (or worm). 
And, as we see in Stigmata, it is in the knowledge of the possibility of the 
layout world’s artifice—its illusoriness—that Regan elects to increase the 
drug’s valency. That is, it is at the precise moment that Regan discovers that 
he may be more than Walt that he then desires to even more fully experience 
the jouissance of his split subjectivity. 
Regan, that is, begins to take pleasure in the very dehiscence that splices 
him in two; when he realises that he is at once both Sam Regan and Walt 
Essex, he momentarily dwells on the insight, perhpas recognising it as an 
hallucination. But what prevents Regan from truly understanding the nature 
of this schism is the bind in which—just as Huxley feels in limbo and “be-
72 See Paul Williams, Only Apparently Real: The World of Philip K. Dick (New York: Arbor 
House Publishing Company, 1986), 4-5, 66-71.
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tween two worlds”—he is also neither of these identities completely, but both 
of them at once and forevermore. Rather than realising, for instance, that 
he is in fact Sam Regan and not Walt Essex, Regan is permitted here only to 
realise that he is a singular figure who is yet split: he discovers that in reality 
he is not Sam Regan at all, but Walt-and-Sam at once.
What Stigmata reveals, then, is the chimerical procession of what Jacques 
Alain-Miller, after Lacan, famously called “the suture.” As Alain-Miller 
indicates, this word “names the relation of the subject to the chain of its 
discourse,” and describes “the element which is lacking” in the economy 
between subject and language. In the diegesis of Stigmata, the suture func-
tions as a “stand-in” for what otherwise should appear as an obvious lacu-
na in Can-D’s “translation” narrative. 73 Even having seen the handwritten 
note, for instance, Regan is precluded from appreciating the illusion of the 
layout world. This is because he is still unable to grasp the illusoriness of 
the apparent proposition that he is Walt Essex, that he lives in 1950s San 
Francisco, and that “his shirts come from Italy, and his shoes were made in 
England” (TSPE, 50). Regan, moreover, is prevented from remembering the 
“other world” in which he is only Sam Regan. 
If the “dreary colonists’s hovel” exists at all, then, it is only ever “remote 
and vitiated and not convincing” in Regan’s mind (TSPE, 51). Increasingly 
perplexed and even “a little depressed” at the sight of the note—an object 
whose irreducible excess and “pure presence” threatens to wreck his trip—
Sam hastily disposes of it, dropping it in a bathroom disposal chute, a hole or 
gap that now is metonymic of a portal or threshold between the two worlds. 
Having disposed of this trace of the “other world,” Regan will nonethe-
less obey it. In a way, Regan must now erase the memory and existence of the 
note; he must hastily supplement it, that is, by means of another technic—the 
vidphone. But to do so is also to authorise and confirm the note’s legitima-
cy. The vidphone is thus the “superior” device on which Sam, following the 
note’s instructions, he contacts Pat “pronto.” Substituting this new memory 
for the note, and for the note’s disappearance—even as he follows the note’s 
instructions—the vidphone conversation enables Regan to play his role as 
Walt convincingly, whose realness he expresses in a “tone as firm and full of 
conviction as possible” (TSPE, 52). But what operates as the crucible in which 
the Can-D narrative is sustained—while the Martian hovel, meanwhile, is 
73 Jacques-Alain Miller, “Suture (elements of the logic of the signifier),” tr. Jacqueline 
Rose, Screen 18, no. 4 (1977): 26. As Slavoj Žižek observes, this is what Deleuze alter-
natively calls the “floating signifier which is the disability of all finite thought.” See 
Žižek, Less Than Nothing (London: Verso, 2013), 585.
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screened out—is more than simply this substitution and repression of the 
note. Rather, in these operations—and throughout all of these affirmatory 
procedures—it is not Can-D itself but the “suture” that allows Sam to recog-
nise the schismatic rupture that has dissected his identity, the schism that 
distinguishes Walt from Sam. 
Of course, the suture allows for this rupture to reappear as a unity a 
“unicity”—even as it also enables Regan to screen this rupture out, to “mask 
over” the very same dehiscence that underpins it in reality. The procedure, 
interestingly, resmbles that which I addressed in chapters 2 and 3 when I 
historicised the developments in the theory of psychosis. There, it may be 
recalled, the polar affects of meloncholy and hyperexcitability were joined 
together in a unitary diagnosis—at first as circular madness, then as psy-
chosis, and finally as and bipolar disorder. Here, Regan enters into a kind 
of bipolar ontology: he has two identities, the one (Sam, in reality) asleep 
and slothful, the other (Walt) now hyper-excited. For Regan to recognise that 
both of these figures exists at once may thus represent his insight into his 
own disorder—albeit that this disorder is a chemically-induced one.
In his mobilisation of Lacanian theory, Slavoj Žižek argues that the su-
ture is responsible for “producing the effect of self-enclosure with no need 
for exterior.” In Stigmata, Can-D offers the grammar in which Regan comes 
to guarantee that his particular self-enclosure remains consistent and un-
impeachable. As a supplement, the suture also ensures that the virtualis-
ing layout, or the “biosociality” of this Perky Pat world, can remain intact; 
meanwhile, of course, the reality of the hovel—or what Žižek might call the 
“exterior”—can ever remain ablated, repressed, and forgotten. 74
But if Stigmata seeks to separate the Can-D experience from everyday life, 
then the indistinct vector that distinguishes the layout world from the hovel 
zone remains only marginally more fuzzy than that which divides Mars from 
Earth. After all, Earth is not entirely excluded or cordoned off from the delu-
sional order of simulacrum that is engendered by the process of translation; 
rather, this originary planet seems at times even less inured to the forces of 
biopolitical incursion predominant on Mars. Indeed, integral to the novel’s 
progression is the restructuration of Can-D’s biopolitical monopoly, which 
begins at about the novel’s halfway point—its volta. What has occurred on 
Mars now begins to infect the entire universe, including on Earth; for anoth-
74 Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 844. Paul Rabinow coined the term biosociality in reference 
to the formation of social identity through geneticised knowledges and practices: “Ar-
tificiality and Enlightenment: From Sociobiology to Biosociality,” in Essays on the An-
thropology of Politics (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1996), 91-111.
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er drug—an alternative to Can-D—now begins to affect everyone, including 
the proprietor of Can-D himself, Leo Bulero 
Dick’s novel thus comes to imagine an interplanetary drug regime, but 
not one that is simply divided between a first and second world. Rather, this 
regime is universalized and inescapable, a drug culture that pervades any 
and all possible worlds. With the emergence of another drug, the pervasive-
ness of what Philip Mirowski calls “pharma’s market” 75 will now become 
all the more totalising and unavoidable in this brave new Sol system of bio-
power. As I have suggested, this new regime arises from what emerges as a 
competing product to Can-D: a new drug named “Chew-Z.” 
Chew-Z is “discovered” by the novel’s eponymous character, Palmer El-
dritch. Having travelled to the edges of deep space—to the outer-regions of 
Proxima Centauri—Eldritch returns with a new deliriant compound, one 
that is derived from a new, hitherto unknown kind of “Titanian lichen.” And 
while it is a dangerous journy, Eldritch’s gambit has seemingly paid off. His 
drug inaugurates a market war with Bulero’s outfit, which is dismayed to dis-
cover that Eldritch’s organisation has begun to promote its more powerful 
preparation using a slogan that metonymically devalorises the religious and 
theological attributes of Can-D. This is the catchy phrase that euphemises 
Chew-Z’s disturbing effects, falsely representing them as the miracle of im-
mortality: “God promises eternal life. We Deliver It!” 
But Chew-Z will only deliver “eternal life” to its choosers in the form of 
terminal hallucinations; it will set in train, that is, only the continuous re-
appearance of three disturbingly robotic symbols, which together become 
the signifiers of Eldritch’s power to eternally haunt and torment the “choos-
er”: that is, Chew-Z’s user. These features in fact will appear in and on the 
chooser’s own body, as well as on the bodies of those around these choosers. 
So, whereas once Regan could not tell himself apart from Walt Essex, now 
choosers like Leo Bulero cannot tell themselves—or anyone—apart from 
Palmer Eldritch: Eldritch is everywhere, pervading and haunting all things 
in a collective hauntology. Constituted by his mechanical eyes, his robotic 
hand, and his steel jaw, Eldritch’s “three stigmata”—these recurring, hallu-
cinal symbols—perpetually reappear and resurface in this new psychoscape, 
the one that immerses the user in a nightmare of dissimulation. And if they 
were not already tragic enough, the effects of this nightmare now seem un-
erasable; they shall stretch into the future far as can possibly be foreseen. 
75 This is what Philip Mirowski nicknames the “Modern Globalized Regime” of Big Phar-
ma in Science Mart (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2011), chapter 5.
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These are the effects that are brought about by just one dose of Chew-Z; 
and, of course, the everlasting effects of the drug signal Dick’s prescient vision 
of the so-called “acid flashback” phenomenon—only eleven cases of which 
had been clinically reported in 1967, three years after Stigmata’s publication. 
But Dick’s illustration of Chew-Z’s effects also suggest Dick’s recognition of a 
darker and more phantasmatic semiotics of illusion, the basis of which had 
been gleaned from industrial history. 76 Unlike the seemingly unified and at-
avistic images of 1950s American life that are engendered by Can-D and the 
“synthetic P.P. Layouts,” Chew-Z’s imaginal realms feature a human—and 
a landscape—that is fully rebuilt, totally novel. Less a prelapsarian fanta-
sy than a sublime, futurological apparition, Chew-Z’s hallucinations thus 
thematise a world of increased mechanisation and phantasm. But it also 
thematises randomness, featuring the strange products of Palmer Eldritch’s 
mind: creatures named “glucks” (TSPE, 107), for instance. These creatures, as 
Eldrich explains to Leo Bulero,
showed you with absolute clarity that this is not a fantasy. They could actual-
ly have killed you. And if you died here that would be it. Not like Can-D is it? 
(TSPE, 102) 
Appearing and disappearing at random, both the glucks and Eldritch’s 
stigmata serve only to mark the starting point of what will later become, at 
least from the chooser’s perspective, the criss-crossing and coalescence of 
Eldritch’s reality and their own. 
As Chew-Z’s effects wear on, seem to wear off, and then return again, 
choosers, who now appear only as “phantasms” to non-users—as ghosts 
of humans that were once alive—witness the entire socius corrode. They 
watch, dismayed, as the social world collectively transforms into a singu-
lar and mechanised identity (TSPE, 142). It is an affective and notably visual 
experience that recalls what Deleuze and Guattari described as the schizo’s 
position: they are exiled from the social world, and yet dependent on it at the 
same time, perhaps most of all to affirm their own sentience.
As it turns out, then, there is no “path back” (TSPE, 233) from the de-
lusional world of Chew-Z. For once its choosers have crossed over into its 
76 This is now diagnostically described as HPPD or hallucinogen persisting perception 
disorder in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-5, 5th ed. (Wash-
ington: APP, 2013), 531 [292.89]. See Edward M. Brecher, Consumer Union Report on 
Licit and Illicit Drugs (Boston: Little Brown, 1972), 288. As Dick himself suggested in a 
1974 interview, “nobody at the time knew that LSD was going to produce flashbacks.” 
Arthur Byron Cover, “Interview with Philip K. Dick,” Vertex 1, no. 6 (1974): 96.
The Shock of Dysrecognition 366
psychoscopic borderlands, it is in this environment that they shall forever 
more remain. As Leo Bulero explains to Barney Mayerson,
“Where Eldritch has the advantage over everyone and anyone who’s consumed 
Chew-Z is that recovery from the drug is excessively retarded and gradual; it’s 
a series of levels, each progressively less an induced illusion and more com-
pounded of authentic reality. Sometimes the process takes years. This is why 
the UN belatedly banned it and turned against Eldritch; Hepburn Gilbert ini-
tially approved it because he honestly believed that it aided the user to pene-
trate to concrete reality, and then it became obvious to everyone who used it or 
witnessed it being used that it did exactly the—” 
 “Then I never recovered from my first dose.” 
 “Right; you never got back to clear-cut reality” (TSPE, 235).
Chew-Z facilitates not simply the totalisation of biopower, however; but rath-
er, before it is banned, it inaugurates a new, duopolistic economic regime. 
In this way it leverages and then supplements Can-D’s popularity, trading 
on the existing brand. And it is in fact in this way that the drug prompts 
the emergence of the Can-D/Chew-Z duopoly—the economic precondition or 
valency that presages the end of any hope in the novel for a “civilized... de-
ployment of biotechnology.” 77 Building on Baudrillard’s formulation of the 
duopoly and the symbolic exchange—a structure popularly emblematised 
in twentieth-century economic history by Coca-Cola and Pepsi’s apparent 
duopoly in the soft drink market—Brett Levinson observes how “biomedi-
cine and bioterrorism” are wont to converge under the load of such a dou-
bling. As Levinson argues, “the terrorist enemy or the enemy of the terrorist 
materialize as competitors for the same space of the bios,” initiating a “sim-
ulation of war” that is only ever a rendering of private economic and political 
capital for “both sides... a means to sustain [their] duopoly.” 78 
In Stigmata, the very proliferation of Chew-Z metonymises the ubiquitous 
nature of such a totalising desire, especially as this desire proliferates in a 
poorly regulated neoliberal marketplace—one that is undergirded in this 
case by a ruthless competition for biopower. To consider such a thematic 
requires Dick, however, to imagine a product that is universally desirable, 
to develop as a convincing metonym for the market forces themselves. And 
while Chew-Z is a remarkable tropism, such a universally desirable object 
will reach even dizzier heights in Dick’s 1969 novel Ubik. In this novel, what 
77 Levinson, “Biopolitics and Duopolies,” 74. Cf. Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and 
Death, tr. Iain Hamilton Grant (London: SAGE, 1993).
78 Levinson, “Duopolies,” 74-5.
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is uncategorically desired takes the form of an aerosol spray that—as the 
novel’s characters discover—functions to preserve those who are in “cold-
pac” life suspension. The purpose of this strange product, which is aptly 
named “Ubik” from “ubiquitous,” had until this point in history been largely 
unknown. 
In Marx’s idiom, Chew-Z and Ubik are thus universal equivalents: these 
are commodities that have the ability to represent or symbolise any other 
product and to represent any value. 79 Advertised in various ways and in a 
kaleidoscope of forms and solutions, Ubik is not just famous for its ability, 
as Rickels notes, to “contain or defer entropy.” Rather, it can also act like 
an anti-psychotic, suppressing the hallucinatory or compulsive fears of its 
consumer: 
One invisible puff-puff whisk of economically priced Ubik banishes compul-
sive obsessive fears that the entire world is turning into clotted milk, worn-
out tape recorders and obsolete iron-cage elevators, plus other, further, as-yet-
unglimpsed manifestations of decay (Ubik, 127).
Enhancing or supplementing the once preeminent human body—the body 
that already “suffers,” as Deluze and Guattari note, “from being organized 
[and] from not having some other sort of organization”—Ubik, just as much 
as Can-D and Chew-Z, offers a virtualisation of a “pure fluid in a free state, 
flowing without interruption, streaming over the surface of a full body.” 
These drugs or adjuvants, in their variously disturbing and exciting ways, 
thus reorganise and replace life with new abilities; and in doing so, they at 
once instantiate, and defer the satisfaction of, the death-instinct, promoting 
an endless life of social exclusion and political opression. 80 
The Transmolecularisation of Philip K. Dick
if stigmata’s illustration of an increasingly pharmacocentric could be histori-
cised, so as to be located in modern history, then the novel’s milieu might be 
seen against the emergence of a spate of new pharmaceutical drugs in Amer-
ica in the 1960s. This is the period in which what Nikolas Rose describes as 
the “molecularization” of life comes to a head; for it is in this second half of 
the twentieth century that, as I have already argued in previous chapters, an 
79 Peter Fitting, “‘Ubik’: The Deconstruction of Bourgeois SF,” Science Fiction Studies 2, 
no. 1 (1975): 50. 
80 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 6.
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increasingly medicalised and pharmacologised existence comes to be lived 
commonly throughout North America. The historical side-effects of this 
transition appear in such social infections as the “iatrogenic amphetamine 
epidemic” of the 1950s and ‘60s, among in a range of other forms. 81 
This period’s pharmaceutical revolution forms a recurrent topos in 
Dick’s novels—just as this escalating presence of molecular technologies 
also structure Dick’s life and career as a writer. Amphetamine in particular 
will become an intensely vital component of Dick’s life between 1963 and 
1965—a period that has been variously dubbed his “Masterpiece Years” or 
“family man period.” 82 Reflecting on these years more than ten years lat-
er, Dick would classify his writing career as having consisted at any time as 
one of either two kinds of writing; evincing in this description the all-en-
compassing logic of drugs—a logic that scaffolds and sutures the binary of 
drugged-up and drugless excursus—he reflected: “Ah, well my writing falls 
into two degrees, the writing done under the influence of drugs, and the 
writing done when not under the influence of drugs.” 83 
Yet even this distinction, which functions something like the binarism 
between Can-D and Chew-Z in Stigmata, is brittle and illusory, for when psy-
choactive substances do not transfuse Dick’s blood and brain, the breach 
is then sutured by a symbolic supplement: “But when I’m not under the in-
fluence of drugs I [then] write about drugs.” 84 The irremediable presence of 
drugs, then—be they in Dick’s body or his books—is predicated, he says, on 
the market demands that cramp his career as an sf author: since the “pay 
rates were so low,” he would remark in an interview, a prolixity of writing 
had to be scrivened. And when Dick was using stimulants, he reflected, he 
could “write so much.” A simple if not paranoid algorithm, Dick’s authorial 
logic limns less a careerist than a survivalist motto—one that also struc-
tures scholarly life: “publish or perish.” “Without amphetamines,” Dick 
reasoned, “I couldn’t have written so much.” 85 
But Dick’s economic or utilitarian account of his drug use only barely 
alludes to the immense personal pressure that the careworn author felt at 
81 See, for instance, Nicholas Rasmussen, “America’s First Amphetamine Epidemic 1929-
71: A Qualitative and Quantitative Retrospective with Implications for the Present,” 
American Journal of Public Health 98, no. 6 (2008): 974-85.
82 Nikolas Rose, “The Politics of Life Itself,” Theory, Culture, and Society 18, no. 6 (2001): 
1-30; and see Scott Timberg, “Philip K. Dick’s Masterpiece Years,” The New York Times 
(23 November, 2010).
83 Anton and Fuchs, “So I don’t write about Heroes,” 37-46.
84 Ibid. Emphasis mine.
85 Ibid.
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this time. Dick felt a deep, abiding obligation to provide for and honour his 
new family—an onus that was all the more difficult to discharge in the wake 
of Dick’s own traumatic childhood, which had been punctuated by the death 
of his twin sister Jane. Jane’s death, caused by malnutrition, had taken place 
just over a month after her birth. 86 While rarely expressed in his interviews 
or prose writing, Dick’s familal anxiety symptomatises in various events 
both in his life and fiction. 87 As a new father, Dick struggled to meet the 
demands of responsibly breadwinning enough money for his and Anne’s 
daughter Laura; but Dick also felt pressured to provide for the three children 
to whom he had become a surrogate father when he took the place of Anne’s 
deceased former husband, the respectable literary poet Richard Rubenstein. 
Suffering from what Anne describes as a “major inner conflict,” Dick fell into 
a general clinical depression in the 1963-5 period, a disorder for which he 
was prescribed a range of drugs, including “Sparene, Stelazine, Preludin, 
and amphetamine, and others.” 88 
But given that, of these numerous drugs, it was amphetamine that 
had been, as Nicolas Rasmussen notes, the “antidepressant of choice” for 
family doctors in the mid-1960s, Dick’s personal circumstances made him 
what would have been the typically invisible or unaccounted-for “drug-de-
pendent” subject of this period. After all, Dick’s circumstances involved a 
confluence of two difficult elements: first, his apparently anxiety-laden and 
neurotic desire to use stimulants in order to write as much as he could, and 
second, his increasingly depressed mood, one whose pathological legitima-
cy authorised his ingestion of more of these compounds. And this was Dick’s 
position precisely at a time when “amphetamines were still widely accepted 
as innocuous medications” by the medical establishment. 89 
Even as evidence began to demonstrate that amphetamines were, unlike 
caffeine, “truly addictive” drugs—and almost certain to produce psychosis 
if taken in high dosages—it was precisely because amphetamine improved 
86 On Jane’s death, see, for instance, Dick, The Exegesis, 520, asterisked note; Sutin, Di-
vine Invasions, 11-13.
87 As Dick would remark in his SF Eye interview, 
I was supporting, at one time, four children and a wife with very expensive tastes. 
Like she bought a jaguar and so forth. I just had to write and that is the only way I 
could do it. And, you know, I’d like to be able to say I could have done it without the 
amphetamines, but I’m not sure I could have done it without the amphetamines, to 
turn out that volume of writing.
 Anton and Fuchs, “So I don’t write about Heroes,” 37-46.
88 Anne Dick, The Search, 104. Preludin, or “phenmetrazine,” is a stimulant. 
89 Rasmussen, “America’s First Amphetamine Epidemic,” 977.
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compliance in mild depression that, as one University of California psychi-
atrist attested in 1965, many “Physicians often go back to the old stand-bys, 
amphetamine and amphetamine-barbiturate combinations.” 90 In a context 
in which many family doctors had been “afraid of using psychotherapy be-
cause they [did] not know how it works,” Dick was prescribed up to six 7.5 
milligram “pills” of methamphetamine (“semoxydrine hydrochloride”) per 
day—the “strongest dose” available. 91 
Dick himself had trusted the orders of a presumed physician at “East 
Oakland care” while he took this methamphetamine compound for a period 
of more than “seven years (or is it nine? My mind seem oddly fuzzy, some-
how).” But Dick’s trust for the prescribing doctor quickly dissipated when 
he realised just what it was that he had been taking. Dick had been amazed 
to discover “after all these years,” as he remarked, the “accompanying bro-
chure” that detailed the “side effects, etc. of the pill.” This was a brochure 
that had, on all previous occasions, been “snatched loose” by the druggist, 
but outlined the drug’s effects in a clearer way than Dick had ever before 
been advised:
One sentence under the subtitle HUMAN TOXICITY particularly made my de-
cade. It reads like this, gang: Overdoses, may, in addition, cause hallucina-
tions, delirium, peripheral vascular collapse and death. (Eeg, gak, wach, fug, 
gugh, whuh!) 92 
Operating as the indirect confession of Dick’s own “overdoses,” here Dick’s 
great realisation explains at least as much about Dick’s “oddly fuzzy” mind 
as it accounts for Stigmata’s biopolitical imaginary. If Chew-Z’s “HUMAN 
TOXICITY” remains unknown to its naïve “choosers”—at least until its ef-
90 Ronald R. Koegler, “Drugs, Neurosis and the Family Physician,” California Medicine 
102, no. 1 (1965): 5-8, 7. Also see Nicolas Rasmussen, On Speed: The Many Lives of Am-
phetamine (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 162; Rasmussen, “America’s 
First Amphetamine Epidemic,” 977; Young D. and W.B. Scoville, “Paranoid Psychoses 
in Narcolepsy and Possible Danger of Benzedrine Treatment,” Medical Clinics of North 
America 22 (1938): 637-46; J. Norman and J. Shea, “Acute Hallucinations as a Compli-
cation of Addiction to Amphetamine Sulfate,” New England Journal of Medicine 233 
(1945): 270–1; F.A. Freyhan, “Craving for Benzedrine,” Delaware State Medical Journal 
21 (1949): 151–6; P. Knapp, “Amphetamine and Addiction,” Journal of Nervous and 
Mental Disease 115 (1952): 406–32; A.H. Chapman, “Paranoid Psychosis Associated 
With Amphetamine Usage,” American Journal of Psychiatry 111 (1954): 43–5; Connell 
P.H., Amphetamine Psychosis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958).
91 Koegler, “Drugs, Neurosis and the Family Physician,” 7; Philip K. Dick to Terry and 
Carol Carr, , October 1964, quoted in Sutin, Divine Invasions, 119.
92 Philip K. Dick, October 1964 letter to Terry and Carol Carr, qtd. in Sutin, Divine Inva-
sions, 119.
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fects take hold—then the intoxicating upshot of Dick’s nearly decade-long 
Semoxydrine treatment had been even more covertly veiled and occulted than 
this, the effects of the drug remaining just as obscure to Dick as the effects of 
Chew-Z had been unknown to Bulero and the novel’s other choosers.
By the mid-1960s, the correlation between the use of stimulants and 
increased levels of subjective energy and euphoria had become common 
knowledge. But this amphetaminergic energy was of a kind that predisposed 
patients to an assiduous writing practice; it enabled those who wrote for a 
living, such as Dick, for instance, to enhance and improve their entire work 
lives. Dick, of course, had already known this much to be true: “I believed 
there was a direct connection between the amphetamines and the writing,” 
he had once explained. 93 Giving credence to the link between amphetamines 
and literary productivity, 1950s pharmaceutical advertisements had even 
encouraged potential users to “[r]elease the story for analysis,” promising—
through the use of injected methedrine (methamphetamine)—a “sponta-
neous free flow of speech” that would have appealed to any aspiring and 
resourceful author seeking a competitive advantage (see figure 7.7, below). 94
While it is now obvious that drugs like methamphetamine are prone to 
abuse, the medical understanding of physiological or behavioural addiction 
during this period had been far less sophisticated. It was, in fact, only slight-
ly more advanced in its day than the knowledge that the medical profession 
had of psychosis’s origins. It was not until the 1960s drew to a close that 
the serotonergic theory of psychosis’s origin—originally postulated by psy-
chiatrist Humphry Osmond in the 1950s during his LSD experiments—was 
abandoned in favour of the new dopaminergic theories. 
Arguing that an overdose of dopamine better presented as a “model 
psychosis”—at least for the purposes of psychiatric study—than the sero-
tonin model, psychiatrists realised that this model was clearly superior to 
those earlier models that found LSD to be a validated “psychotomimetic” 
(a psychosis-mimicking substance). It was in this context that psychiatrists 
increasingly postulated that, more than any other neurotransmitter, dopa-
mine lay at the origin of psychotic symptoms. 95 And relevantly, it is also pre-
93 Williams, “The True Stories of Philip K. Dick,” 46-7.
94 Ibid.
95 See, for instance, Humphry Osmond, “A Review of the Clinical Effects of the Psychot-
omimetic Agents,” Annals of the New York Academy of Science 66, no. 3 (1957): 418-34; 
Rasmussen, On Speed, 202-3; and Daria Peleg-Raibstein et al., “The Amphetamine Sen-
sitization Model of Schizophrenia: Relevance Beyond Psychotic Symptoms?” Psycho-
pharmacology 206 (2009): 603-21.
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cisely just such an amphetamine psychosis that, as Sutin suggests, may have 
produced the “visage of perfect evil” that Dick, just before writing Stigmata, 
would apprehend in the sky in 1963. 96 
Echoing the incident in which Dick’s father, Edgar, had donned a gas-
mask and caused terrific “anxiety” in his four-year-old son, the omnipotent 
Palmer Eldritch would always function as a reverberation of Dick’s father’s 
96 While it is difficult to know how to read them, Dick’s interview remarks of 1978 suggest 
that neither Stigmata nor this Eldritch vision was catalysed, as some critics have sug-
gested, by LSD. As Dick asserts, he had at that time only read of the visions caused by 
LSD in Aldous Huxley’s Doors Of Perception. See Joe Vitale, “An Interview with Ameri-
ca’s Most Brilliant Science-Fiction Writer,” The Aquarian (11 October 1978), reproduced 
in PKD Otaku 4 (2002): 7-11, available at www.philipkdickfans.com/resources/journals/
pkd-otaku/.
Figure 7.7 Both methamphetamine and amphetamine were mar-
keted for depression, including as a supplement to psychoanalysis. 
See Nicholas Rasmussen, On Speed, Figure 24, 148-9; American 
Journal of Psychiatry (June, 1952).
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presence; he is, in this way, an all-seeing and all-knowing face—one that 
had already been augured in Dick’s 1957 novel, Eye in the Sky. 97 As Dick later 
noted of the incident with his father: “His face would disappear,” and would 
turn him into something that was “not a human being at all.” 98 Having ap-
parently not used LSD at the time that he experienced this vision of his fa-
ther’s gas-masked face—a vision that overcame Dick as he walked en route 
to his writing hovel—it remains possible that the horrifying psychotrope, 
already inscribed on Dick’s memory, functioned for him both as a delusion 
and abreaction, at once the repressed vestige of the past and a new artifact 
of Dick’s increasingly amphetaminergic consciousness. 99
By 1971, Dick was able to recognise his dependence on amphetamines; 
and, when he called his mother, Dorothy, he finally confessed that he had 
become a drug addict. 100 The following day, Dick was admitted to Stanford 
University’s Hoover Pavilion Psychiatric Hospital; and it was here that he de-
cided—or realised—that he no longer needed amphetamines to write prolif-
ically. In 1977, Dick recalled feeling greatly relieved, being no longer subject 
to those desperate “economic pressures” that had led to his deep depression 
of the previous decade. 101 It had been a decade of deep and sustained acedia 
within a monastic writing workshop and even when he, like Melville’s Bartle-
by, had “preferred not to” write, he continued writing nonetheless, amelio-
rating the strain of this work with the aid of amphetamine. 
But Dick’s account of his time at the psychiatric hospital is also at least 
partly inexplicable. He was surprised, for instance, to hear the results of the 
medical exam that had been performed by Dr. Harry Bryan, the doctor who 
Dick would later describe as “the best psychiatrist [he] ever saw.” 102 Dr. Bryan 
had, according to Dick, 
discovered something odd about me... that when I took amphetamines... they 
never reached my brain!... The consensus, signed by the four doctors who’d ad-
97 See Dick, Eye in The Sky (New York: Ace Books, 1957).
98 Sutin, Divine Invasions, 14, 126-7.
99 Dick did, however, often express his excitement at LSD’s uses. In “Schizophrenia and 
The Book of Changes,” for instance, Dick notes that “LSD has made the discovery of 
[temporal distortion] available to everyone.”’ Sutin, ed. The Shifting Realities, 177. Dick 
had also been effusive at the prospect of “religious experience” being “scientifically 
studied” through LSD. See “Faith of Our Fathers,” 68-9. Also see Sutin, Divine Inva-
sions, 127, 141-42; Gregg Rickman, Philip K. Dick: The Last Testament (Long Island: The 
Valentine Press, 1985), 12, 58. 
100 Sutin, Divine Invasions, 175.
101 Anton and Werner, “So I don’t write about Heroes: An Interview with Philip K. Dick.”
102 Dick, The Exegesis, 21.
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ministered the physical and psychological tests, was that the amphetamines 
were not affecting me physically, they were not reaching the neural tissue, but 
they were being excreted through the detoxifying process of the liver. 103
Demonstrating that there was “nothing wrong with [him],” the physical and 
psychological exam brought Dick a long-awaited sense of relief and reassur-
ance: he was not, as it turned out, a drug addict—at least not neurologically. 
Yet this exam also generated more questions than answers. If the amphet-
amines had never been psychoactive—and had, in fact, never crossed the 
blood-brain barrier—then how and why had Dick been so compelled to use 
the amphetamines, and so habitually? How had he been apparently experi-
encing their effects for almost a decade? And what, now, could account for 
his visions, paranoia, and, most stunningly, his singularly prolific output? 
Suggesting no clear explanation to improve on the hypothesis that he had 
been “taking [the amphetamine pill] for a placebo effect of some kind,” 104 Dick 
fills in the gaps by postulating his own theory, his own suture. He attributes 
his drug use to his desire to apparel himself in a “protective coloration” that 
disguised him amid California’s drug subcultures: “Everybody else was tak-
ing some form of drugs,” he said, “and I wouldn’t have known how to behave 
if I didn’t have something to take.” 105 Following his physical exam in 1971, 
Dick’s newfound belief in the indeterminacy of drugs would be reworked and 
revamped in his later novels as their total unpredictability. 
In A Scanner Darkly, for instance, protagonist Bob Arctor faces a psychiat-
ric exam not unlike Dick’s own—only to discover a similar, although inverted, 
biomedical revelation. Informed that Substance D—the toxic drug that Arctor 
has used to infiltrate and surveil a group of suspects—has now done things to 
his brain that should “never happen” and “may be permanent,” Arctor pon-
ders his biological intervention as the cause of an “abnormal condition the 
body isn’t prepared for” (ASD, 218-19). 
In both his science fiction and life, then, Dick’s drugs become agents of 
dysrecognition whose value lies in their shocking signification of precisely 
that which is unknown and unknowable. By virtue of the kind of pharmako-
nicity that Derrida imputes both to speech-acts and to writing, the drug as a 
literary psychotrope becomes as “seductive” for Dick in the 1960s as it is had 
been terrifying at that time for the general public, and had been revelatory to 
103 Paul Williams, “The True Stories of Philip K. Dick,” 46-7. Cf. Daniel DePerez, “An Inter-
view with Philip K. Dick,” Science Fiction Review 19, no. 5 (1976): 6-15.
104 De Perez, “An Interview with Philip K. Dick,” 8-9.
105 Williams, “The True Stories of Philip K. Dick,” 47.
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his readers. Both then as now, Dick’s drugs provide exemplary allegories for 
Derrida’s interminably “undecidable” phenomenonology; the drug produces 
both real and literary disorientations through its myriad “detours of a signifier 
foreign to it.” 106 
Perpetually standing in for institutional operations or signifiers that are 
extrinsic to its own effects—religion, market capital, and even the communi-
ty or socius in which drug use is normalised, proscribed or enforced—drugs 
like Can-D and Chew-Z enigmatically disappear into their contexts so that, as 
Ronnell notes, simply “being-on-drugs indicates that a structure is already in 
place, [even] prior to the production of the materiality we call drugs.” 107
If the precise contours of the structure that scaffolds the invisible neuro-
logical operations of drugs could be made visible, then they might be more 
clearly understood; they might be revealed, in fact, to have had their own 
indeterminacy or unknowability exploited by others—by those who know 
not all, but something more, than the population about them. Drugs would 
be shown to have been colonised and co-opted by those who produce and 
purvey them, now deployed by a governmentality for purposes unknowable 
to the end user, and by a government that depends on its biopower for its 
continued control. Regulated, reappropriated, and revalued, drugs in Dick’s 
novels are revealed to be distributed by just such a force. They are no more 
controlled by the state as agents of a late-capitalist economic power than 
they are enshrouded by private actors in the enigma of their indeterminate 
and invisible production. Highly controlled lest any drug should be used as 
an end in and of itself—or discovered to be something other than what their 
purveyors suggest they are—drugs, like those in the biopolitical state in Stig-
mata, and as in other of Dick’s science fictions, bring into incisive relief the 
shocking reality of psychopharmacological experimentation in the global-
ised twentieth-century.
Unlike any of the chapters before this one, this final chapter has exam-
ined the way in which literary science fiction may serve as a grand allegori-
sation for biopolitical control and power—especially in relation to drugs. 
And while it has extended on the work of the first part of the thesis, it has 
also, much like the psychobiographical chapters on Huxley, examined Dick’s 
biographical history in order to better explain the author’s relation to am-
phetamines, psychosis, and the human body.
106 Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 76.
107 Ronell, Crack Wars, 33.
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Conclusion
Aldous’s Atropine Eyedrops 
and The (St)Art of Seeing
some twenty years before the publication of Norman Yoder’s fabricated sto-
ry of the six LSD-using students who were blinded by sun-gazing—a story 
recounted in this thesis’s introduction—Huxley himself would experiment 
with what he called “sunning the eyes.” 1 In 1939, Huxley, who was now for-
ty-five years of age and recently settled in America, adopted this practice 
after having sought assistance for what he, dismayed, had discovered was 
his “steadily and quite rapidly failing” eyesight. Desperate, Huxley met with 
Margaret Corbett, a teacher at the School of Eye Education in Los Angeles. 
This was a school that Corbett had founded herself, and which lay not too far 
from Aldous and Laura’s Hollywood home. 2 
It was at this school that Huxley learned the “Bates Method”: a relatively 
controversial alternative therapy proposed by William A. Bates in his study of 
vision, The Cure of Imperfect Sight By Treatment Without Glasses (1920). As one 
of Bates’s most faithful disciples, Corbett demonstrated to Huxley the vari-
ous ways in which Bates’s techniques could be used to treat visual dysfunc-
tion through the “reeducation” of the mental and visual senses. 3 It would be 
from among this range of sensorimotor techniques that Huxley would learn 
to do precisely what Yoder later sought to caution about: to expose one’s eyes 
directly to sunlight. 4 Having experienced significant improvement immedi-
ately upon adopting this and other of Bates’s techniques, Huxley promptly 
disposed of his eyeglasses. Within two years, when he wrote his Art of Seeing 
(1942), Huxley would promote the technique to his readers: “Those who have 
1  Aldous Huxley, The Art of Seeing (London: Chatto & Windus, 1974), 1.
2  See Bedford, Aldous Huxley, 1: 373-5; Dunaway, Huxley in Hollywood, 133; Murray, Ald-
ous Huxley, 319.
3  See William Bates, The Cure of Imperfect Sight By Treatment Without Glasses (New York: 
Central Fixation Publishing Company, 1920).
4  In addition to his 1920 book, William Bates also published a magazine, Better Eyesight, 
between 1919—1930. The theory that imagining “blackness” was therapeutic was, ac-
cording to Huxley, modified by Bates toward the end of his life, when he instead in-
structed his followers to remember “pleasant scenes and incidents out of [their] own 
personal history.” See AOS, 23. 
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the sense to sun their eyes wisely,” he claimed, perform a ritual that will 
“certainly do them good” (AOS, 65). 5 6
Like his experiments with hypnotism and his subscription to the Alexan-
der Technique, Huxley’s adoption of Bates’s methods speaks not only to his 
serious interest in alternative medicine, but of what would become his in-
creasingly mystical intuition and faith in the “psycho-physical instrument.” 
For Huxley, these methods represented, as he wrote in a letter of 1942, no 
less than the
possibility, on the physiological plane, of a complete reconditioning analo-
gous to that which takes place through the techniques of mysticism on the 
psychological and mystical planes. 7
But it is also possible that even these methods had an antecedent: a prac-
tice whose description is neither quite as mystical nor as instinctive as these 
“complete reconditioning[s].” This was an altogether more molecular than 
physiological technique that, while discussed in detail in Bates’s book, had 
been known to Huxley long before he had encountered either Bates’s or Al-
exander’s names. And while none of Huxley’s biographies appears to provide 
a source for Huxley’s knowledge of this method, it is certain that Huxley, at 
least by 1914, had begun using it. 8 
The method consisted of Huxley’s application of an atropine solution to 
his eyes, which, as it bathed and diluted them, enabled the eye muscles to 
relax. This allowed Huxley to “see round,” as he writes in The Art of Seeing, “a 
heavy patch of opacity at the centre of the cornea” (AOS, 8). What is fascinat-
ing, however, is that Huxley’s atropine eye solution—at least if administered 
in a high enough dosage—is also an extremely powerful psychoactive alka-
loid, a substance that is known to produce “profound mental changes” in 
those who are exposed to it. 9 A naturally occurring tropane alkaloid found 
5 Valentine Basnayake, “‘Fifty per cent terrific! Fifty per cent non-existent’: Aldous Hux-
ley and Medicine,” Ceylon Medical Journal 49, no. 4 (2004): 142-4, esp. 142.
6 A more recent assessments of Bates’ “refractive” method appears in a report of 
the American Academy of Ophthalmology: Jennifer K. Harris et al., “Complemen-
tary Therapy Assessment Visual Training for Refractive Errors,” August 2013, ac-
cessed 13 November 2013, http://one.aao.org/Assets/9ddadf62-c784-4a58-9193-
bc404272fe2c/635121685199770000/visual-training-for-refractive-errors-2013-pdf. Also 
see H.R. Hildreth, W.H. Meinberg, et al., “The Effect of Visual Training on Existing 
Myopia,” American Journal of Ophthalmology 30 (1947): 1563-76. 
7 Huxley to Miss Hepworth and Mr. Green (Letter 458) in Letters, ed. Smith, 473-4.
8 Bedford offers the most detailed account: Aldous Huxley, 1: 43.
9 See for instance, E.K. Perry, R.H. Perry, “Acetylcholine and Hallucinations: Disease-Re-
lated Compared to Drug-Induced Alterations in Human Consciousness,” Brain and 
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in plants in the Solanacea family (including the atropa belladonna or deadly 
nightshade, the Datura stramonium, the mandrake, and others, all of which 
are extremely toxic), atropine is generally classified as a hallucinogen in the 
“deliriant” or anticholinergic class. Just as much as any plants that contains 
the alkaloid, atropine liquid is generally known to be capable of causing in-
credibly powerful hallucinations and delusions, as well as “confusion and 
hallucinosis without recall.” 10 Long of interest to historians of ancient folk-
loric practices and mythology, atropine and other deliriants has often asso-
ciated with the apocryphal “flying ointments,” which—along with opium— 
enabled witches to “fly,” or rather to induce a sensation of flight. 11 In small 
quantities, and when delivered to the eye, the drug acts as antimuscarinic, 
blocking the pulsation or transmission of certain receptors in the muscles 
of the eye that serve to constrict pupil size, and allowing the muscles to relax 
and lay dormant rather than strain. 12 
The question of whether Huxley had ever himself sensed the hallucinal 
effects of the drug—or whether he had known of the possibility of these ef-
fects—must remain a speculative and an unanswered one. Of course, this is 
not idle speculation, for there have been a number of cases in which opthal-
mological use of atropine as eyedrops has caused serious hallucinosis, such 
as in one case where “13 children who (presumably in error) received 13 mg 
of atropine in the form of eyedrops, all became delirious but... survived.” 13 
Cognition 28, (1995): 240-258. Even in the foreword to Albert Schweitzer’s book on the 
possibility of diagnosing the historical Jesus Christ with psychopathy (an elaboration 
on Schweitzer’s PhD thesis), the author underscores the possibility of developing “hal-
lucinations from relatively small dosages of therapeutic drugs, such as atropine.” See 
Schweitzer, The Psychiatric Study of Jesus, tr. Charles R. Joy (Boston: The Beacon Press, 
1948), 14. 
10 See, for instance, Peter Brawley and James C. Duffield, “The Pharmacology of Halluci-
nogens,” Pharmacological Reviews 24, no. 1 (1972): 31-66, esp. 33,
11 On witches’ “flying ointments,” see Michael J. Harner, “The Role of Hallucinogenic 
Plants in European Witchcraft,” in Hallucinogens and Shamanism, ed. Michael J. Har-
ner (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Francis King, Sexuality, Magic, and Per-
version (London: Neville Spearman, 1971), 63, 68. For another discussion of atropine 
induced flight, also see Carlos Castaneda, The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of 
Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 131-6, 203-4. 
12 See, for instance, Albert Hofmann, Richard Evans Schultes, Plants of the Gods: Origins 
of Hallucinogenic Use (New York: Van der Marck Editions, 1987), 88. 
13 James S. Ketchum, Chemical Warfare Secrets Almost Forgotten: A Personal Story of Med-
ical Testing of Army Volunteers with Incapacitating Chemical Agents During the Cold War 
(1955-1975) (California: Chem Books, 2006), 322. Also see Henry G. Mortona, “Atropine 
intoxication: Its Manifestations in Infants and Children,” Journal of Pediatrics 14, no. 
6 (1939): 755-760; Burçin Sanlıdağ, Okşan Derinöz, and Nagehan A. Yıldız, “A Case of 
Pediatric Age Anticholinergic Intoxication due to Accidental Datura Stramonium In-
gestion Admitting with Visual Hallucination,” The Turkish Journal of Pediatrics 56, no. 
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In a more recent and better documented emergency case, the authors not-
ed that, while uncommon, the patient’s “anticholinergic toxicity” had been 
caused by “opthalmologic atropine.” And while here the patient’s symptoms 
consisted of acute “visual hallucinosis,” the emergency staff concluded that 
these hallucinations were “likely to resolve within days of discontinuing the 
offending agent.” 14 When in 1916, Huxley had requested, by letter, that his 
father Leonard forward him his package of atropine, he would—by asking 
his father to help him heal his eyes—figuratively invert the scenario in which 
Oedipus wrests the golden brooches from his mother’s gown, and dares to 
perform that vicious self-enucleation. 15 However, Huxley’s request would also 
form a prefiguration of the scene in which, on his deathbed, he would also 
seek his final dosage of “moksha-medicine” from Laura, his adoring wife. 16 
And yet, despite these figurations and prefigurations, none of Huxley’s 
remarks indicates that he had been aware of atropine’s potential to induce 
hallucinations. Indeed, to pose such a question is to speculate—as this the-
sis has done throughout its pages—on the possibility that Huxley had, with-
out even having realised it, already communicated with an other, alterity, or 
psycotogen within the body or brain—even at an early age. It is to suggest 
that Huxley would have already developed an instinctive or intuitive under-
standing of the “otherness” and the potential of psychoactive scrivening in 
his adolescent years. And if the worst that such a speculation as this can do 
is to generate propositions of the kind just articulated—postulations whose 
truth, at least at this point in history, can be neither confirmed nor entirely 
dismissed—then it is toward such a work of speculation that pharmacogra-
phy aspires, and in pursuit of such a truth that studies of narcoliterature, 
such as this one, will proceed.
Huxley would never have been one to dismiss such a speculation, anyway. 
His experiments at the borderlines of medicine testify to his radical open-
ness to just such possibilities as these. For in addition to hypnosis, the Bates 
Method and other unorthodox techniques, Huxley also adopted, at least 
for a short time, and often for specific ailments—the practices of dianetics, 
acupuncture, and “E-medicine” (a variety of meditation treatment). 17 But the 
3 (2014): 313-15.
14 Andrew G. Bishop and John M. Tallon, “Anticholinergic Visual Hallucinosis from Atro-
pine Eye Drops: Case Report A,” Canadian Journal of Emergency Medicine 1, no. 2 (1999): 
115-6.
15 See my chapter 6.
16 See Huxley to Leonard Huxley (Letters 100 and 102) in Letters, ed. Smith, 113-6.
17 Basnayake, “‘Fifty per cent terrific! Fifty per cent non-existent,” 142.
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ubiquity and authority of orthodox medicine often attenuated Huxley’s pub-
lic influence. When, for instance, Julian Huxley, having been impressed at 
Huxley’s success using the Bates Method, mentioned the practice in a public 
address of 1941, it prompted one listener, Dr. Parness, to write to the Brit-
ish Journal of Medicine with his concerns. 18 Apparently scant on detail and 
perhaps too suggestive for its orthodox audience, Huxley’s speech had led 
Parness to ask whether Bates’s method had been “approved by the leading 
ophthalmologists.” 19 In a substantial annotation, the editor of the journal 
offered a measured response to Parness’s concerns, suggesting that “before 
condemning [the] practice, it would be as well to examine the evidence in 
support of it.” 20 But what is most interesting is the annotator’s discussion of 
Bates’s claim about atropine:
... it should be added that this is only an incidental observation; but that phar-
macologists err in believing that atropine acts only on unstriped muscle is 
part of [Bates’] general argument, for Bates found that this drug will paralyse 
the extrinsic muscles which produce accommodation. One experiment... ap-
pears to show that the dead fish still has a living mind; its brain is pithed to 
induce relaxation. The treatment based on these revolutionary observations 
aims at mental relaxation, and the pithed fish appears to be its prototype. 21
While it was not until Huxley had already finished his The Art of Seeing that 
he had seen this annotation (at which he point he included it in the book as 
an appendix), there can be no doubt that Huxley had read of the experiment 
in Bates’s Cure of Imperfect Sight himself. 22 Huxley had already suggested, for 
instance, that the production of mental relaxation through such techniques 
as “sunning,” could be “propitious... not only for memory, but also for vision” 
(AOS, 104). But nowhere in The Art of Seeing does Huxley describe atropine or 
its beneficial effects—other than in the book’s preface, where he indicates 
not its benefits, but only notes that he had used it as a child (AOS, 8). 
18 Huxley had conveyed to Julian a detailed summary of the “empirical facts” of his own 
case of improvement in a letter of 30 July 1939: Huxley to Julian Huxley (Letter 431) in 
Letters, ed. Smith, 441-3. 
19 J. Parness, “Remedy for Defective Sight,” British Medical Journal 2, no. 4210 (September 
13, 1941): 389.
20 “Perfect Sight Without Glasses,” British Medical Journal 2, no. 4210 (September 13, 
1941): 383.
21 Ibid.
22 This appendix (“Appendix I”) is not reproduced in the Creative Arts Book Company’s 
1982 publication, which this thesis cites. It appears, however, in seemingly all the ver-
sions published by Chatto & Windus, including the first edition of 1942, 74-6.
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Given that Huxley—a candid and, like TH, “passionately honest” think-
er—did not, neither in his correspondence, nor in essays or fiction, describe 
anything other than his ordinary usage of atropine, it perhaps seems likely 
that, had Huxley ever experienced an altered state of consciousness while 
using the drug, he had himself remained unaware of it. But this conclu-
sion, as with this thesis more generally, is less concerned with proving that 
Huxley had already encountered an altered state in his youth (or during his 
Cambridge year), than with proposing the means by which Huxley, like Dick, 
came to view medicine and the body as two sites that are as much liable 
to philosophical expression and literary speculation as they are the “proper 
studies” of positivistic and scientific inquiry.
Huxley’s complete indifference to the “correctness” of his adoption of 
the Bates Method, for instance, suggests the gravamen of his epistemology 
of openness:
Whether Dr. Bates was right or wrong in his rejection of the Helmholtz theory 
of accommodation, I am entirely unqualified to say. My own guess, after read-
ing the evidence, would be that both the extrinsic muscles and the lens play 
their part in accommodation. This guess may be correct; or it may be incor-
rect. I do not greatly care. For my concern is not with the anatomical mech-
anism of accommodation, but with the art of seeing—and the art of seeing 
does not stand or fall with any particular physio-logical hypothesis...  23
For Huxley as for Dick, then, pathology and the art of medicine (the tekhne 
iatrike) function as trustworthy indices of truth only when they may also be 
artfully and flexibly apprehended or reappropriated by their students and 
patients. To reflect upon and conceive of the body and the brain’s physical 
condition is not simply to reflect upon one’s health, then, which is to diag-
nose or pathologise the body. It is rather to infinitely conceive of the very 
possibility of the body and brain’s infinite potential to be interpreted either 
as good or bad, positive or negative, well or ill, right or wrong. 
That is, the art of medicine for both these writers involves a recursive, 
continuous, and endless adaptation to the body and brain’s every movement 
in a “following” that represents a lifelong manipulation and refinement of 
the manner in which this very process proceeds. It is in precisely this artful-
ly chiasmic and pharmakonic mode that Huxley and Dick conceive of their 
psychotropes, producing in their compositions, and scrivening in their nar-
ratives, the very potentiality of their having intuited a sovereign power—an 
23  Ibid. 7-8.
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external or internal agent, a commanding other—whose presence cannot 
simply be rejected or accepted, nor even mimicked, but must methectically 
be adopted as an interlocutor. Their writing serves as a grand allegorisation 
of this ontological inquiry, this quest in which a “being” is found, one with 
whom a the writer must henceforth participate in what may be either peril-
ous experiment or joint discovery.
There are, of course, ample allegories for this formulation of psychopo-
litical and psychotropic reappropriation that this thesis has not addressed, 
including many that have not been written by Huxley and Dick. Then again, 
there are many works by Huxley and Dick, also of interest in this respect, that 
this thesis has not studied. Dick’s well-known 2-3-74 experience, for instance, 
allows us to recognise the way in which the methectic incorporation of an 
“other”—of some molecular alterity or different form of external agent—can 
usher in overwhelming and life-changing effects. 
In précis, Dick’s story is as follows: while undergoing dental surgery on 
an impacted wisdom tooth, the author had been given sodium pentothol to 
relieve the pain. Some hours later, once he had arrived at his home, Dick an-
swered the front door to a “pharmacy delivery-girl bearing a painkiller and 
wearing a gold necklace depicting a fish” (ex, xiv). Suddenly apprehending a 
pink beam in the sky—one that seemed to emanate from the young woman’s 
fish necklace—Dick experienced what he called an “anamnesis”: a “discor-
porating slippage into a vast and total knowledge that he would spend the 
rest of his life explicating, or exegeting” (ex, xiv). While this event represents 
the quizzical moment in which Dick’s medicine—his sorely yearned-for 
drug—finally arrives, much to his excitement, it is notable that Dick’s glee 
was perhaps only amplified by the psychoactive effects of the sodium pen-
tothal that had already been cascading throughout his brain receptors. and 
yet, this excitement also does something else to Dick. This vision, that is, 
also brings to ahead a particularly kairotic instant for him, producing a new, 
gnostic vision of the world. In this way, the vision echoes the many instants 
of metanoia that had also so struck Huxley, such as that he experience when 
he first used mescaline. 
In these moments, both authors, for the first time, are able to concep-
tualise of the history of symbols and “psychotropes” in a new way. Whether 
for good and bad, such experiences produce new ways of seeing—not simply 
of seeing the physical world, however, but the literary and symbolic world 
within which so many mythical and political figurations of the self already 
exist—within which, that is, so many psychotropes already tussle and vie for 
dominance. 
Conclusion 383
It is thus a “molecular awareness” that these authors nurture, attend to, 
and scriven. Artfully and contemplatively seeing their organism’s every at-
omistic modulation, Huxley and Dick’s narcoliteratures constitute so many 
symphonic elaborations of what today remains enigmatic and unelaborated 
in the mental, biological, and physical sciences. To suggest that the psycho-
tropes produced not only by these authors but by those others to which this 
thesis has referred—Leary, Michaux, Artaud, and even Deleuze and Guat-
tari—might profit from further investigation, then, is to express only the 
most obvious point. 
What is perhaps a less apparent point than this—but a notion that this 
thesis has sought to propound, time and again—is that these speculative 
and molecular narratives form a narcoliterature so enigmatic—and yet so 
proximate to and apparent in our human world—that its importance to lit-
erary scholarship is only the beginning of its value. For, as I have argued 
throughout this thesis’s pages, this genre’s value as literature is at the very 
least matched by its centrality in our future political and genealogical world. 
It is essential for further developing, that is—and perhaps even for achiev-
ing—a new, and truer science of the nonhuman; and it will be indispensable 
for apprehending a truer—and perhaps even a truly nonhuman—form of 
science.
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